DEMOCRACY 

AND THE 

EASTERN QUESTION 



DEMOCRACY 

AND THE 

EASTERN QUESTION 

THE PROBLEM OF THE FAR EAST AS DEMON- 
STRATED BY THE GREAT WAR, AND ITS RE- 
LATION TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 



BY ^,^- ^^^^' 

THOMAS F.'klLLARD 

Author of "Our Eastern Question," "The New 

Far East," "America and the Far 

Eastern Question," etc. 




NEW YORK 

THE CENTURY CO. 

1919 






Copyright, 1919, by 
The Century Co. 



Published, May, 1919 



m ^7 i9i9 

©CI.A5 15673 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTEB PAGE 

I The Issue 3 

The problem as posed in the East — The issue the same as in Europe 
—Militarism versus democracy — Hopes of the democratic peoples of 
Asia — Causes of war in the far East — Dr. Charles Eliot's report — Dan- 
gerous tendencies — Protagonists of the new order — Viscount Grey on a 
league of nations — Relation of the Eastern question to a league — 
The opposing theory — Marquis Okuma on diplomacy — Craft and secrecy- 
its requisites — Okuma and Bernhardi — Japan and the question of alli- 
ances — Japan and the spoils of war — Dr. Nitobe's opinions — The Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance — Its relation to a league of nations — Proposed by 
Germany — Reasons for the alliance analyzed — Alliances and the causes 
of war-^The war cloud in the far East — Need for measures to prevent 
war — The problem and the United States — Essence of the problem. 

II The Real Character op Japan 16 

Creation of modern Japan — Myth and fable — The parallel with mod- 
ern Germany — The cult of emperor divinity — Invention of a new religion 
— Japan's historical background — Bushido a recent fabrication — Divine 
origin of the Japanese nation — The military autocracy — A replica of 
Prussianism — Why Japan has mystified the West — Japanese language a 
screen — Evolution of Japanese view of the West — Foreign patronage now 
resented — Exclusion of "dangerous thoughts" from Japan — American 
Constitution in that category — A striking incident — Dilemma of Chris- 
tianity in Japan — Trying to reconcile it with emperor divinity — Japan's 
constitutional forms — Throne not responsible to people — All rights rest 
in throne — Japan and democracy — Liberal ideas not tolerated — A theo- 
cratic state — "The Government and industry — Japan's eificiency — -State 
of administration in Japan — Government of Japan's dependencies — For- 
mosa and Korea — A Korean appeal — Status of foreigners in Japan — ^The 
so-called liberal elements — Downfall of the bureaucracy predicted — - 
Japan's foreign propaganda — Some illustrations — Japan after the war — 
Attitude toward feague of nations — Question of armaments — Time re- 
quired for reform. 

III Japan's Policy in the Great War 48 

A devious course — A policy of opportunism — How it was circum- 
scribed — Japan's rating of other nations — "Powers" and lesser nations 
— America not a "power" — Why Japan entered the war — Not so obli- 
gated by Anglo-Japanese Alliance — No quarrel with or hostility to 
Germany — Japan's forehandedness in declaring war — Her motives an- 
alyzed — Periods of Japan's war policy — Its various motivations — Gov- 
erned by expediency and opportunity — Lessons of the war — Making 
Japan's army and navy obsolete — How foreigners in the East view Japan 
— Destruction of former international standards — The anti-British agi- 
tation in Japan — Control of publicity by the Government — Secret diijlo- 
macy in wartime — The secret treaty with Russia — Putting pressure on 
her allies — Using the German entente possibility — Oblique methods — - 
The veto of events — Entrance of America in the war — The Russian rev- 
olution — A German-Russo-Japanese entente — Count Terauchi's views— ;- 
Baron Goto's opinions — Pro German sentiment in Japan — Japan's posi- 
tion at the peace conference — What she really wants — Fear of political 
and moral isolation — The question of Kiao-chou. 



vi CONTENTS 

CHAPTEB PAGE 

IV China and the War 84 

Sentiments of Chinese about the war — Apprehension of Japan — Ef- 
forts to preserve China's neutrality and territorial integritj' — ^The first 
proposal — ^Outline of the situation — China's rights and wishes disre- 
garded — Japan's ultimatum to Germany — China's sovereignty ignored — 
Great Britain's attitude — Position of the United States — Japan's over- 
running of Shantung — The next move — Japan's twenty-one demands — 
Her oblique course — The "Agreement" forced upon China — China's pro- 
test — Statement by the United States — Dilemma of the Chinese Govern- 
ment — China's first offer to join the Allies — Its discouraging reception 
— China's second ©O'er to join the Allies — Conditions of this offer — Plan 
blocked by Japan — Irritation of Japanese press — Japan's attitude de- 
fined. 

V China and the War — (Continued) 102 

China's position in 1916 — Chinese sentiment about the war — No tan- 
gible reason to fear Germany — Real fear of Japan — Suspicion of the 
Allies — The United States takes a hand — Influence of America at Peking 
— Invitation to China to sever relations with Germany — Diplomatic 
situation caused by this proposal — How the powers stood — The atti- 
tude of Japan — Sounded by Russia — -Some secret correspondence — 
What Japan wanted — British and French influence — Japan's oblique 
course — China's internal situation — The United States advises China — 
Questions raised by this action — Irritation of Japan— Misrepresenting 
the issue — Japan-American relations — Meaning of Root-Takahira agree- 
ment — Japan's anti-American propaganda in China — Some examples — 
The analogy of Korea — The Chinese point of view — Shifting of Japanese 
attitude — Advantages to China in declaring war — Effort to detach China 
from America — China declares war — Her action analyzed — New turn to 
events , 

VI China and the War — (Continued) 136 

Shift of Japan's diplomatic strategy — Efforts to establish special po- 
sition in respect to China — Analysis of the paramountcy and special 
position doctrine — Purpose of the Ishii mission to America — China dis- 
turbed by factional strife — The abortive monarchy revival — Return to 
power of Tuan Chijui — Financed by Japan — The loan question — Obsta- 
cles to American loans — The banking group method — Dangers of the old 
system — Ja7)an's violation of the group agreement — China's desire to 
participate in the war — Effort to obtain funds from America — Opposi- 
tion of Japan to China's participation — Reasons for this opposition — 
Japan versus the Western powers — A delicate question — Japan's plan to 
control China's military organization — Some confidential dPspatches; — 
The Lansing-Ishii Agreement — What it meant — Motives of the parties 
to it — Was Japan flirting with Germany ? — Text of the agreement. 

VII China and the War — (Concluded) .... 154 

The Lansing-Ishii Agreement — Its premature publication by Japan — 
Uneasiness caused by it — My letter to Mr. Lansing — Dangers of the in- 
cident — Might alienate both China and Japan — Had China been traded 
off? — Was the agreement a bribe to Japan? — Need to counteract first 
impressions — Japan violates the "gentlemen's agreement" — Agreement 
given publicity at Peking — Reason's for Japan's procedure — A difference 
of translations — What does "special interests" mean? — The American 
version — China repudiates the agreement — Cryptic character of the in- 
strument — Its effects in the far Ea^^t — Japanese propaganda and the 
agreement — Criticisms of a Chinese — The doctrine of territorial pro- 
pinquity — Its dangers — What was the American Government's object? 
—Further analysis of the agreement — Its legal aspects — Which is the 
correct intcriirotation ? — American interpretation probably the best- 
International psychology of the agreement — Possible motives of the 
United States — Putting world pressure on Japan — Japan's opportunity. 



CONTENTS vii 

CHAPTEB PAGE 

VIII The Corruption of a Nation ... . . 174 

Increase of Japan's influence in China — The revised Japanese policy — 
Its motives and methods — China's wish to participate in the v?ar — How 
it was defeated — American loan refused — Effects of this refusal — Cor- 
ruption of Chinese officials — Getting control of the Government — The 
War Participation Board — The military agreement — Advent of Nishi- 
hara — 'The orgy of loans — Japan's two-faced policy — Attitude of other 
powers — The rake's ])rogress — Sowing seeds of internal dissension — 
Japan in Shantung — Establishment of civil administration there — Pro- 
tests of the Chinese inhabitants — The question analysed — -Japan's objects 
revealed — Forced sale of Chinese lands — Fraudulent seizure of mines — 
Survey of Japanese "penetration" of Tsinan-fu — Brothels and drug shops 
— Where the money came from — Refastening the opium trade on China — 
Japan's illicit trade in morphia — -How the trade is conducted — Explana- 
tions of the Japanese Government — Exploiting the Chinese bandits. 



IX China and Economic Imperialism 221 

Definition of economic imperialism — Its relation to international af- 
fairs — Its working method — War-causing elements of the system — Its 
application to China — Beginning of foreign trade with China — Develop- 
ment of strategical jjhases — The "sphere of influence" idea — Dangerous 
phases — Prevision of John Hay — The Hay Doctrine — Its outward ac- 
ceptance by the powers — Private agreements based on the "sphere" 
thesis- — Recrudescence of the "sphere of influence" practice — Due to 
Japan's policy — War provided Japan's opportunity — Japan's fear of 
American influence — A flank movement — The Shibusawa plan — The "co- 
operation" idea — Its real purpose exposed — How it was contrary to 
traditional American policy — How it was invidious to China — China's 
situation — Dangers inherent with the cooperation plan. 



X China and Economic Imperialism — (Concluded) . 238 

Blindness of Americans to certain conditions— Applying lessons of the 
Great War — Relation of militarism to economic imperialism — Some as- 
pects of American trade in China — Effects of the "'hyphen" in foreign 
trade — Fallacy of the Shibusawa i)lan — A remarkable letter — Why Anjer- 
leans in China are anti-Jaiian — Japan and China contrasted — First and 
later impressions — Coordination of Japanese political and commercial 
methods — A strong arraignment of Japan — Her recent course in China 
indicted — How the Chinese are impressed — Seem.ing inconsistency of 
Allied professions and policy- — Implication of America's weakness — 
Japan's anti-Allied propaganda — The coming reaction — Japan's unpopu- 
larity with the Chinese — How it may affect post-war business — Japan's 
capital in China is force — The moral issue — Effects of the cooperation 
idea on American trade in China — Its military aspect. 



XI The Open-Door Policy . 256 

Definition of the open door — Talk with Viscount Motono— -China, 
Japan and America — Monroe Doctrine and Hay Doctrine comjiared — 
Their principles identical — The Japanese Monroe Doctrine for China 
— False analoi^ies — Causes for failure of the Hay Doctrine — Nullified by 
private agreements — Japan and the open door — Manchuria a test case 
- — Japan's discriminations there — Spy and police systems — Making it 
unpleasant for other foreigners — Influence over Chinese officials — Reac- 
tions from the Lansing-Ishii agreement — Jajianese interpretation ac- 
cepted — Si)ecial antagonism to Americans — Incidents showing Japanese 
contemjit for Europeans — Case of British woman missionary— Japan 
exercising sovereign authority — Summary of methods handicapping 
American trade in Manchuria and Shantung — The mail and shipping 
matters — Views of Aroterican organizations. 



viii CONTENTS 

OHAPTEE ^OO 

XII The Siberian Question 283 

Siberia and the Eastern question — Their close relation — Developments 
after Russia's collapse — Japan and intervention — The attitude of Rus- 
sians — The propaganda for intervention — Japan's sounding of the Allies 
— Attitude of France — Great Britain's attitude — Japan and Germany 
— Danger of a combination — The interests of China — The menace to 
China — Japan's proposal to intervene exclusively — Motives of Great 
Britain and France — Effort to obtain America's assent — A flood of 
propaganda — America's interest analyzed — Importance of protecting 
democratic peoples — Territorial proximity — The old diplomacy at work 
— Suspicion of Japan — Rejection of the one nation plan — Change of 
Japan's attitude — Conversion from asset to liability. 

XIII The Siberian Question — {Concluded) . . . 297 

Effects of the Russian Revolution — Its extension to the East — The 
position of Siberia — How it differed from Russia in Europe — China's 
close relation to the question — The Chinese Eastern Railway — Disorders 
in Manchuria — Political elements analyzed — Different motives — Japan's 
selfish policy — The German influence — Various Russian factions — Col- 
lapse of Russian authority in Manchuria — China forced to act — Japan's 
fear of America — A secret diplomatic note — Japan, Russia, and Ger- 
many — Japan seeking for advantage — Proposals to Russian groups — 
Backing different factions — Secret anti-American propaganda — Some 
examples of this — The American intervention plan — Japan and the 
Chinese Eastern Railway — Obstruction of the Allies — Rushing Japanese 
troops into Manchuria — Usurpation of China's prerogatives — The Man- 
chuli incident — Attitude of Japanese toward other allies — Incident at 
Changchun — The armistice and after. 

XIV The Solution 325 

Effects in China of the coUapse of Germany — The internal situation 
— Composition of the Government — Japan forcing her schemes — The 
armistice — Weakening of Japanese influence at Peking — Some causes 
of this — Injection of American ideals — President Wilson's prin- 
ciples — Their application to China — Work of American propaganda — 
Japan's plan to represent China at the peace conference — The scheme 
blocked — Uneasiness of Chinese — The Southern point of view — Further 
effort by Japan to intimidate China — Effort to prevent the publication 
of secret treaties — Outcome of that matter — Further advice of the Al- 
lied powers to China — Trying to end the civil strife — The conference at 
Shanghai — What shall be done for China? — The case of China sum- 
marized — Responsibility of America — The problem analyzed — Question 
of extraterritoriality — A plan for its gradual abolition — This plan con- 
sidered — The railway question — The question of loans and finance — 
New declaration of the American Government — Will China take the 
cure? — China's appeal to civilization, 

APPENDICES 

A The Hay Doctrine — Notes and Treaties Between the 
Powers Affirming the Commercial Principle of 
the "Open Door" and Declaring Their Intention 
to Respect the Independence and Territorial In- 
tegrity of China, and Separate Agreements 
Among the Powers Concerning, and Defining 
Their Respective "Spheres of Interest" and 
"Special Positions" in China 361 



CONTENTS ix 

PAGE 

B Japan's Diplomatic Demands on China in 1905, with 
the Original Secret Twenty-One Articles, the 
Eleven Articles Presented to the Powers Incor- 
rectly Representing Japan's Demands, the Re- 
vised Demands, the Chinese Government's Official 
Statement of the Negotiations, and the Agreement 
and Notes Which China Was Compelled to Sign . 373 

C Text of the Military Agreement 421 

D Memorial of the "Black Dragon" (Japanese) Society 

Concerning Japan's Policy in China .... 426 

E Extracts from "A Memorial for the Advancement 
of German Interests in China Issued by the Ger- 
man Association of Shanghai 432 

F Collection of Laws and Regulations of the Russian 

Government Published by the Ruling Senate. . 441 



FOREWORD 

This work is not presented as a non-partizan or an impartial 
discussion of the subject. It could not be that, for it embodies 
the deep convictions formed and accumulated in the course of 
years of close contact with the matters at issue, and the opin- 
ions which, I hope, shine through the presentation of the mate- 
rial were born in the process of "living with" the problem. 
Few foreigners that is, few Westerners could live in the far 
East during the last twenty years and still be impartial on the 
questions included in the position of China and her contacts 
with Japan. 

Some of the facts and much of the criticism presented in the 
following pages were suppressed or repressed during the Great 
War for reasons at times connected with the war politics of 
nations, and at times because of legal restraints upon their 
publication. That time of restricted publicity has passed with 
the need, or the fancied need for it, and foreign residents of 
China and Japan now feel that the truth, and nothing less 
than the whole truth, about these matters should be known to 
Western peoples. The design of this work, therefore, is to 
present the case as it appears to an overwhelming majority 
of foreign residents of the East. I have not encumbered the 
book by giving much of the contrary side of events and of the 
contrary arguments. As in the case of Germany and the re- 
sponsibility of the German military party for the Great War, 
the evidence is decisively preponderating, although in this case 
Japan, like Germany, can put in a more or less plausible de- 
fense. I leave that defense to the extensive Japanese propa- 
ganda in America and elsewhere. 

I have, whenever it served the subject and argument, chosen 



FOREWORD 

to include comments of my own that were published previously 
rather than to state the same matters again in slightly different 
language; and I also have preferred, when that has been ger- 
mane, to quote from other writers, from official reports and 
documents, and from the columns of newspapers, rather than 
to give my own views of the topics under discussion. In 
choosing the newspapers to quote I have whenever possible 
given preference to those of British nationality, because the 
British press in the far East scarcely can be accused of being 
incurably anti- Japan or of being under the influence of ' ' Ger- 
man propaganda." About Japanese affairs I have quoted 
from the two leading foreign papers published there — the 
"Japan Advertiser," an American owned and edited paper, 
and the ' ' Japan Chronicle, ' ' recognized as the principal Brit- 
ish organ. The ' ' Japan Chronicle ' ' especially, because of the 
long residence there of its editor and publisher, is recognized 
as carrying almost an authoritative weight ; and it, moreover, 
is pertinent that it is published under the severe regulations 
of the Japanese Government press censorship. 

The sources usually are given in conjunction with the quo- 
tations except in case of private reports and secret documents, 
when I have withheld names of the authors and where I ob- 
tained them. They are in all cases, however, authentic. I 
should like to recommend to those who may desire additional 
light on this subject the several books of the well-known Eng- 
lish writer, Lenox Simpson ("Putnam-Weale"), and the 
works of Professor Hornbeck, as giving recent accounts and 
criticisms of value. 

Thomas F. Millard 

New York, March 20, 1919. 



DEMOCRACY AND 
THE EASTERN QUESTION 



DEMOCRACY AND 
THE EASTERN QUESTION 



CHAPTER I 

THE ISSUE 

The problem as posed in the East — ^The issue the same as in Europe 
— Militarism versus democracy — Hopes of the democratic peoples of 
Asia — Causes of war in the far East — Dr. Charles Eliot's report — Dan- 
gerous tendencies — Protagonists of the new order — Viscoimt Grey on a 
league of nations — Relation of the Eastern question to a league — 
The opposing theory — Marquis Okuma on diplomacy — Craft and secrecy 
its requisites — Okuma and Bernhardi — Japan and the question of alli- 
ances — Japan and the spoils of war — Dr. Nitobe's opinions — The Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance — Its relation to a league of nations — Proposed by 
Germany — Reasons for the alliance analyzed — Alliances and the causes 
of war — The war cloud in the far East — Need for measures to prevent 
war — The problem and the United States — Essence of the problem, 

THE problem of the Great War and its aftermath as 
posed in the far East is identical in principle with 
the same problem elsewhere in the world. In Europe 
the issue is seen distinctly as a conflict of opposing theories 
of international polity, termed concisely militarism and de- 
mocracy. 

In Europe Germany is taken as the apotheosis of auto- 
cratic militarism, and contrasted with her, with a feeling 
of being marked for her impending assault or aggression, were 
nations that were weaker in the sense of being less readj'' 
and efficient for war because they are more democratic. In 
the far East Japan stands for autocracy and militarism, and 
China has the position of the weak and apprehensive democ- 

3 



4 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

racy. As the issue of militarism in Europe is not confined 
to Europe and cannot be confined there, but embraces the 
whole of civilization, so is the issue as posed in the far East 
equally embracing. 

This issue of militarism vers^ls democracy in recent times 
has been so extensively analyzed and commented on that all 
intelligent persons have some understanding of it and of its 
terminology. The discussion has resolved itself into terms 
and phrases standing for the opposing theories. Certain 
things are associated with certain other things, certain con- 
ditions are accompanied by certain other conditions, certain 
causes lead to certain effects. It is understood that the auto- 
cratic forms of government and militarism conform with and 
are indispensable to each other. Predatory imperialism also 
is indissolubly connected with autocracy and militarism. We 
have become familiar with the euphemisms which imperial- 
istic diplomacy has coined to describe its processes: "special 
position," "peaceful penetration," "paramount interests," 
"strategical requirements," "spheres of influence," "defen- 
sive frontiers," "buffer states," "strategical railways," 
"secret diplomacy," "economic nationalism," all these are 
from the lexicon of predatory imperialism, and have covered 
the earth. 

Opposed to the policies which these phrases express, a new 
lot of phrases have been coined: "rights of weaker nations," 
' ' self-determination of peoples, " " autonomy of races, " " open 
diplomacy. ' ' 

All of the old-school methods of world politics, and the 
practical applications of them, have been worked in the far 
East until the democratic and weaker nations there are sick 
nigh unto death of them, until the democratic peoples of the 
Asiatic world, comprising nearly half of the earth's popu- 
lation, are now listening with strained and painful expec- 
tation to the voices of the new day as expressed in the new 
slogans. 

Although the principles and the general conditions of 



THE ISSUE 5 

the issue of militarism versus democracy in the far East 
are the same as to type as the issue in Western countries, 
I shall, in trying to demonstrate Oriental aspects of the ques- 
tion, confine the discussion largely to utterances and ex- 
amples originating or applying specially to the East. Just 
before the outbreak of the Great War, Dr. Charles W. Eliot, 
president emeritus of Harvard University, made a visit to 
the far East to investigate and to report on conditions there 
as they effect peace and war. Dr. Eliot made an exhaustive 
report, from which I will quote : 

The Causes of War Have Changed 

Advocacy of these slow-acting means of preventing wars in the 
East implies that within the superintended areas the probable causes 
of international war have changed within fifty years. Dynastic and 
religious wars, and wars in support of despotic government are no 
longer probable; and racial antipathies are held in check by the 
superintending European powers in all the countries to which that 
superintendence extends. Thus, the Pax Britannica has practically 
put an end to the racial and religious warfare which from time to 
time dislocated the Asiatic countries over which British influence now 
extends. Small outbreaks of racial antipathy or religious fanaticism 
occur locally; but these are insignificant exceptions to the prevail- 
ing tranquillity. The fighting Great Britain has done to establish 
and maintain this quieting influence has been fighting on a small 
scale compared with that which went on among European nations 
during the nineteenth century, or among Oriental peoples in many 
earlier centuries, and the Pax Britannica has therefore been a great 
contribution to the peace of the world. 

It is not only in the East that the probable causes of international 
war have lately changed. All over the world, it is reasonable to 
suppose that wars for dynastic motives will occur no more, and 
that religious motives for warfare will hereafter be incidental or 
secondary instead of primary. It is also reasonable to believe 
that wars in support of absolute monarehs and despotic govern- 
ment will henceforth be unknown, so general is the worldwide 
movement towards constitutional government and free institutions — 
a movement from fifty to three hundred and fifty years old among 
the different nations of the West, but comparatively recent in the 
East. 



6 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

The Future Causes of War 

What, then, will be the probable causes of international war in 
the future? 

The causes of war in the future are likely to be national dis- 
trusts, dislikes, and apprehensions, which have been nursed in igno- 
rance, and fed on rumors, suspicions, and conjectures propagated by- 
unscrupulous newsmongers, until suddenly developed by some un- 
toward event into active hatred, or widespread alarm which easily 
passes into panic. While the Eastern peoples — far and near — will 
have some causes of their own for war, because in some instances 
neither their geographical limits nor their governmental institutions 
are as yet settled, among the Western peoples the most probable 
future causes of war, in addition to national antipathies, will be 
clashing commercial or industrial interests, contests for new markets 
and fresh opportunities for profitable investments of capital, and 
possibly, extensive migrations of laborers. All modern governments, 
in which life, liberty, and property are secured by public law, 
desire to extend the commerce and trade of their people, to develop 
their home industries by procuring markets for their products in 
foreign lands, to obtain in comparatively unoccupied or undevel- 
oped parts of the earth opportunities for the profitable employ- 
ment of their accumulated capital, and to gain room for a possible 
surplus of population in the future. Eastern and Western peoples 
alike feel the desire for a large, strong governmental unit, too for- 
midable to be attacked from Avitliout, too cohesive to be disintegrated 
from within. Both East and West exhibit the modern irrepressible 
objection to alien rule, especially when such rule, like that of the 
Manchus or the Turks, produces poverty and desolation, denies 
liberty, and prevents progress. 

Several Western nations which have the saving, or accumulating 
habit, are eager to make loans to remote and comparatively poor 
nations which are in great need of money to pay for costly public 
works of transportation, conservancy, public health, and public se- 
curity. In making such loans the bankers of each Western nation 
expect the support and protection of their own government. As 
security for such loans the borrowing government, national, pro- 
vincial or municipal, pledges some of its resources; and if the ex- 
pected interest or dividend is not paid, the lender forecloses. Hence 
serious international complications. In this lending business the 
Western powers come into competition with each other, and stimu- 
lated by mutual jealousies, engage in aggressive operations against 
the Oriental peoples, who have been as a rule helpless in their hands, 
until Japan adopted and improved on the Western military organi- 



THE ISSUE 7 

zation and methods of fighting, and succeeded for a short time in 
borrowing the money needed to pay the heavy costs of a modern 
warfare. 

Dr. Eliot 's conclusions, which since then have received much 
confirmation from events of the Great War, were that among 
the principal causes for wars thereafter in the far East 
would be, (a) frictions among Oriental nations due to clashes 
of interest and ambitions, and possible aggressions one upon 
another, and (b) antagonisms developing from commercial 
and financial competitions there of foreign nations. 

The principal protagonists of the new order for world poli- 
tics have been President Wilson, Viscount Grey, Lord Bryce, 
William H. Taft, and a few statesmen in Europe. Those men 
all speak out of ample experience in political finesse and ad- 
ministration. Certainly no higher authority on modern di- 
plomacy and international policy lives than Lord Grey. In 
his noteworthy brochure on the proposed league of nations as 
a substitute for former methods of handling international af- 
fairs he wrote [the italics are mine] : 

The second condition essential to the foundation of the League of 
Nations is that the Governments and peoples of the States willing to 
found it understand clearly that it will impose some limitations upon 
the national action of each, and may entail some inconvenient obli- 
gations. 

Smaller and weaker nations will have rights that must he respected 
and upheld by the league. Stronger nations must forego the right 
to make their interests prevail against the weaker hy force, and all 
States must forego the right in any dispute to resort to force before 
other methods of settlement by conference, conciliation, or if need 
he arbitration, have been tried. 

This is the limitation. The obligation is that if any nation will 
not observe this limitation upon its national actions, if it breaks the 
agreement which is the basis of the league, rejects all peaceful 
methods of settlement and resorts to force against another nation, 
they must one and all use their combined force against it. 

The economic pressure that such a league could use would in itself 
be very powerful, and the action of some of the smaller States com- 
posing the league could^not perhaps go beyond the economic pres- 
sure, but those States that have the power must be ready to use all 



8 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

the force, economic, military, or naval, they possess. It must be 
clearly understood and accepted that deflection from or violation of 
the agreement by one or more States does not absolve all or any of 
the others from the obligation to enforce the agreement. 
Anything less than this is of no value. 

It is not my purpose to bring a discussion of the lea^e 
of nations into the scope of this work except to show how the 
conditions which it aims to eradicate are bound up as im- 
portantly in the far Eastern question as they are in the situa- 
tion of Europe. There is general agreement in the democratic 
countries that something must be devised that will be a great 
improvement over the old-school diplomacy to prevent or to 
deter ambitious and predatory nations from disturbing con- 
tinually the peace of the world; and it will be of little use 
to invent and organize a plan to do this if there is no ade- 
quate comprehension of the work which it has to do. A 
solution of the Eastern question is a part, and a very im- 
portant part, of the work a league or its substitute has be- 
fore it. 

It is an open secret that some eminent statesmen in Europe 
and a few in America are not favorably disposed to the idea 
of a league of nations. Mr. Arthur Balfour, Lord Lans- 
downe, Georges Clemenceau, Baron Sonnino, are some states- 
men who have revealed that they have slight faith in the 
ability of such a league to function in place of the former 
system of alliances between powers. In the East, also, there 
are dissenters, especially in Japan, from the league idea. It 
is interesting to note the views of Marquis Okuma, the ' ' Sage 
of Japan, ' ' who was Japanese prime minister when the Great 
War started and for two years afterwards, who was responsi- 
ble for Japan's war policy in its inception, and since the death 
of Marquis Yamagata is Senior Elder Statesman. Marquis 
Okuma left office in 1916, but he speaks with as much authority 
as any Japanese living. He occasionally warns and admon- 
ishes his countrymen about questions of domestic and world 
politics, and recently he made some oracular comments on 



V. THE ISSUE 9 

diplomacy. On his views the "Japan Chronicle" of May 
9, 1918, said editorially: 

Marquis Okuma has a remarkable faculty of being all things to 
all men. He is President of the Japan Peace Society, and has ex- 
pounded with fluency the benefits of arbitration and the necessity 
of the limitation of armaments in the case of all countries save Japan. 
On the other hand, he can contribute to a militarist organ like the 
"Kokumin" an article which is the negation of all that he has ad- 
vanced when habited as an apostle of peace. He is jingo and 
pacifist by turns. To a deputation of American publicists he will 
orate on the bonds uniting Japan and America and condemn the 
journalism which sows discord, while in the columns of his magazine 
he will write of America and American policy in the most provoca- 
tive manner. 

But the veteran statesman always appears more natural in the 
guise of jingo than in that of pacifist, as might be expected from 
the author of the Twenty-one Demands on China, In view of that 
episode some of the observations which he makes in the article ap- 
pearing in the "Kokumin" (translated in yesterday's issue) are 3f 
much interest. "International relations," he says, "are quite unlike 
the relations subsisting between individuals. Morality and sincerity 
do not govern a country's diplomacy, which is guided by selfishness, 
pure and simple. It is considered the secret of diplomacy to fore- 
stall rivals by every crafty means available." Finally, he lays 3own 
the proposition that a nation must possess both wealth and military 
force to make its authority felt. 

It will be noted that there is a great similarity in the point of 
view of Bernhardi and Okuma. "Might," says the former, "is at 
once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is settled 
by the arbitrament of war." Again, "A most difficult problem is 
raised by the question how far, for political objects moral in them- 
selves, means may be employed which must be regarded as reprehen- 
sible in the life of the individual." Or still again, "The relations 
between two States must often be termed a latent war, which is 
provisionally being waged in peaceful rivalry. Such a position jus- 
tifies the employment of hostile methods, cunning, and deception, 
just as war itself does, since in such a ease both parties are deter- 
mined to employ them." 

It cannot be said, therefore, that the veteran statesman has justi- 
fied the policy which he-expounds in the "Kokumin" by the results 
accompUshed, and we are glad to find a Japanese journal like the 



.10 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

"Asahi" condemning on moral grounds his advocacy of national 
egoism. Marquis Okuma's disparagement of the unmilitary Allies 
and appreciation of the military Teuton may therefore be discounted. 
The end is not yet. 

The trend of Japanese intellectual reactions from the war 
is displayed more fully in later chapters of this work, but 
as showing how some Japanese thinkers are trying to adapt 
the national point of view to the lessons of the war may be 
taken the opinions of Dr. Inazo Nitobe, who has taken occa- 
sion to warn his countrymen that too frank a spirit of acqui- 
sition and selfishness may react on Japan. Dr. Nitobe, it 
may be recalled, is well known as the inventor, or the pro- 
tagonist and interpreter, of "Bushido." He is a professor 
at the Imperial University at Tokio and formerly was a student 
at Johns Hopkins University. I again quote the "Japan 
Chronicle," of July 11, 1918: 

Reprimands like that which Dr. Nitobe has recently administered 
to his countrymen are rather rare in Japan, where national self- 
satisfaction is generally very much in evidence. Nothing is more 
common in Japanese writings on the war than to dwell upon the im- 
mense sacrifices which Japan has made, and to hint at the rewards 
that she therefore has a right to expect. Dr. Nitobe compares 
Japan's gains with the other Allies' losses, and predicts that there 
will be a bad reaction of feeling when, on the settlement, Japan's 
share in the spoils of war is found to be very small. In making 
these criticisms Dr. Nitobe goes much further than would be becom- 
ing in a foreign critic. Some time ago, when the "Chronicle" sug- 
gested that the furnishing of supplies for handsome pa;sTnent hardly 
came within the definition of self-sacrifice, a Japanese publicist re- 
plied that such a remark was more outrageous than anathema. The 
critic would probably have had an apoplexy if the "Chronicle" had 
gone only half as far as Dr. Nitobe. It is quite natural, of course, 
that native criticism should be more patiently borne than foreign. 

Dr. Nitobe, even for a purveyor of home truths, is almost unduly 
severe. We have frequently pointed out in these columns that to 
Japan the war is not the same thing that it is to France and Eng- 
land, or even to America. The mischief that Dr. Nitobe foresees 
arises from the adulation of Japan and all her works in which Mr, 



THE ISSUE 11 

Balfour takes such a leading part, and which creates a false impres- 
sion among the Japanese of the part that this country plays in the 
war and leads in the direction of the disappointment predicted. 

Dr. Nitobe takes it for granted that at the peace conference some- 
thing approximating to the settlement talked of among the Allies 
since the beginning of the war will be eli'ected, and that everything 
will be settled on a general consideration of the public good, while 
if any compensation, territorial or monetary, can be secured from 
the aggressors, it will be divided among the Allies according to their 
sufferings, sacrifices, and needs. Together with this is blended an 
idea of the resumption of the old relations between Japan and the 
powers, which means that the powers will "advise" Japan not to 
make too great a profit at the expense of her weaker neighbours. 

How far such relations will be resumed remains to be seen. 
Japan will be, by that time, in a position, commercially and finan- 
cially, much more comparable with that of the powers, but will be 
incalculably behind them in the matter of armaments, which give 
special point to advice. Dr. Nitobe takes a mucli higher view of 
international polities than Marquis Okuma. The late Premier was 
instrumental in bringing Japan into the war, and conceived that as 
soon as Japan's power in the far East was demonstrated, and the 
value of her allegiance established, the European Powers would 
consider it best to refrain from protest whatever Japan might do in 
China. In his very first essay, however, he overreached himself, and 
discovered that, preoccupied as the powers were with their more im- 
mediate affairs, they were not resigned to the prospect of standing by 
while Japan made China a tributary State. Dr. Nitobe remembers 
that it was nothing but the diplomatic protests which prevented the 
Twenty-one Demands from complete enforcement, and as a political 
idealist he feels the discredit accruing from this situation far more 
than he would ever exult in an increase of political domination over 
neighbouring countries. 

Dr. Nitobe goes to the trouble of confuting the Japanese idea 
that a war "to make the world safe for democracy" is not a desir- 
able one. It is not probable that any Japanese ever seriously be- 
lieved that the objects of the war are inimical to the polity of Japan, 
though some may have made this an excuse for their perverse pas- 
sion for depreciating the Allies. The common idea of those who 
profess such concern for Japan's peculiar system is that, bound up 
with the devotion of all Japanese to the Imperial House, is the 
preservation of the privileges of the persons who happen now to be 
in advantageous position.^. Their narrowness of view is the natural 



12 DEMOCEACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

complement of the sort of patriotism which looks only to spoils in 
a war which is, to a degree uncommon in international struggles, a 
moral issue. 

In the far East the question of the basis for international 
politics after the war inevitably, at some point of a discus- 
sion, comes to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This alliance, 
except the secret treaty made between Japan and imperial 
Russia during the war, is the only offensive and defensive 
alliance between powers having the far East as their special 
field. Later in this work I mention the disposition of the 
Japanese at one stage of the war to throw the alliance with 
Great Britain overboard; but that sentiment was frankly 
based on calculated self-interest. It is interesting, therefore, 
to obtain a glimpse of Japanese conception of the alliance in 
juxtaposition with the idea of a league of nations. Discus- 
sions of the alliance in Japan, and especially suggestions Eind 
proposals that it be abrogated, naturally received the close 
attention of British who live there, and the "Japan Chron- 
icle," the leading British organ in Japan, makes this com- 
ment editorially in its issue of January 28, 1919: 

In the article on alliances which Dr. Sawayanagi, the well-known 
educationist and for a time Vice-Minister of Education, has con- 
tributed to the "Taiyo," he puts his finger on one of the root causes 
of the war which has destroyed the flower of European youth and 
threatened the fabric of civilisation itself. As will have been seen 
by the translation of the article appearing in Sunday's issue, Dr. 
Sawayanagi raises the question whether the time has not come for 
the abrogation of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance. Hitherto this sug- 
gestion has been made by Japanese who regarded the revision of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1911, removing all danger of Britain 
being compelled by the terms of the compact to participate in war 
against America, as destrojang the value of the agreement, which, 
with Russia no longer a foe to be feared, simply acted as a cheek on 
Japan's diplomatic activity in the far East without conferring any 
proportionate advantage. 

Dr. Sawayanagi takes up a different attitude. He points out that 
Russia is now in such a disorganised state that her assumption of an 
aggressive policy in the East has removed the raison d'etre of thq 



THE ISSUE 13 

Alliance, but his chief reason for suggesting its termination is that 
it is clearly out of harmony with the League of Nations which it is 
assumed the Peace Conference will in some form or other bring into 
being. There is ample justification for the view taken by Dr. Sawa- 
yanagi. President Wilson holds very strongly not only that a League 
of Nations should be open to all and common to all, but that a partial 
League of States, such as the present Allies, might be used for selfish 
purposes, and would destroy the very objects for which the League 
of Nations was framed. Indeed it was one of the President's five 
conditions of a satisfactory peace that ''no special interest of any 
nation can be made the basis of any settlement which is not con- 
sistent with the common interest of all." This evidently rules out 
alliances for special objects between two or more nations, as such a 
policy would tend to set up groups within the League, creating all 
the old animosities and constituting a serious danger to the peace 
of the world. 

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance must go with the other compacts, 
as being against the general interest. It has been asserted that the 
conversion of the Anglo-Japanese agreement of 1902 into an offen- 
sive and defensive alliance in 1905 maintained peace, but it may with 
equal truth be contended that the Alliance narrowly escaped plung- 
ing Europe prematurely into the war of mutual destruction that 
actually began ten years later. For the Alliance came about not so 
much from a desire to maintain peace in the far East as because of 
hostility to Russia, which was then pursuing an aggressive policy in 
Central Asia and the far East, and the more definite character given 
the agreement in 1905 was clearly with the object of preventing 
France from going to the assistance of her Russian ally. There 
were occasions during the progress of Rodjestvensky's squadron to- 
wards the far East w^hen the relations between Japan and France 
were strained almost to the breaking point, owing to the aid given 
the Russian squadron in French ports. Had the two powers come 
into armed conflict all Europe would have been ablaze. Britain 
would have come in on the side of Japan against France and Russia, 
and, despite the Kaiser's letters to the Tsar during the crisis, it is not 
impossible that when the rupture came Germany would have found 
her interest in siding with Britain rather than with her traditional 
enemies on the east and west. 

Looking back upon the history of the last forty years with the 
experience of the last five years as a guide, it becomes clearly evi- 
dent that it was the groups of alliances which kept Europe in a 
perpetual ferment during^that time, and altogether, with what Bright 
called the "bloody fetish" of the balance of power, encouraged all 



14 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

the nations in that mad race of armaments which in due course ended 
in an explosion. 

It is curious that an agreement between Britain and Japan was 
first mooted by the German charge d'affaires in London, Baron von 
Eckardstein, who suggested a triple alliance between Japan, Great 
Britain, and Germany respecting affairs in the far East. Count 
Hayashi, then Japanese Minister m London, took up the suggestion 
warmly, obtained the approval of his Government and approached 
Lord Landsdowne, the British Foreign Secretary. Sir Claude Mac- 
Donald, British Minister to Japan, who was in London at the time, 
strongly supported an Anglo- Japanese Alliance, and, prompted by 
Hayashi, brought pressure to bear on the British Foreign Office by 
expressing a fear that Japan might make an alliance with Russia. 
Lord Lansdowne, who at first was not very sympathetic, finally ap- 
proved. The German participation was dropped, and an alliance 
between Britain and Japan negotiated. This was in February, 1902. 
Prince Ito, then on his way to endeavor to negotiate an arrangement 
with Russia of differences with Japan, was thrown over by Kasu- 
migaseki, and the result a couple of years later was the Russo- 
Japanese War. 

The next departure from the British Liberal policy of being 
friendly with all nations but allied with none was in concluding an 
entente with France in 1904, which probably had the effect of pre- 
venting France joining Russia against Japan, and thus extending 
the war to Europe, though it was evidently regarded as necessary to 
convert the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the following year into a 
positive instrument of offence and defence. But the catastrophe was 
only postponed, not averted. 

The existence of the two groups of alliances, avowedly framed to 
ensure peace, made war inevitable. So much is evident to-day. It 
rests with the Peace Conference to devise another method. The old 
system has failed utterly and disastrously. In a common agreement 
between all States to ensure peace there may be security for the 
future. But such an arrangement must rigidly exclude all public 
or secret agreements of alliance, the effect of which would be to 
divide the nations into two or more hostile groups. 

Students of politics and conditions in the far East, and 
foreigners who live there, almost without exception feel that 
unless that part of the world is somehow relieved from the 



THE ISSUE 15 

pressure of the imperial ambitions of Japan, another war, 
which beyond doubt will involve several of the western 
powers, including America, is inevitable. They see the issue 
distinctly, in both its moral and political aspects, as much a 
Western question as it is an Eastern one, and with scarcely 
any important exceptions they feel that the old system can- 
not be so revised and readjusted that it can assure p^aee 
in the East any more than it did or can secure peace in Europe. 
It will be futile to patch up a peace in Europe while leaving 
free to run their course in the far East all the old war- 
breeding elements. The outcome will be the same there as it 
was in Europe. 

For America all the applications of the war in Europe 
can also be taken with regard to a war in the far East 
arising from the issues that are now drawn there. The 
analogy between the previous policy of the United States to- 
ward Europe and its alliances, its ententes, and its wars, and a 
similar policy toward the East, is exact. Just as the great 
war has demonstrated the fallacy of the isolation of America 
from the scope of such disputes and the futility of treating 
our contacts with these questions on a detached basis of 
"good feeling" and good wishes for all the nations so in- 
volved, and of "leaving Europe to settle its own quarrels," 
so Americans should realize that the Eastern question will 
not settle itself, and that it is a part of the business of the 
United States, for its own security if for no other motive, 
to help settle it rightly. 

The Eastern question can be expressed in two words, Japan 
and China. It is only by understanding the true characters 
of both those nations and the problem of their relation to 
each other that the modern issue of the far East can be com- 
prehended. 



CHAPTER II 

THE REAL CHARACTER OP JAPAN 

Creation of modern Japan — ^Myth and fable — The parallel with mod- 
ern Germany — The cult of emperor divinity — Invention of a new religion 
— Japan's historical background — Bushido a recent fabrication — Divine 
origin of the Japanese nation — The military autocracy — A replica of 
Prussian! sm — Why Japan has mystified the West — Japanese language a 
screen — Evolution of Japanese view of the West — Foreign patronage now 
resented — Exclusion of "dangerous thoughts" from Japan — American 
Constitution in that category — A striking incident — Dilemma of Chris- 
tianity in Japan — Trying to reconcile it with emperor divinity — Japan's 
constitutional forms — Throne not responsible to people — All rights rest 
in throne — Japan and democracy — Liberal ideas not tolerated — A theo- 
cratic state — The Government and industry — Japan's efficiency — State 
of administration in Japan — Government of Japan's dependencies — For- 
mosa and Korea — A Korean appeal — Status of foreigners in Japan — The 
so-called liberal elements — Downfall of the bureaucracy predicted — 
Japan's foreign propaganda — Some illustrations — Japan after the war — 
Attitude toward league of nations — Question of armaments — Time re- 
quired for reform. 

THE Japanese Empire in its present national form 
is dated by most historians and commentators from 
1867, when the "restoration" occurred. It is in- 
teresting and, as will be shown later, also very significant 
that the so-called restoration of Germany usually is taken 
from 1866, when that nation conclusively proved its military 
superiority over Austria, a victory that was a forerunner 
of the war of 1870 and the creation of the modern German 
Empire. 

In estimating the character of modern Japan, it is neces- 
sary to review that nation's previous history only with regard 
to the origin and development of national institutions and 
characteristics that influence the nation in these times. An- 
pient Japan is no more an issue in world politics to-day than 



THE EEAL CHARACTER OF JAPAN IT 

is ancient Germany or ancient Rome or Greece. The histories 
of Rome and Greece abound in matters that now are ad- 
mitted to be purely mythological, and people now would 
not take them seriously in considering political tendencies 
of the Italy and Greece of to-day. Yet a vast amount of the 
mythology of ancient Japan, without western peoples being 
aware of it, has been woven into western popular conceptions 
of modern Japan, and its legends have obscured the real 
Japan from any exact comprehension by westerners. In 
America we measure Europe with a fair degree of accuracy 
because we have the same historical and ethnological origins, 
and can use our own standards of measurement in our com- 
parisons ; but a great majority of Americans, and Europeans, 
too, have been measuring Japan by the almost mythological 
standards that Japan has set up for herself. 

There is, however, little about modern Japan that is difficult 
of comprehension, and nothing at all that is mysterious. 
Japan is a nation whose history for several centuries is an 
open record, though not a plainly visible record. One reason 
why it is not better known in the West is because of the 
difficulties of the Japanese language, which are a severe ob- 
struction to foreign penetration of Japanese literature and 
current thought; another reason is that Japan adroitly set 
out to write her own history for westerners to believe, and 
the West has, with an astounding complacency, taken Japan's 
own estimate of herself. The West, in effect, has given Japan 
a blank draft on its credulity, and allowed the Japanese to fill 
it out for themselves. Japanese propaganda has done that. 

Bom almost exactly at the same time with modern Ger- 
many, modern Japan, in adapting herself to western civili- 
zation, has conformed almost exactly to the German political 
system, the German thesis of statecraft, the German military 
organization, the German conception of the great game of 
welt-politik, and the German methods of playing that game. 
Intelligent Japanese do not dispute this, although for the 
last few years it is not a fact which the Japanese Govern- 



18 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

ment has desired to spread in some countries. A majority 
of Japanese military leaders were educated in Germany, 
the Japanese Army is organized after the German model and 
conception of discipline, and a majority of Japanese modern 
medical practitioners, and many leaders in the educational 
and scientific life of Japan, were educated in Germany. 

But it has not been those origins and associations that 
made the Japanese admirers and imitators of Germany. It 
has been Germany's military successes and rapid rise as a 
power that induced the Japanese to believe in the superiority 
of the German system and the German efficiency as a means 
of national expansion. There were, of course, similarities in 
German and Japanese institutions that strengthened those 
other attractions. For instance, the dogma of the divine 
right of emperors which was dramatically revived in Europe 
by the kaiser was paralleled by the cult of emperor divinity 
in Japan. Their growth and development were contempor- 
aneous. Some commentators have attributed the conception 
of Japanese statesmen of the imperial divinity idea as a means 
to consolidate the rule of the political oligarchy that accom- 
plished the restoration and rode into power with it to a 
study of the development of the same idea in Germany. That, 
however, is difficult to prove, because the idea sprang and 
developed in the two nations nearly at the same time. A 
very good account, and a reliable one, of this phase of modern 
Japan is given by a recognized authority on Japan, Basil 
Hall Chamberlain, for many years professor of Japanese and 
philology at the Imperial University in Tokio, and the author 
of many well-known books about Japan. In a little-known 
brochure of his, "The Invention of a New Religion," pub- 
lished in 1912, Professor Chamberlain wrote [my italics] : 

The first glimmer of genuine Japanese history dates from the fifth 
century after Christ, and even the accounts of what happened in the 
sixth century must be received with caution. Japanese scholars know 
this as well as we do; it is one of the certain results of investigation. 
But the Japanese bureaucracy does not desire to have the light let 



THE REAL CHARACTER OF JAPAN 19 

in on this inconvenient circumstance. While granting a dispensa- 
tion re the national mythology, properly so called, it exacts belief in 
every iota of the national historic legends. Woe to the native pro- 
fessor who strays from the path of orthodoxy. His Avife and chil- 
dren will starve. From the late Prince Ito's grossly misleading 
"Commentary on the Japanese Constitution" clown to school eom- 
pendiums, the absurd dates are everywhere insisted upon. This 
despite the fact that the mythology and the so-called early history 
are recorded m the same works, and are characterized by the like 
miraculous impossibilities; that the chronology is palpably fraudu- 
lent; that the speeches put into the mouths of the ancient mikados 
are centos culled from the Chinese classics; that their names are in 
some cases derived from Chinese sources; and that the earliest Japa- 
nese liistorioal narratives, tlie earliest known social usages, and even 
the centralized Imperial form of Government itself are all stained 
through and through with a Chinese dye, so much so that it is no 
longer possible to determine what percentage of the old native 
thought may still linger on in fragments here and there. 

In the face of all this, moral ideals which were of common knowl- 
edge derived from the teaching of the Chinese sages, are now arbi- 
trarily referred to the "Imperial Ancestors." Such, in particular, 
are loyalty and filial piety — the two virtues in which, in the far- 
JEaslern world, all the others rest. It is furthermore officially taught 
that, from the earliest ages, perfect concord has always subsisted in 
Japan between beneficent sovereigns on the one hand, and a grate- 
fully loyal people on the other. Never, it is alleged, has Japan been 
soiled by the disobedient and rebellious acts committed in other 
countries; while at the same time the Japanese nation, sharing to 
some extent in the supernatural virtues of its rulers, has been dis- 
tinguished by a high-minded chivalry called Bushido, unknown in 
inferior lands. 

Such IS the fabric of ideas which the official class is busy building 
up by every means in its power, including the punishment of those 
who presume to stickle for historic truth. 

The sober fact is that no nation probably has ever treated its sov- 
ereigns more cavalierly than the Japanese have done, from the be- 
ginning of authentic history down to within the memory of living 
men. Emperors have been deposed; Emjierors have been assas- 
sinated; for centuries every succession to the throne was the signal 
for intrigues and sanguinary broils. Emperors have been exiled; 
some have been murdered^in exile. From the remote island to which 
he had been relegated one managed to escape, hidden under a load 



20 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

of dried fish. In the fourteenth century things came to such a pass 
that two rival Imperial lines defied each other for the space of fifty- 
eight years — the so-called Northern and Southern Courts; and it was 
the Northern Court, branded later by historians as usurping and 
illegitimate, that ultimately won the day, and handed on the Impe- 
rial regalia to its successors. After that, as indeed long before that, 
for long centuries the government was in the hands of Mayors of 
the Palace, who substituted one infant sovereign for another, gen- 
erally forcing each to abdicate as soon as he approached man's 
estate. At one period, these Mayors of the Palace left the Deseend- 
ent of the Sun in such distress that His Imperial Majesty and the 
Imperial Princes were obliged to gain a livelihood by selling their 
autographs. . . . Even in the present reign — the most glorious in 
Japanese history — there have been two rebellions, during one of 
which a rival Emperor was set up in one part of the country, and 
a republic proclaimed in another. 

As for Bushido, so modem a thing it is that neither Kaempfer, 
Siebold, Satow, nor Rein — all men knowing their Japan by heart 
— ever once allude to it in their voluminous writings. The cause 
of their silence is not far to seek: Bushido ivas unknown until a 
decade ago. The very ivord appears in no dictionary, native or for- 
eign, before the year 1900. Bushido, as an institution or a code of 
rules, has never existed. The accounts given of it have been fabri- 
cated out of the whole cloth, chiefly for foreign consumption. 

Thus, within a space of a short lifetime, the new Japanese re- 
ligion of loyalty and patriotism has emerged into the light of day. 

The new Japanese religion consists, in its present early stage, 
of worship of the sacrosanct Imperial Person and of His Divine 
Ancestors, of implicit obedience to Him as head of the army (a 
position, by the way, opposed to all former Japanese ideas) ; 
furthermore, of a corresponding belief that Japan is as far su- 
perior to the common ruck of nations as the Mikado is divinely 
superior to the common ruck of Kings and Emperors. Do not the 
early history-books record the fact that Japan was created first, 
while all other countries resulted merely from tlie drops that fell 
from the creator's spear when he had finished his main work ! 

Thus does it come about that the neo-Japanese mj-ths concern- 
ing dates, and Emperors, and heroes, and astonishing national vir- 
tues already begin to find their way into popular English text- 



THE REAL CHARACTER OF JAPAN 21 

books, current literature, and even grave books of reference. The 
Japanese governing class has willed it so, and in such matters the 
Japanese governing class can enforce its will abroad as well as at 
home. The statement may sound paradoxical. Study the question 
carefully and you will find that it is simply true. 

To quote but one official utterance out of hundreds, Baron Oura, 
minister of agriculture and commerce, wrote this in February of 
last year [1911] : 

"That the majesty of our Imperial House towers high above 
evei'ything to be found in the world, and that it is as durable as 
heaven and earth, is too well known to need dwelling on here. . . . 
If it is considered that our country needs a religious faith, then, I 
say, let it be converted to a belief in the religion of patriotism and 
loyalty, the religion of Imperialism — in other words, to Emperor- 
worship. 

The new religion, in its present stage, still lacks one important 
item — a sacred book. Certain indications show that this lacuna 
will be filled by the elevation of the more important Imperial re- 
scripts to that rank, accompanied doubtless by an authoritative 
commentary, as their style is too absti'use to be understood of 
the people. ... In fact, a volume on the whole duty of Japanese 
man, with selected Imperial poems as texts, has already appeared. 

One might have imagined that Japan's new religionists would 
have experienced some difficulty in persuading foreign nations to 
accept the truth of their dogmas. Things have fallen out other- 
wise. Europe and America evince a singular taste for the mar- 
vellous, and find a zest in self -depreciation. 

As giving a Japanese view of this aspect of modern Japan, 
I shall quote from "The Political Development of Japan," 
by George Etsujiro Uyehara, D. Sc, published in 1910. It 
can be noticed that Professor Uyehara adheres to the fiction 
that something is known about Japanese histor^^ in remote 
ages, for he speaks of matters supposed to have happened 
twenty-five centuries ago. As Professor Chamberlain remarks, 
no Japanese would dare^to contradict or discredit any of the 
national historical myths. Professor Uyehara says; 



22 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

The Divine Right of the Emperor, however absurd it may seem 
to the theorists of individuahstie idealism, still holds a predomi- 
nant place in the minds of the Japanese; and its political value 
seems to be as important to the Japanese nation as tlie religious 
value of miracles and mythological and allegorical stories is to 
certain religions. Therefore, to understand practical politics in 
Japan, we must make a careful examination of the effects of Mi- 
kadoism upon the Japanese body politic. 

The Divine Right of the Emperor is the fundamental principle 
on which the Japanese polity was first established and on which 
it still rests. The first national organization known in the history 
of Japan was religio-political in its character. The common wor- 
ship of the Sun-goddess, with the Emperor as the high priest, was 
one of the chief functions of the government. In fact, the term 
matsurigoto, meaning worship, is etymologically in pure Japanese 
identical with that of government. In speaking of Shinto, the old 
State religion of Japan, Dr. Aston says: "Secular and sacred are 
much less differentiated in Shinto than in more highly developed 
religions. The Mikado was at once the sovereign and the high 
priest." Thus the original, the fundamental political idea of the 
Japanese seems to confirm the theory which Professor Burgess 
pronounces universal : "The unbiased political historian will not 
dispute the proposition — that the earliest forms of the State were 
theocratic — but he will teach that the State was brought through 
the earlier and most difficult period of its development by the power 
of religion. . . . This is entirely comprehensible from the stand- 
point of a correct political philosophy. The first and most funda- 
mental psychological principle concerned in the development of 
the State is that of Piety, i.e. reverence and obedience. Unless the 
character of the mass of the population be moulded by this prin- 
ciple, the reign of the law cannot be attained." 

However, many \Yestern nations have long since abandoned 
the theocratic form of State. There remains here and there only 
its shadow ; already, even before the time of Plato, various forms 
of State seem to have existed. It is most singular that Japan has 
firmly and religiously adhered to her old traditional polity and 
made no single departure from it in the twenty-five centuries of 
her existence, during which she has passed through many vicissi- 
tudes, political, social, and economic. Many changes have taken 
place from time to time in the form and mechanism of her govern- 
ment, but its fundamental polity, a unique fact in political history, 
has never been altered, shaken, or transformed. It appeals, tliere- 
fore, most intensely to the Japanese people, no matter how primi- 



THE EEAL CHARACTER OF JAPAN 23 

tive and childlike its origin, and is engraven on their hearts and 
minds, and engenders their deepest admiration, reverence, and 
affection. 

That the Mikado reigns and governs the country absolutely, by 
a Right inherited from His Divine Ancestors, is the unconscious 
belief or the instinctive feeling of the Japanese people. Indeed, 
it may be said to be their religion — religon in the sense of the 
"inner voice" as defined by Matthew Arnold. 

The military autocracy, a replica of Prussianism, that has 
governed Japan since the restoration exercises its povt'er in 
a large measure by standing behind the person of the emperor 
and using the throne as a symbol. Japan really has in this 
period been governed by an oligarchy of very limited numbers. 
Its core is the Genro, a small group of Elder Statesmen, in- 
cluding only half a dozen or so men. Political parties and 
groups in the Diet are composed of followers of this or that 
member of the Genro. There are by-currents of political 
thought and influence, gathered in the survival of the ancient 
clans, in the military class, and nowadays in the new plutoc- 
racy: but all of those are controlled by the oligarchy, which 
clusters closely about the throne and prevents any undesirable 
influence from peaching it. Created after the restoration as a 
symbol through which the aristocratic autocracy could govern 
more easily, and as focusing a national sentiment, the throne 
and its di^dne attributes have in time taken on an actual power 
from the acceptance by the people of its divine status. Thus 
in late years the throne at times has threatened to overcast the 
oligarchy, and it is conceivable that if ever a man of real ability 
should become emperor, he might take power from the hands 
of the oligarchy and wield it himself. Even now to some 
extent the throne is becoming a sort of Frankenstein of the 
oligarchy, and the emperor cannot always be controlled abso- 
lutely as the inner governing circle wish. The system works 
smoothly as a rule, especially with a people densely ignorant 
in the mass, as long as the throne remains complacently a 
puppet for a highly intelligent ruling class; and it has ad- 



24 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

vantages, as Germany had, over nations democratically and 
therefore more loosely governed. A difference in the develop- 
ment of the imperial divine right theory in Germany and 
in Japan was that in Japan it was not the presumption of 
an emperor, but was the invention of subjects as a device to 
govern a superstitious people; while in Germany it was a 
clever, but erotic and intensely egotistical, emperor who re- 
vived it, and it was taken complacently by the military autoc- 
racy because it suited their ends. It is a curious reflection 
that western peoples, who found in the kaiser's divine pre- 
tensions only a matter for scorn and ridicule, have taken the 
similar pretension of the mikado, if not seriously, at least 
without ridicule or resentment. The reason is to be found 
in the fact that the western popular conception of Japan 
has been tinged with romanticism, as a sort of play-nation, 
not to be judged seriously or by critical standards. 

In his work, quoted in this chapter, Professor Chamberlain 
states that a principal reason why Japan had succeeded in 
understanding the West well, while remaining a mystery to the 
West, is the difference in languages. Western languages are 
simply composed from an alphabet of twenty-six letters, while 
Japanese is an idiograph language which very few foreigners 
ever master. Undoubtedly, the Japanese language has been 
one of the best screens which that country produces, and one 
which has been of singular service to the world politics of the 
nation. 

In the course of its development modern Japan has under- 
gone an evolution in its comprehension of the West. Japan 
began to understand the West long before the West began 
to understand Japan, because the Japanese were keen, almost 
desperately keen, about understanding the West, while the 
West was only a little interested about Japan, as one is in- 
terested in any curio. Japan has not until recently pre- 
sented itself to the West as a serious and important problem 
which relates directly to the security of the West, while from 
the time of real impact of the West upon Japan, a period 



THE REAL CHARACTER OF JAPAN 25 

usually dated from Commodore Perry's visit, Japan has known 
that the West stood for and contained the knowledge which 
Japan must acquire if she were to rise to first rank among 
nations. 

But as time passed, and the Japanese began to think them- 
selves proficient in western knowledge and science, and 
especially after they had demonstrated, at least to their own 
satisfaction, a superiority over even western powers in west- 
ern military tactics, they took on another attitude toward 
western institutions. Having for so long assured others of 
the divine origin of their country and its preeminent attri- 
butes, the Japanese began to believe all the things of them- 
selves that their propaganda had somehow induced westerners 
to believe of them. This developed in them an internal 
conceit and arrogance, which rarely, except with the vulgar 
classes, showed through the natural outward tact and polite 
demeanor of the people, but which nevertheless ran strongly 
in Japanese thought and character. The Japanese developed 
self-confidence and, after that, self-sufficiency. This caused 
them to resent any attitude of patronage and condescension 
in foreigners, whether this was merely the provincial conceit 
of the ordinary tourist or patronizing of a more subtle char- 
acter. 

In this more subtle class of foreign patronage can be placed 
such well-meant works as missionary and educational efforts. 
Only recently the Japanese regarded foreign religious mis- 
sions with tolerance, if a little contemptuously, and they 
took much in the same manner as they were bestowed such 
benefactions as schools and hospitals. It is different now. A 
nation, or a people, which arrogates to itself the first place on 
earth by reason of its divine origin and associations, and which 
considers itself an equal or the superior even in material 
and military power of any nations except a few, rejects in- 
stinctively a patronage which, on its face, assumes, firstly, 
that Japan herself cannot afford to pay for such institutions ; 
secondly, that she is benighted and needs such foreign en- 



26 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

lightenment ; thirdly, that without foreign aid she could not 
attain it; and, fourthly, that it implies the superiority of the 
"West. Japan went to school to the West and absorbed its 
knowledge with avidity. But the Japanese now feel, rightly 
or wrongly, that they have been graduated. Foreign churches 
and religious missions for foreigners in Japan, foreign hos- 
pitals for foreigners in Japan, foreign schools for foreigners 
in Japan, do not offend the Japanese as yet; but foreign 
religious missions for Japanese, foreign schools and hospitals 
for Japanese, irritate the rapidly swelling pride and conceit 
of the Japanese. I have heard of a recent instance of how an 
American physican in Japan journeyed about the United 
States soliciting subscriptions to build and equip a medical 
school and hospital in Japan. He raised a good deal of money, 
and when he returned to Japan he discovered an almost im- 
perceptible coolness toward his project by the Japanese. On 
investigating, he learnt that the Japanese did not feel that 
they were in need of foreign charity of this kind. So far 
tact and certain exigencies of world politics have repressed 
this disposition of the Japanese, but it is beginning to be 
shown plainly in many instances. 

A very interesting demonstration of this new spirit, and 
one also which has a decided political significance in con- 
junction with issues of the Great War, is the so-called Hepburn 
incident which occurred in 1918. I quote the "Japan Adver- 
tiser": 

SHALL AMERICAN DEMOCRACY BE ALLOWED A 
CHANCE IN JAPAN? 

Minister of Education Says "No!" in Opposing Establish- 
ment OF New Chair in Imperial University 

The attentive eyes of a couple of hundred professors and lec- 
turers as Avell as 4,000 students of the Imperial University of 
Tokyo, who are always claiming the freedom of leai-ning Avithout the 
intervention of conservative bureaucrats, are now concentrated upon 
the peculiar development of affairs as regards the official sanction 
for the professorial chair on America and American Affairs, which 



THE REAL CHARACTER OF JAPAN 27 

is to be established in the College of Law by the donation of 
yen 60,000 from Mr. Alonzo Barton Hepburn, well known New York 
banker and millionaire. 

The situation is complicated, but the fact itself is that Mr. Ryo- 
hei Okada, Minister of Education, has voiced his objection to the 
establishment of the new chair in Japan's leading educational in- 
stitution on the ground that the American teaching of democracy 
will be harmful to Japan's national politics. He is hesitating to 
give the official sanction for the chair, which must come in the form 
of an Imperial Ordinance, according to the official regulations of 
the university. 

During the latter part of last year Mr. Hepburn's donation was 
reported. Baron Shibusawa, who was first consulted by the New 
York banker upon the problem, was pleased with the latter's idea 
to promote Japanese-American friendship by establishing a course 
in the university on American affairs and sounded the university 
officials regarding the question. Apparently, there was practically 
no objection on the part of the university, and, in consequence, the 
negotiations were smoothly carried out. 

Baron Megata, who was then in America as the head of Japan's 
financial commission, discussed the matter with Mr. Hepburn many 
times and the plan was satisfactorily concluded at the end of last 
year between the American financier and the Imperial University 
of Tokyo. 

Accordingly, the American course, consisting of three lectures, 
''American Independence" by Dr. Nitobe, "The American Consti- 
tution" by Professor Minobe and "American Diplomacy" by Pro- 
fessor Yoshino, was inaugurated at the beginning of the year. A 
grand ceremony for the opening of the new course was held, with 
President Baron Yamakawa's speech of congratulation, followed 
by a talk by Professor Hijikata, the Dean of the Law College. 

As the course was quite new to the students, and as the lecturers 
were all the best and most popular speakers, the course soon became 
a center of interest. On every Saturday afternoon, when the lec- 
tures were given, the large auditorium was crowded by several hun- 
dred young students, consisting not only of those entered in the 
College of Law but hundreds of others who were studying litera- 
ture, medicine, science, engineering and even agriculture. 

At the same time a plan was made by the faculty to 
select a candidate to fill the chair in the future. He was 
to be one who specialized in the course, some young, energetic 
and intelligent graduate of the college. It is said that if the selec- 
tion was settled, the nfew professor was to be sent to America 



28 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

at onee. Furthermore, it was promised by the university authori- 
ties that the new professor might spend one-third of every year 
in America, even after he began regular service. The original plan 
was on an even larger scale. It was proposed that the new pro- 
fessor should also serve as an university extension lecturer, travel- 
ing all around the Empire to give lectures on America and Ameri- 
can affairs to public audiences in various cities and towns. 

Turning to the trouble now in consideration, it is worth recalling 
the Imperial Ordinance on the Imperial University, which was 
originally issued in 1886 and revised in 1890 and 1893. 

Article 1 of the Ordinance says: "It is the purpose of the Im- 
perial University to teach and investigate such arts and sciences 
as those demanded by the state." 

Article 18 says: "The variety and number of the professorial 
chairs is to be decided by the Imperial Ordinance, which is to be 
issued for special necessity." 

The principles expressed in these two articles are declared to be 
the fundamental ideas which explain the nature of the present con- 
troversy. In an interpretation by the Minister of Education, ac- 
cording to a university professor, the new course on America not 
only fails to fill the requirement of "such arts and sciences as those 
demanded by the state," but is rather harmful to the welfare of 
the state. As the establishment of any new professorial chair is 
to be decided by Imperial Ordinance, in accordance with Article 18, 
Mr. Okada, the Minister for Education, holds practically the full 
power for sanctioning the new American chair. 

Japanese officialdom does not invite the introduction of demo- 
cratic propaganda into Japan, and fears even to hear the word 
"democracy," just as the Japanese people a hundred years ago 
shuddered before the word "Christianity," a professor at the Im- 
perial University said to an "Advertiser" reporter yesterday. Be- 
sides the government officials, several university professors, though 
they represent the minority, hold the similar views toward the men- 
tion of American democracy. C'le professor declared yesterday 
that Professor Shinkichi Uyesugi, who holds the chair for Japaneese 
Constitutional Law in the university, was disgusted by the faculty's 
decision to establish the new American course and approached 
Premier Count Terauchi a couple of months ago, asking the Pre- 
mier to intervene. 

There have been whispers, of course, to the effect that the Min- 
ister of Education is not solely responsible for the desire to ban 
the American course of study; that there may be others behind the 
curtain. But the question still remains, and it is one which has 



THE REAL CHARACTER OF JAPAN 29 

deeply stirred Japanese educational circles. Shall the rising gen- 
eration of Japan be permitted to receive the democratic ideas of 
America or shall the doors be slammed in the face of "dangerous 
thoughts"? 

And the "Japan Chronicle" commented on the matter 
editorially, on May 16, 1918, as follows : 

Some time ago, Mr. Hepburn, the nephew of a well-known mis- 
sionary, offered a large sum of money for the establishment of a 
Chair of American History at the Tokio Imperial University. 
The generous donor had a sentimental attachment to Japan, and 
he desired, as is evident from the nature of the gift, to promote 
a better understanding between the two countries, conceiving pos- 
sibly that Japan, about whose feet still cling the rags of the feudal 
system, might profit by a better knowledge of the struggles of a 
country which had begun the creation of constitutional govern- 
ment from the beginning — not built upon old foundations — and 
might therefore be expected to have useful knowledge to impart. 
When the news was first received of this benefaction it was stated 
in the Japanese newspapers that the new Chair was to be for the 
study of the American Constitution, and jocular remarks were 
made about it being tantamount to an importation of "dangerous 
thoughts." It was not supposed that there could be any serious 
obstacle to the execution of the American donor's wishes, but when 
the benefaction was next heard of the American Constitution had 
been modified to American History, and whereas it might have been 
expected that the offer would be accepted with alacrity, months go 
by, and still official permission is not given for the creation of the 
new Chair. On top of this comes the announcement by Mr. Okada, 
the Minister for Education, that a Chair of Shinto is to be estab- 
lished at the Imperial University at Tokio, and to this one of the 
Professors of the University added that it had been considered wise 
to establish this new Chair before the advent of the American 
foundation. In other words, American history is of the nature of 
"dangerous thoughts," but since the poison cannot very well be 
avoided, it is wise to take the antidote first. Comment made by 
way of a joke turns out to be the very serious conclusion of the 
highest authorities in the country. 

It is one of those cases where it is almost impossible to effect in 
imagination a transposition, so as to see how a situation will ap- 
pear to other people. If one of Japan's war millionaires wished 
to endow a chair of Japanese history or even of Shinto at Harvard, 



30 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

what -would be the effect? It is possible that the Harvard authori- 
ties would reply that though they felt very grateful they had no 
expectation of a large number of students attending the lectures 
and therefore suggested that the millionaire reconsider his offer. 
Or they might accept it with alacrity. The one thing that is most 
unimaginable is that the American Government would hasten to 
present the University first with a Chair of Republicanism or of 
Episcopal Methodism. Or if such an offer were made to Oxford, 
it would never enter the head of Mr. Lloyd George that the Em- 
pire's safety or the country's morals demanded the prior establish- 
ment of a Chair of Druidism. It is quite easy to fancy Mr. G. B. 
Shaw founding a Cambridge Chair of Dangerous Thoughts, — and 
easier to imagine its being accepted than to conceive of its rejection. 

One of the effects of Japan entering into relations with foreign 
countries has been the growth of an official obscurantism about 
those matters which are supposed to affect the honour of the nation 
and of the Imperial House. Under the Shogunate little enough 
respect was shown to the Sovereign; but during a half-century in 
which the West has learnt to criticise and question all things, Japan 
has gone so far as dismissing professors for doubting historical 
dates. So far as modem history is concerned, the searchlight of 
criticism is free to search out its details, but when it goes back be- 
yond documented times it becomes too sacred for critical research. 

The object of the men who desire to organise Japanese opinion 
and belief according to sealed pattern is solely the honour and 
glory of Japan, but their method is the outcome of a strange lack 
of faith in the abilities and genius of the Japanese people. 

Does Mr. Okada reall,y believe that the forces which move Japan 
are different from those which govern the rest of humanity? And 
has he so little imagination as to be unable to draw a conclusion 
from the fact that the countries where thought is most free are 
those which have made the most progress? Beliefs, like knowledge, 
progress, and when they are not allowed to progress they die; yet 
it would be very surprising to hear that the new Chair of Shinto 
was intended to encourage a spirit of free inquiry, research, and 
generalisation from the ancient history of Japan, for that is the 
very last thing that the official classes understand by the study of 
Shinto. 

It is curious that the Japanese, wlio are so solicitous regarding 
what other nations think of them, do not reflect on the influence 
on their international relations of the cult of an exclusive nation- 
ality. 



THE REAL CHARACTER OF JAPAN 31 

Many intimations of late have also given notice that the 
Japanese Government is growing resentful of the Christian 
missionary propaganda and proselyting in Japan, although 
this matter carries with the handling of it, and especially 
with any attempt to curb or to expel it, a most delicate ques- 
tion, one so full of irritations of western sentiments and 
moral beliefs that the Japanese Government is, and well may 
be, reluctant to raise the issue. That Christian tenets and 
propaganda are directly opposed to the concept of emperor 
divinity and worship is quite apparent to most minds ; but, 
oddly, there is an effort in Japan to reconcile the two. Out 
of many instances that I have heard of, I quote — the italics 
are mine — again from Professor Chamberlain's brochure, "The 
Invention of a New Religion": 

The Rev. Dr. Ebina, one of the leading lights of the Protestant 
partorate in Japan, plunges more deeply still into this doctrine, 
according to which, as already noted, the whole Japanese nation 
is, in a manner, apotheosised. Says he: 

"Though the encouragement of ancestor worship cannot be re- 
garded as part of the essential teaching of Christianity, it [Chris- 
tianity] is not opposed to the notion that, when the Japanese Em- 
pire was founded, its early rulers were in communication with the 
Great Spirit that rules the universe. Christians, according to this 
theory, without doing violence to their creed, may acknowledge that 
the Japanese nation is of divine origin. It is only when we realize 
that the Imperial Ancestors were in close communion with God, 
that we understand how sacred is the country in which we live. 
{Dr. Ehina ends hy recommending the Imperial Rescript on edu- 
cation as a text for Christian sermons). 

In truth the Christian movement in Japan is confronted 
with a serious dilemma — a dilemma that is leading its foreign 
protagonists in Japan into some queer elisions of Christian 
teaching and dogma in their effort to retain their hold on 
Japanese converts, and at the same time to make it possible 
for those converts still to be orthodox subjects of the mikado. 
It further is interesting to recall that of Japan's fulsome 
adulators none have Feen more energetic in singing her praises 



32 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

unstinted, in condoning her delinquencies, and in defending 
her foreign policy, than some prominent Christian mission- 
aries. The missionaries who live and work in Korea, Formosa, 
and China, however, have a different tale to tell, although 
the conditions under which they have to work requires them 
often to suppress their criticisms. 

In previous books I have written fully about Japanese politi- 
cal institutions — the constitution, the ballot suffrage, the par- 
liament, and the various machinery of Government — and will 
review those matters but briefly here. One point might be 
noted, that the constitution of Japan did not spring from the 
people, but is held to be the gift of the emperor to the people, 
thus preserving the throne as the origin even of popular 
rights and liberty and the fountain of all authority. In his 
''The Political Development of Japan," Professor Uyehara 
wrote, "Old Japan never had a Magna Charta, nor a Bill of 
Rights, nor any political manifesto involving abstract princi- 
ples of justice, equality, liberty, and the rights of men." The 
constitution derives its authority not from the people, but 
from the throne. The throne is not in any sense held to be 
responsible to the cabinet or to the Diet, or to the people for 
its administrative acts. The Diet is responsible solely to the 
throne, not to the people. The Cabinet is responsible to the 
throne, not to the Diet. Regarding the constitution Professor 
Uyehara wrote : 

The doctrine of sovereignty is embodied in the major premises 
of the present Constitution of Japan. The logical severity and 
rigidity of its structure, perhaps, surpass that of the present Con- 
stitution of France, though the fundamental doctrines embodied 
in these two documents are as diametrically opposed to each other 
as the Poles. The main thesis of the Japanese Constitution is the 
sovereignty of the Emperor, whereas that of the French Constitu- 
tion is the doctrine of vox populi vox dei. 

Article IV. of the Constitution of Japan states that "the Em- 
peror is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself all the 
Powers of the State." 



THE REAL CHARACTER OF JAPAN 33 

In one of his articles from Japan to the "Daily Mail" of 
London, written in 1918, Bernard Falk criticized the ten- 
dency of foreigners to over-praise Japan, and the "Japan 
Chronicle" thus commented: 

It will be noted that Mr. Falk is not quite so strongly impressed 
by Japanese enthusiasm for the war and her determination to make 
the world safe for democracy as some observers viewing things from 
England or America. Viscount Ishii, who does talk English fluently, 
would perhaps have convinced the correspondent of the "Daily Mail" 
that things in Japan are not what they seem. "It is waste of time 
and it is folly," says Mr. Falk, "to talk to Japan of democracy or 
in terms of high-flown idealism. The average Japanese does not 
comprehend the meaning of democracy." This will come as a shock 
to readers of Viscount Ishii's speeches [in America] and of the 
eulogistic references to Japan of Mr. Balfour and Lord Robert 
Cecil. Mr. Falk has something to say on this head also. In com- 
menting on the news sent out to Japan by wire he says: "It may 
be sincerely hoped that the continual outpouring of sickly and 
flattering patronage which has characterised British references to 
Japan will cease. Sensible men in Japan are not moved by it and 
others jump to wrong conclusions, exaggerate its importance, and 
become violently chauvinistic — always a danger in a country which 
is essentially nationalistic." 

The Japanese have reached a point when they are some- 
what irritated even by the flattery of foreign statesmen and 
politicians, for when this flattery is obviously overdone, it is 
taken as a reflection on the good sense of the Japanese, or 
as satire. This applies only to the educated class of the 
Japanese, who compose the Government, the university pro- 
fessors, the other professions, and the upper business elements. 
The Japanese masses are unaware of any satire in foreign 
flattery, for they have been told, and believe readily, that such 
modern scientific utilities as electricity, telephones, wireless 
telegraph, and machinery, are the inventions of the Japanese. 
Does not this credulity coincide with the belief that Japan is 
of divine origin and the foremost nation on earth, which is the 
foundation of Japanese patriotism? 



34 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

A great deal has been said, and much more probably will 
be said in favor of allowing Japan a kind of paternal position 
in respect to China and other backward states, so called, in the 
far East. Aside from the moral and institutional character- 
istics of the Japanese nation as they relate to this suggestion, 
especially vis-a-vis a genuinely democratic country like China, 
there is the question of Japan's competency to fulfil such a 
mandate from civilization on the basis of efficiency. Japan's 
economic and industrial efficiency is closely connected with 
the Government. Dr. Uyehara writes [my italics] : 

Under such circumstances the Japanese people had been accus- 
tomed to place implicit trust in tbeir government. Their economic 
conditions were never so distressing as to make them declare that 
"the government is of the people, by the people, and for the peo- 
ple." It was understood by them that the government, being an 
authority above, should take the initiative in all important matters 
of State and lead the people, and the people should follow in strict 
obedience. This idea is still consciously or unconsciously dominant 
in the minds of the Japanese masses. Hence the Japanese as a 
nation are like a well-disciplined army, but as individuals are little 
better than disbanded soldiers. This is, perhaps, the strongest 
and the weakest point of the Japanese nation. 

The excessive dependence of the people on the government, or the 
omnipotence of the government itself (Seifumanno-Shugi), as Mr. 
Shimada calls this peculiar mental habit of the people, has certain 
advantages and disadvantages in the development of the country. 

That Japan has never experienced a violent constitutional revo- 
lution in her history is, no doubt, largely due to this peculiar mental 
habit of her people. 

A close observer would, perhaps, be more struck by the socialistic 
tendency of the Japanese State than by its military and political 
achievements. Indeed, this most monarchical State is found to be 
most socialistic. In Japan, State initiative and supervision in in- 
dustrial matters is very strong, in spite of the fact that the Govern- 
ment is not responsible to the people in the strict sense of the term. 
The entire postal system, telephones, and telegraphs, are owned 
and operated by the State; nearly all the gas, the electric, and 
water plants throiighout the country belong to the State or to the 
municipality. Again, all railways are now nationalised, and even. 



THE REAL CHARACTER OF JAPAN 35 

the tobacco, salt, and camphor industries are a State monopoly. 
There are in Japan very few great commercial and industrial un- 
dertakings, such as banking, shipbuilding, shipping, and naviga- 
tion, etc., completely carried out by private individuals. The Jap- 
anese people are habitually inclined to wait for, or to depend on 
governmental initiative or subsidy for a great industrial or com- 
mercial enterprise. The "Constitution," says Baron (now Vis- 
count) Kaneko, "has been issued, and laws and codes have been 
brought to a certain perfection, and we now possess a complete 
skeleton of a State. But in the point of muscle and blood which 
I term the economic State, it is far from complete. It does not 
require much study to find out that, in spite of the satisfactory 
development of codes of laws and of a military system, the economic 
condition of our country is most discouraging." 

The economic position of Japan was considerably improved 
during the Great War, when the country was able to have 
all the advantages of being one of the allies, while at the same 
time, in so far as feeling the strain of the war, it was almost 
the same as a neutral. Japanese industry received a tre- 
mendous stimulus by the war, and made great profits. Never- 
theless, we find the "Japan Chronicle," in an editorial en- 
titled "Japanese EfiSciency in Practice," published on Jan- 
uary 30, 1919, saying: 

It is remarkable that at a time when the administration in Japan 
itself is so bad that it seems on the verge of break-down, Japanese 
chauvinists should be pressing the Government to add to its respon- 
sibilities by insisting on the control of railways in Siberia. Every 
day they have before them evidence that the railways administra- 
tion is so over-taxed that it often appears in danger of collapse. 
The rolling-stock is quite inadequate for the demands upon it, 
either of passenger or goods traffic. No proper attention is paid 
to the equipment of the railways, with the result that engines, car- 
riages, and goods trucks are constantly under repair. No pro- 
vision is made for times of abnormal pressure, such as at the New 
Year, either as regards passengers or freight. If a train loses time 
on its journey from some unexpected incident, no attempt ever 
seems to be made to make up for the time lost : a train will be timed 
by the schedule to stay at a certain station for ten minutes, and it 
will be kept there ten mimites even if a couple of hours late, for no 
reason whatever save that it is scheduled for that period. Connee- 



36 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

tions are constantly lost. Trains coming from a long distance, 
such as from beyond Karuizawa to Himeji, a run of four or five 
hundred miles, are included in the local service of the districts 
through which they pass, stopping at every station on the way, 
with the result that, bemg constantly late, they simply disorganise 
the local traffic. As showing the lack of co-ordination, trains of 
empty trucks may be seen leaving an industrial centre like Osaka 
instead of the trucks being utilised on the return journey. No at- 
tempt seems to be made to keep the administration of the railways 
up to date by adopting the improved methods of foreign countries. 
In the majority of cases the stations are a discredit to the service; 
the waiting-rooms are filthily dirty, even newly-built stations like 
Tokyo and Yokohama rapidly deteriorating, while the latrines 
would in any other country be the subject of prosecution by the 
sanitary inspector. About the only part of the service that can be 
commended is the through mail trains, which are well appointed 
and keep time, and with these may be bracketed the electric service 
between Yokohama and Tokyo both for speed and punctuality. 
Otherwise the condition of the railways goes from bad to worse. 

Instead of seeking to obtain control over the Siberian railways, 
and thus still further deplete its small staff of railway experts, the 
Japanese Government would do well to engage American or British 
railway experts for the reorganisation of its own lines. In the end 
money would be saved, while the sen-ice would be improved. 

But it is not only in the matter of railways that the Govern- 
ment administration appears on the verge of collapse. Inefficiency 
i3 rife throughout all the departments of State organisation. It 
is only necessary to point to the post office and the telegraphs, to 
the local tramway services, to the condition of the roads, to the in- 
adequate protection afforded by the police, in order to realise 
the extent of the break-down of State and local administration, etc. 

Japan's policy of railway penetration of China and Siberia 
is of course political strategy, and has little relation, except 
as a means for evasion of the "open door/' to economic 
efficiency either in those countries or in Japan. Neither has 
Japan's pretension to act as the representation of civilization 
in directing reform in China or in Siberia any genuine found- 
ation in her administrative fitness for that work. Japan's 
administration of her own dependencies, Korea and Formosa, 
is an ill-concealed scandal. In Formosa the natives are not 



THE REAL CHARACTER OF JAPAN 37 

allowed educational advantages, for they might inculcate 
sentiments of revolt against Japanese rule ; they are exploited 
as laborers for the Japanese sugar and tea planters, and ac- 
quire easily the drug habits inculcated by Japanese traders. 
In Korea the situation is in some respects even more repre- 
hensible.^ 

On the evening before I was to sail from Shanghai for 
America, last December, a man came to see me in my apart- 
ment in the Astor House. When my servant showed him in, 
I at first thought that he was a Japanese dressed in foreign 
clothing. But he proved to be a Korean, a Christian, who 
had been driven by Japanese persecution to leave his native 
land. Disguised, he had escaped across the Yalu River into 
Manchuria, and had succeeded in getting through the Japanese 
zone into China proper. At Shanghai he was then doing 
Y. M. C. A. work among Koreans, and he came with a card 
of introduction from a friend of mine in the Y. M. C. A. 
organization of China. The man said that he had heard I 
was going to Washington and to Paris, and he came to ask 
a favor of me. Koreans were very anxious to have the case 
of Korea presented to the peace conference, and they did 
not know how to get it done. No Korean can leave his country 
except with a Japanese passport, which usually they cannot 
obtain. Neither during the war can they travel anywhere 
without a passport. Would I, he asked, take a short memorial, 
a presentation of Korea's appeal to the conference, and de- 
liver it to the President of the United States or to one of the 
American delegates at Paris? He asked me if I thought 
there was any chance to have the case of Korea reopened 
at the conference. I told him that I thought there was slight 
chance for that to be done. He said that Koreans had raised 
a sum — about one hundred thousand dollars I think he said — 
to pay the expenses of a Korean delegation to go to Paris. 

1 Accounts of Japan's taking of Korea and her administration there 
are given in the author's previous books, "America and the Far Eastern 
Question," and "Our Eastern Question," 



38 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

Some Koreans in America were to go, he said. After hand- 
ing me his memorial, which was type-written, he left. In 
March, 1919, I read a news dispatch from Washington to 
the effect that the Government had refused to issue pass- 
ports to some Koreans who wanted to go to Paris, because 
it had no right to grant passports, they being technically 
Japanese subjects, and Japan had objected to the passports 
being issued. 

I have a copy of the memorial which the Korean Christian 
handed to me. It begins with a review of the histories of 
Japan and Korea and the events which led to the annexation 
of Korea by Japan, It then proceeds: 

The present condition of Korea may be described in three parts: 
1. Spiritually. 

Knowing that a nation depends on the spirit of its citizens, the 
Japanese are trj'ing in every way to stop our spiritual development. 
Christianity in Korea has been recognized as the national religion, 
from which we have learned the meaning of democracy and the 
value of liberty. Since the American missionaries introduced our 
people to the Saviour of the world, the number of Christians has 
groAvn steadily and so fast that there are now more than half a mil- 
lion of people living under the light of life. Thus Christianity is 
playing the most important role in our spiritual development. But 
in Korea Christianity itself is in state of persecution by the Bud- 
dhist or Shintoist rulers. For example, in 1911, about two hun- 
dred of our best Christians were arrested and imprisoned, giving 
the pretext of conspiracy against Terauchi, the then governor- 
general. To every church the Japanese send two or three spies 
to overhear what preachers preach and pray. On the other hand. 
Buddhism, Confucianism and Shintoism are strongly encouraged 
among the Koreans. But finding that this plan, being behind 
time, cannot succeed, they employ and send the Japanese pastors 
to Korea, not to preach but to bend their whole effort in assimila- 
tion. They even force us to worship their King as a God, to our 
greatest pang. 

There is only one newspaper in our own language in Korea, but 
even that is managed and published under Japanese administration. 
Magazines are not allowed: even though it be allowed, it cannot 
give any benefit to Koreans, for the protocols should be carefully 
examined by the police before publishing. 



THE KEAL CHARACTER OF JAPAN 39 

Public meetings are absolutely forbidden in any place and at 
any time. Not a single university nor a library club exists in 
Korea. There are four colleges being run by the government; 
but literature, history and politics are not taught, but merely vo- 
cational education, and they can admit no more than eight or nine 
hundred students. There are only three middle schools, but very 
low graded ; moreover, all the lessons are taught in Japanese. What 
a waste of national ability it is! Their purpose of educating us 
is to enhance our loyalty to their Emperor and not to guide us to 
become good citizens. It is needless to say that bible teaching is 
not allowed in either Christian or non-Christian schools, and Eng- 
lish is prohibited lest the Koreans know the affairs of the world, 
so the Koreans are both "blind" and "deaf" to the current move- 
ments of the world civilization. Under such conditions how can 
you expect the Koreans to be cultivated and uplifted? 

2. Politically. 

It is safe to say that Korea is governed by police and soldiers. 
We have neither rights nor liberty, but the duty of paying taxes. 
There is no safety even for private houses and letters. There is 
neither parliament nor municipality, so the wrongs done by the 
brutal Japanese policy are nowhere to be appealed and redressed. 
All the la\vs and affairs are made and executed by the few Japanese 
officers and no Koreans have any part in it. Thus you can imagine 
what kind of life the Koreans are living. 

3. Economically, 

Co-operation is the fundamental principle of economics, but the 
Japanese do not allow the Koreans to co-operate in developing 
their country. The minimum of capital is placed so high for cor- 
porations by the law that an ordinary Korean cannot afford to start 
it. And in case he can afford to do so, his inexperience will turn 
him out a failure. Thus we have no company or factory that can 
be called a corporation. The Koreans, in this way, are compelled 
to make their living by only cultivating the land. But so many 
Japanese immigrants are coming over every year that very soon all 
the land shall be occupied by them. And for lack of capital no 
mines are allowed to be opened by the Koreans. The Japanese an- 
nounce to the world that they are helping Korea fiancially, but it is 
nominal; on the contrary, they are profiting greatly by exporting 
our national wealth to their country and imposing heavy taxes on 
us. Thus Korea is drained of her money and resources rapidly, 
and difficulty of living has therefore been the inevitable result. 

Understanding that they Cannot Japanize the Koreans, the Japan- 
ese are trying to destroy Korea by these cruel policies, which are 



40 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

their own invention. What is, then, left for Koreans to do? They 
are lost in a maze. Yet they are not despondent and indeed noth- 
ing can discourage them. They are struggling with all their hearts, 
minds and bodies for independence, justice and peace. For this 
we are crying to the conscience of the world, especially to the 
Americans who uphold the grand principles of President Wilson 
that a nation should be ruled in accordance with the consent of 
the governed. As long as Japan practices these cruel policies the 
world peace which Ave so much desire can never be realized. 

In conclusion we declare that we are not conquered, but merely 
only cheated and destroyed by the Japanese falsehood. This same 
falsehood and their imperialism is going to ruin all Asia, not let- 
ting the admirable ideas of President Wilson of peace and democ- 
racy get a foothold in Asia. 

Korea must be redeemed. Democracy must exist in Asia. Now, 
you Americans once guaranteed, in the first treaty between Korea 
and the United States of America some thirty years ago, the inde- 
pendence of Korea. Therefore we appeal to you to help us secure 
this same independence. 

Tlie picture of conditions in Korea given by this memorial 
is not overdrawn. The situation of the native inhabitants 
under Japan 's rule actually is that of serfdom. Yet I do not 
see what can be done about it now, for it scarcely is probable 
that the powers will want to add a new complication of small 
nationalities to the numerous ones in Europe that they al- 
ready have to deal with. Yet in principle the ease of Korea 
is as much entitled to consideration as the case of Jugo-Slavia, 
Poland and Czech-Slavia. It would embarrass Japan exceed- 
ingly to have an inquiry by the conference, or by a commis- 
sion of a league of nations, into her administration of Korea 
and Formosa. The Koreans, muzzled and suppressed as they 
are, nevertheless tried by popular demonstrations in March, 
1919, to attract the attention of civilization to their case. 
"When he sent his inspiring words winging around the world, 
President Wilson probably had little idea where they would 
penetrate or the hopes they would raise among far-away sup- 
pressed peoples. 

The bad state of administration in Japan was empha- 



THE REAL CHARACTER OF JAPAN 41 

sized in 1918 by wide-spread industrial disturbances, by 
strikes, and rioting. The rice riots, so called, had to be sup- 
pressed by the military, with the loss of many lives. The 
Government was alarmed, and took measures to cheapen the 
price and improve the distribution of the food consumed by 
the masses, granting a subsidy for the purpose, Mutterings 
of a social and economic upheaval are frequent in Japan. 
The war prosperity has made many new millionaires, and 
vastljT^ increased the wealth of many former millionaires, but 
it has not improved the condition of the masses ; and with the 
coming of peace a serious economic reaction is feared. 

The status of foreigners in Japan is not understood in the 
"West, Where, however, a good deal is heard about the alleged 
discrimination of some western nations against Japanese on 
''race" grounds. Having given a thorough analysis of the 
Japanese-American emigration question in previous books, 
I shall refer to it only briefly here, to call attention to the 
fact that the laws of Japan, and the administration of justice 
in the courts of Japan (and also wherever Japanese courts 
exercise jurisdiction, as in China), discriminate against for- 
eigners notoriously. Foreigners cannot own real property 
in Japan, and of late years even the right of foreigners to 
do business there has been made largely nominal by the 
enforcement of interpretations and regulations that compel 
them to take Japanese into partnership. As to "race equal- 
ity," Chinese laborers are excluded from Japan, as they are 
from America and other western countries, and for the same 
reasons; and Korean laborers, although now subjects of 
Japan, are not privileged to work there when they compete 
with Japanese. 

It is necessary in this connection to make the point clearly 
that the Japanese Government for years has been using this 
"race" and emigration question as a diplomatic "herring" 
across the trail of world politics. The Japanese Government 
never really presses for an examination and adjustment of 
this question, but the Japanese propaganda harps on it fre- 



42 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

quently for the purpose of raising a dust. This from the 
"Japan Chronicle" of February 13, 1919: 

A little story about Dean Inge has been working its way faithfully 
around tbe English papers, and from time to time turns up in the 
mails. The Dean met a "very interesting and intelligent" Japanese 
one day. It is not very flattering to Japan to think it necessary to 
put in the adjectives as though such qualities were unlooked-for and 
extraordinary, but that by the way. The Dean told his interesting 
and intelligent acquaintance that he thought Japan ought to join the 
League of Nations. On which he was asked, in reply, whether he 
thought that Japan had any call to disarm and join such a League 
when her people were not allowed to enter America and Australia 
as colonists. The Dean said that that was a very difficult point, but 
that he was afraid that the Australian and American workman would 
shrink from no violence to keep the Japanese out. That Chinese 
workmen are excluded from Japan, and that it is easier for a 
Japanese to purchase land in California than for a Californian to 
do so in Japan, — of these things the good Dean was, of course, 
blissfully unaware. 

A point that I frequently have brought out myself in dis- 
cussion of this question, also was clearly stated by the "Japan 
Chronicle" editorially in December, 1918: 

It has been remarked before that Japan uses the exclusion griev- 
ance rather as a diplomatic counter than as an ideal. The assiduity 
which Japanese Consuls abroad display in getting the children of 
Japanese registered as Japanese subjects betokens no very earnest 
desire that Japanese should have the right of naturalisation about 
which so much is heard from time to time. And when it comes to 
demanding that foreigners should have the right to demand privi- 
leges of free entry and land-ownership, the request, if made at the 
Peace Conference and acceded to, would have some curious results. 
For instance, it would give Japanese employers the right to import 
Chinese labour, which they would be very ready to do on account of 
its cheapness and tractability. It would give Chinese the right to 
buy land and engage in agriculture in Japan — a right which at pres- 
ent is most jealously guarded as the exclusive privilege of natives of 
the soil. In a country so well filled as Japan tliere is the minimum 
danger from the competition of foreign labour of any sort, and there 
is far less difference between the wages of the Chinese labourer and 



THE EEAL CHARACTER OF JAPAN 43 

those of the Japanese than there is between those of the Japanese 
and those of the Californian. Yet, though the Japanese are ex- 
tremely exclusive themselves, they work up a fine fever of insulted 
dignity when it is made difficult for them to acquire land in America. 
The Japanese themselves, however, acknowledge the expediency of 
special restrictions on the influx of strangers in sparsely populated 
tracts, for in the famous Foreign Land-ownership Act, which is kept 
for show but not for use, the Hokkaido is specially excluded, appar- 
ently lest any foreigner come in and develop on a large scale. 

There can be little doubt that, were Japan to make her land as 
accessible to strangers as she would like to see that of California, 
there would be serious economic difficulties through Chinese com- 
petition. Nor would her present position abroad be greatly im- 
proved by the concessions demanded. Chinese and Korean compe- 
tition would follow them wherever they went, and while in many 
cases the Japanese by smartness and handiness would be able to win 
their way, they would find freedom for Chinese labour in the coun- 
tries to which they most desire to emigrate a heavier burden than 
the present restrictions on any entry of Asiatics at all. Emigration 
to Korea and Manchuria is not very popular because, in spite of all 
the encouragement given, the advantages offered, and the great pos- 
sibilities of the soil, the Japanese find it very hard to compete 
against the natives. They would not find it less hard if every kind 
of Asiatic from lands just as crowded as Japan were free to enter 
the various Promised Lands along with them. 

I would not give the impression that there is no sentiment 
among Japanese in favor of more liberal political institu- 
tions or of "democratic" institutions. Such sentiment exists 
among a small group of educated men and advanced thinkers, 
but they seldom dare to express those views, and then quali- 
fiedly. Some commentators, however, profess to perceive in 
Japan the stirrings of genuine democratic and constitutional 
inclinations. This alleged disposition became apparent es- 
pecially after the defeat of the Central alliance was certain. 
Writing in the December (1918) number of "Nihon Yujiro 
Nihomjin" (Japan and Japanese), Dr. Yujiro Miyake, one 
of the most inflential editors in Japan, predicted that Ger- 
many's downfall would bring the downfall of the bureaucracy 
in Japan. He wrote-r 



44 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

It is difficult to define what we call bureaucrats in Japan, but 
practically they are those who belong to the Choshu and Satsuma 
clans, having controlling power over the Privy Council and the 
House of Peers as well as to a certain extent over the governmental 
offices. They say that Prince Yamagata leads the Japanese bureau- 
crats, but we say more correctly that a certain number of men lead 
the faction in the name of Prince Yamagata. 

The fundamental idea of Japanese bureaucracy is the superiority 
of government or officials of the government over the people. They 
think that officials are superior to commoners in all respects, so that 
they are always afraid of the appearance of the abler, greater and 
more influential men outside of their own circle. 

The Japanese Army was organized in accordance with the Ger- 
man system. So with Japanese politics, laws, science and every- 
thing else. Thus Japan was Germanized. The admirers of the 
German military system were apt to think that the German political 
system would be the best in the world, just as her military system 
was. The followers of the German science, on the other hand, 
blindly declared that Japan should follow Germany in all depart- 
ments of her national activity. 



"We are, indeed, glad that our countrymen have gradually realized 
their fallacies, as the result of the Allied victory and the downfall 
of German militarism. Amongst all, those of the medical circle 
were first awakened. Except Japanese physicians of an older 
generation, who still stick to the German method, men of the 
younger generations are now looking for the source of their learn- 
ings in France, England and America. Next, the militarv circle 
is awakening, slowlj" though, and Japanese military authorities now 
recognize the strength of the French Army. But it may take some 
time before they realize fully why the British and American armies 
are strong and useful. 

The last to awaken are those of the political circle, especially 
the bureacrats. They are now struck dumb with amazement. They 
now have no time to think over the situation. Indeed, the change 
is too great and too astonishing to them. We are earnestly await- 
ing the time when they will finally realize the whole thing. But, 
is it possible? We are glad, however, that the people have already 
awakened. They do not see the bureaucrats with the same eyes 
with which the bureaucrats see them. The general situation has 
changed, no matter whether militarists or bureaucrats are stiU 
dreaming their old dreams. 



THE REAL CHARACTER OF JAPAN 45 

The illusions about Japan which have been, and still are 
to a great extent, prevalent in western countries are due to 
a combination of causes and circumstances, but the chief 
reason for them has been the propaganda conducted in west- 
ern countries, indeed throughout the whole world, by the 
Japanese Government. As an English writer put it some 
years ago, Japan is past-master of the art of "window-dress- 
ing." The task of Japan's national propaganda has been 
to "window dress" that country, its national characteristics, 
institutions, ideals, purposes, and acts. Its success has been 
remarkable. As an example of this "window-dressing," take 
the Japanese railways in Korea and Manchuria. They were 
equipped with the latest American cars, Pullmans and diners. 
At all places where tourists are likely to stop, the railways 
have built and operate good hotels. Tourists are amazed to 
find at places like Seoul, Mukden, Dairen, Port Arthur, and 
Changchun, modern hotels, with staffs of well-trained serv- 
ants. They naturally contrast these up-to-date methods with 
conditions on the Chinese government railways, and conclude 
that Japan is progressive and efficient while China is un- 
progressive and inefficient. Tourists do not know, or seldom 
think about those trains and those hotels being Japanese 
national propaganda; that they are run at a heavy loss, the 
deficits being made up by the Japanese Government. 
EquaDy wrong conclusions often are made about the visible 
evidences of Japanese progressiveness in those parts of China 
where Japan has established a firm foothold, as in Manchuria 
and Shantung ; or what transpires in Korea and Formosa be- 
hind the screen of obvious material development. 

I believe that the Japanese Government is sincere in some of 
its professions of changes of policy made since the downfall of 
the Central alliance: tut it is merely a change of policy, not 
a chavge of heart. Moreover, it is a change of policy not 
from moral conviction, but for expediency and under com- 
pulsion, or the fear of^ompulsion. Japan's foreign friend- 
ships go whatever way her advantage lies, or in some phases 



46 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

her friendship moves in the line of which nation she fears; 
that is, Japan is inclined to li^ie up with power. She was be- 
coming' indifferent to the friendship and opinion of America 
while America was relatively weak among the powers, or was 
considered so. She began again to value the friendship and 
opinion of America from the moment it was evident that 
America would become formidable in a naval and military- 
way, which would give force in world politics to the vast eco- 
nomic resources and man power and wealth of America. 

In a private memorandum which I wrote in the autumn 
of 1917, in connection of certain remarks made to me by 
Viscount Motono, then Japanese minister of foreign affairs, 
I said: 

Thus, for the first time since the writer has had a knowledge of 
Eastern conditions, the United States really holds the balance of 
power in that region, if it chooses to exercise it. The dependence 
of France and England on America in bringing an end of the war 
in their favor makes those nations amenable to just suggestions 
from America relating to the Eastern question. 

As to Japan's sincerity in her present professions of a change of 
policy in China, it should not be forgotten why she has changed 
and what caused her to change; nor should there be any relaxation 
of the conditions that give power over and pressure on her. Even 
if it is taken for true that the statements given by Viscount Motono 
to me represent a genuine and sincere reversal of attitude, it must 
be borne in mind that as yet this reversal is only in attitude, and is 
not yet translated into practice. Moreover, it should not be pre- 
sumed that even a genuine reversal of opinion by a small group of 
Japanese statesmen can at once undo with the mass psychology of 
the Japanese nation the results of years of cultivation of a totally 
different thesis of national power and expansion. The Japanese, 
having for a generation been taught to dream of imperial power 
and expansion by the sword, will not at once mentally consent to 
accept a comparatively minor place in the world: for there can be 
hardly any doubt, if disarmament comes and nations hereafter must 
develop according to peaceful economic laws, that such a condition 
will consign Japan to be a second or third class nation. Therefore, 
whatever Japanese statesmen and propaganda may utter now, it 
must l)e kept in mind that their hearts have not changed, and that 
it will take years before they will become reconciled to accept a 



THE KEAL CHARACTER OF JAPAN 47 

lesser place in the world than their own exaggerated ambitions and 
the fulsome compliments of western writers have taught them to 
aspire to. During this period of readjustment it can be expected 
that, secretly, they will constantly be plotting and planning to gain 
advantage along the line of their old [Prussian] theorem of na- 
tional expansion, and only constant vigilance will be able to hold 
them in cheek. 

The Japanese Government's subsequent policy in China 
showed hovr accurately I estimated its alleged change of 
heart in 1917. 

Japan's attitude to a league of nations eventually w^ill 
depend on what such a league turns out to be. If the idea 
is adopted by the principal Allied powers, then Japan also 
will accept it, at least temporally, for she would be isolated 
otherwise. One thing is clear: if such a league enforces 
proportional disarmament, Japan will be very much cha- 
grined, and will evade those provisions if she can. Already 
the expressions of Japanese statesmen and officials distinctly 
foreshadow that attitude. For to reduce her armaments 
materially will . deprive Japan of her only genuine title to 
rank as a ''power." Marquis Okuma, when he last was 
premier of Japan, in 1915, wrote in "Shin Nijon": 
"Diplomacy, to be really effective and successful, must be 
backed up by sufficient national strength. It is only ten 
or fifteen years since Japanese diplomacy began to carry 
weight with foreign countries, and it began from the time 
that western powers commenced to recognize Japan's mili- 
tary strength." 

The Japanese Government to-day, notwithstanding the 
Great War, its outcome and its lessons, cannot conceive inter- 
national politics carried on except by the old methods and 
gaged by the old reckonings. It will be many years before 
Japan, as well as Germany, actually can revise her national 
character to accept and meet new conditions. 



CHAPTER III 

japan's policy in the great war 

A devious course — A policy of opportunism — How it was circum- 
scribed — Japan's rating of other nations — '"Powers" and lesser nations 
— America not a "power" — Why Japan entered the war — Not so obli- 
gated by Anglo-Japanese Alliance — ^No quarrel with or hostility to 
Germany — Japan's forehandedness in declaring war — Her motives an- 
alyzed — Periods of Japan's war policy — Its various motivations — Gov- 
erned by expediency and opportunity — Lessons of the war — Making 
Japan's army and navy obsolete — How foreigners in the East view Japan 
— Destruction of former international standards — The anti-British agi- 
tation in Japan — Control of publicity by the Government — Secret diplo- 
macy in wartime — The secret treaty with Russia — Putting pressure on 
her allies — Using the German entente possibility — Oblique methods — 
The veto of events — Entrance of America in the Avar — The Russian rev- 
olution — A German-Russo-Japanese entente — Count Terauchi's views — 
Baron Goto's opinions — Pro-German sentiment in Japan — Japan's posi- 
tion at the peace conference — What she really wants — Fear of political 
and moral isolation — The question of Kiaochou. 

JAPAN'S course during the war was so devious and at 
times so oblique that only by keeping clearly in mind 
its ruling motive is her policy comprehensible. That 
ruling motive was imperial aggrandizement. 

"When hostilities began, the Japanese Government probably 
may have been surprised at the suddenness of the outbreak, 
but it was not caught unprepared. Such a situation, while 
perhaps not actually expected to happen soon, lonii' had been 
calculated on; just as in Europe the German Government 
had every possibility of the situation there checked up and an 
orderly plan ready-made to handle it. Japanese statesmen 
were fully apprised (far better than, for instance, the Ameri- 
can Government was) of the exact niceties of the balance of 
power in Europe; how the nations probably would take sides 
according to their different interests, ambitions, compulsions, 

48 



JAPAN'S POLICY IN THE GREAT WAR 49 

and alliances ; and the military preparations and resources of 
all of them. In the event of a great European war, the Jap- 
anese Government had previously calculated the resultant 
situation and how it would affect Japan's own imperial aims. 
The writings and other utterances of leading Japanese states- 
men, publicists, professors, and military experts within the 
last twenty years reveal this unmistakably. 

Japan's imperial opportunity, with Europe occupied and 
exhausting itself in a gigantic war, of course was quite defi- 
nitely circumscribed by geographical and other conditions. 
Although many Japanese writers and some politicians in- 
dulged in, and at times gave expression to, wild dreams of 
world dominion, practical Japanese statesmanship confined 
its plans within limits. Looking eastward, the probability of 
acquisition did not extend beyond some islands in the Pacific. 
Looking to the south, Japan had very definitely included the 
Dutch East Indies within the scope of her possible expansion. 
Siberia contained distinct possibilities But incomparably the 
greatest field for Japan's imperial expansion lay to the west, 
in China. 

With respect to the conditions by which Japan's imperial 
expansion program could be worked out, Japanese statesman- 
ship naturally was guided by the generally accepted tenets of 
diplomacy and military science as they were held when the 
great war began and by the status and characteristics of 
nations as they existed then. Certain nations were classed 
as "powers," and the other nations were variously graded 
as second class, third class, trailing off into weak and backward 
states and uncivilized peoples. By Japan's computation (I 
have seen a confidential memorandum giving the rating of 
nations as calculated by the Japanese army and navy staffs 
in 1912) the United States was rated a second-class nation, 
not as a power. The powers were, first, Germany ; then. Great 
Britain, Russia, and France, and of course Japan herself. 
The United States was not rated as a power, because that 
nation had hardly any army, and its navy was not being kept 



50 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

up. It is evident that Japan then expected that the cult 
known as paciHsin would be able to control the military and 
naval policies of the United States. Japanese statesmen and 
thinkers — many of their writings show this — also were count- 
ing on the extension of the voting suffrage to women in Amer- 
ica further to weaken the fighting impulses of our nation and 
to place it permanently among the weaker nations. As to 
military and naval power, these were estimated according to 
the existing ideas of the experts as to tactics, arms, and the 
elements of military strength. 

Among the powers Japan had an open alliance with one 
of the greatest of them, Great Britain, which applied to the 
far East and India, It has been generally believed in Amer- 
ica, and also elsewhere, that Japan entered the war because 
she was required to do so by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 
That is not correct, although at the time it entered the war 
and for some time afterward the Japanese Government dis- 
tinctly gave out that impression. This attitude was main- 
tained as long as it served Japan 's purposes ; but later, after 
America had entered the war and was aiding the cause of the 
Allies in an unselfish way, an attempt was made to show that 
Japan had entered the war solely from motives of lofty prin- 
ciple. In a speech made at Boston on the Fourth of July, 
1917, Viscount Ishii, then on a special mission to America, 
stated definitely that Japan was not obligated to enter the 
war by the terms of the alliance with Great Britain, but had 
done so because she recognized the peril to the world which 
a victory of Germany would bring. This habit of the Japa- 
nese Government of adapting its announced motives to suit 
the circumstances is very well exposed by some editorial com- 
ment of the "Japan Chronicle": 

Viscount Ishii, of course, is making [in America] just the sort of 
speeches that is liked by people who like that sort of thing. His 
ascription of the rumours of a Japanese-German rapprochement to 
German intrigue is rather hard on Mr. Gregory Mason, as the fa- 
mous interview with Count Terauchi is the only thing in the way of 



JAPAN'S POLICY IN THE GREAT WAR 51 

such a rumour that has been heard for some time. Two years ago, 
Viscount Ishii suggested to the American Ambassador as directly as 
he could that Germany was at the bottom of every mischief -making 
rumour, and now he makes the remarkable statement that in mid- 
Pacific his slumbers were disturbed by the question, "Are you going 
into alliance with Germany?" There must be Germans concealed 
under the bunks in the trans-Pacific liners to disturb the thoughts of 
passengers with evil suggestions — ^something like the serpent whis- 
pering in the ear of the sleeping Eve. However, perhaps, like the 
serpent, the voice that disturbed the Viscount was only an allegory. 
What IS a good deal more interesting is that Viscount Ishii stated 
in his Fourth of July speech that there was nothing in the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance which compelled Japan to participate in the war. 
That is the view that has always seemed obvious, though some of 
the highest authorities have declared that Japan entered the war "in 
accordance with the obligations of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty." 
When, on one occasion, we pointed out that had participation been 
obligatory under the treaty Japan would have come in automatically 
instead of coming in only contingently after Germany had rejected 
the terms of her ultimatum, we were very severely admonished in the 
Japanese press, and the terms of the declaration of war were quoted 
to show how malicious we were. But here is Viscount Ishii officially 
repudiating the obligation ! It is of course all the more creditable to 
Japan that no treaty obligation was needed, but that is not how 
many prominent Japanese have regarded the matter hitherto. 

The circumstances through which Japan entered the war 
were extensively considered in a previous book of mine ("Our 
Eastern Question," 1916), and the subject is given further 
mention later in this work. At this point I am only trying 
to disclose the obscurantism of Japan's diplomacy relating to 
the war. It can be taken now as officially established that 
Japan did not enter the war because required so to do by the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Therefore, when war started in 
Europe, Japan had no quarrel with Germany and no apparent 
cause to go to war against her. Germany had given to Japan 
absolutely no provocation for war that ever has been dis- 
closed. So if Japan then decided to make war on Germany 
it was for some purpose of her own that was not connected 
with the causes of the w^r in Europe, except that the war in 



52 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

Europe gave Japan an opportunity to attack nations safely 
that otherwise she would not have ventured to assail. The 
great war made it possible for Japan to take possession of such 
possessions as Germany had in the Pacific Ocean and in China 
before they could be taken by the nations already at war 
against Germany. As a matter of fact, the possibility that 
Japan would seize this opportunity was not overlooked by 
the Allied powers. In order to forestall a British occupation 
of the German islands in the Pacific, a Japanese naval force 
was despatched to occupy them before an answer was received 
to Japan's ultimatum to Germany, and the arrival of the 
naval squadron was immediately followed by a number of 
Japanese merchant ships loaded with Japanese immigrants 
and their possessions prepared for permanent settlement. A 
reckoning of the speed of these ships, and taking the time of 
their arrival at the islands, shows that they must have left 
Japan before the declaration of war against Germany. That 
was forehandedness quite up to the Prussian standard, and 
almost equal in efficiency to Japan's forehandedness in at- 
tacking Russia, in 1904, before severing diplomatic relations. 
Japan's motives were obvious enough to those who under- 
stand far Eastern conditions. There were some desirable pos- 
sessions of a nation engaged in the European war lying easily 
accessible to a Japanese occupation. The alinement of the 
powers in the war clearly indicated that within a few months 
Germany would be cut off from the sea because of the great 
naval preponderance of the nations arrayed against her ; and 
then in due course the Caroline and Marshall islands, and 
possibly Tsingtau too, would fall into the hands of one of the 
European allies. Japan did not want that to happen, and 
neither did she want the Kiaochou leasehold to revert to 
China if there was a possibility of obtaining it for herself. 
To seize the German possessions in the Pacific and China of 
course required Japan to declare war on Germany. Japan 
had no hostility to Germany. Quite the contrary, for of all 
Western nations the Japanese, especially the governing class, 



JAPAN'S POLICY IN THE GREAT WAR 53 

admired Germany the most. Furthermore, most Japanese 
military experts believed that Germany ultimately would win 
the war. In that case it would be possible after the war for 
'Japan to adjust matters with Germany by negotiation; she 
could take chances on that. Meanwhile there was virtually 
no danger in taking over Germany's possessions in China and 
the Pacific. That was the reasoning of Japanese statesman- 
ship on the question of participation in the war, as was con- 
clusively demonstrated by the circumstances and by Japan's 
subsequent actions. 

It is possible now, moreover, to get some perspective on the 
motives of Japan at the beginning of the war by revelations 
that are constantly being made of what she hopes to obtain 
in the peace terms. This volume could be filled with quota- 
tions from the writings and speeches of Japanese statesmen, 
leading educators, politicians, and publicists on these ques- 
tions ; but I shall take as a typical view one recently expressed 
by a leading member of the Diet. I quote from an editorial 
of the "Japan Chronicle" of December 26, 1918: 

Imperialism and aggression, which were to come to an end with 
this war, have seldom received more frank expression — not even by 
Treitsehke and Bemhardi — than in the speech which Mr. Hamada, 
Vice-President of the House of Representatives, recently dehvered 
at a meeting in Hyogo of the Kokuminto. As reported by Japanese 
papers, Mr. Hamada said that at the Peace Conference Japan's 
attention must be directed to questions relating to the permanent 
possession of the South Sea Islands now under occupation, the secur- 
ing of rights and interests in Tsingtau, and the control of the Chi- 
nese Eastern Railway. He admitted that if the principle of no- 
indemnities and no-annexations, which he wrongly attributed to 
President Wilson, were endorsed by the Peace Conference, it would 
be difficult to carry these points. Still, he thought that if Japan's 
delegates were sufficiently persistent, they might be able to accom- 
plish all that Japan required. As America had a scheme of naval 
expansion, which in his opinion was designed with a view to counter- 
acting the influence of the British navy, so Japan must expand her 
navy to counterbalance the navy of America. Apparently, in Mr. 
Hamada's opinion, this project would receive the support of Britain, 
and thus Japan's object of extending her territory would be attained, 



54 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

for such a scheme of naval expansion would make it imperative for 
Japan to retain possession of the South Sea Islands as a naval sta- 
tion. With unabashed cynicism, and apparently with that strange 
confidence often shown that Japanese is a secret and unknown 
tongue, he went on to suggest how Japan's promise to retrocede 
Tsingtau might be kept in the letter without affecting the ultimate 
aim of establishing Japanese control. Tsingtau, he said, "may be 
retroceded to China, so far as formality is concerned, . . . but steps 
must at the same time be taken to arrange with China for keeping 
the territory as a base for the Japanese fleet and succeeding to all 
the rights and interests possessed by Germany prior to the war." 
Aganist what menace is this Japanese naval station on the Chinese 
coast to be maintained? Is America the enemy or is it China that 
must be kept in subjection? Mr. Hamada, Vice-President of the 
House of Representatives, confines himself to the declaration that 
these steps are necessary for Japan's national defence and her eco- 
nomic development in China. Furthermore, it is essential in his 
opinion for Japan to take control of the Chinese Eastern Railway 
"for the purpose of Japan's national defence," just as the Germans 
in 1871 annexed Alsace-Lorraine in order that the frontier of the 
Fatherland might be rendered safe. Mr. Hamada claimed that the 
dispatch of Japanese troops to Siberia justified her claim to the 
control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and that if she failed to 
secure it "her intervention in Siberia was at once meaningless and 
a failure." Of any idea that the expedition was to assist the Allies 
by extirpating German influence in Siberia and suppressing the 
thousands of German prisoners of whom so much was heard prior 
to the expedition, there is no evidence at all in Mr. Hamada's speech. 
In his view the Siberian campaign was undertaken by Japan to 
obtain certain territorial and economic advantages, and he scolds the 
Kenseikai for opposing an expedition that had such objects in view. 

The view expressed by this important member of the Diet 
is not exceptional, but beyond doubt expresses the real senti- 
ments of a great majority of politieall}^ intelligent Japanese, 
and it is the view expressed by at least ninety per cent, of 
published comments on these topics of leading Japanese and 
the Japanese press in the course of the war. 

With such motives and objects, Japan's war policy became 
subject solely to expediency as applied to those motives and 
objects, which is to say that it varied according to cireum- 



JAPAN'S POLICY IN THE GREAT WAR 55 

stances. The variations of the policy can be comprehended 
by dividing it into periods, which I differentiate as follows: 

(a) Period of military calculation on old lines. 

(b) Period of direct intimidation of China. 

(c) Period of comprehension of the part of resources, indus- 
try, and finance in modern war. 

(d) Effects of these developments on Japanese political 
thought. 

(e) Period of belief in a victory of Germany. 

(f) Anti-British period. 

(g) Entrance of America into the war. 
(h) The collapse of Russia. 

(i) Period of pot-hunting and claim-jumping in China. 

(j) Period of Siberian developments. 

(k) The collapse of autocracy. 

These so-called periods, or some of them, more or less over- 
lapped one another, yet each represents a distinguishable 
phase of Japanese political opinion and motivation with re- 
gard to the war. The progress of military operations in 
Europe soon revealed that many theories of tactics and arma- 
ment upon which the previously existing military organiza- 
tions were predicated must be relegated in favor of new tactics 
and appliances. The war was scarcely two years old when it 
became evident that Japan's army and navy were out of date. 
That of course could be remedied in time ; meanwhile the coun- 
try had been drained of surplus supplies, arms, and muni- 
tions to sell them to Russia. But the thing that impressed 
Japanese statesmen more strongly was the demonstration that 
no nation lacking ample supplies of certain raw materials, and 
an efficient and highly specialized economic organization, could 
hope successfully to wage war against nations possessing those 
resources. In short, Japanese e^tperts began to understand 
that according to the new standards Japan was not a power, 
but in reality was a second-class nation. How was this to be 
remedied? The chief elements of national sufficiency on a 
modern war-making basis are not possessed by Japan within 



56 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

her present territories. They are possessed by China, and 
also are to be found in Siberia. Incidentally they exist in 
some degree in the Philippines; but acquisition of those is- 
lands by Japan has been dismissed as a possibility since the 
demonstration of America's war-making strength. These con- 
siderations gave fresh impetus to Japan's Asian continental 
policy, and caused her to extend efforts to control the iron, 
coal, and oil resources of China and Siberia. 

I think it will be interesting and illuminating to insert at 
this place some extracts from a letter — the italics are mine — 
written in 1918 by a leading American resident in China to a 
friend in the United States. I withhold the names of the 
writer and the recipient, but vouch for the authenticity of the 
letter : 

Several months have passed since my last letter to you because I 
have taken it for granted that your thoughts and interests must be 
concentrated upon the more decisively important events at home and 
in Europe; but while the attention of the western world has been 
absorbed in that struggle, the East has been undergoing a no less 
important development of its own : or rather, Japan has been taking 
full advantage of the critical situation of her allies, first, to demand 
and obtain a comparative free hand in the Extreme East and par- 
ticularly in China, and secondly, to use this advantage to her own 
exclusive benefit in obvious detriment to China especially and 
scarcely less so to the dominant nations of the West. Japan has 
worked assiduously and skillfully, but the factor which above all 
(except her geographical propinquity, her instinctive understanding 
of Asiatic psychology and her detachment from the West) has given 
her temporary superiority over the white races is the utter unscrupii- 
lousness and the lack of all principle which characterize her policy 
and actions, together with her willingness and ability to face and 
deal with men and facts as they are, and not (as we Americans are 
so apt to do) as we would like to believe them. Neither in the minds 
of Japan's leaders nor in the public opinion of the nation as a ivhole 
has there yet been developed any trace of international honor, or of 
that altruism towards weak or subject nations which is so striking a 
feature of our own foreign policy. 

Japan's rise from Medisevalism is too recent, and in the twentieth 
century she presents the interesting spectacle of a pirate nation, 
pursuing a purely opportunist policy — a striking counterpart here 



JAPAN'S POLICY IN THE GREAT WAR 57 

in the East to the role which Germany has played during the pres- 
ent generation m the West. In fact, so similar have been the policies 
which have actuated both those nations that it is startling until we 
remember that throughout her entire modern rise Japan has taken 
Germany as her pattern and has founded her present structure on 
an essentially Prussian model. It would be easy and not uninter- 
esting to trace the parallel between modern Prussianism and modern 
Japan : not merely in military and naval affairs, but in the entire 
system and principle of government; in the federal control of 
education, warped and twisted to unprincipled national aims and 
which eliminates free thought and internal criticism; in the making 
of treaties with the mental reservation to adhere only to such of the 
provisions as w^ould be clear advantage to itself and to disregard 
them utterly when it might seem advantageous to do so, and with true 
Prussian disregard of all restraining morality; and, among other 
things by the conduct of a very expensive and insidious propaganda 
in foreign countries. 

In this last Japan has far surpassed her teacher, probably because 
of a more acute realization of the difficulty of the task; and it is in 
America where the Japanese propaganda has been most active and 
where, so far as we can judge, it has been mai^^elously successful. 
. . . The Japanese propaganda constitutes a danger more subtle but 
of scarcely less importance to America and the white races — to what 
we might call the whole corpus of Anglo-Saxon political philoso- 
phy — than that which we are now combating openly in Europe; and 
to the success of this propaganda America seems to lend itself easily, 
almost greedily, by its comfortable pacifism and especially by its lack 
of interest and lack of fixed and continuing policy in foreign affairs, 
aided to an extent by certain American business interests the suc- 
cess of whose immediate plans in Japan or connected with Japan 
would be endangered by any diminution of cordiality. Americans 
are inclined to believe only what they want to believe (or at least 
so it seems to us out here), and accept with eagerness every verbal 
protestation of Japan's friendship and good will, and even of her 
altruism toward China and good faith toward her allies in far East- 
ern affairs; and the times when these protestations become more 
frequent and more fulsome almost always indicate the times when 
Japan's actions to the contrary are more obvious and drastic. The 
soothing vapourings of Ishii, for instance, in reference to develop- 
ments in China and Japan's attitude thereto are so diametrically 
opposed to the truth as to cause utter incredulity among Americans 
here that they could possibly be taken seriously at home. 

Japan's influence in ihe American press is easier to understand. 



58 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

The influence of some few papers (possibly the ) may have 

been bought outright. An American editor of national iniluenee 
■who passed through the East a few months ago stated privately 
that he was made a definite oft'er of $200,000 to promote in America 
the interests of Japan, it being specially explained to him that he 
would be asked to print no lies made out of the whole cloth, but only 
to suppress, minimize, or to explain away everything unfavorable to 
Japan, and at the same time to feature in a skillful manner what- 
ever might tend to increase American confidence and trust in Japan. 
If Japan had gone no further her methods would merely have been 
of Prussian crudeness, but her skill lay in the campaign whicli had 
preceded the offer. Before this editor had left the United States, 
before he had even contemplated the trip, he began to meet, appar- 
ently by chance, an increasing number of Japanese and Americans 
who had traveled in Japan, who persuaded him that the distrust of 
Japan was due merely to racial antagonism and to the misunder- 
standing resulting from mutual ignorance, and that he would per- 
form a very real service for America and for tbe peace of the world 
by going to Japan and making himself an authority on the whole 
far Eastern question. During his stay in Japan he was received 
with the simply charming hospitality which the Japanese accord to 
all foreigners of any possible influence, and was apparently given 
access to all shades of Japanese opinion. ... It was all done with 
German thoroughness of detail and with Japanese skill, and, man of 
broad training as he was, he was led to convince himself that he 
would be doing a patriotic duty as an American to conduct his 
paper on a pro-Japanese policy. There was no hint of a bribe in 
the way the financial offer was made; and it was only after he left 
Japan that he was able mentally to orient himself. . . . The pro- 
Japanese policy of the for many years is believed to have 

had its origin in the captivating hospitality and courtesy showered 

on when he visited Japan. No one who knew him even by 

his Avritings supposes for a second that he was bribed. ... In 
Japan (another example of Prussian thoroughness) there is a highly 
organized system for the entertainment and proper instruction of 
prominent foreign tourists. The most dangerous, because the most 
misinformed person, is the tourist who has spent a few weeks in 
Japan. Many foreigners have fallen easy prey to this method, 

notably , who was decorated with the Sacred Treasure 

for advocating in America a Japanese trusteeship for China. . . . 
The latest activity of Japan's propaganda was her effort to secure 
the consent of the otlier allied Powers for an exclusive Japanese in- 
tervention in Siberia, which, were she once in possession she would 



JAPAN'S POLICY IN THE GREAT WAR 59 

never let go, and which would place her in direct touch with Russia 
and Germany, and thus in a position to extort new benefits for her- 
self from her present allies, and eventually to consolidate a Russian- 
German-Japanese alliance. This is far from being an idle dream, 
or the nightmare of a Japanophobe. By many of the sanest students 
of the far East it is regarded as the greatest menace of the imme- 
diate future. It is well known that Japan keeps in close touch with 
Berlin, ready perhaps to switch over at any time it would advantage 
her to do so ; a policy of extorting benefits from the Allies to remain 
with them while playing with Germany by remaining inactive. Out 
here it is believed that America's entrance prevented such a shift by 
Japan at the time of the Russian collapse. 

Following the realization that the war was destroying many 
of the formerly accepted standards of comparative military 
and naval power, came a generally accepted belief among 
Japanese, and in the Japanese Government, that the Central 
powers would win the war. The Japanese Government was 
not at all dismayed by that possibility; in fact, one scarcely 
can doubt that they would have preferred such an outcome to 
an Allied victory, although a stalemate of mutual exhaustion, 
with its comparative augmentation of Japan's military power 
and international influence, probably would be preferred to 
any other result. "With Europe exhausted and divided into 
two comparatively equal groups of hostile nations, Japan's 
diplomatic position would be much enhanced because of her 
increased value to whatever side she would decide to ally her- 
self. 

AVith that contingency in view, it became evident that the 
existing Anglo-Japanese Alliance might become an embarrass- 
ment, for it would cripple Japan's freedom to make new 
arrangements provided the result of the war should make such 
a course expedient and advantageous. These, it hardly can be 
doubted, were the ideas and motives that actuated the remark- 
able wave of anti-British sentiment and criticism which per- 
vaded Japan in 1915 and extended into 1916. I gave consid- 
erable attention to this topic in my last previous book ("Our 
Eastern Question ")7 and I shall limit reference to it here to 



60 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

some quotations from ''The Far East Unveiled," by Frederic 
Coleman, F.R.G.S., published in 1918. Mr. Coleman was dur- 
ing almost the whole period of the war an important agent 
of British war propaganda, and he twice visited the far East 
on that mission. His full reports to the British Government 
would be interesting, and his two books containing his observa- 
tions may be taken to represent such matter as the British 
Government desired or was willing to have published during 
the war. In the chapter entitled, "An Anti-British Cam- 
paign, ' ' Mr. Coleman wrote : 

"No Englishman will ever forget the anti-British campaign in the 
Japanese press when Britain was fighting for her life." 

The speaker was one of the most prominent Englishmen in the far 
East. His voice vibrated with emotion as he spoke, though his tone 
was low and his manner quiet and thoughtful. I knew that he was 
not given to impulsive and careless utterances. 

"I have been given to understand by prominent Japanese," I said, 
"that the press campaign that criticized England so severely and 
advocated the abrogation or sweeping revision of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance emanated from and was conducted by a most irresponsible 
section of the press." 

"That is not true," was the reply. "The paper that began the 
business was 'The Yamato,' a Tokio paper that certainly could not 
be termed a particularly influential one. But the rest of the press 
of Tokio, with hardly an exception, joined in the hue and erv^ Are 
you surprised that we felt it deeply? Is it not natural that we 
should look for friendly sympathy from an ally at a time when we 
were engrossed in a struggle for our very existence? Is it to be 
wondered that when we received a stab in the back, instead of the 
support for which we had a right to look, the knife should go deep 
and leave a nasty scar?" 

That those unfamiliar with the press campaign that caused so 
much heartburning among the more thoughtful of the English resi- 
dents of Japan may grasp its full meaning, I quote the following 
paragraphs from a pamphlet of English authorship published in 
Tokio as an answer to a Japanese magazine article on the subject. 

"Article VI, of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement says, 'The present 
Agreement will remain in force for ten years (from 1911).' The 
same Article continues: 'If when the date for its expiration ar- 



JAPAN'S POLICY IN THE GREAT "WAR 61 

rives, either Ally is engaged in war the Alliance shall continue until 
peace is declared.' Nothing would seem to be plainer. 

"The ordinary newspaper reader throughout the world interprets 
the present agitation in Japan for the abrogation of the Anglo- . 
Japanese Agreement as: 

"(1) An attempt to get rid of an Agreement which has not run 
for more than half the number of years contracted for. 

"(2) An attempt to get rid of it in war time, which it had been 
expressly agreed should not be done. 

"(3) An attempt to get rid of it because some Japanese think 
that Japan could do better for herself in China if no Agreement 
existed. 

"(4) An attempt to get rid of it because some Japanese think 
Great Britain is not doing well in the war or is not going to do 
well. In other words, that the attitude of the Japanese will be dif- 
ferent when the British na\'y wipes out the German fleet, or when 
Germany is driven from France. 

"(5) An attempt to get rid of it which continued for many 
months without, apparently', being reproved." 

The Japanese I talked with admitted that an anti-British press 
campaign, advocating openly the abrogation or revolutionary revi- 
sion of the Anglo- Japanese treaty, took place in Japan when Britain 
was at war. But they minimized the importance of the papers that 
took part in it, declared it was aimed against the English in the far 
East rather than against Britain as a power, and said the obscure 
press was out from under any real control and not worth bothering 
one's head about. 

The Englishmen in Japan did not pass over the subject so lightly. 
The quieter the Englishman the more deeply he felt the disloyalty 
of the attack. 

The fact that the campaign took place did not tend to better feel- 
ing between English and Japanese in the far East. That is a pity, 
for the feeling, without such extraneous aids to make it bitter, was 
quite sufficiently unsjinpathetic one for the other. 

No person who is familiar with the conditions and regula- 
tions under which newspapers are published in Japan credits 
for a moment the assertion that the anti-British agitation in 
Japan during the war was made against the wishes of the 
Government. Those who criticized the alliance with Great 



62 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

Britain and advocated its repeal or drastic revision included 
prominent Japanese politicians, leading educators, men prom- 
ment in business, and even some men in the Government. The 
control of the Japanese Government over the press in Japan 
is virtually absolute in peace as well as in war. Editions of 
newspapers frequently are suppressed for the most trivial in- 
fractions of regulations, for actions that arbitrarily are con- 
strued by the authorities to infract regulations, or in some 
cases for alleged infractions of regulations that never have 
been issued. Nearly every newspaper in Japan has a "jail 
editor," a Japanese employed to take responsibility for its 
infractions of the regulations and suffer the penalty. Within 
the last twelve months a foreign editor in Japan has been 
convicted and sentenced to prison for publishing an extract 
from a foreign newspaper discussing political institutions in 
Japan. As an example, of which I could give hundreds, of 
how the Japanese Government controls publicity in Japan, 
take the following editorial comment of "The Japan Chron- 
icle": 

By an unfortunate coincidence, in the same issue in which we were 
telegraphically informed that Viscount Ishii [in America] once 
more declared Japan to be using her efforts to attain an interna- 
tional democracy, there appeared a paragraph reporting a sequel to 
the Tagawa ease. Now in that ease it is very difficult to see any 
tendency towards the extension of democracy in Japan, whatever 
may be wished internationally. Mr. Tagawa, M. P., who was 
Under-Secretary to the Judicial Department in the Okuma Adminis- 
tration, wrote an article criticising the Genro for interfering in the 
selection of a new Cabinet, which Mr. Tagawa maintained was an 
Imperial prerogative. The article was temperate in tone and to 
most people would appear a moderate essay on a constitutional 
issue. Nevertheless Mr. Tagawa was prosecuted and sentenced to a 
term of five months' imprisonment, which was finally confirmed by 
the Court of Cassation. A number of his friends, including Mr. 
Ozaki Yukio, formerly Minister for Justice, thereupon contributed 
to a Tokyo magazine a series of appreciations of Mr. Tagawa's 
character. This has offended the authorities, and the Editor of the 
magazine has been called to the Procurator's Office for examination, 



JAPAN'S POLICY IN THE GREAT WAR 63 

the expectation being that a prosecution will ensue on a charge of 
defending a criminal. 

The inference is that in Japan it is not only illegal to criticise 
the Elder Statesmen for what is, rightly or wrongly, regarded as 
unconstitutional action, but dangerous to express sympathy with one 
who has been sentenced to imprisonment for the use of very elemen- 
tary rights of free speech. 

We should be glad to find Viscount Ishii delivering an essay to 
Americans on the principles of democracy as illustrated by the 
Tagawa ease. Probably if his attention were directed to it he 
would say that it was all part of the German intrigue to divide the 
Allies. In this category we must place the San Francisco school 
trouble, the alien land laws in certain States, and the Twenty-One 
Demands on China by Japan. The Germans are certainly a won- 
derful people. 

All the Englishmen v^ith whom T have discussed the anti- 
British agitation in Japan are emphatically of the opinion 
that it was instigated and privately steered by the Japanese 
Government, which suppressed it when it had served the pur- 
pose it was designed for. That purpose was to impress upon 
Great Britain and the Allies in Europe that it was necessary 
to satisfy Japan in order to hold her vnth the Allies. The 
military situation in Europe at that time was especially favor- 
able to enable Japan to put this psychological pressure on her 
allies. Russia's military strength had been broken, Serbia 
had been crushed, the Dardanelles expedition had failed, and 
the Central alliance had been strengthened by the addition 
of Bulgaria. Germany without apparent difficulty was hold- 
ing her own on the western front and was able to make steady 
headway on the eastern front. There was little visible pros- 
pect of an acquisition of strength to the Allies that would 
change the balance in their favor. (Japan might have sup- 
plied it, but had no thought of doing so.) As regarded by 
Japanese, America was incurably pacific and would not enter 
the war under any provocation. Moreover, the Japanese Gov- 
ernment knew about the secret agreements that were being 
made among the European Allied governments, whereby the 
demands of Russia, and later of Italy, were conceded by 



64 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

Prance and Great Britain, in return for concessions or mili- 
tary support. If Russia and Italy could press for acquisitory 
gains in the event of a victory of the Allies and as compensa- 
tion for participation in the war, why should not Japan also 
take advantage of the predicament of Europe to obtain her 
bit? 

To Japanese in general, and also to Japanese statesmen, the 
moral issues of the war as voiced by European statesmen were 
merely political platitudes uttered under pressure of expedi- 
ency, and for effect upon the common sort of mankind and 
neutral nations, and which bore slight relation to the real ob- 
jects of governments in prosecuting the war or to the settle- 
ment of its issues. Japan's knowledge of diplomacy and 
world politics had been learned in the European school, the 
school of Talleyrand and Metternich. Japanese statesmen 
had studied the history of Europe, its previous wars, and its 
previous treaties of peace ; and they absolutely were unable to 
conceive that a new set of principles for adjusting the issues 
of a war would or could be adopted in this case. So Japan 
worked steadily through the war to seize any opportunity 
that came to strengthen her position in world politics, and to 
safeguard it by agreements with other powers, and to create 
trading-points to use at the peace conference. In doing this 
Japan almost brazenly utilized the possibility that she could, 
if she wanted to, at any time make a separate peace and a 
subsequent alliance with Germany as a lever on her allies. 
"Why should she not ? Other nations in the Allied group had 
done it. 

Early in 1916 the Japanese Government thought the time 
auspicious to get certain issues adjusted with Russia, and it 
moved accordingly. In that case the German alternative was 
utilized, as is shown by diplomatic papers published after the 
Russian revolution : 

From M. Sazonoff. Russian Minister for Foreig'n Affairs, to the 
Ambassadors at London, Paris, and Tokio. Dated May 1], T!)16. 
The Japanese Government has informed me that the Gorman 



JAPAN'S POLICY IN THE GREAT WAR 65 

Ambassador at Stockholm has twice approached the Japanese Am- 
bassador and attempted to convince him of the desirability for con- 
cluding peace between Germany, Russia, and Japan. I informed 
Motono that I should be quite prepared to listen to Germany's peace 
proposals, on the condition that they should be simultaneously made 
to Russia, France, England, and Japan. As regards Italy, since she 
is not yet at war with Germany, there is no necessity for demanding 
that an application should be made to her also by Germany, but we 
will keep her informed about these proposals, because the relations 
to them can only be determined by the Allies together. 

Addition for Tokio. Please thank the Japanese Government for 
this invaluable communication. 

As a result of this method, Japan was able to conclude with 
the Russian Imperial Government a new treaty, signed in the 
summer of 1916. There were, in fact, two agreements, one 
published and one secret. The secret treaty made then be- 
tween Russia and Japan was published by the Russian revo- 
lutionists after the imperial regime was overthrown. The 
italics are mine. It follows : 

RUSSO-JAPANESE TREATY 

The Russian Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial 
Government, aiming to strengthen the firm friendship between them, 
established through the secret agreements of July 17-30. 1907, June 
21, July 4, 1910, and June 25, July 8, 1912. have agreed to supple- 
ment the aforesaid secret agreements with the following articles: * 

Article 1 

Both the high-contracting parties recognize that the vital interests 
of one and tlie other of them require the safeguarding of China from 
the political domination of any third Power ivhatsoever, ha\nng hos- 
tile designs against Russia, or Japan: and therefore mutually obli- 
gate themselves, in the future at all times when circumstances 
demand, to enter into open-hearted dealings, based on complete trust, 
in order to take necessary measures with the object of preventing the 
possibility of occurrence of said state of affairs. 

Article 2 

In the event, in consequence of measures taken by mutual consent 
of Russia and Japan,'n5n the basis of the preceding article, a declara- 



66 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

tion of war is made by any third PoAver, contemplated by Article 1 
of this agreement, against one of the contracting parties, the other 
party, at the first demand of its ally, must come to its aid. Each 
of the high-contracting parties herewith covenants, in the event such 
a condition arises, not to conclude peace with the common enemy, 
without preliminary consent therefor from its ally. 

Article 3 

The conditions under which each of the high-contracting parties 
will lend armed assistance to the other side, by virtue of the preced- 
ing article, as well as the means by which such assistance shall be 
accomplished, must be determined in common by the coiTesponding 
authorities of one and the other contracting parties. 

Article 4 

It is requisite to have in view that neither one nor the other of 
the high-contracting parties must consider itself bound by Article 2 
of this agreement to lend armed aid to its ally, unless it be given 
guarantees by its allies that the latter will give it assistance corre- 
sponding in character to the importance of the approaching conflict. 

Article 5 

The present agreement shall have force from the time of its exe- 
cution, and shall continue to be in force until July 1-14, of the year 
1921. 

In the event the other of the High-Contracting Parties does not 
deem it necessary twelve months prior to the end of said period, to 
declare its unwillingness to continue the present agreement in force, 
then the said agreement shall continue in force for a period of one 
year after the declaration of one of the Contracting Parties dis- 
claiming the said agreement. 

Article 6 

The present agreement must remain profoundly secret except to 
hath of the High Contracting Parties. 

In witness whereof the persons invested with full power by both 
parties, have signed and affixed their seals to the present agreement 
at Petrograd on the 20th of June- July 3, of the year 1916, which 
corresponds in the Japanese calendar to the third day of the seventh 
month of the fifth year of the reign of Tais. 

(Signatures). 

Sazonopp. 

MOTONO. 



JAPAN'S POLICY IN THE GREAT WAR 6t 

Several things in this secret treaty are significant. It was 
apparently made without the knowledge of the other Allied 
powers. It scarcely can be assumed, however, that the ' ' third 
power" against which this treaty nominally was intended to 
protect the interests of Japan and Russia m China was one of 
the European allies of Japan and Russia. That construction 
of the treaty would convict the nations that made it of down- 
right underhandedness, or by logical inference of an expecta- 
tion of a betrayal of them by some of their allies. It was not 
directed against a nation in the Central alliance ; in that case 
this treaty would be unnecessary, for Japan and Russia 
already were allied and at war against the nations of the Cen- 
tral alliance. There is no room for doubt as to the identity of 
the "third power" mentioned in this treaty. It is directed 
at the United States. Japan recognized the United States as 
the nation most likely to oppose and withstand Japan 's designs 
in China, and the Japanese Government, while the war w'as 
straining her allies, at favorable moments (which meant usu- 
ally at times when the Allies were being hard pressed, and at 
some unfavorable turn of the military or political situation) 
was quietly pressing the Allied powers to agree to Japan's 
special position in China and other matters. From Russia 
Japan procured recognition not only of her special position 
in China, but also was to have the military support of Russia 
in the event that a "third power" would attempt to disturb 
the arrangements of Japan in China. In a supplementary 
agreement with Russia, made at the same time this treaty was 
signed, and also in the terms of other secret and published 
treaties between the same governments made since the Russo- 
Japanese War, just exactly how they would divide their inter- 
ests and positions in China had been clearly defined. Japan 
probably made use of Russia 's pressing need of supplies from 
Japan, and financial credits to pay for them, to gain Russia's 
consent. At the same time Russia was depending to an even 
greater extent on supplies and credits from America, yet the 
Imperial Russian Government did not fear to make a diplo- 



68 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

matic trade against America secretly. America was still con- 
sidered au amateur in world politics. 

It is so seldom that one finds really discerning criticism of 
Eastern att'airs in the American press that the following edi- 
torial comment of the "Boston Transcript" about this Russo- 
Japanese treaty is worth quoting: 

No "armed demonstration against America" can actually be dis- 
covered in the secret treaty which the late Okuma government en- 
tered into with the imperial government of Russia, as published in 
the Bolshevik organ at Petrograd. But the treaty, which mani- 
festly is genume, is a new evidence that the Okuma regime was 
perfectly ready to enter into agreements with everybody against 
everybody else, if by that means a point could be gained for its pur- 
pose here and there. Japan had a hard and fast treaty with Great 
Britain, which apparently made the two covmtries firm partners in 
the East. But this did not prevent Okuma from attempting a secret 
alliance with Russia and Germany to defeat the purposes of both 
Great Britain and America. That was one of his projects at the 
very time when Japan was nominally at war with Germany. KJnow- 
ing the treachery of the Czar to the Allied cause, Okuma was appar- 
ently ready to take advantage of it to get into quasi-respectable 
relations with Germany. All this was unspeakably base. But 
Okuma fell from power largely by reason of his treacherous methods. 
Has his fall altered the Japanese character? No one can say that. 
We need to keep our eyes open in dealing with these highly gifted 
people. But it is reasonable to suppose that no understanding of 
the Okuma sort exists between Germany and the present Govern- 
ment of Japan, and in the meantime there is no real Russian govern- 
ment of any kind in existence. The Bolshevik diplomatic publica- 
tions will make a highly interesting chapter of diplomatic history 
when they are all at hand and digested. 

It was in the summer of 1916 that the Japanese Govern- 
ment also induced Great Britain (as was revealed at Paris 
after the peace conference had met) to sign a secret agree- 
ment consenting to Japan's retention of the former German 
insular possessions in the Pacific Ocean that lie north of the 
equator. 

But events have a way frequently of putting to naught the 
best-laid plans of diplomats, and soon after the Russo-Japan- 



JAPAN'S POLICY IN THE GREAT WAR 69 

ese secret alliance was signed and sealed, two momentous 
events made it of no value to Japan. These events were the 
entrance of the United States into the war and the revolution 
in Russia. 

The possibility of a German-Russo-Japanese entente after, 
or perhaps even during the war, did not become active in 
Japanese political discussion until some time after the revolu- 
tion in Russia, and when its results began to appear. Count 
Terauchi had succeeded Marquis Okuma as head of the Japan- 
ese cabinet, and in the spring of 1918, at a time when the 
Siberian question was to the fore, Gregory Mason, editor of 
the "Japan Advertiser" and then on the point of leaving 
Japan, had an interview with the Japanese premier, which 
was published in "The Outlook" (New York) in May, 1918. 
Count Terauchi 's remarks to Mr. Mason were written out by 
Mr. Y. Tsurumi, who acted as interpreter, were then submit- 
ted to the premier and to the home and foreign ministries, 
and re-revised by Count Terauchi. The interview there- 
fore can be taken as "official." I quote from the inter- 
view : 

"Count Terauchi, you may permit me to ask a very bold, straight- 
forward question," I said, "for I should like to dispel the misunder- 
standing that is prevailing among certain sections of Americans. 
Now that the Berlin-Bagdad dream has been shattered, certain Ger- 
man newspapers have begun to talk of a Berlin-Tokio connection 
through Russia. Some Americans are possessed of the opinion that 
there is a possibility of Japan's forming an alliance with Germany 
after the war, if the conclusion of the present war should favor such 
possibility. What is your Excellency's opinion about this?" 

"That will depend entirely on how the present war may end," said 
General Terauchi. "It is impossible to predict the changes which 
the conclusion of this war may bring. If the exigencies of the inter- 
national relationships demand it, Japan, being unable to maintain a 
position of total isolation, may be induced to seek an ally in Ger- 
many; but, as far as I can judge from the existing condition of 
affairs, I see no such danger. In other words, I believe that Japan's 
relations with the Entente Allies will continue unaltered after the 
present war." ^ 



70 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

The publication of this interview caused a small furor in 
Japan, and the press and government officials attempted to 
explain away the premier 's statement, and even to dispute its 
authenticity, of which there is no reasonable doubt. Coming 
exactly as it did, and when the situation of the AUies as a 
whole was very sensitive to such ideas, the statement of the 
Japanese Premier made a deep impression. How it was re- 
ceived by the pro-Ally press in the East can be illustrated by 
some editorial comment of the "Japan Advertiser" of May 
29, 1918 : 

It cannot be said that an examination of the context modifies the 
face value of the passages we have quoted. Mr. Mason clearly had 
in his mind the possibility that German power would overspread 
Russia, and was seeking a clue to Japan's policy in that event. He 
began with questions about Japanese inten^ention in Siberia — a 
burning question at that moment. Would Japan intervene? Would 
she intervene singly or conjointly with the Allies? What would she 
think of a small ^'buffer" Russia, with Germany holding the Baltic 
provinces and Japan occupying eastern Siberia? Suppose Ger- 
many and Japan were finally face to face in Asia? Would they 
meet as rivals or as friends? Since those questions were asked two 
incidents have shown how much they were to the point. One was 
the kite flown in connection with Mr. Colljm's visit to London which 
in effect held out the proposal that Germany would make a "good 
peace" in the West if she got her way in the East. The otiier was 
President Wilson's words on May 19, a fortnight after the "Outlook" 
interview had been published in America, in which he said: "The 
Germans seek for an opportunity to have a free hand, particularly 
in the East, to carry out the purposes of conquest and exploitation. 
Every proposal with regard to concessions in the West involves res- 
ervations with regard to the East. Now, so far as I am concerned, 
I intend to stand by Russia as well as by France." 

Count Terauchi's answer to Mr. Mason's questions was that 
"Japan, being unable to maintain a position of total isolation, may 
be induced to seek an ally in Germany." He went on at once to say 
that he believed there was no such danger and to express his belief 
that after the war, as before, Japan's relations with the Entente 
Powers would remain unaltered. Further, it is not only just to 
Comit Terauchi but essential to an understanding of the question, to 



JAPAN'S POLICY IN THE GREAT WAR 71 

point out that the hypothetical case was constructed by Mr. Mason. 
Count Terauehi's was not the originating mind. He stated what 
Japan might do in certain circumstances, and at once added that he 
did not believe that the circumstances would ever come to pass. But 
if it is candidly examined does that meet the point? The circum- 
stances which the interviewer sketched are not figments of the imag- 
ination. Germany is devoting all her energies to the task of making 
them actual ; she has made considerable progress, and, so far as Rus- 
sia is concerned, it would be difficult to set a limit to her progress. 
How are those possibilities to be prevented from becoming accom- 
plished facts except by all the Allies putting as much energy into 
the fight as Germany is doing, opposing her ambitions with "force, 
force to the utmost, force without stint or limit'"? What is force 
of arms without force of will? It is not the part of the leaders of 
Allied nations to outline opportunist policies for the hour of defeat 
but to concentrate their energies on making defeat impossible. It 
may be said that opportunism is a universal policy, and that Count 
Terauchi has only given a characteristically blunt expression to a 
creed which all statesmen in their hearts confess. We do not see 
how any one can admit the premise with this war before them, and 
especially in view of the white heat of energy with which America 
has set herself to a task so remote from her traditional preoccupa- 
tions, so devoid of material gain. Be that as it may, there is cynical 
opportunism and enlightened opportunism. The former waits on 
events, intent on securing its individual profit, from the welter; the 
latter seizes the opportunity to achieve the result which it prizes. 
We cannot imagine that Count Terauchi meant to tell the world that 
Japan would await the result and stand in with the winner, but we 
cannot escape the feeling that the impression which his words will 
create will be something like that. 

As frequently is the ease in sueli instances, this discussion 
served rather to bring into relief the pro-German trend of 
Japanese political thought than to prove its non-existence. In 
1918 the "Daily Mail" (London) sent one of its staff corre- 
spondents, Bernard Falk, to the far East to write about con- 
ditions there. He interviewed many prominent Japanese in. 
and out of the Government, among them Baron Goto, then 
minister of foreign affairs. That interview was devoted prin- 
cipally to a discussion of the question of intervention in 



72 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

Siberia, but it touched also on other phases of the war. I will 
quote from the interview, as published in the *' Japan Adver- 
tiser" of June 13, 1918: 

"Has Japan any ground for complaint against the Allies?" 

"Of course you have heard of the differences of opinion regarding 
the exports of steel from America to Japan, but the differences never 
amounted to much, and the whole question was treated in a good 
spirit by both nations. Just now I think the United States is as 
satisfied with the result of the negotiations as Japan is. No, we 
have no cause of complaint." 

"But we might fairly complain of those Japanese politicians who 
appear to regret that Japan is not allied with Germany?" 

"I do not say there are not such men amongst us, but it is quite 
a common thing in any country for men apposing the government to 
say whatever suits their book and make political capital, which is 
why such politicians exist in Japan. The people of Great Britain 
may rest assured that so long as the Japanese Empire exists the 
Japanese people are their good friends." 

"And to me some Japanese newspapers are scarcely suggestive of 
enthusiasm for the Allied cause ?" 

"Please do not mistake temporary partisan political phenomena 
for solid convictions. Believe me, there is little reason to suppose 
that indifference or adverse criticism are deeply founded." 

"Further, it appears to me that the Japanese people utterly fail 
to visualise British achievements in their true proportions or to 
reabze how much stronger Great Britain has become in a naval and 
military sense?" 

"There may be people foolish enough to underestimate your naval 
and military strength, but I would not place them among our respon- 
sible thinking elements. Possibly the Japanese people may have 
expected more showy results from your armed forces. You know 
how a coup de theatre appeals to common people." 

"Personally, I find it difficult to reconcile the German morale of 
your army and the Germanized character of your culture with the 
universality of the English language. Please explain this contradic- 
tion of the common experience that with the prevailing language 
goes the culture of a people?" 

"The question is a good one. I have never heard it from a for- 
eigner before though he may have had it in mind. The condition 
you depict does exist in Japan; you see German-like soldiers side by 
side with an English speaking population. If I may be allowed to 
say so that is a beautiful part of our national character. Japan 



JAPAN'S POLICY IN THE GREAT WAR 73 

absorbs the civilization of eveiy country, but whether one studies 
England or Germany it is always, with us, from the viewpoint of 
the Japanese people. So those soldiers who look to you so German 
have in reality entirely Japanese minds ; so also the people whom you 
hear speaking Enghsh are yet Japanese in thought. In other words, 
borrowed civilization and borrowed beautiful things are only to 
round off our own character, not to displace it. I stayed in Ger- 
many for many years. I studied there and people may think me 
pro-German. I am not pro-German at all. I am not anti-English. 
I am quite Japanese sharing the national views regarding our in- 
ternational relationships." 

"I do not quite follow you when you say that you are not anti- 
English. I would expect that?" 

"What I want to say is that I am not one-sided. I am very im- 
partial, but when it comes to choose between enemy and ally, of 
course towards the enemy I cannot be pro-German because a pro- 
German is an enemy and towards a friend I cannot be unfriendly 
as anti-EngUsh. What I wish to convey above all is that I am 
Japanese, but at this juncture when we are fighting an enemy how 
can I be indifferent to the Allied Powers? Please understand me 
correctly." 

"Do you believe in the permanency of the Anglo-Japanese Alli- 
ance?" 

"The question has come to me before from foreigners, including 
some Englishmen. If the whole world changes, if the sun were to 
rise in the west, then anything might happen. Otherwise — " 

"The strange pro-Japanese demonstration in Berlin on the day 
Germany declared war on Russia still mystifies people in England 
who know the facts. Can you explain it?" 

"Interpretation is difficult but I will give you mj view. Before 
the war there was no incident hurting the feelings of the two na- 
tions (Germany and Japan). We were on very cordial terms. 
Therefore when the German people thought that in the coming war 
Japan might take sides on her own account, they did not believe 
Japan would do any harm against Germany and they wanted to 
demonstrate their friendliness." 

"Did they not think you would take an opportunity to move 
against Russia?" 

"Some may have thought so but I do not agree. Germany must 
have known that Japan and Russia would remain good friends." 

"Critics of Japan say you fight for your own materialistic ends 
and not for ideals?" _ 

"Japan had no particular reason to go to war with Germany. 



74 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

She came in in obedience to the obligations of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance. And to keep faith. The facts are there to justify us," 

"But, pardon me, that was duty, not idealism?" 

"True, but behind the duty was the ideal. The late Emperor 
Meiji left 30,000 poems enshrining the beautiful ideals of mankind 
and in any moment of stress or crisis the nation turns to them as to 
a Bible." 

That interview with the Japanese foreign minister very well 
represents Japan's war policy as the Japanese present it. It 
is interesting to note, however, that Baron Goto, in talking to 
an English journalist, adheres to the fiction that Japan entered 
the war in obedience to the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alli- 
ance, an assertion which Viscount Ishii, talking to impress 
Americans, expressly contradicted less than a month later at 
Boston, 

With regard to the pro-German sentiment of Japanese, Ber- 
nard Falk wrote in one of his articles to the ' ' Daily Mail ' ' : 

Except among a few Tokio professors there is no desire in Japan 
for a German victory, though her morale and army culture and prev- 
alent ideas are largely German, despite the fact that everybody of 
note talks English. There is considerable admiration for German 
military achievements, leading in some eases to doubts whether in 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance Japan has backed the right horse. 

It no doubt was true that in 1918 Japanese were more 
doubtful of a German victory in the war than they were in 
1915 and 1916, and by that time it was pretty evident that the 
Allies were the stronger, with the addition of America, so any 
uneasiness that existed about having backed the wrong horse 
was lessened. 

During the war the Japanese Government changed three 
times. A ministry headed by Marquis Okuma was in power 
when the war began. Okuma long has posed as a man of a 
democratic trend of political thought, and in that attitude he 
at times has been very useful to Japan, whenever in the course 
of events it was deemed expedient by the oligarchy to present 
a, "liberal" front to the world, or to speak through a "liberal" 



JAPAN'S POLICY IN THE GREAT WAR 75 

mouthpiece. In fact, Okuma is one of the Elder Statesmen, 
which is the inner circle of the oligarchy whose power was 
built upon and rests now on the cult of emperor divinity : and 
no ministry in Japan ever pursued a more frankly imperial- 
istic policy than this Okuma administration did. When 
Okuma 's government (as every Japanese ministry does in- 
variably) became so entangled and involved in its political 
crossings and turnings that it was necessary to shift the scen- 
ery, a ministry with Count Terauchi as premier came into 
office. The Terauchi ministry lasted until the autumn of 
1918, when the Allied war aims as expressed by President 
Wilson had been formulated on a platform of relegating autoc- 
racy and imperialistic aggressions of nations, and the defeat 
of Germany was portended almost with certainty; and Jap- 
anese statesmen thought it well to begin to adapt the Japanese 
Government to this change in world conditions. If the world 
was to be made safe for democracy, then Japan would be 
democratic. This means that having swung from a "liberal" 
to a militarist ministry when it looked as if militarism would 
become established by the war, the Government now would 
ape democracy by swinging even farther back toward liber- 
alism. So the Hara ministry took office with a flourish of 
democratic trumpets. It took office, it is interesting to ob- 
serve, almost exactly at the time when Germany, in prepara- 
tion for making peace, also changed coats, and placed the Gov- 
ernment in the hands of a so-called "liberal" ministry. 
Japan also was getting ready for the peace, and, as usual, took 
her cue from Germany. 

With peace actually in sight, almost every editor and publi- 
cist in Japan turned to writing Japan's peace terms. There 
was remarkable similarity among them. The terms outlined 
by Marquis Okuma, in the "Kokumin" of October 22, 1918, 
are representative. They follow: 

(1) Japan should approve all decisions to be readied by Great 
Britain, France and the United States so far as the territorial altera- 
tions in the Western front. Central Europe, Balkans and in the Afri^ 



76 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

can colonies are concerned, as she has no direct interest in the affairs 
of these territories, 

(2) Japan's attitude towards the problems relating to the future 
of Germany and Russia should be decided in accordance with the 
conclusion reached by the Allied conference, but Japan should declare 
first that the fundamental principle applicable in settling the prob- 
lem should be founded on the universal desire to obtain the perma- 
nent peace of the world. 

(3) The problems relating to war indemnity should be settled by 
the Allied conference. 

(4) The future of the Samoan Islands, which has caused various 
diplomatic controversies between Great Britain, the United States 
and Germany, should be decided in accordance with the will of the 
former two Powers, for the purpose of destroying German bases in 
the Pacific. 

(5) The German New Guinea, which is now occupied by the Brit- 
ish should not be returned to Germany. Australia would not consent 
to the retrocession, even though the home government of Great 
Britain might accept it. The principle should also be applicable to 
the Bismarck Islands. 

(6) Japan should hold those islands like Marshall, Caroline, and 
others, which are now occupied by the Japanese navy, as it is dan- 
gerous to return them to Germany, and as there is no reason to let 
the other Powers occupy them. 

(7) The cable line between Tsingtao and the southern islands, 
which is now occupied by the Japanese navy, should be held by 
Japan. The cable line is a property owned by a private concern, so 
that Germany should buy it up before conceding it to Japan. 

(8) Japan should return Tsingtao to China, as she has declared; 
but she should have the right to hold the exclusive settlement there 
and various organs and buildings attached to the settlement. The 
Tsinan Railway, which is a property of a private concern, should be 
bought up by the German Government and then should be conceded 
to Japan. 

(9) The problems relating to the maintenance of order in Siberia 
should be settled by the Allied conference, but all the Allied Powers 
should refrain from any action or demand for acquiring concessions 
in Siberia. 

(10) The relations between China and other Powers should be 
based upon the principle of open-door and equal opportunity. 

For a wonder, the conditions given by Marquis Okuma I 
believe actually did represent about what Japan really wanted, 



JAPAN'S POLICY IN THE GREAT WAR 77 

as far as they went. She wanted to keep the Marshall and 
Caroline Islands, and had made a secret agreement with Great 
Britain, the only Allied power that has an interest in the 
matter, to that effect. Japan's main desire is to retain her 
hold in Shantung province and at Tsingtau. To do that, she 
had marked out, and acquired by forcing the Chinese inhabit- 
ants to sell their lands, a large area at Tsingtau for a Japa- 
nese "concession," and similar areas at Tsinan and other 
places in Shantung. With those concessions, and the special 
rights wrung from China by the agreement of 1915 and its 
supplements, and with possession of the Tsingtau-Tsinan rail- 
way, Japan would be content for a time. In Siberia Japan 
is indeed anxious that the Allied powers "should refrain from 
any action or demand for acquiring concessions in Siberia," 
for that would give other powers a foothold there, which 
Japan does not want them to obtain. 

It is of slight consequence whether Japan obtains the 
Marshal] and Caroline islands by annexation or by becoming 
a mandatory of a league of nations. Objection to Japan own- 
ing the islands made by other nations, is solely strategical, 
because of their possible use for naval bases and wireless sta- 
tions ; but if a league of nations becomes a reality, and arma- 
ments are kept within reasonable and proportionate bounds, 
such strategical points have little value. 

While Marquis Okuma's list covers what 'Japan wanted of 
the peace conference in terras of territory and vested interests, 
it by no means includes all of what Japan wants to secure. 
I shall summarize what I believe to be what Japan really 
wants in world politics at this stage of the game : 

1. Confirmation by the powers of agreements made by them 
with Japan during the war. 

2. Recognition by the powers of agreements which Japan 
has obtained from China during the war. 

3. Recognition by the powers of Japan's paramountcy in 
the settlement of far Eastern questions. 

That is what Japan wants, and there will be tremendous 



78 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

disappointment in Japan if those objects are not secured. 
Japan's attitude toward every question in the settlement of 
war issues will be determined solely by their relation to those 
propositions. The first five articles of Marquis Okuma's list 
refer to questions in which Japan has no interest except as 
they afii'ect the world balance of power, and Japan will adapt 
her policy to whatever balance of power emerges from the 
war. Discussing the first three months of the peace confer- 
ence in the New York "Evening Post," of March 8, David 
Lawrence wrote: 

The Japanese delegates are the mystery of the conference. They 
say least and interfere less in what is going on. Silently they listen 
to what is said and rarely make comment. The Japanese delegation 
always appeared to be on cordial terms with all the other delegations. 
They seemed merely interested onlookers, but promise subsequently 
to take a vital part in the conference. 

Japan was merely an interested onlooker at the conference 
until matters that touch her interests would come up. Except 
for the flurry about China revealing some matters connected 
with Japan's attitude in China fthat incident is discussed 
later in this volume") , the Japanese delegation observed a de- 
tached attitude in the early months of the Paris conference. 
Japan went to the conference, as she entered the war, in a 
spirit of opportunism. She was prepared for all ordinary 
eventualities. If the conference was handled in the usual way 
and controlled by the usual motives, which Japan rather ex- 
pected, and hoped, the Japanese Government felt able 
to hold its own. Japan knew that other nations in the 
allies' group had pursued an oblique course during the war, 
and would go to the conference to urge claims and secret 
agreements no whit better, and in cases worse than those Japan 
wanted to get recognized. The Japanese Government knew 
also that the nations whose objects and motives were identical 
in principle with those of Japan would be in a large majority 
at the conference. Here was good ground for diplomatic 
trading, and Japan went with a number of "trading horses" 



JAPAN'S POLICY IN THE GREAT WAR 79 

in her diplomatic bag. She also was fairly well supplied with 
issues that can be used as ' ' smoke-screens, ' ' and as offsets with 
powers, like the United States, that cannot be induced by 
the old-fashioned trading process. Among these "smoke- 
screens" is the so-called ''race-equality" issue, with its corol- 
lary of Japanese immigration to the United States, Canada, 
and Australia. Japan, of course, did not want a league of 
nations ; but she is quite prepared, if a league is organized, 
to join it, and to claim her right to be its mandatory in the far 
East. 

The great fact that confronts Japan as a result of the war 
is that her former method of reckoning international values 
must be changed completely. The list of international ratings 
has to be revised radically. The powers now are, apparently, 
America, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. In 
this list, it is evident that some of the nations are rated as 
powers only by courtesy, when they really have dropped to the 
position of second-class nations. Japan herself has dropped 
back, in fact, into the second class; for she has not the re- 
sources to encounter successfully a real power. For instance, 
before the Great War Japanese experts rated America as a na- 
tion in the second class, and felt certain of Japan's ability to 
worst America in any war about issues outside the North 
American continent. Japan has no such illusions now. Jap- 
anese experts know that Japan has slight chance in a war 
between those nations alone to defeat America on any issue. 
Japanese statesmen feel also th'at the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
is not likely to be renewed by Great Britain, and that an en- 
tente of America and Great Britain is almost sure to follow 
the war. The collapse of Russia and the temporary eclipse of 
Germany leaves Japan with no place to go in case she takes 
issue with America or Great Britain. The Japanese delega- 
tion, furthermore, carried to the peace conference a feeling of 
uneasiness about the probable exposure of her real role during 
the war and the sentiments of some of her allies about that ; 
in short, Japan dreaded a moral isolation. 



80 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

Certain moral embarrassments of Japan's position were 
very well put by the well-known English author and authority 
on China, Lenox Simpson ("Putnam-Weale"), in November, 
1918: 

In these circumstances nothing is more amazing than the sugges- 
tion Japan is reported in the press to have made that her advisers 
advise China regarding China's peace programme. If there is one 
power left in the world that resembles Germany in her methods of 
conducting national business, and in the constitutional predominance 
of the military caste, that power is Japan. In her view countries 
are still the estates of princes and the peoples are merely their sub- 
jects. In all the literature that has poured out of Japan dunng the 
war there is no indication that the aim and purpose of democracy is 
in the least bit understood; for although a "popular" Cabinet has 
just been installed in office, the constitution has not been changed, 
nor have Ministers been made by the machinery of law responsible 
to Parliament. Precisely the same language can be applied to Mr. 
Hara and his colleagues in the Cabinet as President Wilson has just 
addressed to the government presided over by the Prince Max of 
Baden — namely, that it is evident that the people have no means of 
commanding the acquiescence of the military authorities of the em- 
pire in the popular will, that the power of the emperor to control 
the policy of the empire is unimpaired; and that the determining 
initiative still remains with those who have hitherto been the masters. 

Consequently, bearing in mind ivTiat has gone on openly in the far 
East under cover of the war, and remembering the many subversive 
measures attempted against China under the heading of desiderata, 
it is within the range of possibility that unless constitutional adjust- 
ments making for the supremacy of the civil power speedily come in 
Japan, she may encounter the humJUating experience of having the 
German plenipotentiaries inquiring of her at the Peace Congress 
whether they are dealing with the authorised representatives of a 
Parliamentary government or the agents of an autocratic regime; 
and if the latter, that any discussion be postponed until the popular 
standard which has been forced on Germany be likewise forced on 
Japan. 

The sudden ending of the war thunder-struck the Japanese 
Government and people. So ill prepared was the public in 
Japan for it that, when the terms of the armistice were re- 
ceived, the Government would not permit the full publication 



JAPAN'S POLICY IN THE GREAT WAR 81 

of them for several days, so the people could be prepared to 
receive the news. 

Before leaving the topic of Japan's policy in the war, it may 
be well to introduce some evidence of Japan's position and 
obligations regarding the Tsingtau question. The real atti- 
tude of the Japanese Government, I am convinced, is reflected 
accurately by the views of the Japanese member of the Diet 
previously given in this chapter ; but that of course is not the 
published official attitude. On the day Japan's ultimatum to 
Germany was sent, Marquis Okuma, then Premier of Japan, 
gave the following statement, which was communicated to the 
press in America by the Japanese official propaganda in New 
York, the "East and West Bureau " : " Japan 's proximity to 
China breeds many absurd rumors; but I declare that Japan 
acts with a clear conscience, in conformity with justice, and 
in perfect accord with her ally [Great Britain]. Japan has 
no territorial ambition, and hopes to stand as the protector 
of peace in the Orient." A few days later, at Tokio, Marquis 
Okuma, in a public address, said: "Japan's warlike opera- 
tions will not extend beyond the limits necessary for the at- 
tainment of the object of the defense of her own legitimate 
interests. The Imperial Government will take no such action 
as could give to a third party any cause for anxiety or un- 
easiness regarding the safety of their territorities or posses- 
sions." And on August 24, 1914, Marq'iiis Okuma tele- 
graphed a message to the American people through "The In- 
dependent" (New York), as follows: 

I gladly seize the opportunity to send, tlirongh the medium of the 
"Independent," a message to the people of the United States, who 
have always been helpful and loyal friends of Japan. It is my 
desire to eonvinee your people of the sincerity of my Government 
and of my people in all their utterances and assurances connected 
with the present regrettable situation in Europe and the far East. 
Every sense of loyalty and honor oblis^es .Japan to cooperate with 
Great Britain to clear from these waters the enemies who in the past, 
the present and the future menace her interests, her trade, her ship- 
ping, and her people'sJives. The far Eastern situation is not of our 



82 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

seeking. . It was ever my desire to maintaia peace, as will be amply 
proved; as President of the Peace Society of Japan I have con- 
sistently so endeavored. I have read with admiration the lofty 
message of President Wilson to his people on the subject of neu- 
trality. We, of Japan, are appreciative of the spirit and motives 
that prompted the head of your great nation, and we feel confident 
that his message will meet with a national response. 

As Premier of Japan, I have stated and I now again state to the 
people of America and of the world that Japan has no ulterior 
motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving 
China or other peoples of anything which they now possess. My 
Government and my people have given their word and their pledge, 
which will he as honorably kept as Japan always keeps promises. 
(My italics.) 

Early in December, 1914, Baron Kato took the occasion of 
an interpellation in the Diet, to shift Japan's position in 
respect to Kiaochou. The proposition is included in the fol- 
lowing questions and answers, published in the Japan press : 

Questions 

(a) Whether Kiaochou will be returned to China? 

(b) Whether the Imperial Government of Japan were pledged to 
China, or to any other Power, in the matter of the final disposition 
of Kiaochou? 

(c) Whether the clause in the ultimatum referring to the final 
restitution of Kiaochou to China did not bind the action of Japan? 

Baron Kato's Replies 

(a) The question regarding the future of Kiaochou was, at pres- 
ent, unanswerable. 

(b) Japan had never committed herself to any foreign Power on 
this point. 

(c) The purpose of the ultimatum to Germany was to take Kiao- 
chou from Germany and so to restore peace in the Orient. Restitu- 
tion after a campaign was not thought of and was not referred to in 
the ultimatum. 

In the years 1915 and 1916 the utterances of Japanese states- 
men and the Japanese press distinctly adopted a tone repudi- 
ating the original promises to return Kiaochou to China, and 
began to invent diplomatic euphemisms for that repudiation. 



JAPAN'S POLICY IN THE GREAT WAR 83 

The real reason, of course, was that the war situation indi- 
cated that Japan safely could repudiate those promises and 
could act as she liked in China. However, after America 
entered the war, Japanese comment on the Kiaochou question 
played it about "fifty-fifty," so that either attitude could be 
adopted, as expediency dictated. When China had become 
one of the Allies' group, and the defeat of the Central alliance 
was established, the original attitude was resumed. After 
reaching Paris as head of the first Japanese delegation to the 
conference, Baron Makino gave an official statement as fol- 
lows: 

Japan is now pledged to return to China this baTbor and port 
built "with German money, together with the territory of Kiaochou, 
which China will receive eighty years sooner than she could possibly 
have secured it. The treaty of 1915, under which this restoration is 
to be made, contains no secret clauses, and an agreement entered into 
in September, 1918, regarding future Chino-Japanese cooperation in 
Shantung contains no stipulation which is more or less than a just 
and mutually helpful settlement of outstanding questions. 

There the issue rests at this writing. Its eventual disposi- 
tion probably will extend to the war's aftermath. 




CHAPTER IV 

CHINA AND THE WAE 

Sentiments of Chinese about the war — Apprehension of Japan — Ef- 
forts to preserve China's neutrality and territorial integrity — The first 
proposal — Outline of the situation — China's rights and wishes disre- 
garded — Japan's ultimatum to Germany — China's sovereignty ignored — 
Great Britain's attitude — Position of the United States — Japan's over- 
running of Shantung — The next move — Japan's twenty-one demands — 
Her oblique course — The "Agreement" forced upon China — China's, pro- 
test — Statement by the United States — Dilemma of the Chinese Govern- 
ment — China's first offer to join the Allies — Its discouraging reception 
— China's second offer to join the Allies — Conditions of this offer — Plan 
blocked by Japan — Irritation of Japanese press — Japan's attitude de- 
fined, 

HEN the Great War began, China had not become 
stabilized from the Revolution of 1911 and the at- 
tempt at counter-revolution in 1913 ; but the Gov- 
ernment under the Presidency of Yuan Shih K'ai gradually 
was establishing its authority over the country, with a fair 
prospect of working out a peaceful solution of the internal 
situation.^ President Yuan estimated events with consider- 
able prevision, and at once took measures to prevent China 
from being vicariously involved. He, in common with other 
close observers of far-Eastern polities, felt that China's cause 
for uneasiness sprung not from acts of any of the belligerents 
in Europe, but centered in the course of Japan. 

With few exceptions, the Chinese felt at the beginning of 
the war only surprise at its sudden outbreak, and almost a 
complete confusion regarding its causes and issues. If Amer- 

1 The events embraced in the situation of China at that time and in 
the years from the beginning of the Great War to 1916, are extensively 
narrated and criticized in a previous book of the author's, "Our Eastern 
Question," published in 1916. 

84 



CHINA AND THE WAR 85 

icans candidly will recall their own general state of mind 
about the war when it began, they, perhaps, will comprehend 
the intellectual reactions of Chinese to that stupendous event. 
As between the two groups of belligerents, the Chinese had 
no decided predilections or sympathies, and only vague no- 
tions about the rights and wrongs of the matter. The Chinese 
even did not have, as in the case of most Americans, ties of 
religious, political, and ethnological origin with the nations at 
war to stimulate interest and to aline sympathy China had 
endured humiliations and what the Chinese regard as wrongs 
and injustice at the hands of most of the nations at first in- 
cluded in the war. As between them, if there was any tip- 
ping of the scale, it is probable that the Chinese felt less re- 
sentment against Germany than, for instance, against Russia 
or Great Britain ; and certainly even at that time the Chinese 
were much more apprehensive of Japan than of any nation 
in Europe. 

Indeed, without doubt it was apprehension of Japan that 
dominated the actions of the Chinese Government in the early 
stages of the war, and the same fundamental reason has mo- 
tivated China's policy throughout the war. All students of 
Eastern politics felt at once that Japan would regard the situ- 
ation in the light of opportunism. It was natural, as in the 
case of America and other nations, that the first thought of 
China was to assume and to sustain a position of absolute 
neutrality. The measures taken by the Chinese Government 
to protect the interests of China and to secure her neutrality 
can be summarized as follows : 

1. A proposal to neutralize under China's control all Chi- 
nese territories leased to foreign belligerent nations or nations 
which might thereafter become belligerents. 

2. A proposal to limit any warlike acts by any belligerents 
in Chinese territory to specified areas. 

3. A proposal that China would join the Allies. 

These three measures were not, of course, made simulta- 
neously. The second followed the failure of the first; the 



86 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

third was a consequence of the rejection of the others and the 
policy of Japan, 

The first proposal was made in the spirit of absolute neu- 
trality. In order to make its application general, and to 
avoid the appearance of being directed against, or in favor of, 
any power or belligerent side, this plan would have included 
the leased territories of Kiaochou (German), the leased terri- 
tories at Kowloon and Weihaiwei (British), the leased ter- 
ritory of Kwangtung, including Port Arthur and Dalny 
(Japanese), and regions policed by Russia and Japan under 
the Manchurian railway agreements. Had China been a 
strong nation, dealing with other nations on a genuine basis 
of equality and self-determination, there would have been no 
question as to her course: she simply would have announced 
her intentions to the world, and have taken over control of the 
territories as a measure of self-protection, and few would 
have questioned the propriety of the action or her right so to 
act. But if China had been a self-determining nation, she 
never would have granted these leaseholds, which were ob- 
tained and held by those powers for their own strategical 
reasons. 

At the time the proposal to neutralize the foreign strate- 
gical leaseholds in China was advanced, Japan was a neutral ; 
and the friendly offices of Japan and the United States, as 
the two principal neutral powers, were solicited by the Chi- 
nese Government in inducing the belligerent nations to con- 
sent. And curiously, but not surprisingly to those conversant 
with conditions, it was neutral Japan, not one of the belli- 
gerents, that blocked the proposal. Germany probably would 
have consented, for by so doing she stood to lose no definite 
advantage, since it was inevitable in any case that Tsingtau 
would soon be made useless as a base for German naval opera- 
tions by joint or separate action of the British, French, and 
Russian navies; indeed, the German legation at Peking was 
receptive to the proposal, foreseeing that refusal would tend 
to draw Japan into the war. Great Britain was also receptive, 



CHINA AND THE WAR 87 

since she would sustain no appreciable loss strategically by 
neutralizing Weihaiwei, and the elimination of Germany's 
far-Eastern base would be accomplished without disadvan- 
tageously involving China. Such a course also would coin- 
cide with general British interests vis-a-vis China. The 
friendly offices of the United States were enlisted, or an at- 
tempt was made to enlist them ; and it appears that the United 
States took some tentative steps toward bringing the powers 
into compliance. However, the opposition of Japan and the 
confused and flustered state of international aft'airs delayed ac- 
tion until Japan precluded further moves by sending an ulti- 
matum to Germany on August 15, 1914 : 

We consider it highly important and necessary in the present sit- 
uation to take measures to remove the causes of all disturbances of 
the peace in the Far East, and to safeguard the general interests 
as contemplated by the agTeement of alliance between Japan and 
Great Britain. 

In order to secure a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, 
the establishment of which is the aim of the said agreement, the 
Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believes it to be its duty 
to give the advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out 
the following two propositions: 

First. To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese 
waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to 
disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn. 

Second. To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to 
the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensa- 
tion, the entire leased territory of Kiaoehou, with a view to the 
eventual restoration of the same to China. 

The Imperial Japanese Government announces at the same time 
that in the event of not receiving by noon on August 23, 1914, an 
answer from the Imperial German Government signifying its un- 
conditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial 
Japanese Government, Japan will be compelled to take such action 
as she may deem necessary to meet the situation. 

The attitudes of the various interested powers, as developed 
by this incident of the effort to protect China's neutrality, 
were significant. Russia was indifferent at first, but when 
Japan's opposition developed, she was precluded by open and 



88 DEMOCEACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

secret agreements with Japan from assenting, or at least from 
signifying approval. Great Britain (or British interests and 
the British press in China) seemed favorably disposed to the 
proposal until Japan's position developed. Great Britain, 
entering upon a long and precarious war, probably felt that 
it was inexpedient to create friction with Japan at the outset. 
France, her whole attention concentrated on the German in- 
vasion, was too distracted to give attention to the matter or 
to estimate how it would affect the course of the war, or 
French interests in the far East. It is probable that France 
merely followed Great Britain and Russia. The time was too 
short for the United States and other neutral nations to or- 
ganize any effective action to stay Japan's hand and to pro- 
tect China. Events were marching with seven-league boots, 
and the disinterested statesmanship of the world in most cases 
was unable to anticipate or direct them. 

It is interesting to note that the terms of Japan's ulti- 
matum to Germany concerning the leased territory of Kiao- 
chou state as its objects almost exactly what it was proposed 
to accomplish by China's plan for neutralization. The dif- 
ferences were that by China's proposal she would have 
taken control over the territory, which belonged to her na- 
tional domain, and furthermore, that acts of all the belliger- 
ents within China's territories would also have been neutral- 
ized. That did not suit Japan, because she purposed making 
use of the opportunity to install herself in Germany's posi- 
tion in China and also to extend that position. Aside from 
that ultimate motive, Japan by her action arrogated to herself 
prerogatives which belonged exclusively to China. By what 
right of international law or custom, for instance, did Japan 
order Germany (for her ultimatum amounted to an order, 
although called "advice") to withdraw all her war-ships and 
armed vessels "from Chinese waters"? Yet the ultimatum 
did that in plain words. At the very moment when Japan's 
ultimatum was delivered, the Chinese Government was con- 



CHINA AND THE WAR 89 

ducting diplomatic conversations with all the belligerent and 
two neutral powers (Japan and the United States) to remove 
from or intern German war-ships in her waters, and allied 
war-ships as well. All allied and central alliance war-ships 
were in due course interned in Chinese waters that China con- 
trolled. It was remarked at the time that Japan had taken 
the opportunity early in the war to assert a kind of protec- 
torate or suzerainty over China; a presumption that alarmed 
China even more than it offended her by covert diplomatic 
insult. 

Regarding the attitude of Great Britain then I wrote in 
* ' Our Eastern Question ' ' : 

There are two theories for Great Britain's course at the time. 
One is that Great Britain initiated Japan's action by requesting 
her aid imder the alliance. The other theory is that Japan herself 
took the initiative, contrary to the real desire of her ally, and by 
force of circumstances compelled Great Britain to acquiesce with, 
and oflBcially to sanction, this diplomatic fiction. I believe in the 
latter theorem. It coincides with the logic of facts and conditions, 
with British interests in China, and with an honorable regard for 
Great Britain's obligations toward China and other nations com- 
mitted to the 'open door' and 'integrity of China' policies; and 
there is plenty of evidence to support it. 

Nothing that I know of has happened since I expressed 
that opinion to make me change it; but, rather, the whole 
course of events in the East and the trend of different na- 
tional policies there as they have been influenced by the war 
have tended to confirm it. There is no doubt, however, that 
when Japan had definitely taken her stand, and undertaken a 
course of action which would put her at war with Germany 
on the Tsingtau issue, the British Government accepted it as 
a fait accompli, and since then has shaped its utterances and 
policy accordingly, however dubious it must at times have 
felt about the outcome, and dissatisfied as it undoubtedly has 
been with many of Japan's subsequent acts. 

When the Chinese Government had failed in its effort to 



90 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

eliminate the foreign leaseholds in China as military areas 
and contention-points between the belligerents, its next move 
was to try to limit the scope of military operations against 
Tsingtau to the territory at Kiaochou leased to Germany, 
This seemed a most reasonable and just condition, but it was 
rejected by Japan for reasons which were soon to appear. 
On the declaration by Japan of war against Germany, Great 
Britain announced that she would join with her ally in the 
operations to take Tsingtau. It is a good illustration of the 
real sentiments and motives of the Allies with regard to this 
matter that this technically proper and correct action by 
Great Britain should have been resented by Japan, and criti- 
cized with asperity by the Japanese press, which accused 
Great Britain of participating only for the purpose of cir- 
cumscribing Japan in her policy in China, and to give Great 
Britain a technical voice in the disposal of the Kiaochou 
leasehold after the war. There is no reasonable doubt that 
these were the objects of the British Government in partici- 
pating in the Tsingtau expedition, for the few hundreds of 
British troops were not needed, and their part was perfunc- 
tory, because the senior Japanese commanding officer pur- 
posely arranged it that way. British troops were careful to 
respect Chinese susceptibilities, for they did not go outside the 
territory included in the German leasehold. On the con- 
trary, Japan found excuses to spread her troops over a con- 
siderable part of Shantung province outside the German 
leased territory, and to seize the railway betw. .1 Tsingtau 
and Tsinan, the capital of Shantung, over its entire length. 
So easily had Japan established herself in Shantung prov- 
ince, and so correctly did she gage the extent of preoccupation 
of her allies in Europe and the indifference or reluctance to 
act of the stronger neutral nations, that by the beginning of 
1915 she was ready to move further to extend her control of 
China. On January 18 the Japanese minister at Peking, Mr. 
Hioki, presented a series of demands set out in five groups and 
twenty-one articles. Since this infamous act has been widely 



CHINA AND THE WAR 91 

discussed/ and the original twenty-one articles, the false 
eleven articles, and the so-called agreement which China at 
the end of negotiations was forced literally at the point of the 
bayonet to sign, all are given as appendices to this volume, I 
include only a summary here. For this nothing perhaps will 
serve better than the following outline of Japan's action 
taken from ''Our Eastern Question," pages 147-148: 

(a) Presentation of demands in twenty-one articles, coupled with 
a strong admonition to China that both haste and secrecy were in- 
sisted on by Japan; (b) Continuous pressure on China to force 
her to concede the demands en bloc, without discussion; (c) Re- 
peated warnings to China not to inform other powers of the 
negotiations, even confidentially; (d) First pubbcations of news 
about the demands were categorically denied by the Japanese 
Government; (e) Newspapers in Japan were warned by the Govern- 
ment not to publish or discuss the demands; (f) Japan's diplomatic 
representatives abroad were instructed to deny and discredit news 
about the demands; (g) The Japanese minister at Peking denied 
to inquiries of other legations that any demands had been made; 
(h) When copies of the original demands, procured from the 
Chinese Government, were received by other foreign governments, 
the Japanese Government still denied the twenty-one articles, and 
presented a list of eleven articles, omitting the most objectionable 
matters. 

An ethical analysis of this action of Japan will disclose that 
it probably transcends in obliquity any act of any other na- 
tion during the war. It marked the beginning of what an emi- 
nent Englishman who is conceded to be a leading authority on 
China and the far East recently termed in a conversation with 
me, ' ' Japan 's policy of treachery to and blackmail of her 
allies." Not only did Japan seek by military intimidation, 
at a time when China was defenseless and unable to obtain 
succor, to bring that vast country under its suzerainty, and to 
undermine all other foreign interests and opportunities in 
China, including and especially those of Japan's leading ally in 
the war, but she tried to do this in secret. Japan not only did 

1 Chapters VIII and IX of the author's book, "Our Eastern Question," 
give a full account of_the presentation and character of these demands. 



92 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

not previously inform the allied governments of her intended 
action toward China, which would completely overturn, if 
successful, the existing international status in the far East; 
she resorted to diplomatic falsehood and subterfuge to con- 
ceal her moves from her allies as well as from other govern- 
ments. 

After protracted negotiations, in which China in vain 
sought help from other powers and tried to evade and soften 
the conditions, she was finally brought to accept Japan's 
terms by an ultimatum, delivered by the Japanese minister 
at Peking on May 7, 1915, in these words : 

The Imperial Japanese Government hereby again offer their ad- 
vice and hope that the Chinese Government, upon this advice, will 
give a satisfactory reply by six o'clock P. M. on the ninth day of 
May. It is hereby declared that if no satisfactory reply is received 
before or at the specified time, the Imperial Japanese Government 
will take such steps as they may deem necessary. 

As Japan had previously made certain naval and military 
moves to intimidate China, and all efforts to induce any other 
power to intervene in her behalf having failed, the Chinese 
Government on May 8 accepted Japan's ultimatum, and a 
week later signed an "agreement" substantially dictated by 
Japan, This agreement was considerably modified from its 
original form through pressure made by other powers and re- 
straints on Japan caused by the shifting international situa- 
tion. Great Britain probably had insisted on the elimination 
of certain clauses of the original demands which would have 
circumscribed and crippled British economic position and in- 
terests in China. The United States also exerted an influence 
in China's behalf, and was instrumental in persuading Japan 
to abandon Group V of the original demands. Group V was 
the most far-reaching and objectionable of the demands, be- 
ing equivalent to placing China under Japan's suzerainty. 
Japan stopped at a point where, as she was then convinced, 
to go further would excessively irritate her allies, alarm the 
United States, and drive China to armed resistance, a situa- 



CHINA AND THE WAR 93 

tion which Japan feared because of the international compli- 
cations it would create, and adverse reactions on her own eco- 
nomic war prosperity. It was fortunate for China that Yuan 
Shih K'ai was president at the time, for he coupled political 
sagacity with stubborn courage, and had vowed to fight, how- 
ever hopeless armed resistance might be, rather than yield 
China's sovereignty. 

In an official statement regarding the negotiations the Chi- 
nese Government said : 

It is plain that the Chinese Government proceeded to the fullest 
extent of possible eoueession in view of the strong national senti- 
ment manifested by the people throughout the whole period of the 
negotiations. All that the Chinese Government strove to maintain 
was China's plenary sovereignty, the treaty rights of foreign Pow- 
ers in China, and the principle of equal opportunity. ... In consid- 
ering the nature of the course they should take in reference to the 
ultimatum, the Chinese Government was influenced by its desire 
to preserve the Chinese people, as well as a large number of foreign 
residents in China, from unnecessary sutfering, and also to pi'event 
the interests of friendly powers from being imperiled. For these 
reasons the Chinese Government was constrained to comply in 
full with the ultimatum, but, in complying, the Chinese Government 
disclaims any desire to associate itself with any revision which 
may thus be affected in the various conventions and agreements 
concluded between other powers, with respect to the maintenance 
of China's territorial independence and integTity, the preserv^ation 
of the status quo, and the principle of equal opportunity for the 
commerce and industry of all nations in China. 

With reference to China's action in accepting Japan's ulti- 
matum, I thus wrote in "Our Eastern Question," pages 161- 
163: 

I have in previous chapters sketched the general internal situation 
of China at that time, to whose c«Dmplieations were added those 
caused by the great war. The Chinese Government was charged 
with a triple responsibility — to preser^^e its own neutrality, to main- 
tain neutrality among belligerents, and to safeguard without dis- 
crimination all foreign interests in China at a period when many 
of those interests were handicapped in protecting themselves. 
Moreover, the Chinese" Government, after Japan's demands became 



94 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

known, was confronted with a serious internal political difi&culty. 
Chinese popular sentiment was .aroused to a hitherto unknown ex- 
tent by Japan's aggressions, and demanded that the Peking Govern- 
ment should reject the demands. The Peking Government had, 
therefore, to meet Japan's menacing diplomacy, and at the same 
time so to conduct affairs as to prevent popular indignation among 
Chinese from flaming up in an attempt to overthrow the Govern- 
ment. In this connection, Mr. Hioki's verbal statements to Yuan 
Shih K'ai, when presenting the original demands in January, are 
interesting. Mr. Hioki then said, if China did not promptly com- 
ply with Japan's demands, that Japan might be unable to restrain 
the activities of the group of Chinese counter-revolutionists then 
sojourning in Japan — or in other words, Japan threatened to in- 
stigate another internal revolution in China.^ Yuan Shih K'ai's 
dilemma is obvious. If he rejected Japan's demands, Japan would, 
use military force to obtain them, which China could not resist 
successfully. If he accepted Japan's demands, even in part, the 
Chinese radical party opposing the Government would accuse Yuan 
of betraying his country, and perhaps would succeed in starting 
another rebellion on that issue, especially if the revolution received 
further financial and other assistance from Japan. If he decided 
to resist Japan, and make such a fight as was possible, the whole 
country would be plunged into disorder, and such progress as had 
been made toward reconstruction would be throvni back, while all 
foreign residents and interests in the country would be imperiled. 
In these circumstances, Yuan chose the wiser course. He conceded 
what he must, and saved such exceptions as he could, hoping that 
China would get a hearing before civilization later. 

The United States Government, which, had during the 
course of the negotiations shown its interest by making in- 
quiries of Japan and China, and diplomatically cautioning 
Japan, delivered on May 16, 1915, through the American 
minister at Peking, this note : 

In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have 
taken place or which are now» pending between the Government 
of China and the Government of Japan and the agreements which 
have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United 

1 As constituting a remarkable revelation of Japan's provocative pol- 
icy in China, the memorial of the Black Dragon Society given in Ap- 
pendix D is well worth reading. 



CHINA AND THE WAR 95 

States has the honor to notify the Government of the Chinese Re- 
public that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which 
has been entered into, or which may be entered into between the 
Governments of China and Japan impairing the ti-eaty rights of 
the United States and its citizens in China, the political or terri- 
torial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy 
commonly known as the open door policy. 

An identical note was handed to the Japanese Government 
through the American embassy at Tokio. If any of the other 
powers protested or indorsed the outcome of the negotiations, 
they did not make their attitudes public. Probably the Brit- 
ish, French, and Russian governments did not consider it 
expedient to voice any objections at that time. But that the 
principal Allied governments were disturbed by the course 
of their Oriental ally soon was to be definitely confirmed. 

From the day war was declared in Europe, Yuan Shih K'ai 
without doubt realized that China's war problem was con- 
tained in one word, Japan, and his astute mind was busy 
with schemes to protect his country. His first thought (I 
have this information from men who during this period were 
the Chinese President's closest advisers) had been of America, 
but the outcome of the early efforts to protect China's neu- 
trality and right of self-determination, and the matter of the 
twenty-one demands, had convinced him that while the Wash- 
ington Government did not approve Japan's policy, it was 
not prepared to take any very forcible action to obstruct it. 
As a possible solution, Yuan had from the beginning of the 
war thought about China joining the Allies. Soon after 
Japan began military and naval operations in Shantung, and 
after Japan had rejected the request of the Chinese Govern- 
ment to limit the zone of operations to the German leased ter- 
ritory, Yuan proposed that China would send troops to par- 
ticipate in the capture of Tsingtau, and that any movements 
outside of the leased territory should be entrusted to Chinese 
troops. This proposal was communicated to Sir John Jordan, 
the British minister at Peking. It appears that Yuan Shih 



96 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

K'ai then acted entirely on his own initiative, for even those 
of his immediate entourage did not know about the proposal 
when it was made. It was not until the matter of China join- 
ing the Allies came up in a dift'erent form, over a year after- 
ward, that Yuan informed others of his first effort. Accord- 
ing to Yuan 's version of the conversation between himself and 
the British minister. Sir John Jordan discouraged such action 
by China. It appears that the British minister gave this ad- 
vice on his own responsibility, without communicating the 
matter to his ally colleagues, the Russian and French min- 
isters. Whether Sir John Jordan at that time communicated 
the proposal, and his own view, to his own Government, I 
do not know, but one presumes that he did. The significance 
of the incident is apparent. If the British minister advised 
Yuan Shih K'ai against joining the Allies then on his own 
responsibility, and without first ascertaining the opinion of 
Downing Street, the consequences of the policy rest on Sir 
John Jordan; if the British Government was informed, and 
inspired its minister's views, its reason for rejecting an ally 
then is a matter of conjecture. The logical presumption is 
that Japan was opposed to having China join the Allies, and 
the British Government had its reasons, perhaps expediency, 
perhaps previous commitments, for permitting Japan to 
handle the situation. 

In the autumn of 1915 (October 28), the principal Allied 
powers (Great Britain, France, Russia, and Japan) addressed 
a joint note to China advising against the mooted restoration 
of the monarchy, on the ground that it would cause dissen- 
sion and disorder in the country. This note marked a very 
interesting point of tortuous war diplomacy in the far East, 
because the Japanese Government, which had been secretly 
instigating the movement in north China for the restoration 
of the monarchy and trying to tempt Yuan Shih K'ai along 
that patTi by private promises of support, and at the same 
time, by its agents in south China, was promoting an anti- 
monarchy party in that region, now by its public utterance 



CHINA AND THE WAR 97 

opposed a change of government in China. Japan's plan to- 
ward China was very simple as to its thesis, having one major 
object and several subordinate variants. The major object 
was to disrupt and disorganize China and implant Japan's 
control on the ruins under the excuse of being obligated to 
protect civilization by preserving order. As means to accom- 
plish that end, Japan played a two-faced game in China's 
internal politics and a two-faced game in international poli- 
tics. Just as in respect to China 's form of goveriunent Japan 
maintained close intercourse with and gave aid and comfort 
to the Chinese radical republican faction, while really desiring 
a monarchy, with a puppet emperor under Japan's control, 
so in world politics Japan had elected to aline herself with 
the Allies while at heart desiring and expecting Germany to 
win. These Machiavellian tactics are almost incomprehensible 
to habitual American thought, but they are the A B C of 
Oriental diplomacy. After the twenty-one demands, none of 
the chief Allied governments could have had any doubts about 
Japan's real attitude toward the war. 

At the time the Allied powers presented this advice. Yuan 
Shih K'ai was in the midst of a very difficult situation both 
nationally and internationally. On October 30, two days 
after the presentation of the advice to suspend the restoration 
movement, a foreign adviser of the Chinese Government per- 
sonally suggested to Yuan Shih K'ai that a way out of 
China's difficulties would be for China to join the Allies. 
To his surprise, he was told that this proposal already had 
been twice advanced by Yuan, early in the war and again in 
August, 1915. Having been rebuffed once, Yuan was circum- 
spect in his second attempt to break into the Allies' consor- 
tium, for he now feared the difficulties that Japan's opposi- 
tion would cause. As before, he approached the British lega- 
tion in Peking, where the suggestion was regarded as inaus- 
picious in that it would ruffle Japan. I am credibly informed 
that in private conversations with Yuan Shih K'ai, Sir John 
Jordan, the British minister, expressed that opinion, which 



98 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

Yuan took to represent the attitude of the British Govern- 
ment. However, this time Yuan did not confine his ap- 
proaches to the British legation alone. By then he had a 
tolerably clear conception of the real motives and attitudes of 
the various powers and the conditions that circumscribed 
them. Yuan also sounded the French and Russian legations, 
and sought the opinion of the American legation. From a 
source close to Yuan, I learned that the suggestion that China 
would join the Allies was favorably received by both the 
French and Russian legations, which no doubt communicated 
their opinions of the China situation to their governments. 
By that time there seems to have developed an opinion among 
the Allied powers that a limit should be set to Japan's "free 
hand ' ' in the East and that a check upon her was necessary. 

In the conversation of October 30 Yuan informed his for- 
eign adviser that he had proposed that China would join the 
Allies on certain conditions; namely, (a) a guaranty of the 
protection of China by the Allies against any reprisals by 
Germany in the future, (b) reversion to China of the German 
leasehold and German concessions in China, (c) the Allied 
governments to agree to the extradition of political offenders 
from the foreign settlements in China. The third condition 
probably requires some explanation. It was pointed at a 
peculiar situation whereby revolutionary plotters against the 
Chinese Government were able to use the foreign settlements 
as bases of their revolutionary operations, and was the occa- 
sion of intense embarrassment to Yuan Shih K'ai in efforts to 
pacify the country and stabilize his government. 

The official attitude of the American Government vis-a-vis 
China joining the Allies at that time of course was indicated 
by the position of the United States as a neutral, but I am 
informed that the American minister expressed his private 
opinion to Yuan Shih K'ai that such a move probably would 
save China. 

The diplomatic conversations on this subject at Peking led 
to formal consultations among the Allied powers. On Novem- 



CHINA AND THE WAR 99 

ber 23, 1915, the ambassadors of Great Britain, France and 
Eussia had an audience with Viscount Ishii, the Japanese 
minister of foreign affairs, at Tokio, when they formally re- 
quested on behalf of their governments that Japan would join 
with their governments in inviting China to enter the war on 
the side of the Allies. From a perfectly reliable source I 
have an account of what happened. As the results of this 
formal audience, and the motives which it demonstrated, rank 
importantly in the diplomatic history of the far East and of 
the war, a brief analysis of some of its elements is pertinent. 
In a recent conversation with one of the leading authorities 
on the politics of the far East, an Englishman, he remarked: 
"One reason for the weakness and error of British policy in 
the far East during the war is that it has been wrongly ad- 
vised by its principal representatives at Peking and Tokio, 
either from their failure to grasp the real situation or from 
timidity or hesitation in stating it to the home Government." 

On the occasion of that audience at Tokio the ambassadors 
of the three European powers personally were but slightly 
conversant with actual conditions in China, a lack of knowl- 
edge that placed them at a disadvantage in treating with Vis- 
count Ishii. The three ambassadors presented the views of 
their governments, and some arguments why China should be 
asked to join the Allies. Viscount Ishii demurred both to the 
proposal and to the arguments that were advanced. He said 
that Japan considered developments with regard to China as 
of paramount interest to her, and she must keep a firm hand 
there. Japan could not regard with equanimity the organi- 
zation of an efficient Chinese army such as would he required 
for her active participation in the war, nor could Japan fail 
to regard with uneasiness a liberation of the economic activi- 
ties of a nation of 400,000,000 people. 

I have italicized Viscount Ishii 's views, which contain the 
essence of Japan's attitude toward China then and now. 
Japan wanted to keep China weak both in a military and an 
economic sense. China was marked to provide Japan's prin- 



100 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

cipal "reward" when tlie Allies, if they won the war, came to 
divide the spoils. Japan did not want to have her self -as- 
signed part of the spoils merged into the general pot, or per- 
haps be deprived of it by bringing China under the protec- 
tion of the Allies. Where, except in China, could Japan 
then hope to obtain adequate practical "compensation" for 
her "services to the Allies"? In this connection, I recall a 
remark of Viscount Motono, Japanese minister of foreign 
affairs, made to me in the course of an interview in his library 
at Tokio in September, 1917, that "The creation of a large 
and efficient Chinese army would be a serious question for 
Japan. ' ' 

The audience of the Allied ambassadors with Viscount Ishii 
resulted in no action, Viscount Ishii's views being confirmed 
in writing a few days afterward, and transmitted to London, 
Petrograd, and Paris. It however brought out positively 
that Japan was opposed to augmenting the strength of the 
Allies by including China. 

During the period when the Chinese Government was hav- 
ing these conversations with a view to joining the Allies, and 
when the British, French, and Russian governments had ap- 
proved the plan and were using their influence to induce 
Japan to assent, the Japanese legation at Tokio, and Japan's 
diplomatic officials in different parts of China, privately were 
doing all they could to dissuade the Chinese from such a 
course. I have definite information from reliable persons 
who then were in positions to have positive knowledge of 
those events, that Japanese consular officials at Shanghai. 
Hankow, and Canton were directing a propaganda opposed to 
Yuan Shih K'ai's plan to join the Allies. Also, the Japanese 
legation at Peking worked assiduously against the proposal, 
even advising Yuan confidentially, but unofficially, that such 
a course probably would involve China in serious difficulties. 

Probably inspired — certainly tolerated by the Government, 
for the press in Japan is strictly regulated, and is forbidden 
expressly to publish news or to comment on foreign affairs 



CHINA AND THE WAR 101 

except by official permission — by the Foreign Office, the 
Japanese press indulged in a tirade against the suggestion 
that China would become an Ally, and was especially bitter 
in its criticism of Great Britain, which power was accused of 
having devised the plan in order to rob Japan of her proper 
place and just rewards. Some Japanese publicists took the 
occasion to point out that Japan had an alternative to re- 
maining in the Allied group, and that Japan, as other powers 
did, must give primary consideration to her own interests. 
This eruption of the Japanese press was the first distinct in- 
timation of a pro- German trend of Japanese thought, and a 
consideration of the possibility of a rapprochement with Ger- 
many in case Japan's relations with her allies should become 
unsatisfactory or disadvantageous. It may be said also to 
mark the beginning of the anti-British wave of sentiment 
which was noticeable in Japan during a considerable period. 

Thus the second attempt to bring China into the Allies' 
group as a belligerent, resulted in failure. 



CHAPTER V 

CHINA AND THE WAR — CONTINVED 

China's position in 1916 — Chinese sentiment about the war — No tan- 
gible reason to fear Germany — Real fear of Japan — Suspicion of the 
Allies — The United States takes a hand — Influence of America at Peking 
— Invitation to China to sever relations with Germany — Diplomatic 
situation caused by this proposal — How the powers stood — The atti- 
tude of Japan — Sounded by Russia — Some secret correspondence — 
What Japan wanted — British and French influence — Japan's oblique 
course — China's internal situation — The United States advises China — 
Questions raised by this action — Irritation of Japan — Misrepresenting 
the issue — Japan- American relations — Meaning of Root-Takahira agree- 
ment — Japan's anti-American propaganda in China — Some examples — 
The analogy of Korea — The Chinese point of view — Shifting of Japanese 
attitude — Advantages to China In declaring war — Effort to detach China 
from America — China declares war — Her action analyzed — New turn to 
events. 

FROM the autumn of 1915 until the following summer 
Chinese politics was concerned chiefly with the move- 
ment to revive the monarchy, with Yuan Shih K'ai as 
emperor, culminating in failure and the death of Yuan. Gen- 
eral Li Yuan Hung, the ' ' Father of the Revolution, ' ' who had 
been vice-president, succeeded to the presidency. Li Yuan 
Hung is an estimable character, but he lacked Yuan Shih 
K'ai's firmness and grasp of international affairs. His for- 
eign policy was very simple in theory — to try to hold a middle 
course and keep China out of trouble. 

Like every other nation in the world, China's policy dur- 
ing the war was subject to the influence of events. By the 
summer of 1916, when Li Yuan Hung assumed the presidency, 
some things were perfectly clear to the Peking government, 
and other matters were problematical. The outstanding 
practical fact which confronted China was the Japan danger. 

102 



CHINA AND THE WAR 103 

Here was the situation: Japan's policy in China seemed to 
have the tacit assent, if not the approval, of the other Allied 
powers, Great Britain, France and Russia, and the Allied 
group had twice repulsed offers by China to join them in 
circumstances which showed Japan's predomination in the 
far-Eastern policy of the Allies; the Central powers were 
showing" no disposition to raise difficulties for China, but on 
the contrary, were assuming a conciliatory attitude; the one 
great neutral power to which China might have turned for 
support, America, continued to pursue what to Chinese 
seemed an aloof and dubious policy. 

The war situation at that time was becoming more favor- 
able to the Central powers. Russia's offensive military 
strength had been broken, and the diversion of Rumania's 
entrance already was reacting against the Allies. The pros- 
pect of a victory for the Allies appeared to be slight to those 
who looked at the situation impartially ; indeed, the situation 
tended toward an end of the war that would be advantageous 
to Germany. A victory for the Allies as then constituted 
and motivated held no hope for China ; on the contrary, such 
an outcome foreshadowed Japan's undisputed ascendency in 
the far East and her unqualified paramountcy in China. A 
feeling was growing among the Chinese that an ending of the 
war in Germany's favor, or with the influence of Germany in 
world affairs undiminished, presented China's best chance 
of relief from Japan's aggressions. Chinese statesmen could 
see no advantage to China, since she was not admitted into 
the Allied group, in further aggravating Germany. A sub- 
dued resentment of and distrust of the Allies by Chinese had 
been created by some phases of Allied propaganda in China 
since the war began. In volume of publicity and facilities 
the British press and news services had almost a command- 
ing advantage in the field, yet their enforced subordination 
to political exigencies growing out of the relations of the 
British and Japanese governments vis-a-vis Japan's course 
in the war and policy in China at times led them into incon- 



104 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

sistencies and hypocrisies that were obvious to thinking 
Chinese. Also during this period France was represented 
at Peking by a minister who on several occasions affronted 
Chinese sensibilities very seriously by a lack of tact and 
bruskness in handling certain questions There was nothing 
in the professed war policy of the Allies, or in its reactions 
as they had so far been felt in China, to arouse a sentimental 
support among the Chinese. It was of little use for the Al- 
lied press in China to argue the brutal character of German 
policy and how a German victory would menace China, when 
it was the brutal character of the Allies' policy — or one of 
the Allied powers, Japan — that was keeping Chinese states- 
men awake of nights. The Chinese only read about (those 
who did read) the predatory policy of Germany in the Allied 
press; they knew about the predatory policy of Japan from 
actual contact, and they saw the British and French press in 
China ignore or condone and extenuate Japan's conduct. 
By the beginning of 1917 a deep distrust of the Allies had 
taken root with the politically intelligent class of the Chinese, 
which was coupled with a growing disbelief in the probability 
of an Allied victory. To Chinese politicians a victory of 
the Allies was definitely taking the shape of a recognized 
suzerainty of Japan over China, and a victory of the Cen- 
tral powers was taking the shape of a possibility of escape 
from Japanese domination. 

It was the United States that injected a fresh and potent 
influence into the far-Eastern situation. The first import- 
ant manifestation of a change in the American attitude to- 
ward the war was the passage in the summer of 1916 of an 
act of Congress authorizing and providing for a larger navy. 
A condition that had reduced the influence of America at 
Peking to that of an academic friend was the lack of mili- 
tary and naval strength of that nation. Chinese politicians 
believed in the friendly sentiments and good intentions of 
the American people and Government, but a succession of ex- 
periences had about convinced them that the United States 



CHINA AND THE WAR 105 

would not, or could not, carry its opinion against an armed 
power like Japan. Early in 1917 there were premonitions 
that the United States might become a belligerent. Then 
came its severance of diplomatic relations with Germany, and 
the invitation by the American Government to other neutral 
ffltttions to join with it by taking similar action as a protest 
against unrestricted submarine warfare by the Central 
powers. The Chinese Government received this invitation, 
which brought on another crisis of China's war policy. 

Official notification that the United States had broken re- 
lations with Germany was received at the American legation 
in Peking about noon on February 4, 1917. The American 
minister. Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, at once requested an interview 
with Dr. Wu Ting-fang, who at that time was Chinese min- 
ister of foreign affairs. Dr. Wu was seriously ill, and his 
son, C. C. Wu, counselor of the ministry of foreign affairs, 
arranged a consultation for that night between Dr. Reinsch, 
President Li Yuan Hung and Premier Tuan Chi-jui, at which 
Mr. Wu represented the Wai Chiao-pu (Foreign Office), 
Dr. Reinsch presented to President Li the invitation of the 
American Government to China to join with the United States 
and other hitherto neutral nations in severing diplomatic re- 
lations with Germany as a protest against ruthless submarine 
warfare. President Li Yuan Hung was sympathetic, but 
feared the possible consequences to China; Premier Tuan was 
reserved and cautious. Dr. Reinsch presented the case and 
urged quick action. No decision was reached that night. * 

Further conferences took place on the next and succeeding 
days, and an acute diplomatic situation became focused on 
the proposal of the American Government. I was in Peking 
then, and followed developments as closely as I could. Other 
legations and persons not connected with governments took 
part in urging the Chinese Government to accept the invita- 
tion of the United States, or to reject it. The various govern- 
ments lined up. The Central group (Germany and Austria) 
was against such astion by China, of course. Of the Allied 



106 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

group Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy were favor- 
able, and Japan was opposed. Japan's opposition, as usual, 
was oblique. The Japanese legation at Peking exerted its 
influence secretly to deter the Chinese Government from ac- 
cepting the American invitation. In a private interview with 
President Li Yuan Hung, the Japanese minister pointed out 
the risks that China would run by following the lead of 
America; that America was not a military power, and even 
if she entered the war, her participation would have little 
effect; that America always talked big and acted little, and 
frequently had left China in the lurch; that Germany could 
not be defeated by the Allies, and therefore the safest course 
for China was to remain out of the struggle and rely upon 
Japan to protect her interests in the settlement; that after 
the war there would surely be a complete understanding be- 
tween Japan and Germany, which would enable Japan to 
guarantee China's security. A private interview in similar 
tone was had between the Japanese minister and Premier 
Tuan Chi-jui, and at the same time the Japanese Foreign 
Office at Tokio was communicating these arguments to the 
Chinese legation there. 

Since by their secret treaty, made in 1916, but then not 
published, Japan and Russia mutually had agreed to inform 
and consult each other with regard to actions toward China, 
the Russian ambassador at Tokio approached the Japanese 
Foreign Office in this instance. Among the secret documents 
published after the revolution in Russia was the following 
report of a conversation — the italics are mine — between M. 
Krupeusky, the Russian ambassador to Japan, and Baron 
Motono, the Japanese minister of foreign affairs [my italics] : 

japan's territorial war aims 

Prom M. Krupensky, the former Russian ambassador at Tokio; 
Despatch dated February 8, 1917. 

I never omit an opportunity for representing to the minister 
for foreign affairs the desirability, in the interests of Japan herself, 



CHINA AND THE WAR 107 

of China's intervention in the war, and only last week I had a con- 
versation with him on the subject. Today I again pointed out to 
him that the present moment was particularly favorable, in view 
of the position taken up by the United States, and the proposal made 
by them to the neutral powers to follow their example, and more 
particularly, in view of the recent speeches of the American minis- 
ter at Peking. Viscount Motono replied that he would be the first 
to welcome a rupture between China and Germany, and would not 
hesitate to take steps in this direction at Peking if he were sure 
that the Chinese Government would go in that direction. So far, 
however, he had no such assurance, and he feared lest unsuccessful 
representations at Peking might do harm to the Allies. He prom- 
ised me to sound the attitude of Peking without delay, and, in 
case of some hope of success, to propose to the cabinet to take 
a decision in the desired direction. 

On the other hand, the minister pointed out the necessity for 
him, in view of the attitude of Japanese public opinion on the 
subject, as well as with a view to safeguard Japan's position at 
the future peace conference, if China should he admitted to it, of 
securing the support of the Allied powers to the desires of Japan 
in respect of Shantung and the Pacific islands. These desires are 
for the succession to all the rights and privileges hitherto possessed 
by Germany in the Shantung province and for the acquisition of 
the islands to the north of the equator which are now occupied by 
the Japanese. 

Motono plainly told me that the Japanese Government would like 
to receive at once the promise of the Imperial [Russian] Govern- 
ment to support the above desires of Japan. In order to give a 
push to the highly important question of a break between Chma 
and Germany, I regard it as very desirable that the Japanese should 
he given the promise they ask: this the more so as, so far as can 
he seen here, the relations between Great Britain and Japan have 
of late been such as to justify a surmise that the Japanese aspira- 
tions would not meet with any objections on the part of the Lon- 
don cabinet. 

DESPATCH DATED MARCH 1, 1917 

The minister for foreign affairs asked me today whether I had 
received a reply from the Imperial [Russian] Government relat- 
ing to Japan's desires on the question of Shantung and the Pacific 
islands, and told me that the Japanese Government would very much 
like to have at the earliest moment a promise from us on the subject. 



108 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

To the British, French, and Italian governments the pros- 
pect of the United States entering the war as an antagonist 
to Germany came as an event of stupendous importance, 
which promised to turn a situation portending stalemate or 
possible defeat into a good chance for the Allies to win the 
war. Therefore, even if they had not been otherwise inter- 
ested in China, those governments probably would have sup- 
ported any move by the American Government tending to 
draw neutral nations into sympathy and alinement with the 
Allies. Their legations at Peking were sympathetic to the 
American proposal, and so advised the Chinese Government. 
It was realized by all diplomats at Peking that Japan did 
not want China to get into the war, especially not on the side 
of the Allies. Japan might have liked to see China join with 
Germany, for she could have given no effective help to Ger- 
many, and that action would have provided Japan with a 
good excuse to occupy the country. Here, however, was a 
new situation, and the diplomatic world wondered how the 
Tokio cabinet would take it. Among diplomats at Peking it 
was pretty well understood how the Japanese Government 
would feel, but how would it act? The inquiry of the Rus- 
sian ambassador at Tokio throws light on Japan's attitude. 
The Tokio Foreign Office without doubt perceived that there- 
after, especially if America entered the war, it would be 
difficult for Japan to sustain any longer an attitude of keep- 
ing China out of the Allied consortium. But, in exchange 
for her consent to withdraw its objection to China joining 
the Allies, the Japanese Government expressly told M. Kru- 
pensky that Japan wanted the assurance of the Allied powers 
that her possession of the Pacific islands north of the equator 
that had belonged to Germany would be guaranteed by 
them, and that her position in Shantung also would be 
recognized. Stripped of its diplomatic euphemism, this meant 
that Japan would not help to bring China into the Allied 
group if that would result in depriving Japan of her 
"whack" in China. 



CHINA AND THE WAR 109 

It is probable that the revolution in Russia prevented the 
Russian Foreign Office from formally giving to Japan the 
desired assurances about the Pacific islands and Shantung, 
for the revolution broke soon after the receipt of M. Krupen- 
sky's despatch at Petrograd, Whether the British and 
French governments were asked by Japan to give similar as- 
surances regarding Shantung, and whether they gave the 
assurances, remains at the time I write a diplomatic secret 
which the deliberations of the peace conference probably will 
expose. At that time (February, 1917), the Japanese am- 
bassador at Washington went to the state department and 
stated that William J. Bryan, when he was secretary of state, 
had promised to respect Japan's special position in China, 
and asked in the event of China and America entering the 
war with the Allies that the American Government would 
support Japan's position in Shantung province and also her 
claim to the Pacific islands north of the equator. I am re- 
liably informed that Secretary of State Lansing said that he 
knew of no promise of that nature ever given by the state 
department, and he declined to commit the American Govern- 
ment in the matter. In that interview, so I am informed, 
the Japanese ambassador told Mr. Lansing that Germany 
had approached Japan with a view to coming to an under- 
standing. It is interesting to note how the Japanese Gov- 
ernment, when it had occasion to procure some commitment 
in its favor from one of the Allies or co-belligerents, almost 
invariably would throw out an intimation of how Japan might 
get what she wanted from Germany, 

Events at Peking, however, moved more rapidly than Ja- 
panese diplomacy calculated they would. The American 
minister with indefatigable energy was urging the Chinese 
Government to accept the American suggestion. The pre- 
mier, Tuan Chi-jui, was the strong man in the Government, 
and really represented it in the negotiations, as Wu Ting- 
fang's illness prevented him from participating actively. The 
Wai Chiao-pu was- well represented by his son, C. C. Wu, 



110 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

who took part in most of the conversations. It developed 
that China wanted something by way of definite assurances, 
and asked that the American Government would promise that 
China would be consulted in the peace settlement as to the 
disposition of her territory and other questions. Dr. Reinsch 
was unable officially to give such an assurance, as the cable 
communication with America just then became temporarily 
interrupted; but he gave his personal opinion, in the event 
that China followed the advice of the United States, that the 
American Government without doubt would use its influence 
to have China's rights respected. Among those at Peking who 
labored to induce the Chinese Government to follow the ad- 
vice of America were several British and American press cor- 
respondents, and especially Dr. George E. Morrison, for many 
years the Peking correspondent of "The Times" of London 
and now political adviser of the Chinese Government ; and Dr. 
J. C. Ferguson, an American adviser. Dr. Wellington Koo, 
Chinese minister at Washington, also urged his Government 
at that juncture to adopt the advice of the United States. 
Among foreigners in China, except Japanese, there was al- 
most unanimity of opinion that China's opportunity to escape 
foreign domination and a further restriction of her autonomy 
and territory lay in getting under the wing of America. By 
dint of much argument the leading men in the Chinese Gov- 
ernment were induced to accept this \dew, and on February 
9, China took the momentous step of severing diplomatic re- 
lations with Germany. 

The official correspondence follows: 

The American Minister at Peking to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

[Note — Copy.'] 

Peking, Febniary 4th, 1917. 
Excellency : 

I have the honor to advise Your Excellency that I have been in- 
structed by my Government to make to you the following notification 
in its behalf: 

This Government, in view of the recent announcement by the 



CHINA AND THE WAR 111 

German Government of its intention to renew indiscriminate sub- 
marine warfare, has no alternative but to pursue the course laid 
down in its note to the German Government on April 18th, 1916. 
It will therefore recall the American Ambassador and his suite at 
Berlin, and will forthwith deliver to the German Ambassador in 
Washington passports for himself and his suite. 

I am further instructed to say that the President is reluctant to be- 
lieve that Germany will actually carry out the threats made against 
neutral commerce, but, if it is done, the President will ask from 
Congress authority to use the national power to protect American 
citizens engaged in peaceful ^nd lawful errands on the high seas. 
The course taken is, in the view of the President, in entire conformity 
with the principles enunciated by him in his addi'ess to the Senate 
on January 22nd, and he therefore believes that it will make for the 
peace of the world if the other neutral Powers can find it possible to 
take action similar to that taken by the Government of the United 
States. 

I avail, etc. 

[sd.] Paul Reinsch. 

The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the German Minister at Peking. 
[Note — Translation. ] 

Peking, 9th day, 2nd month, 
6th year of the Republic. 
[Februarj^ 9th, 1917.] 
Your Excellency: 

A telegraphic communication has been received from the Chinese 
Minister at Berlin transmitting a note from the German Government 
dated February 1st, 1917, which makes known that the measures of 
blockade newly adopted by the Government of German}^ will, from 
that day, endanger neutral merchant vessels navigating in certain 
prescribed zones. 

The new measures of submarine warfare inaugurated by Germany, 
imperilling the lives and property of Chinese citizens to even a 
greater extent than the measures previously taken which have already 
cost China so many lives, constitute a violation of the principles of 
international law at present in force, and an interference with legiti- 
mate commercial intercourse between neutral states and between 
neutral states and belligerent powers ; if we submit to this method of 
warfare it will be equivalent to an admission on our part that this 
arbitrary and unjustifiable course of action is in accordance with 
international law. ^ 



112 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

The Chinese Government, therefore, protests energetically to the 
Imperial German Government against the measures proclaimed on 
February 1st, and sincerely hopes that with a view to respecting the 
rights of neutral states and to maintaining the friendly relations be- 
tween these two countries, the said measures will not be carried out. 

In case, contrary to its expectations, its protest be ineffectual, the 
Government of the Cliinese Republic will be constrained, to its pro- 
found regret, to sever diplomatic relations at present existing be- 
tween the two countries. It is necessary' to add that the attitude of 
the Chinese Government has been dictated purely by the desire to 
further the cause of the world's peaee and the maintenance of the 
sanctity of international law. 

I avail, etc. 

[sd.] Wu Ting-fang. 

The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the American Minister at Peking. 
[Note — Translation.] 

Peking, 9th day, 2nd month, 

6th year of the Republic. 

^ ^ „ [February 9th 1918] 

Your Excellency: 

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's 
note of February 4th, 1917, informing me that the Government of 
the United States of America, in view of the adoption by the German 
Government of its new policy of submarine warfare on the 1st of 
February, has decided to take certain action which it judges neces- 
sary as regards Germany. 

The Chinese Government, like the President of the United States 
of America, is reluctant to believe that the German Government will 
actually carry into execution those measures which imperil the lives 
and property of citizens of neutral states and jeopardize the com- 
merce, even legitimate, between neutrals as well as between neutrals 
and belligerents and which tend, if allowed to be enforced without 
opposition, to introduce a new principle into international law. 

The Chinese Government being in accord with the principles set 
forth in Your Excellency's note and firmly associating itself with the 
Government of the United States of America, has taken similar 
action by protesting energetically to the German Government against 
the new measures of blockade. The Chinese Government also pro- 
poses to take such action in the future as may be deemed necessary 
for the maintenance of the principles of international law. 

I avail, etc. 

[sd.] Wu Ting-fang. 



CHINA AND THE WAR 113 

Japan was surprised at China's sudden decision, but the 
Tokio Government immediately issued a statement, approving 
the action, so phrased as to give to uninformed persons an 
impression that China's action was taken by the advice of 
Japan. 

Six months passed between China's breaking of diplomatic 
relations with Germany and her declaration of war against 
that power, and during this period the diplomatic struggle 
at Peking to sway China's policy was continued. The situa- 
tion was complicated by an internal political quarrel between 
the executive branch of the Government and the parliament, 
which eventually caused the dissolution of parliament and 
a breach between the northern and southern Chinese parties, 
and had as an interlude the fiasco of the restoration of the 
monarchy. As these phases of China's internal politics are 
closely related to the war policy of the nation and form its 
background, some explanation of them is pertinent. I quote 
some comments of my own, published in ' ' Millard 's Review, ' ' 
Shanghai, of June 9, 1917 : 

China is again in the throes of one of the recurring political 
crises which periodically threaten to disrupt the nation, and which 
are so discouraging to her foreign friends. The issue is, as usual, 
somewhat indistinct, both as to principle and expediency; but the 
chief elements can be discovered. At bottom, it is a struggle for 
control of the Government between Chinese political parties — or 
factions is a better term, for a Chinese political party, as these are 
understood in western countries, has not yet come into existence. 
Roughly, these factions are described as the Military Party, and 
the so-called Liberal Party — the latter being named the Kuoming- 
tang. The Military Party is chiefly composed of the Tuehuns, or 
military' eonunanders of the various provinces and districts. Nearly 
all the troops now under arms in China are controlled by the 
Tuehuns, and this gives them such political power as they possess. 
The Liberal Party has a majority in the Parliament — a Parliament 
which was elected, or selected by factional caucuses, prior to the 
last rebellion, and which was dissolved by Yuan Shih K'ai. The 
Military Party has, since the death of Yuan Shih K'ai, and the 
assumption of the Presidency by Li Yuan Hung, held the principal 
Cabinet offices, under General Tuan Chi-jui, recently Premier. 



114 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

General Tuan took office when the State seemed to be crumbling, 
after the sudden death of Yuan, and managed to organize a Govern- 
ment, such as it was. Parliament, when it reassembled, became the 
center of opposition to the Premier's Government, as it had been 
in Yuan Shih K'ai's administration. There is little in this contest 
between Parliament and the Executive branches of Government to 
distinguish it, in principle, from similar contests in other countries 
since the struggle for democratic government began. There are 
the usual disputes over rights, precedence, power and privileges, 
as between the two branches of Government. A difficulty is that, 
in China, there is no recognized constitution; a temporary instru- 
ment exists, but its legality and application are matters of dispute. 

Here are all the elements for political friction, and of course 
the friction developed. This was not unexpected; it even was not 
altogether undesirable in a republic, academically, provided it was 
restrained within proper bounds. But, when Parliament and the 
Premier disagreed — and they usually did disagree — there was a 
deadlock which frequently blocked the wheels of administration. 
An old story. The Premier tried to have his way, and Parliament, 
while obstructing him, sought opportunities to put the Premier in 
a hole. Between the factions, President Li Yuan Hung has tried 
to be neutral, and to shape his course by the provisional constitution, 
and the advice of foreign constitutional lawyers. His coui^se has 
always been moderate, and conciliatory, and he has continually 
striven to preserve peace, and to work out a solution on republican 
lines. As the schism widened, the Premier drew to him the Tuchuns, 
and they formed a partial solidarity as opposed to the majority 
in Parliament. The quai-rel developed into a complete breach, and 
the Premier induced the President to summon the Tuchuns to Peking 
for consultation. Some of the influential Tuchuns responded, and 
went to Peking; where they agreed to demand the dissolution of 
Parliament as necessary to the administration of the Government. 
On the other hand. Parliament — or the Kuomingtang majority — 
insisted on the dismissal of the Premier, and the appointment of a 
Premier and Cabinet harmonious with and satisfactoiy to Parlia- 
ment. In this situation, the Premier resigned (or was dismissed 
by the President) and left Peking. The Tuchuns soon followed 
him to Tientsin, and announced their independence of the Central 
Government, threatening a military advance on the capital unless 
their conditions were complied with, and Parliament was dissolved. 
This is a rough outline of recent events. 

In attempting to discern the merits of this dispute, and the bet- 
ter course to adopt, it is necessary to consider what are, or may 



CHINA AND THE WAR 115 

be the real underlying causes of dissension, and the fundamental 
principles involved. The Military Party claims that the present 
Parliament has no legal basis for existence, and this argument is 
not without plausibility. The Liberal Party claims that it is try- 
ing to sustain in China the vital principles of republican and con- 
stitutional government. Therefore, the issue has two phases — 
what is right in principle, and what is politically expedient. As 
a matter of principle, taking constitutional forms as they are gen- 
erally understood and applied, the Tuehuns are wrong in dictating 
to the Government, and in demanding the dissolution of Parliament. 
In short, a group of generals assert the right to decide legal ques- 
tions, and to enforce their interpretation of constitutional issues. 
This assumption is subversive of constitutional govenameut — there 
is no doubt on that point. So on the main issue, Parliament is 
technically in the right. On the other hand, the Military Party 
have a very good argument on grounds of political expediency. 
The Tuehuns contend that order is the first requirement of the 
Chinese Government at this juncture; that order cannot be main- 
tained except by the Government controlling troops, and that the 
Tuehuns have the troops — therefore, the Tuehuns are the only 
officials who can mamtain order, and their wishes must be con- 
sulted in the composition of the Cabinet, and the decision of ad- 
ministrative questions. Furthermore, the Tuehuns claim that if 
they would yield to Parliament, and obey its injunctions, that the 
result merely would be that they would be removed from their 
commands, and replaced by members of the other Party, who when 
in power would be not a whit less arbitrary in using the army for 
partisan advantage than the present Military Party is. There is 
much in the present state of Chinese polities to bear out this argu- 
ment. As for Parliament, its ease must now rest solely on the 
technical basis for its existence. As a functioning constitutional 
body it has so far been a failure. 

The drawn-out controversy which preceded and bi'ought on the 
crisis developed some interesting matters. An argument used by 
the Liberal Party to undermine the Premier with the people was 
that he plans to betray the country to Japan; and that he has re- 
cently concluded a secret agreement with Japan whereby Japan is 
to sustain the Military Party in restoring the monarchy in China, 
and be compensated by concessions and supervision over some of 
China's administrative functions. A prominent member of the 
Liberal Party said to me recently: "I wonder if the American 
Government understands why Japan, which has for some time sup- 
ported our Party in Chinese politics, is now supporting the Pre- 



116 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

mier's party?" The reason, according to my questioner, is that the 
ex-Premier had planned to betray China into the hands of Japan. 
This accusation, coming from men who for years have been sus- 
pected of themselves being closely associated with Japanese designs 
and policy in China, is at least interesting. 

With reference to Japan's part in these complications, and her 
possible course in case China becomes embroiled in civil war at 
this time, I think that less apprehension need be felt now than if 
this crisis had come some months, or a year ago. World events 
are taking a course that compels modification, or at least suspen- 
sion, of some phases of Japan's policy toward China, as exemplified 
by Group V of the twenty-one demands. Without accusing Japan 
of insincerity in her present professions of change of heart on 
these matters of policy, it can be pointed out that, even if she 
should still want to press Group V and to seize the opportunity 
which civil war in China would give for interv^ention here, world 
conditions are far less favorable to a consummation of such a 
project than formerly. The revolution in Russia and the military 
and political reconstitution of America that is taking place, with 
the reactions of those events on other Powers now and in the fu- 
ture, profound^ affect Japan's position, and therefore probably 
will influence her policy in China. 

At that juncture the American Government took cognisance 
of the state of China and sought to check its disorderly ten- 
dencies by addressing to China a friendly note of advice. 
This act at once became the subject of wide-spread criticism, 
for it was a further innovation in the far-Eastern policy of 
the United States. I include here some of my own comments 
made at the time. In "Millard's Review" of June 16, 1917, 
I wrote : 

Action by the United States in officially requesting all the allied 
powers to address China in terms similar to the American note 
sent last week (advising China against becoming involved in ei^'il 
war) has unusual significance. When the American note was pub- 
lished, the Japanese semi-official press immediately began to crit- 
icize it in a somewhat irritated tone, on the theoiy that it is rather 
an impudence for America to advise China, without first consulting 
Japan. Some editors even have held that, in case it was necessary 
to advise China, Japan ought to insist that any advice be given 
through Tokio exclusively. This argument is directly in line with 



CHINA AND THE WAR 117 

the hypothesis which Mr. Zumoto and other Japanese publicists 
have been propagating so sedulously during the last two or three 
years, and amounts almost to an assertion of Japan's right to 
manage China to the exclusion of other nations. This last note of 
the American Government seems like a direct retort to those as- 
sumptions. Not only does the United States take her own course 
in advising China, but she now goes further, and directly asks the 
Allies, including Japan, to join in giving the same advice. In one 
sense, this can be taken as a straw indicating the answer that may 
be given to Mr. Zumoto's speculations about how far America will 
go, as he puts it, in "interfering between China and Japan," or 
being a "political busybody in Eastern affairs." It begins to ap- 
pear that American foreign policy already is taking forms not as 
yet comprehended, in all their significance, in Japan, and which 
are of intense interest to Chinese. This action of America, and the 
reasons which have prompted it, are of course quite apart from 
China's reception of the advice, and even of the other powers' re- 
sponse to America's request. 

And in "Millard's Review" of June 23, 1917, I wrote fur- 
ther: 

For the time, more interest has been evinced in the note of the 
American Government to China, and its effort to have certain other 
nations join with it in this pacific advice, than in phases of internal 
polities. There is some obscurity about the sending of this note, 
as to time and circumstances; but it seems to have been the in- 
tention of the American Government to present the note to China, 
and at the same time to provide other nations w;ith copies of it, 
asking them to address China in similar terms. Evidently it was 
not intended to make action by America in any way dependent or 
conditional on conjunction with any other nations, for the note 
was presented independently, without waiting for replies from 
other powers. These replies have now been made, to the effect 
(as to Great Britain and France at least) that while they agree in. 
principle with the advice given by America and with its objects, 
they are inhibited from joining in the advice. Analyzed, this hardly 
can mean anythmg else than that Great Britain and France, at 
some previous time, have made engagements (probably with Japan 
and Russia, or with either) which are not abrogated, and which 
deter those powers from acting with America at this time. 

Perhaps one purpose of the American note was to bring this 
revelation. If Great Britain and France think the American ad- 



118 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

vice sound in principle, and correct as to objects, why not join 
with America in trying to influence China by friendly moral suasion, 
in the interest of maintaining peace among Chinese at this time, 
and probably also with the additional object of finding a way peace- 
fully to sustain democratic institutions in this comitry? The an- 
swer logically must be that, at some time within the last few years, 
perhaps since the gTeat war began, Japan has wrung commitments 
from these powers regarding their policies in China. If this is 
true, then undoubtedly America wants to know it, and the way has 
been paved to find out exactly what the status is. The time is 
coming when, in the far East as well as in Europe, all the hold- 
over agreements of the secret school of diplomacy, which played 
so powerful a part in getting the world into this war, will have to 
be put face up on the table. This is the intimation carried in world 
politics by this American note to China. It is indicative of funda- 
mental diplomatic moves that are taking place as a result of en- 
trance of America into the war. 

The Japanese press in Japan and that part of the press 
in China controlled by Japan made an issue of this incident 
of the American advice to China. As usual, the criticism 
was linked with a systematic misrepresentation of the facts 
and with garbled news despatches about the affair. I quote 
from two leading Japanese newspapers on the topic: 

FROM THE "tOKIO ASAHI" 

That the ad\dce recently given to China by Dr. Paul Reinsch, 
American Mmister to China, was clearly interference in the do- 
mestic polities of China cannot be denied. Only it is not clear 
with what motive that advice was given. It had been interpreted 
in good faith that the advice was given under instructions issued 
cai-elessly by the American Government, based upon the recom- 
mendations of the American Minister in Peking. But we now 
have come to learn of the true intention and motive of the Amer- 
ican advice from the reasons made public for sending that ad^4ee 
by the American Secretary of State, as per our special despatch 
from New York. According to the entire tenor of the American 
advice to China, America meant from the first to interfere with 
the domestic aflPairs of that country. She purposely exaggerated 
the mobilization of Japanese troops and the urgency of prepara- 
tions of the Entente Powers against the war situation as reasons 
for this advice. We considered the rumor of a Japanese invasion 



CHINA AND THE WAR 119 

of Siberia very seriously in connection with the rumor of a separate 
peace by Russia. Now this horrible scheme has been made use of 
in the American advice to China. Even if the rumor in question 
were true, the contention that Japan needs to prepare to mobilize 
in Manchuria sooner or later on behalf of the Entente Powers does 
not by any means justify America's independent interference in 
China's domestic politics by over-riding other nations. 

FROM THE "TAMATO" (tOKIO) 

America's recent action was at great variance with the policy 
hitherto pursued by that country. It is still fresh in the memory 
of the Powers that America withdrew from the Quintuple Syndicate 
in China on the ground that it did not wish to interfere in Chinese 
politics, and that when the Japanese Government approached 
America with a proposal of advising Yuan Shih Kai to postpone 
the establishment of a monarchy, she declined to take concerted 
action with Japan and other Powers for a similar reason. Yet 
America has now precipitately interfered in China's domestic 
politics independently of the other Powers, who are assuming the 
passive attitude of lookers-on. Moreover, America must be aware 
of the superior position enjoyed by Japan in China, which may be 
compared to that enjoyed by America m Mexico. Yet while Japan 
has abstained from taking any steps whatever in Mexico, in defer- 
ence to America's special position there, America has interfered 
in China's domestic politics by ignoring Japan's position there. 

The ''Japan Advertiser," the American paper at Tokio, 
had this to say : 

Anyone who knows anything about America's policy in China 
will appreciate that America has no political ambitions, no de- 
sires for spheres of influence or any political or tmancial control 
in China. The note addressed by the United States Government 
was a friendly one and merely advisory, and expressed a desire 
to see China set aside her factional political disputes at this critical 
time. 

We regret the comments in the Japanese press and we regret 
the interviews which were given to the foreign press, because we 
have worked and wish to continue to work for closer and more 
friendly relationships between Japan and the United States. There 
never was a time when conditions were more favorable to the pro- 
moting of a closer andjaetter understanding between the two coun- 
tries, nor has any administration in Japan stood on a broader and 



120 DEMOCKACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

saner foreign policy to assure such results than that of those in 
power at the present time. 

We regret it because suspicion will now be attached to Japan's 
motives. The note which the United States sent to China is one 
which any and every nation having the interests of China at heart 
should be willing and ready to subrscribe to. There is nothing in 
it which any nation can justly take exception to. 

I want to elucidate the matter of this advice of the United 
States to China novr because it was a forerunner of import- 
ant events, and because it was a fairly distinct revelation of 
certain international purposes and alinements. The Amer- 
ican note in itself was inoffensive in tone and had no ulterior 
objects. It simply suggested to China that the moment was 
very unpropitious for any nation to become internally disor- 
ganized, and that such a situation contained special dangers 
for China. "Why any other power should object to such an 
influence being applied at that time to the situation of China 
one scarcely can see, unless other powers should desire to have 
China in disorder. I bring these points out here because 
later on this same question of the foreign powers advising 
China about the same condition came up again in somewhat 
different circumstances. The Japanese propaganda about the 
incident then was a prelude, as it developed subsequently, to 
certain purposes of the Ishii mission to America. In "Mil- 
lard's Review," June 23, 1917, I wrote: 

Japan has followed the example of the principal Allied nations 
of Europe, and is sending a commission to America composed of 
eminent Japanese. The Japanese press attaches great importance 
to this visit, and no doubt it will be given considerable prominence 
in the United States, where it will be "boosted" by the full machin- 
ery of Japan's oi'ganized publicity there. I am very glad this 
commission is to visit the United States at this time, but hardly 
for exactly the reasons which the Japanese press advances. The 
well-worn formula, "to create a better understanding in America of 
Japan's true purposes," which is the ostensible purpose of the 
visit as ascribed by the Japanese press, is of course merely the 
customary balderdash. Such visits of Japanese, and Japan's 
propaganda ui America have heretofore been used principally to 



CHINA AND THE WAR 121 

prevent Japan's purposes from being understood there. I regard 
the purposes of this mission as follows : First, to get into the lime- 
light along with the other powers before the American public, so 
as to absorb some reflected popularity and to keep Japan's view- 
point to the fore; Second, to insinuate Japan's theorem of adjust- 
ing the war issues as they apply to the East into the thought of 
the American people and American Government. Of course, this 
is perfectly legitimate from Japan's standpoint, and is just what 
the special missions of other nations went to America to do in 
their own behalf. Without doubt, the Japanese mission will be 
received as politely as the other missions were, and what the com- 
missioners have to say will be listened to seriously. In one way, 
however, I think the Japanese press is a little wrong in perspective 
on the mission, and its effects in America. It assumes rather too 
much that these eminent Japanese will tell a lot to Americans, and 
is inclined to ignore what Americans may tell these Japanese. I 
welcome, and the American Government also should welcome, this 
chance to tell Japan privately, but in perfectly plain terms, how 
the United States regards some of the fundamental problems con- 
nected with far Eastern conditions and polities; and to make it 
plain to Japan that hereafter the United States intends to inter- 
est itself actively in the solution of these questions. Once this is 
accepted in Japan as a fact, there will be a great and I hope a 
permanent improvement in the relations between Japan and Amer- 
ica. 

One thing that ought to be impressed on these commissioners is 
that the United States will not submit to being thrust into the 
position of a satellite of Japan in respect to China; nor of Europe 
either. Emphasis of this point need not mean nor display any sug- 
gestion of antipathy to Japan, or of opposition to her legitimate 
commercial expansion in China, or anywhere; nor of indisposition 
of Americans, or the American Government, to cooperate with 
Japan whenever cooperation is legitimate and feasible. But Amer- 
ica, in dealing with China, should remain a free agent, with full 
independent powers of action in matters of particular interest to 
our nation and which are or should be outside the scope of inter- 
vention by other nations. We allow this position to Japan, and 
should insist on retaining it for ourselves. I have no patience 
with publicists in America who are disposed to concede a contention 
so frequently advanced by the Japanese semi-official press, that 
under the Root-Takahira Agreement the United States Govern- 
ment is required or obligated to consult Japan before taking im- 
portant steps in China. ^Recently, according to reports telegraphed 



122 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

from America by Japanese news services, the "New York Evening 
Post," a leading pacifist organ, argues that the United States ''should 
■understand Japan's special predominance in China, and not take 
any diplomatic action there without first consulting Japan, be- 
cause there is a convention, etc." The Japanese papers garble 
utterances of this kind so frequently that I may be doing the 
"Evening Post" an injustice to credit it with having advanced this 
argument, but it is in line with utterances of that paper that I 
have seen before. When it advances (if it has done that) the 
argument that the Root-Takahira Agreement commits the United 
States to consult Japan in all diplomatic moves made in resi>eet 
to China, it takes an utterly untenable position, which will not 
bear analysis. 

The Root-Takahira Agreement consists of identic notes ex- 
changed between the then Japanese Ambassador at Washington 
and Elihu Root, then Secretary of State, by which both Govern- 
ments, in identical terms, engage to sustaiu the status quo in China 
and the principle of equal commercial opportunity here and the 
temtorial integrity of China. Article 5 says: "Should any event 
occur threatening the status quo as above described or the prin- 
ciple of equal opportunity as above defined, it remains for the 
two Governments to communicate with each other in order to ar- 
rive at an understanding as to what measures they may consider 
it useful to take." Does this seem to require the United States to 
consult Japan previous to senduig a Note to China, which is aimed 
to sustain the principle of the Root-Takahira convention'? And 
if it should be so construed, does it not bind Japan in exactly the 
same way? Does the Japanese press contend that, before taking 
any steps in China, Japan must previously consult the United 
States, under the terms of the Root-Takahira convention? And 
if so, why did not Japan previously infonn the United States of 
her intention to present the famous twenty-one demands to China? 
The assumption that this last American note need first be visaed 
by Japan before being presented to China is prepostei'ous, and 
efforts to inject this idea into American opinion and polic}', and into 
Chinese thought, should be resisted. 

The Chinese Government took the advice of the American 
Government in the same spirit that it had been given, and 
replied, thanking the American Government for its advice 
and stating that the matter vi^ould be given careful attention. 
For the moment the advice made a strong impression on the 



CHINA AND THE WAR 123 

fractious political groups in China and among the intelligent 
Chinese generally; and had it then been supported, as the 
United States asked, by similar advice of all the Allied 
powers, it might have been made practically effective; but 
none of the other powers officially supported the advice, and 
one of them, Japan, had different plans about China. 

From the time when, in February, China had severed 
diplomatic relations with Germany, there was pressure at 
Peking to induce the Government to follow^ the breaking of 
relations with a declaration of war. China's reluctance to 
do that had been modified by the entrance of the United 
States as a belligerent. The declaration of war by America 
had indeed altered the whole war situation for China, but the 
full meaning of the changes it wrought in war policj" did not 
at once penetrate Chinese thought. As the two belligerent 
groups were defined before America entered the war, the 
Chinese had little faith in the protestations of any of the 
warring powers. The Chinese did not think that Great Brit- 
ain or France or Italy had any special invidious designs upon 
China, but they firmly believed that Japan had such designs 
and that Japan had somehow obtained from her Allies the 
privilege of doing as she liked with China. This hypothesis 
was constantly being confirmed by circumstances. To the 
Chinese the attitude of the powers, and Japan, toward the 
American advice to China was circumstantial evidence of a 
secret recognition among them of Japan's paramountcy in the 
far East. At that time the Japanese press was busily sow- 
ing suspicion of America among the Chinese. I commented 
on some phases of that propaganda in "IVIillard's Review" 
of August 11, 1917, as follows : 

Some grave matters are broached in the leading editorial of "The 
Herald of Asia," [the Tokio magazine edited by Mr. Zumoto], under 
the title, "American Friends of China." The article begins by 
mentioning the publication in book form of impressions gained 
by Mr. Tadasaburo Yamamoto (described as a millionaire ship- 
owner) during a receni visit to China. The author describes his 



124 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

conversations with a number of prominent Chinese, among whom 
was Mr. Tang Shao Yi, who is quoted as having said: "It is the 
Americans who led the Koreans to the loss of their independence. 
Americans instigated Korean politicians in schemes of national in- 
dependence, which misettled the minds of the Korean people. This 
was doubtless a contributing cause of the annexation of that coun- 
try by Japan. Americans are now apparently trying to make China 
follow in Korea's fatal footsteps." That certainly is a remark- 
able point of view. One wonders just what Mr. Tang had in mind 
in easting now this veil of suspicion over American policy in China. 
However, "The Herald of Asia" proceeds to interpret: "Mr. Tang 
Shao Yi doubtless speaks from personal knowledge when he says 
that the same fatal mistake which some of their compatriots made 
in Korea is now being committed by a gi'oup of Americans in 
China. It is not to be supposed for a moment that any hint is 
here intended that the consequence would be the same as in the 
case of Korea. China is now passing through one of the most im- 
portant crises in her history. It is easy to see that dangerous rocks 
are ahead of her, but we have too much faith in the race virility 
of her people to believe that she will ever pass under alien rule. 
It is not, however, to be denied that a number of Americans in 
the far East are pursuing a line of policy which is calculated to 
thwart understanding and good will between the two gTeat Asiatic 
nations which common interests should make the best of friends." 
But Mr. Zumoto, it appears, is only using Tang Shao Yi's alleged 
views as a text to preach a little sermon to China by citing the 
horrible example of Korea. "The Herald of Asia" proceeds: "It 
may reasonably be doubted whether Korean independence could 
have been saved even if she was free from all instigations by her 
American friends. Having proved herself incapable of self-re- 
generation during over twenty years of her intercourse with the 
outside world, it was obvious that she badly needed guidance and 
instruction from a strong Power vitally interested in her preserva- 
tion from hostile foreign aggressions. When the struggle for su- 
premacy in Korea between Japan and Russia ended in our favor, 
there was no longer any doubt as to who should be Korea's pro- 
tector and guide. To any candid observer it was plain that the 
only wise and patriotic course for the Koreans was to accept the 
logic of events and grasp in an open-hearted manner Japan's out- 
stretched hands of friendship and assistance. Had they done so, 
they might not have been able to secure their independence, but 
they certainly would have been able to retain in their hands a 
large measure of national autonomy. . . . The Koreans may perhaps 



CHINA AND THE WAR 125 

be pardoned for their failure to seize the unique opportunity of 
bettering their national fortmies thus offered by Japan. ... It 
may not be quite correct to say, as Mr. Tang is alleged to have 
said, that it was her American friends who caused the loss of 
Korea's independence. But it seems perfectly safe to say that 
Korea's American friends, with few exceptions, did much to re- 
tard the process of her reconciliation with Japan and to that extent 
contributed to her final annexation by Japan." 

These extracts from the article of "The Herald of Asia" are 
enough to give its tone and argument. According to the editor, 
the Koreans perhaps would have lost their independence and 
autonomy anyhow since that fate was inevitable (although the in- 
dependence of Korea was guaranteed by Japan in her declaration 
of war on Russia, in the first alliance with Great Britain, and in 
the treaty of peace with Russia), but that loss was hastened and 
aggravated because of the sympathy of Americans living in Korea 
with the national sentiments of the Koreans. "The Herald of 
Asia's" argument about Korea is not pointed at the American 
Government, for it is well known that President Roosevelt was 
most accommodating (even ignoring a treaty then in existence 
between the United States and Korea) by falling in gracefully 
with Japan's policy of acquisition ; so it narrows to a revival of the 
old accusation of pernicious political activity of American educa- 
tional and religious missionaries in Korea. We had thought that 
this accusation was (at least among intelligent westerners) suffi- 
ciently disproved by the revelations at the trial of the so-called 
conspiracy eases at Seoul a few years ago. To American mission 
organizations can be left the task of defending the status of that 
work in Korea; but when "The Herald of Asia" draws an analogy 
of China with Korea, and of the disposition of Americans living in 
China to sympathise with the wish of Chinese to sustain China's 
national existence, that thesis requires demonstration. 

With the case of Korea, the alleged unfortunate (to the Koreans) 
sympathy of Americans there without doubt is meant to apply, and 
in practice does apply to American missions; and the inference 
clearly is that in ease American missionaries in China show a 
similar sympathy with Chinese in their wish to preserve their na- 
tionality, that Chinese ought to beware of such sympathy and of 
actions springing out of it as likely to have a result here similar 
to what occurred in Korea. The inference of course also applies 
to Americans in China of other occupations who hold such views. 
As to the sentiment of American missionaries and educators in 
China on this point, ^t is pertinent to recall the striking letter 



126 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

written by a leading American chureliman in China to President 
Wilson soon after the presentation at Peking of the famous de- 
mands in twenty-one articles, in 1915: "In the very nature of th6 
case, every American missionary, Catholic and Protestant, sym- 
pathizes with China in her desire to preserve her independence 
and integrity. Indeed, while our missionaries are not preaching 
politics, our usefulness with the Chinese would be immediately at 
an end if they felt that we were out of sympathy with their as- 
pirations to preserve their national freedom and independence. 
The Japanese Government understands that all missionaries, and 
especially Americans, whether they express it or not, feel in their 
hearts hostility to any etfort on Japan's part to secure control of 
China by threats of force. Christianity inspires individuals to be 
loyal to God rather than to man, and to contend for freedom to 
worship Him according to the dictates of their own consciences. 
Such convictions are necessarily in conflict with any attempt at 
military dictation to a nation by an alien Government and race. 
The Japanese Government as instinctively feels the antagonism of 
Christianity to her progress in Korea and in China as the Roman 
Government felt the antagonism of early Christianity to her im- 
perial despotism. Hence, Japan's attempts by threats of force 
and through her^ efforts to impose secrecy on China to secure the 
control of this nation, in the very nature of the ease will lead her 
also to hinder, cripple, and if possible to destroy the work of 
Christian missionaries in China." 

Humanity has a short memory; but we think that "The Herald 
of Asia" mistakes somewhat by belie\'ing that the world's memory 
is shorter than it really is ; and if it is short of memory the world 
often is long of remembrance. Does Mr. Zumoto think that Group 
V is so soon forgotten"? — and that the world also has forgotten 
that the United States was the only power which excepted publicly 
to Japan's action then? There is a general disposition, in the in- 
terest of keeping appearances, to be willing to allow that incident 
to drop into the limbo of relegated matters that have been out- 
crops of the great war, and which are now slipping away in the 
course of developing the war's objects on new and broader lines. 
But Japan never has definitely repudiated nor relinquished Group 
V; and until that is done it cannot be forgotten, nor overlooked. 
For reasons that are daily becoming more apparent, Japan is now 
hindered from presently pursuing a frankly pi'edatory policy in 
China, for predatory policies are distinctly going out of fashion 
among the more enlightened nations that in the main compose the 
existing Allied association — the nations which must conquer mili- 



CHINA AND THE WAR 127 

tarism if it is to be conquered. We may be sure, further, that 
li' miiitarLsm is SLippressed m Europe, that it will not be allowed 
to survive in dangerous form in the far East. And with an ex- 
tinction or suppression of militarism there also will be an enforced 
deletion of political policies based on militarism. Therefore Amer- 
icans who live in China need feel no hesitation in giving play to 
their natural democratic disposition to sympathize with China's na- 
tional aspirations. In so acting they are sure of being in line with 
the announced policy of the American Government, and with prin- 
ciples that democracy is now struggling to keep alive in the world. 
By the way, ''The Herald of Asia" deprecates any criticism of Ja- 
pan's policy in China by Americans; but that paper by its article 
shows that it considers efforts of the Japanese press to sow sus- 
picion of America among Chinese to be perfectly legitimate. 

I want to mention here that Tang Shao Yi told me a year 
or more after I wrote those comments that he had been al- 
together misquoted by the Japanese author, who perverted 
his meaning. 

During the period when China was being urged by the 
United States and other of the Allied powers excepting Japan 
to declare war against Germany I frequently discussed the 
situation confidentially with prominent Chinese politicians 
of both factions, and I obtained in that way a very good idea 
of the Chinese point of view on the war. Perhaps I cannot 
express that view better than to quote, without giving his 
name, an eminent Chinese as he spoke privately to me on one 
of those occasions when I was urging that China should follow 
the advice of the American Government and enter the war. 
He said: 

I am in favor of China entering the war, but only on the ex- 
press stipulation and promise of the United States and Great 
Britain and France that certain things will be assured to China. 
We want the definite promises of those powers that China will 
be protected against Japan; that under no circumstances will any 
of them hereafter recognize or support any claim or pretension of 
Japan to a special position m China, or to any kind of a para- 
mountcy in relation to China. Frankly, we Chinese believe that 
Great Britain and France already have committed their govern- 
ments to support Japan on these questions; therefore, we want the 



128 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

unequivocal promises of those governments that whatever arrange- 
ments they have made with Japan or any other power that are of 
such a character will be abrogated. We Chinese do not believe 
that the United States ever has, or is now contemplating, the 
recognition of Japan's paramountey in respect to China; but if 
America has no thought of that policy, why does your Govern- 
ment permit to proceed uncontradicted from any official source 
the plain imputations of Japan's propaganda and press that Japan 
is entitled to a paramount position in China? 

I think I have observed among the other nations a disposition 
primarily to consider their own positions and interests, and so we 
Chinese may be excused for thinking first about this war in terms 
of the interests and security of China. You say we can trust the 
United States, and especially President Wilson, to get justice for 
Cliina at the peace conference. As to that, your Government has 
always talked very well about China, but at the pinch it usually 
has left her in the lurch by refusing to take any active part in 
aiding her, or even to enforce your own policies here. As to Presi- 
dent Wilson, he is but a man and will die in time, and his tenure 
of office ends in a short while. He cannot answer for his suc- 
cessors or the policies of succeeding governments. As for me, I 
have begun to doubt if the United States ever will have either the 
power or the will to be of much real aid to China. Good wishes 
are fine things, but we need practical help and a practical display 
of force behind our nation. We do not now trust Great Britain 
or France, because of their apparent acceptance of Japan's policy 
toward China. We cannot afford to repose trust in the United 
States until it proves to us that it has the will and the power to 
help us. The United States never has been a military nation, and 
in the East international politics moves in terms of military power. 
So while we believe in the good purposes of America, we cannot 
put our dependence solely on her. A league of nations, you say; 
but such a league is at present a mere vision. It is only if the 
United States, acting with the other western powers, will give us 
definite promises that I favor China entering the war. Separated 
from, America, we do not trust Great Britain and France. Separ- 
ated from Great Britain and France, we do not believe that Amer- 
ica will be strong enough to put a check on Japan. Moreover, who 
can tell which side will win the war'? Japanese military and naval 
experts have told me privately that Germany is sure to win; and 
in that event how will China's position be improved by assailing 
her now"? 



CHINA AND THE WAR 129 

At that time, the summer of 1917, the resources of Amer- 
ica for war and their effects on the military situation were 
but slightly comprehended in China, but the influence of the 
United States was growing with each passing month. Japan's 
diplomacy still was discouraging China from entering the 
war, but this opposition was less obvious — that is, more secret 
— than formerly. The Japanese press still was critical of 
the proposal that China would become a belligerent. Its gen- 
eral attitude is very well outlined by some comments of the 
''Japan Chronicle," printed in August, 1917, The "Japan 
Times" is considered a mouthpiece of the Tokio Foreign Of- 
fice, published in English. 

While on the subject of the attitude of the "Japan Times" con- 
cerning German influence, it is instructive to go back a few months. 
Today the Tokio journal is convinced that any opposition to the 
declaration of war by China must be due to the influence of Ger- 
man gold. But a few months ago, when it would have been pos- 
sible for China to join the Allies without much friction, the "Japan 
Times" was most vehement in its objections to such a course. In 
those days it saw the influence of German gold in a proposal that 
would have effectually destroyed German intrigues in China. As 
recently as last October the Tokio journal was denouncing "the 
English journalist Simpson" ("Putnam Weale") as "the party" 
who is endeavoring to obtain the admission of China to the ranks 
of the Allies, and to show its opmion of anyone who advocated 
such a scheme professed to accept as true a Japanese rumor that 
Mr. Simpson had tried to "blackmail" the Governor-General of 
Mukden. Furthermore, the "Japan Times" worked itself into a 
white heat of indignation over the suggestion that "Great Britain 
is again scheming to induce China to enter the war on the Allies' 
side," declared the story to be unthinkable, suggested that such 
action on the part of Great Britain would be "unprincipled" and 
professed to a suspicion that German machinations were behind 
the scheme. The tendency of the whole article was to suggest that 
if Britain held views in favor of China joining the Allies, she was 
guilty of an unpardonable offence. Since then the Japanese 
Government has been changed. A new Administration has come 
in with a different policy. The objections which Japan held to 
China joining the Allies have been withdrawn. Consequently the 



130 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

"Japan Times" has promptly turned its coat. Where a few months 
ago the suggestion that China should join the Allies, or the state- 
ment that Britain was encouraging her to do so M-as the result of 
German machinations, today the opinion that it would be a mis- 
take for China to enter actively into the war must also be inspired 
by German gold. We are left to speculate on the inspiring mo- 
tive of the volte face of the "Japan Times," which within seven 
months can hold two absolutely contradictory opinions, on each 
occasion suggesting that those who hold the opposite opinion must 
he dishonest. 

As valid reasons why China should enter the war against 
Germany were cited certain conditions affecting her that 
would thereby be relieved or ameliorated. These conditions 
are summarized in a memorandum submitted to the Chinese 
Government by Dr. George E. Morrison in August, 1916, as 
follows : 

1. The share of the Boxer indemnity which China has to pay to 
Germany is $135,000,000, and to Austria $6,000,000— a total of 
$141,000,000. These amounts would revert to China. 

2. Of these amounts, without any increase of her present bur- 
dens, China could obtain from the Allies a loan of not less than 
$100,000,000. 

3. China is at present paying to Germany on account of the Boxer 
indemnity and on account of railway and other loans, £6,000 per 
day. The payment of that money would at least be suspended 
until after the war, and in case of the £2,000 per day paid for the 
Boxer indemnity, it would never recur, 

4. The German concessions at Tientsin and Hankow would re- 
vert to China, or they might be embodied in International Settle- 
ments, the creation of which would materially lessen China's fric- 
tion with the foreign Powers, 

5. By terminating her treaties with Germany China would be able 
make new and more advantageous treaties after the war, and pos- 
sibly have a general revision of treaties. 

6. In the Customs there are 118 Germans emploj^ed, 41 in the 
indoor and 77 in the outdoor. By their removal vacancies would be 
made which could be filled by Chinese students, of whom 24 per year 
are turned out by the Customs College and are waiting emplojTuent. 

When it was evident that the united urging of the Amer- 
ican, British, and French governments, and the influence of 



CHINA AND THE WAR l3l 

individual foreigners, would bring China into the war, Jap- 
anese diplomacy made a characteristic manoeuver. The 
Chinese Government was advised by Japan to declare war as 
one of the Allies, and not as a separate nation. This was a 
scheme to detach China from the United States, which power 
never had formally joined the Allies, and attach her to the 
Allies, thereby making her a part of and subject to the private 
agreements made among the nations composing the original 
alliance. Of course Japanese diplomats did not, in present- 
ing the question to Chinese officials, put it quite that way; 
but the Japanese press in its comments plainly revealed that 
as the motivation of the plan. China decided, however, still 
to follow the example of the United States, and independently 
declared war against Germany and Austria on August 
14, 1917. I discussed that action contemporaneously in 
' ' Millard 's Review ' ' of August 18 : 

China has declared war on Germany and Austria. This momen- 
tous decision opens vistas that none can fathom now, and contains 
possibilities for this nation which cannot be calculated accurately. 
Yet any candid attempt at fore-measurement of the eventual re- 
sults of this action must consider it favorably. Taken as a move 
in a political formula, this act is logical. By first protesting to 
Germany, in conjunction with the United States and other then neu- 
tral nations, against Germany's unrestrained submarine warfare, 
China took an attitude that led almost inevitably to the next step — 
severance of diplomatic relations with Germany. At that point the 
matter hung fire for several months, for various reasons. The 
former Government was inclined to take the nest step, but it showed 
a disposition to make the step conditional on actions or promises to 
be given to China by the Entente allied nations. In so insisting 
China was well within her privileges and rights; for China without 
doubt has very vital interests which are indissolubly bound up in 
the outcome of the war — the assurance hereafter of her national 
integrity and autonomy, the recovery by her of rights and posses- 
sions which during the application of the now-declining "sphere" 
and "si^ecial position" international theorem were wrested from her 
or established by forcible presumption, the adjustment of fiscal 
matters affected by agreements with other nations. 

But the principal nations of the allied association have taken 



132 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

the position that China ought not to enter the war as a bargain- 
maker, but rather should enter as a matter of principle, and having 
once entered she then could depend on the allied association of na- 
tions to apply to China the broad principles which are now in 
process of being formulated into a fixed understanding among those 
nations — principles whose guiding thought is to keep alive the 
spirit and forms of democracy in the world and to bring a peace 
making it possible for unmilitary and inoffensive nations to live in 
security. In fact, China had small basis for trying to enter the 
war as a bargain-maker. She had plenty of precedents in history 
for that attitude, and enough precedents m the way some nations 
have come into this war. But bargaining in this case means having 
something to give that is useful in prosecuting the war — and when 
it came to that kind of bargaining China had little to give in mate- 
rial factors. If her only asset or claim to consideration rested on 
what she could deliver to the allied association by way of material 
help to them in prosecuting the war, then China's position was 
weak. For instance, if all that the allied association had in mind 
was to use China to augment their military power during this war 
for the purpose of defeating the Central Alliance, this object might 
be obtained by using China as a sort of international trading-stamp 
by granting to some powers in the allied association certain desired 
advantages of "special position" and "paramountcy" in China in 
return for those powers supplying military forces for use in Europe. 
That method of course would have to discard all pretence of paying 
attention to the rights of weaker nations. It is morally indefen- 
sible; but when China sought to put her entrance as a belligerent 
on a bargaining basis she was resigning voluntarily the arguments 
inherent with her moral position as a "weaker nation" in the sense 
this phrase is now being used in relation to aims of the war from 
the standpoint of the allied association. 

Other elements besides this moral issue contributed to delay action 
by China. Chief among these were the complications caused by an 
internal disintegration of the Chinese Government which has led the 
nation to the brink of civil strife. At a time when the question of 
declaring war against Gennany was being discussed actively at 
Peking, the dispute between the parties arrived at an acute stage 
which precipitated the dissolution of Parliament, was followed by 
the abortive restoration of the monarchy, and then by a return to 
authority in the Government of Tuan Chi-jui. Almost at the incep- 
tion of that crisis the American Government advised China in effect 
that for the moment the question of declaring war on Germany was 
of less importance than the mamtainance of internal order. 



CHINA AND THE WAR 133 

Whether that advice (which stirred up a little international tempest 
of tea-pot proportions) actually influenced the Chinese or not, the 
internal situation did for a while obscure and suspend the question 
of entering the war. But the war question could not for long re- 
main in the background, because it virtually encompasses most of 
the other issues involved with China's situation. No doubt the 
Government at Peking felt the influence of those other forces in 
making its decision to declare war. 

Effects of China's action on her foreign relations and interna- 
tional position have wider scope. In the far East the first effect 
that will be thought of is connected with Japan. By entering the 
war China shifts her international position from that of a neutral 
(which in practice has come to mean a nation or individual whose 
rights no belligerents feel obligated to respect) to that of a member 
or associate of a belligerent group which includes Japan. It will 
be very interesting to notice how Japan as a Government will take 
this change of China's status that so materially alters Japan's posi- 
tion vis-a-vis China. We already know what Japan thought about 
China joining the Allies when it was first proposed nearly two 
years ago. At that time Japan (if we can judge by the outbursts 
of the semi-official Japanese press) very strongly dissented to the 
proposal. In recent months (since the entrance of America) the 
Tokio Government has adopted a different attitude than formerly 
and now professes no objection to having China come into the allied 
group. Political conditions in the world without doubt have in- 
duced this change of view and policy at Tokio; but has the Jap- 
anese Government also experienced a change of heart? 

It is not with the thought of pecking at Japan or of not permit- 
ting the world to forget acts of Japan which Japan herself may 
now regret, that we bring this matter into view now; but because 
it is a fundamental issue of the proposition that cannot be ignored 
or suppressed in any discussion that is not altogether superficial. 
It is necessary to reiterate some phases of this question again and 
again to get them firmly fixed in the world's public opinion out of 
which a solution of the war must come. None are so entirely and 
supersensitively conscious of how Japan's international position is 
being affected by passing events and tendencies as are the Japanese 
themselves, no doubt. The intellectual force (or the force of the 
intellectuals) which will or ought to dictate the terms of peace is 
considering Japan, is sizing her up and ticketing her off, just as it 
is sizing and ticketing off all the other big and little nations, to 
discover how they line up^f or or against the principles of democracy 



134 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

whieh the major part of the allied association are now committed to 
sustain in making the peace and after the peace. 

In deciding to cast her lot with these forces that are now getting 
concentrated with the major naiions in the allied association, China 
has not however acted wisely or cleverly solely on the ground of ex- 
pediency. She has taken a road which leads toward where China 
ought to want to go — a civilization in which China can be free from 
fears of external encroachments incited by the old predatory and 
nai'rowly exploiting spirit, free safely to develop her own nation- 
ality by peaceful process into a firm and respected position in the 
world. And having chosen this course China should never lose 
sight of the principles to which she must cling if this vision is to 
become a reality, never forget how easy it might be to turn the cur- 
rent by deflecting some important element to the other side, and 
should commit herself wholeheartedly to doing what she can to help 
the common cause. For it will make a great deal of difference to 
China which side wins this war, and whieh side has the dominant 
saying in makmg the conditions of the peace. It means the differ- 
ence between two diametrically opposite theorems of world polities. 
It means (why should we not say tins'?) the difference of the policy 
of America toward China in the past twenty years and the^ policy 
of some of her nearer neighbors which have kept her in almost con- 
stant alarm and apprehension, and which if they should be consum- 
mated would reduce China to a vassal state or exting-uish her na- 
tional existence altogether. A victory for the reconstituted allied 
association means a China at liberty to indulge her desire to be- 
come a democracy in administrative fonns as well as in the spirit 
(which she now has), and that she will not be driven by foreign 
militarism to develop militarism herself as the only alternative to 
falling under the dominion of military nations. It means the differ- 
ence between Group V and a Hay Doctrine. As far as one can peer 
along the future course of events, this is the choice that China has 
made by declaring war on Germany. 

When China declared war, the Japanese Government and 
the Japanese press realized the expediency of changing their 
attitnde, which they did with usual celerity. The Japanese 
Government promptly issued statements approving China's 
act so phrased that they would impress any who were not 
familiar with preceding events with the idea that Japan was 
chiefly responsible for adding a new member to the Allied 



CHINA AND THE WAR 135 

consortium. The purpose of this diplomatic fiction was to 
preserve the outward presumption of Japan's paramount 
position in respect to China. If it appeared that China had 
taken so important a step without consulting Japan, or 
against the wishes of the Tokio Government, then Japan's at- 
titude of paramount power in China was punctured. But 
the Japanese press could not dissemble quite so readily. The 
following editorial comment of the Tokio "Asahi" fairly re- 
flects the feeling of the Japanese about the event : 

China has at last declared war against Germany and Austria on 
August 14. Will it be beneficial to China? Will it be advanta- 
geous to the Entente Powers, especially to Japan? China has sev- 
ered relations with Germany on the advice of America. But Amer- 
ice told China that participation in the war is a secondary thing 
and that China should first address herself to secure unity at home. 
That was vei'v kind advice indeed. China will not receive any very 
remarkable benefit from participation in the war. She will only 
incite internal dissensions thereby, so that she will have to sacrifice 
money and lives in the attempt to quell the discord at home. The 
southern leaders are opposed to participation in the war. But if 
they openly say so they are liable to be suspected of sympathizing 
with Germany and to win the disfavor of the Entente Powers. . . . 
If China is to be thrown into confusion, because of participation in 
the war, then it is not advantageous to the Entente Powers. It will 
not be advantageous to Japan, which has close relations with China. 

So China entered the war, and gave to the far-Eastern 
situation a new turn. 



CHAPTER VI 

CHINA AND THE WAE — CONTINUED 

Shift of Japan's diplomatic strategy — Efforts to establish a special po- 
sition in respect to China — Analysis of the paramountcy and special 
position doctrine — Purpose of the Ishii mission to America — China dis- 
turbed by factional strife — The abortive monarchy revival — Return to 
power of Tuan Chi-jui — Financed by Japan — The loan question — Obsta- 
cles to American loans — The banking group method. — Dangers of the old 
system — Japan's violation of the group agreement — China's desire to 
participate in the war — Effort to obtain funds from America — Opposi- 
tion of Japan to China's participation — Reasons for this opposition — 
Japan versus the Western powers — A delicate question — Japan's plan to 
control China's military organization — Some confidential despatches — 
The LansingJshii Agreement — What it meant — Motives of the parties 
to it — Was Japan flirting with Germany? — Text of the agreement. 

OF Japan's modern policy toward China it may be 
said that it never changes its fundamental objec- 
tives, but it frequently shifts its strategy and 
tactics. The alteration of China's international position by 
that nation declaring war on the Central powers caused an 
immediate adaptation of Japan's policy to the new situation. 
One of the first moves of the Tokio Government was to try 
to obtain the recognition and confirmation of Japan's para- 
mountcy, or special position in China. Each accession to the 
Allied belligerent consortium created new complications and 
modified previous trades and arrangements; so the entrance 
of America and China made it necessary for Japan to obtain 
the assent of another power to her program. The Ishii mis- 
sion was despatched to America with that object, and Japanese 
propaganda in America began a special campaign for recog- 
nition of Japan's special position and paramountcy in China, 
for in Japan's propaganda the two terms are frequently used 

136 



CHINA AND THE WAR 137 

as synonyms. I wrote on this topic in "Millard's Eeview" 
of August 25, 1917 : 

It is a rather curious development of opinion in America about 
far Eastern affairs, and especially about Japan and her policies, 
that part of the American press is now disposed to concede to Japan 
a "special position" and "paramountcy" in relation to China just 
at a time when Japanese statesmen and the Japanese press are sup- 
pressing these claims — or at least are putting the soft-pedal on them. 
One follows the mental process of some writers for the press in 
America with not a little speculation as to its well-springs and pur- 
pose. Take for instance the case of the "San Francisco Chronicle." 
We can recall, not so long ago, when that newspaper had a general 
tone that might (to follow the shallow terminology of the propa- 
gandists) be called anti- Japanese. That was when the Japanese 
questions which apply locally to California were to the fore. With 
the gradual suppression of those issues (a suppression not due to 
them being satisfactorily adjusted, but to other and wider causes of 
world politics that have altered the relative positions of both Japan 
and America in international affairs), many newspapers in America 
seemed to get imbued with the notion that Japan had to be placated, 
and that the best or the only way to keep Japan from being trouble- 
some about the immigration question was to concede to her whatever 
she wanted elsewhere. Now of course it was to bring about this 
very state of mind in American political thought that caused Japa- 
nese diplomacy to raise and to agitate the immigration issue, and 
it is perhaps an irony of fate that just when Japan seemed to be 
"getting away with it," a world war and its unexpected ramifications 
would come along and undermine Japan's China policy at its point 
of first contact. 

Among some editorial comments on this topic by the press in 
America recently compiled by the "Literary Digest" (a majority of 
the papers oppose Japan's paramountcy claims, by the way) is the 
following of the "San Francisco Chronicle": "We might as well 
face the fact now that Japan does occupy a special position with 
regard to the neighboring Empire and that sooner or later her in- 
evitable mastery of that country [China] will be definitely estab- 
lished." This goes pretty far — farther indeed than most of Japan's 
regular propagandists have ventured to state openly. Japanese 
diplomats would not like for these views of the "Chronicle" to be 
widely published in China, for they will not be at all acceptable 
to Chinese, however they may sound in America and Japan. A point 
very frequently overlooked by newspapers in America, in casually 



138 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

as a matter of academic argument thus disposing of the Chinese 
Republic and the political future of the Chinese people, is how such 
opinions will be taken by Chinese, and how Chinese may be led by 
them to reflect about America and Americans. Putting the best 
motive for those opinions of the "San Francisco Chronicle" that can 
be ascribed to them — that they spring from a sincere belief not 
perhaps in the justice and morality of Japan's assumptions, but 
that because of her military power and economic strength it will 
not be possible to prevent her from absorbing China — they are pub- 
lished just at the moment when in Japan it is understood that this 
power and this strength has diminished, perhaps forever, as compel- 
ling forces to accomplish the supervision or subjugation of China. 
Every mail bringing the Japanese newspapers cames fresh and pro- 
gressive evidences of this probably, to them, unwelcome conviction. 

Paramountcy used in this connection is fairly definite. We can 
understand what is meant by it. But just what do the "San Fran- 
cisco Chronicle" and other publicists who use the teim mean by a 
nation having a "special position" with regard to China? Do they 
have in mind intellectual contacts, or moral influence, or is the term 
merely a geographical allusion? Except Russia, which has a land 
frontier contiguous with China for something like six thousand miles, 
Japan has a special geographical position with respect to China in 
that she is closer to China than any other of the gTeater nations. 
But is distance the only rule of calculation applicable to this idea of 
special position as between different nations? If it comes to moral 
and mental influences, surely they are not to be measured by a yard- 
stick. One hardly will believe because Japan is miles nearer to 
China than the United States is, that thereby Japanese moral and 
intellectual influence with the Chinese must be in proportion to the 
distances. By the geographical theory of measuring influence and 
special position as among nations, then the United States has a right 
to claim a superior position to nations in Europe with regard to 
China. Some one ought to clarify this doctrine of special position 
by getting up a graduated scale, so that each and every nation will 
know by arithmetical method just what its special position is to 
every other nation. The idea has interesting possibilities. Interna- 
tional contacts might be marked off on a chart, so that each nation 
could see at a glance how much moral and mental influence with all 
other nations it is entitled to have. The plan could be extended to 
trade among nations; this could be pro-rated on the international 
special position chart, and there need be no competition, for every 
nation would know how much trade it could have in proportion with 
the other nations. 



CHINA AND THE WAR 139 

But the bald truth is that this special position theorem in inter- 
national affairs and world politics is on its last legs, if we are to 
believe that the present allied association is playing the game "on 
the square"; and that it will win this war, or that it will be able to 
dominate the thought of which the peace will be born. The bald 
truth is, further, that the special position theorem as applied by the 
"San Francisco Chronicle" to Japan vs. China is bluff and bun- 
combe. Its only basis is the power to apply military intimidation. 
If this war does not succeed in getting world politics fairly clear 
of the special position doctrine, then it may be fought m vain — for 
it is in that doctrine that the causes for this war sprouted; and no 
broad political conclusion stands now more nakedly exposed than 
that a continued acceptance in international law and practice of the 
special position doctrine will cause frequent wars hereafter. 

"While the Japanese Government was making, at Tokio and 
Washington, a strong effort to induce the United States to 
recognize some kind of special position for Japan in China, 
and, as was subsequently disclosed, was trying to induce other 
Allied powers to bring persuasion or pressure on America 
for the same purpose, Japanese policy in China changed its 
method. This shift can be briefly described as a change from 
militant intimidation to financial pressure and bribery as 
means to get results. I shall illustrate that process in a sub- 
sequent chapter, and will here follow the international de- 
velopments. 

The factions in Chinese politics continued to draw apart 
notwithstanding the advice of the American Government, and 
by the autumn of 1917 there were indications that Japanese 
were playing the old game of giving comfort and support to 
both sides. The monarchy fiasco in the summer of 1917, when 
General Chang Hsun restored the young emperor for a week, 
had given Japan an opportunity to gain an influence over 
Tuan Chi-jui. Tuan had resigned as premier in Li Yuan 
Hung's government on the issue of dissolving the old parlia- 
ment, and had gone to live at Tientsin. He was there when 
the monarchy was restored, and he succeeded in rallying some 
generals and their troops, induced them to march to Peking, 
retook the palaces, gud restored the republic. In this move 



140 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

Tuan was financed by Japan, obtaining a loan through the 
Yokohama Specie Bank at Tientsin. Tuan's success in over- 
turning Chang Hsun's coup brought him into office again as 
premier. Li Yuan Hung resigned the presidency, and was 
succeeded by Feng Kuo-cheng, who had been governor at 
Nanking. 

The Chinese Government was then in its chronic low finan- 
cial state, and various projects to raise money were being dis- 
cussed, bringing up the general question of foreign loans. A 
few months previously an American group of bankers had 
been prevented from making a loan to China by the lack of a 
responsible Chinese government to deal with. In June, 1917, 
I wrote in "Millard's Review": 

Will it ever occur, I wonder, that this question of loans to China 
can be disassociated from Chinese political factional squabbles'? At 
hardly any period, since the first revolution, has it been feasible to 
conduct loan negotiations at Peking without running foul of opposi- 
tion of a Chinese party, which was trying to prevent its opponents 
in the Government from obtaining funds. Thus loans sadly needed 
for useful purposes and administrative stability have been made 
the football of party polities, and have been struggled for, or op- 
posed, according to which faction would have the spending of the 
money. In this latest instance, the American bankers had no course 
except to negotiate with the Chinese Government which is recognized 
by the American Government. Before the transaction could be con- 
cluded, this internal crisis occurred; and thereafter the Kuoming- 
tang protested against the loan on the ground that the money, 
in the hands of the Government, would be used to crush liberal 
institutions in China. Telegrams were sent to the American press 
voicing this contention, and an effort was made to show that, if the 
American government aided in putting the loan through, it would 
be using its power to exterminate republicanism in China. One can- 
not now foretell a time in China when this contention cannot be 
advanced by whatever faction is not in control of the Government; 
and if it is to be taken as a valid reason against foreign loans, 
then it becomes tolerably clear that foreign loans, and especially 
American loans, cannot be made. Just now this outcry is raised 
by the members of the dissolved Parbament sojourning in Shang- 
hai, who at the same time openly announce plans for raising funds 
to promote a rebellion. The lesson of these circumstances seems 



CHINA AND THE WAR 141 

to be that, after the war, the question of foreign loans in China 
must be made subject to an international formula supported by 
enough powers to make it effective. 

The condition outlined in that comment of mine has been 
an effective bar to several projects for American and other 
foreign loans to the Chinese Government. American bankers 
were free to negotiate loans with the Chinese Government, 
but British, Japanese, French, and Russian bankers were 
bound by the Reorganization Loan Agreement not to make 
loans to China independently until the provisions of that 
agreement had been fulfilled or abrogated. Writing in "Mil- 
lard's Review" just before China declared war, August 11, 
1917, I commented on the question as follows : 

Under existing conditions, the United States has a strong interest 
in this matter of loans to China both for business and pohtical 
reasons. The withdrawal of the American bankers from the 
6-nation consortium was at that time conclusive with it; but the 
American Government made it clear that, by declining to support 
those bankers in the reorganization loan because of some of its 
provisions which were thought to infringe on China's autonomous 
rights and which the American Government would not assent to 
as a matter of principle, it in no way was qualifying the right of 
American bankers to deal independently with China or the right 
of the American Government to support such independent loans. 
With conditions as they have developed because of the great war, 
a peculiar situation relating to international finance has arisen 
whose reactions on the question of loans to China must be con- 
sidered now. Let us suppose that, as is reported, the residuary of 
the 5-nation banking group offers a loan to China and will proceed 
with the negotiation and payment of such a loan. Under condi- 
tions that exist, British, French and Russian banks have no money 
to lend actually, and any such loan by them to China would have 
the character of a transference by banking process to this use of 
money borrowed largely from America. America is now financing 
Russia, Great Britain and France to the extent of billions, and 
probably will finance them for tens of billions more. It is a jug- 
gling of figures and plirases to say that a 4-nation loan to China 
now, which would exclude America and leave America out of con- 
sideration, would be an actual financing of China by the 4-nation 
banking group. Of the~nations in that residuary group only Japan 



142 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

has free money of her own to lend. This is none the less true in 
principle and in fact because, by bookkeeping, it could be shown 
that money so loaned to China might come from funds raised by 
domestic loans in Russia, England and France. Unless the great 
amounts now being supplied to those nations by America were 
derived from that source, then the supplies which that money is 
paying for would have either to be paid for out of funds raised 
by domestic loans, or be gone without; and therefore money would 
not be available to lend to China. 

Loans to China during the continuation of this war therefore are 
on a different basis than formerly in both the financial and political 
aspects. In respect to American participation in them, such partici- 
pation could take either or all of four characters — (a) money first 
borrowed from America by the British, Russian and French Gov- 
ernments which might turn some of it over to British, Russian and 
French bankers to lend to China, (b) money loaned to China inde- 
pendently by American bankers, (c) money loaned to China by the 
American Government out of the public funds, as is being done 
to Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Belgium and perhaps other 
nations in the allied association, (d) for American bankers to 
rejoin the 4-nation group. Which is the better method of helping 
China financially at this time is a serious question. For the Amer- 
ican Government, in ease China joins with the nations arrayed 
against Germany, directly to advance money to China certainly is 
the easiest and shortest way to get China out of financial diffi- 
culties and to make it possible for her to be of material help to 
the Allies. This method at once obviates any complications caused 
by the group muddle: for such action of course would be taken 
with the knowledge and approval of other powers in the allied asso- 
ciation. If the bankers growled, they simply would be told to mind 
their business — and they would have to do that too. It is quite 
feasible, if the American Government desires it, for American 
bankers independently to make a large loan to China; and if other 
nations and the bankers of other nations should feel dissatisfied 
with that course they would have to make the best of it because of 
greater things involved. I think it can be safely assumed that the 
American Government will not consent to have the method desig- 
nated (a) adopted; and that method cannot be carried out against 
the opposition of America. 

By some ways of looking at this matter, something can be said 
in favor of carrying on by means of the group oi'ganization. But 
the banking group would have in that case to include American 
bankers, as formerly. This method would reduce friction and 
resentments among the banking interests of the different nations. 



CHINA AND THE WAR 143 

and perhaps also would lessen irritations among the nations that 
would be the political sustainers of the hnanciers. It would how- 
ever, at least during the war, require the fiction of an actual par- 
ticipation of Russian, French and British finance, whereas this par- 
ticipation would be largely relative. By preserving the group sys- 
tem, with the inclusion of American bankers, there would perhaps 
be less difficulty after the war in keeping matters straight and in 
going on easily and without undue international competition; al- 
though survival of the group carries the post-war German complica- 
tion. I have not in this discussion so far paid much attention to 
one very important phase of it — what Chinese may think about 
the propositions. Chinese probably will, among these alternatives, 
have their opinion and preference which must be considered; but 
one can see that because of broader international relations it may 
not be feasible to conform to Chinese preference entirely in those 
arrangements. There ought to be give and take on all sides, having 
in view an adjustment conducive to China's integrity and security 
and to smooth international relations now and hereafter. 

If the banking group should be determined as the means of help- 
ing China financially, care must be taken to obviate some condi- 
tions within the group and inherent with its old organization which 
would almost surely impair its usefulness now and hereafter. Ver- 
sus independent action by one power, the group method has certain 
plain disadvantages derived principally (and this is pertinent) from 
previous conceptions of international policy as practiced by some 
of the powers in China, These disadvantages reside in those clauses 
which make it possible for any one national section of bankers, on 
their own motion or by instigation from their Government, merely 
by objecting, to prevent any action by the group that may be ap- 
proved by the majority. In the comparatively short history of the 
group this has happened several times. We need not cite the in- 
stances — they will at once come to mind with those who have fol- 
lowed events in China in recent times. One time it was this power 
which obstructed, another time it was that power. Of several cases 
that have occurred, nearly all of them were due to diplomatic rea- 
sons of Governments which were not directly related to or connected 
with finance, or to the affair with which the group was immediately 
busy. For instance, a power wants something let us say in Man- 
churia, so to obtain that it has its banker nationals obstruct some 
financial matter until, by diplomatic indirection, the other thing is 
obtained. The game often in the past has been played this way 
at Peking. If the group is permitted to survive, this defect in its 
organization and working method should be effectively remedied. 



144 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

Soon after the shift of Japan's policy in China caused by 
the change of China's international status, it became apparent 
that Japanese would not be bound by the group agreement. 
Beginning with the advances made to aid in the suppression 
of the Chang Hsun revolution, came a period of Japanese 
loans to China independently of the other group of Allied 
powers. When President Feng Kuo-cheng assumed office, his 
government seemed to want to participate in the war, and 
tried to obtain a loan from America to finance the participa- 
tion. During the autumn of 1917 there were negotiations 
through the Chinese legation at Washington to obtain finan- 
cial advances from the United States treasury under the same 
conditions that such advances were being made to other 
governments in the Allied belligerent group. I believe that 
the state department favored such advances — they were 
recommended by the American legation at Peking — but diffi- 
culties were made by the treasury department for budget 
reasons. It may be that the Ishii mission, then in America, 
had an influence in deterring the American Government from 
financing China as a war measure. At any rate, the project 
for an American loan failed, and from that time the Tuan 
cabinet began to lose faith in America and turn to Japan. 
Speaking to me a year afterward, Dr. Reinsch said that if he 
could then have given the Chinese Government positive as- 
surances of American financial support, China could have 
been swung into an active war participation policy. The 
diplomatic representatives of Russia, Great Britain, France, 
and Italy at Peking all encouraged the Chinese Government 
to participate actively. Japan was opposed, and Japan car- 
ried the day. 

The Japanese loan policy in China that followed after 
China declared war on Germany and Austria was distinctly 
opposed to the policy of all the other Allied powers there. I 
shall hereafter attempt to elucidate the methods, purposes, 
and results of the Japanese loan policy in this period, but it 
is necessary at this point to explain the principal conflict of 



CHINA AND THE WAR 145 

the two policies. The western powers (America, Great 
Britain, and France) were in favor of financing the Chinese 
Government only under certain conditions. Under the act 
of Congress regulating such expenditures, the United States 
Government had authority to make financial advances to help 
nations in the Allied group in prosecuting the war, but the 
act was not interpreted to cover loans for other purposes, 
such as internal administration, unless specifically authorized 
by Congress. If the Chinese Government had presented a 
definite plan for war participation under the supervision of 
foreign officers, as was done by other nations, then it would 
have been feasible for the United States Government to finance 
the operations, and the Allied western powers would have 
approved it. But to advance funds to China without such a 
definite plan and without the necessary supervision and direc- 
tion would probably mean that the money would be used in 
connection with the civil disorder, and would be used to 
prosecute a civil war instead of a war against Germany. 
Such procedure would immediately array perhaps half of 
the Chinese against the Allies. By common consent, then, the 
western allied powers moved cautiously in China, and in the 
circumstances it was felt that was the only safe policy. 

Japan, however, played a lone hand. While her diplomats 
at Tokio and the other Allied capitals were professing agree- 
ment with the other governments, in China Japan took a 
course directly opposed to their ideas and wishes, and one 
which, moreover, was calculated to wreck the Allied policy, 
and which did wreck it. The French Government sent a 
military mission to China, which prepared a plan for Chinese 
participation in the war. That this question was a delicate 
one was recognized by experts who understood the real situa- 
tion in the far East. It is interesting at this point to quote 
from a report of an experienced military expert of one of the 
western Allied powers at Peking, dated October 19, 1917: 

The Allies should desist from urging Japan to send troops to 
Europe, as if pushed too far her agents provocateur, of which 



146 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

there are many on both sides in China, will undoubtedly be directed 
to bring about hostilities between the north and south, which will 
give Japan her long desired opportunity to step in and settle 
matters, and thus justify her reiterated statements that her forces 
were necessary at home in order to protect the interests of the 
powers in China, and to maintain and preserve the peace of the far 
East. 

The Allies should at once take a definite and determined stand 
against Japan's disloyal and perfidious policy vis-a-vis China and 
China's political integrity, which policy is being given the active 
assistance and support of a body of unscrupulous venal, and traitor- 
ous Chinese cabinet ministers and highly placed officials. 

If not checked at once, Japan will be induced to go the limit, 
naturally believing that the longanimity and tolerance of the Allies 
indicate their tacit approval or else fear, and eventually Japan's 
actions will be such as to make imperative the taking of stem and 
drastic measures, with the probable disastrous result of forcing her 
into the arms of the Central powers — a situation however which 
would probably be welcomed by the Japanese Government and cer- 
tainly by a large majority of the Japanese people, who are at 
heart sympathetic with Germany and German institutions and 
methods of government. 

Japan did not want to send troops to aid the Allies in 
Europe, for that would mean an enormous expense and no 
adequate compensation. Still less did the Tokio Government 
want China to send troops to aid the Allies in Europe, for 
that would place Japan in a very unfavorable light by com- 
parison. At that time most military experts of the Allied 
governments stationed in the far East were convinced that 
the Japanese Government wanted Germany to win the war, 
and that it was seeking a good opportunity to quit the Allies 
and reach an understanding with Germany. It was plain to 
experts on the politics and conditions of the far East that what 
Japan wanted out of the war was more likely to be attained 
by a victory of Germany than by a victory of the Allies. I 
mention this belief now because it is pertinent to a phase of 
important events then developing. The Japanese Govern- 
ment could not very well object openly to China aiding the 



CHINA AND THE WAR 147 

Allies in Europe, for that would put too severe a strain on its 
relations with the other powers, but such participation by 
China might be prevented by intrigue. Roughly, the plan 
was to involve China in civil war and internal disorder, and 
thus make it impossible for the Government to participate in 
Europe. To this end the Tokio Government devised a plan 
to sell the Chinese Government arms and munitions and to 
finance the transaction. Light on Japan's diplomacy at that 
time is given by some correspondence of the Russian ambas- 
sador at Tokio to the Russian foreign office, published after 
the revolution in Russia: 

DISPATCH FROM THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AT TOKIO, DATED 
OCTOBER 16, 1917 

In reply to my question as to the credibihty of the rumors alleg- 
ing that Japan is prepared to sell to the Chinese Government a 
considerable quantity of arms and munitions, Viscount Motono 
confirmed them, and added that the Peking Government had prom- 
ised not to use the arms against the Southerners. It was evident 
from the Minister's words, however, that this promise possessed 
only the value of a formal justification of this sale, infringing as 
the latter does the principle of non-intervention in the internal 
Chinese feuds, proclaimed by Japan herself, and that the Japa- 
nese Government was in this instance deliberately assisting the 
Tuan Chi-jui Cabinet in the hope of receiving from it in return 
substantial advantages. It is most likely that the Japanese are 
aiming principally at obtaining the privilege of rearming the entire 
Chinese army, and at making China dependent in the future on 
Japanese arsenals and the supply of munitions from Japan. The 
arms to be supplied to China are estimated at 30,000,000 yen. At 
the same time, Japan intends establishing an arsenal in China for 
the manufacture of war material. 

We come now to an event of immense importance — the sign- 
ing at Washington of a new agreement between the American 
and Japanese governments relating to China, known as the 
Lansing-Ishii Agreement. Although nothing was known at 
Washington, except to those of the inner diplomatic circle, 
that such an agreement was even being discussed, it evidently 



148 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

was known at other capitals. I produce here an official letter 
from the Russian ambassador at Tokio to the Russian foreign 
office (the italics are mine) : 

DESPATCH FROM THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AT TOKIO, DATED 
OCTOBER 22, 1917 

Referring to Bakhmetyeff's [Russian Ambassador at Washing- 
ton] N 598, if the United States thinks, as it appeared to our Am- 
bassador [from conversation with Lansing], that the recognition of 
Japan's special position in China is of no practical consequence, 
such a view will inevitably lead in the future to serious misunder- 
standings between us and Japan. The Japanese are manifesting 
more and more clearly a tendency to interpret the special position 
of Japan in China, inter alia, in the sense that other powers must 
not undertake in China any political steps without previously ex- 
changing views with Japan on the subject — a condition that would 
to some extent establish a Japanese control over the foreign affairs 
of China. On the other hand, the Japanese Government does not 
attach great importance to its recognition of the principle of the 
open door and the integrity of China, regarding it as merely a 
repetition of the assurances repeatedly given hy it earlier to other 
powers and implying no new restrictions for the Japanese policy 
in China. It is therefore quite possible that in some future time 
there may arise in this connection misunderstandings between the 
United States and Japan. The Minister for Foreign Affairs again 
confirmed to-day in conversation with me that in the negotiations by 
Viscount Ishii the question at issue is not some special concession 
to Japan in these or other parts of China, but Japan's special 
position in China as a whole. 

A large volume could now be written with the Lansing- 
Ishii Agreement as a text ; indeed, it is safe to say that many 
books will be written about it or about the issue it raises, 
and wars may be fought about it. This agreement has three 
sides: the side of the United States, the side of Japan, the 
side of China. The United States and Japan are parties to 
it; China is the subject of it, but not a party to it. It is 
easy to discover Japan's motives in the wording of the agree- 
ment. It is possible, even probable, that the motive of the 
American Government is not mentioned in it. 



CHINA AND THE WAR 149 

A glimpse of Japan's motive is given in a confidential 
letter of the Russian ambassador at Tokio to the Russian 
foreign office (the italics are mine) : 

DESPATCH FROM THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AT TOKIO, DATED 
NOVEMBER 1, 1917 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to call on him to-day, 
and communicated to me confidentially, but quite officially, the text 
of the notes transmitted in my telegram No. 2, which are to be 
exchanged at Washington on November 2 or 3 between the Ameri- 
can State Secretary and Viscount Ishii. A similar communication 
was made to-day to the British Ambassador here. The French and 
Italian Ambassador will receive the text of the Notes in a day or 
two, privately, for their information. The publication of the 
Notes will probably take place on November 7; until then the 
Minister asks the Powers to keep his communications secret. 

"When handing me the above-mentioned text of the Notes, Vis- 
count Motono added that he had only received it in final form 
yesterday by wire from Washington; and since Viscount Ishii was 
to leave [Washington] the night after next, the signature of the 
Notes could not have been postponed, in spite of the Japanese 
Government's desire to ascertain the views of the Russian Govern- 
ment on the subject prior to it. The Minister hoped that he would 
not be blamed for that at Petrograd — especially as the present 
agreement between America and Japan could not arouse any ob- 
jection on our part. Viscount Motono mentioned that when con- 
cluding [gap in the original], one of the objects was to put an end 
to the German intrigue intended to sow discord between Japan and 
the United States, and to prove thereby to the Chinese that there 
was between the two powers a complete agreement of view with 
regard to China, who, therefore, must not reckon on the possibility 
of extracting any profit from playing off one against the other. 

To my question whether he did not fear that in the future mis- 
understandings might arise from the different interpretations hy Ja- 
pan and the United States of the meaning of the terms: "special po- 
sition" and "special interests" of Japan in China, Viscount Motono 
replied hy saying that — [a gap in the original]. Nevertheless, I 
gain the impression from the words of the Minister that he is con- 
scious of the possibility of misunderstandings also in the future, 
hut is of the opinion that in such a case Japan would have better 
means at her disposal for carrying into effect her interpretation 
than the United States. 



150 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

These confidential diplomatic communications were not 
published for months after the announcement of the Lansing- 
Ishii Agreement, and they show that even before that com- 
pact was announced by the American and Japanese govern- 
ments its content had been officially communicated to at least 
one government in the Allied group — Russia. "Were the other 
Allied powers also apprised of what was going on at Wash- 
ington and Tokio? This constitutes a very extraordinary 
and in some phases an inexplicable incident. It was an im- 
propriety for two nations in the Allied group to make an 
agreement which affected other nations in the same group 
without informing them. An article of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance says, ''The High Contracting Parties agree that nei- 
ther of them will, without consulting the other, enter into a 
separate agreement with another power to the prejudice of 
the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement." 
Japan had violated that article in trying to force the twenty- 
one demands on China without informing Great Britain. 
The United States was not formally an ally of any nation, 
but its spokesmen had publicly condemned the practice of 
making secret and separate agreements about issues relating 
to the war while it was going on. Yet the United States was 
the first nation, after it became a belligerent, to evade the 
principle it had pronounced; for even if, as is probable, the 
other Allied powers were privately apprised of the Lansing- 
Ishii negotiations and their purposes, the Chinese Government 
was not informed or consulted. In publishing the agree- 
ment in the United States the state department gave a long 
statement in which some very interesting suggestions were 
throwTi out. I quote from that statement (''The New York 
Times.") : 

The importance and far-reaching character of this agreement are 
emphasized by a statement by Secretary Lansing pointing out the 
application of the pact to the great war. It not only sweeps away 
the mutual suspicion that has tended to produce ill-feeling between 
the two Governments, but embraces an understanding, made known 
through Secretary Lansing's statement accompanying the formal 



CHINA AND THE WAR 151 

documents, tnat the Japanese Government "desired to do tneir part 
in the suppression of Prussian militarism, and were eager to co- 
operate in every practical way to that end." 

One of the questions asked since the arrival in this country of 
the special Japanese Mission headed by Viscount Ishii was why 
Japan had not taken a more active part in the war. The Japanese 
Commissioners have answered it in a way that is entirely satisfac- 
tory to the United States, and there now appears to be no doubt 
that if Japan is called on to furnish men and means to help in 
German defeat, she will respond readily. 

The intimation is very plainly conveyed that to induce 
Japan to take a more effective part in prosecuting the war on 
the side of the Allies v^as among the objects of the Lan- 
sing-Ishii Agreement. That the relations of Japan to the 
Allies, or vis-a-vis Germany, were desiderata of the agree- 
ment was further intimated by the statement of the state 
department. The misunderstandings between the Japa- 
nese and American governments, so that official statement 
said, had been due to "German propaganda," and it was 
stated that Viscount Ishii had laid before Secretary Lansing 
the evidence of efforts of the German Government to reach a 
separate understanding with Japan. As bearing on this 
point I insert a paragraph taken from a report of a secret 
agent in Russia of one of the Allied governments, dated 
October 18, 1917: 

I have reliable information that two Japanese officials who are 
attached to the Japanese Embassy at Petrograd have returned from 
a visit to the eastern front, where they went about one month ago. 
My informant, who is close in the confidence of the Russian revo- 
lutionary party, told me that these Japanese succeeded in having 
interviews with German officers at a town near the front. He says 
that the German officers were representatives of the German foreign 
ofiiee and Avere not military officers. The Russian revolutionary 
party believes that if Russia makes a separate peace Japan will 
make an alliance with Germany in order to protect her position in 
the far East and China. I understand that the Japanese Ambassa- 
dor at Petrograd has sounded the Russian revolutionary government 
on this matter. These matters are to be considered in connection 
with the operations of the Japanese agents in Switzerland. 



152 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

Having briefly sketched the international baekgroimd of 
the agreement, it is now given in full : 

Department of State, 
Washington, ISTov. 2, 1917. 

Excellency: I have the honor to communicate herein my under- 
standing of the agreement reached by us in our recent conversations 
touching the questions of mutual interest to our Governments relat- 
ing to the Republic of China, 

In order to silence mischievous reports that have from time to 
time been circulated, it is beheved by us that a public announcement 
once more of the desires and intentions shared by our two Govern- 
ments with regard to China is advisable. 

The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that 
territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, 
and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes 
that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in that part 
to which her possessions are contiguous. 

The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unim- 
paired, and the Government of the United States has every confi- 
dence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Govern- 
ment that, while geographical position gives Japan such special 
interests, they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of 
other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore 
granted by China in treaties with other powers. 

The Governments of the United States and Japan deny that they 
have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or 
territorial integrity of China, and they declare, furthei-more, that 
they always adhere to the principle of the so-called "open door," 
or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China. 

Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the 
acquisition by any Government of any special rights or privileges 
that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China, 
or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the 
full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry 
of China. 

I shall be glad to have your Excellency confirm this understanding 
of the agreement reached by us. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest con- 
sideration. 

Robert Lansing. 
His Excellency, Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, Ambassador Extraordinary 
and Plenipotentiary of Japan, on special mission. 



CHINA AND THE WAR 153 

The Special Mission of Japan, 
Washington, Nov. 2, 1917. 

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note 
of to-day, communicating to me your understanding of the agree- 
ment reached by us in our recent conversations touching the ques- 
tions of mutual interest to our Governments relating to the Re- 
public of China. 

I am happy to be able to confirm to you, under authorization of 
my Government, the understanding in question set forth in the 
following terms: 

[Here the Special Ambassador repeats the language of the agree- 
ment as given in Secretary Lansing's note.] 

K. ISHII. 

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan, on spe- 
cial mission. 
Honorable Robert Lansing, Secretary of State. 

This text of the exchange of notes constituting the agree- 
ment is taken from ' ' The New York Times, ' ' and is the same 
as was published in newspapers throughout the world. If 
there are any reserved or secret clauses, which qualify or 
modify the agreement, no credible intimation of their exist- 
ence has been given. 



CHAPTER VII 

CHINA AND THE WAR— CONCLUDED 

The Lansing-Ishii Agreement — Its premature publication by Japan — 
Uneasiness caused by it — My letter to Mr. Lansing — Dangers of the 
incident — Might alienate both China and Japan — Had China been traded 
otf? — Was the agreement a bribe to Japan? — Need to counteract first 
impressions — Japan violates the "gentlemen's agreement" — Agreement 
given publicity at Peking — Reasons for Japan's procedure — A difl'erence 
of translations — What does "special interests" mean? — The American 
version — China repudiates the agreement — Cryptic character of the in- 
strument — Its effects in the far East — Japanese propaganda and the 
agreement — Criticisms of a Chinese — The doctrine of territorial pro- 
pinquity — Its dangers — What vras the American Government's object? 
— Further analysis of the agreement — Its legal aspects — Which is the 
correct interpretation? — American interpretation probably the best — 
International psychology of the agreement — Possible motives of the 
United States — Putting world pressure on Japan — Japan's opportunity. 

THE Lansing-Ishii Agreement was signed at "Washing- 
ton on November 2. The two governments had 
agreed that the notes were to be published simultane- 
ously at "Washington and Tokio at a stated hour on Novem- 
ber 7. The Japanese Government, however, gave the agree- 
ment premature publicity. 

Newspapers in the United States and Europe printed on 
the morning of November 6 a despatch from Peking stating 
that the Japanese legation there had informed the Chinese 
foreign office of the agreement, and gave a brief synopsis of 
it. The news was not prominently displayed by the Ameri- 
can press, but I, being in New York at the time, happened to 
see the despatch, and immediately sent the following tele- 
gram: 

Robert Lansing, State Department, Washington. 

Publication at Peking and elsewhere that United States recog- 
nizes Japan's special position in China with interpretations given 

154 



CHINA AND THE WAR 155 

in Far East will cause great uneasiness and unless immediately 
explained will damage American prestige and influence in China 
seriously. If understanding as reported by Japanese legation at 
Peking is true Cliina's position adversely aifeeted and America's 
moral position with Chinese impaired. If not correctly stated I 
earnestly urge that you will telegraph true facts to American Minis- 
ter at Peking authorize him publish and also that a correct version 
be given to press in America. 

Thomas F. Millard. 

On that day, November 6, the state department gave out 
the text of the agreement, accompanied by a long statement, 
from which I have previously quoted. It also communicated 
with the American legation at Peking, and took other steps 
to counteract certain effects of Japan's premature publica- 
tion. I had little information then about what was happening 
at Peking, but I was able to gage the situation from my gen- 
eral knowledge of conditions and what I could learn in New 
York and "Washington. My opinion of the matter was ex- 
pressed clearly in the following letter to Mr. Lansing : 

New York City, November 12th, 1917. 
Hon. Robert Lansing, Washington, D. C. 

Dear Sir: A feeling of national responsibility, and of friend- 
ship for China, impels me to address you in regard to the agreement 
relating to China recently made by the American and Japanese 
governments. In the introduction to the statement given to the 
press, and also in your own remarks supplementing the text of the 
agreement, the state department plainly draws the implication 
that any who dissent from the presumed objects and purposes or 
the wisdom of this agreement are to be regarded as either conscious 
or unwitting agents of German propaganda; but that inference will 
not deter me from privately setting before you some matters that 
I regard as important, and which apply to the effects of the action 
that has been taken. 

You doubtless will recognize that long residence in the far East 
and close contact with conditions there afford opportunities to get 
a point of view that is not always apparent in this country. To 
most persons who comprehend the delicate situation of China, this 
action in its first impressions is almost stupefying. Ever since the 
publication of the agreement and the accompanying explanation of 
the state department, r"have been cudgeling my brain to discover 



156 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

a logical and reasonable explanation for it that is compatible with 
the honorable requirements of our nation in the circumstances. 1 
visited Washington in an attempt to get some light, and while there 
I talked with some officials of the Department, and also with the 
Chinese minister. From them I gathered the following: 

(a) The agreement is extremely distasteful to the Chinese and 
was made without consulting their wishes. 

(b) The state department (according to the officials with whom 
I talked) does not intend by this agreement to recognize the "spe- 
cial position" of Japan in China except in the sense of geographical 
proximity; while by the reiteration of the guarantees of the "open 
door" and of the "integrity of China," the state department feels 
that our Government commits Japan unreservedly to a respect for 
and observation of these principles, and perhaps also commits the 
American Government affirmatively to give direct support to these 
principles in case they are violated or threatened. 

However, most of us who understand actual conditions in China 
perceive ambiguities in this announcement, and in the text of the 
notes constituting the agreement, which, unless steps are taken to 
prevent it, maj' work out into a most delicate and dangerous 
situation, which involves both American interests and the national 
honor. 

In regard to the recognition of Japan's special position in China, 
it may be that the state department has an interpretation of this 
phrase in mind which is very different from how Japan under- 
stands it, and from how it will be understood in China. I feel that 
I know how this part of the agreement will be understood in China. 
It will be interpreted largely in the light of the meaning which 
Japan's propaganda in that region has in the last two years been 
giving to it, and according to the practical application of Japan's 
policy in China as this is known there. In that light, Chinese "will 
believe that the American Government has abandoned its traditional 
policy toward China, and has for reasons or compensations not 
appearing in the agreement consented to allow Japan a free hand 
in China. 

Chinese feeling about this must be taken in conjunction with 
recent events, and the circumstances whereby China was first in- 
duced by the influence of America to sever diplomatic relations with 
Germany, and later to declare war on Germany. China was induced 
to take these steps by the assurances that by joining the allied 
consortium she would be protected in the peace terms. In taking 
this step China had no thought of being protected against Germany, 
for Chinese did not feel that their nation was in any present 



CHINA AND THE WAR 157 

danger from Germany. China did feel, and still does feel, that 
she is in danger from Japan, and that by following the advice of 
America she would safeguard herself from invidious pressure from 
Japan, or from having her national autonomy and economic de- 
velopment subordinated to Japan's control. Our minister at Peking, 
myself as a publicist, and other Americans in China labored to 
impress the Chinese Government with the importance of falling in 
line with America, arguing that America is China's disinterested 
friend, and that our government could be depended on to help 
China through the crisis. The signing of this agreement, with the 
interpretations that at first will be given to it in Chma, places Amer- 
icans in China in a very embarrassing position — a position from 
which only some action of our Government which will constructively 
aid China will extricate us. 

Without doubt the immediate effects of this agreement are most 
unfortunate in respect to China, and to American prestige and 
American interests in China. The manner of first giving the agree- 
ment publicity, through the Japanese legation at Peking, also was 
of all methods the most likely to disseminate an impression injuri- 
ous to American prestige. I have read carefully the agreement and 
the aeeompanjang explanations in the hope of discovering in their 
phraseology something to indicate a purpose by our Government 
compatible with what we have led China to expect of us, but I 
cannot find it. Only two theories or interpretations of the agree- 
ment are possible — (a) that we have really consented to giving 
Japan a preferential position in respect to China that amounts to 
a recognition of a suzerainty over China, protecting only our 
commercial position there, or (b) that we limit our recognition of 
Japan's special position to the relation of geographical proximity. 

If the first hypothesis is correct, then we have greatly offended 
China, and have forfeited the confidence of Chinese; in short, Chi- 
nese will consider that we have betrayed China. 

If the second hypothesis is correct, then the agreement will not, 
as it professes, have improved the relations between America and 
Japan: for if it turns out that we do not intend to concede the 
interpretation of "special position'' that undoubtedly is taken by 
Japanese, then the Japanese will regard us as having "buncoed" 
them, and will feel a greater resentment against us than formerly. 

Thus it appears that this agreement may work out so that we will 
lose the good will and confidence of both the Chinese and the 
Japanese. 

In your statement accompanying publication of the agreement, 
you especially emphasize certain alleged effects of "German propa- 



158 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

ganda" in China, and as it has affected the relations of Japan and 
America. I state my opinion (based on tolerably full knowledge of 
all the various propagandas operating in China and the East) that 
the full and free operation of German propaganda in China for 
five years could not turn Chinese sentiment against America and 
the Allied side as effectively as this agreement will, unless practical 
steps are taken without delay to demonstrate to Chinese our friend- 
ship, and that in making this agreement we have not intended to 
consign them to a fate which of all dangers they have been dreading 
as the most imminent. As methods that can be used to extend 
practical aid to China, I beg to refer you to my previous letter 
of October 23. 

If it turns out that in making this agreement our Government 
intended to recognize, without consulting China's wishes, and to 
concede what in practice will amount to a suzerainty'' of Japan 
over China, then Chinese will regard America as having betrayed 
China and will be resentful accordingly. An intelligent Chinese 
said to me since the publication of this agreement : "For two years 
we have suspected that Russia and Great Britain had agreed to 
recognize Japan's paramountcy in China to secure Japan's aid 
in the war, but we did not know it. If they did that, they have 
kept it a secret. We never suspected that America would do 
such a thing. Now she has done it, and has announced it to the 
world. Chinese must presume that America in doing this has con- 
sulted with her principal allies. In these circumstances China must 
feel that she has been betrayed by her assumed friends." Un- 
fortunately, I could find no reply to make to this indictment. It 
remains for the American government by its subsequent acts to 
confirm or refute it. Until it is refuted, American interests and 
prestige in China are subject to the application (as without doubt 
will be done) by competing interests of all the suspicion and 
odium that can be extracted from the situation as it stands. 

The application of these circumstances in their relation to the 
general allied position is obvious. The reactions in Russia and in 
so-called "weaker nations" that are now wavering in the position 
of being forced to take one side or the other, can be foreseen; and 
the uses which German propaganda can make of this incident at this 
juncture, to sow suspicion of America's purposes and motives, and 
to point out seeming inconsistencies of our acts with our professions, 
are plain. These apparent inconsistencies need not be invented — 
they actually do exist in certain obvious aspects of this new agree- 
ment with Japan. One fears that our Government does not always 
understand clearly the psychology of these questions as it applies 



CHINA AND THE WAR 159 

to different nations. It need not be assumed that in other nations 
and with other peoples the acts of our Government will be under- 
stood as it means them, or even that its acts always will work out 
as it thinks they will, or as intended. Events in relation to the 
war frequently demonstrate the grave errors which have been made 
by the allies in regard to the psychology of different peoples, and 
their effects upon the fortunes of the war. It is not improbable 
that, before this war is ended, the friendly sentiments of and the 
active aid of the Chinese may be needed. 

With regard to the effect of this agreement upon American com- 
mercial interests and development in China, I can find little satis- 
faction. The reiteration of the guarantee of the *'open door" is in 
itself satisfactory (although a supererogation, for this is assured 
by previous agreements which were not abrogated formally) ; but 
it is likely to be the reverse of assuring to American interests in 
China by reason of phrases of your statement, in which you ex- 
press confidence in Japan's observance of the "open door." Are 
Americans and Chinese to infer from this that our Government 
regards the way in which Japan has observed the open door in 
China during the last ten years as being satisfactory? If this is a 
correct interpretation of your confidence in Japan's observation 
of the open door in China, then Americans in China will feel the 
reverse of confidence in the security of their position there; for 
they know how Japan's idea of the open door has worked in practice. 

A theory of course is applicable to this agreement, that because of 
exigencies of the military situation in Europe it has been necessary 
to bribe Japan to remain with the allied side by conceding to her 
a free hand in China. This hypothesis would cynically repudiate 
the avowed principles of our Government in entering the war: 
but it might be defended on the "imperative necessity" theory of 
international affairs provided the facts would bear it out. In 
trying to find for myself a reasonable explanation of the Govern- 
ment's purposes in making this agreement, I have considered this 
hypothesis, but without finding in it a reasonable explanation. It of 
course presumes a treacherous intent of Japan, and a willingness 
on our part to adopt a practice which we so strongly condemn in 
Germany. Furthermore, it does not appear that Japan can at 
this juncture give much practical help to the allies in the war. 
The impracticability, for political reasons, of using Japanese troops 
on the Russian front, is obvious to any who understand the psy- 
chology of the Russians in relation to this question. The imprac- 
ticability, for material reasons, of using Japanese troops and sup- 
plies on the western European front also is apparent, because of 



160 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

the difficulty of their transport, and supply there in comparison with 
reinforcements sent from America. 

If the quid pro quo of this agreement is only the supply by 
Japan of some ships for the Allied use, then I believe that this aid 
could have been procured by only giving Japan steel and cotton, 
and by other processes applicable to her. 

I have not discussed these matters without a purpose. This pur- 
pose is that the Government may see the advisability of taking steps 
to counteract the first impressions given by this agreement, and to 
take measures to extend practical aid to China, and to stabilize 
conditions in the far East on the line of our national interests and 
our traditional policy. 

With regards I remain 

Yours truly, 

Thomas F. Millard. 

When I wrote that letter I did not know about the revela- 
tion of the Japanese Government's interpretation of the 
Lansing- Ishii notes plainly given in the secret correspondence 
of the Russian ambassador at Tokio (see previous chapter), 
but I had no doubt in my own mind of what the Japanese 
interpretation would be. Neither did I know then that Japa- 
nese diplomacy had prematurely published the agreement to 
gain a point at the expense of the United States. To under- 
stand that phase of the matter we must turn to events at 
Peking. 

By what usually is called a ''gentleman's agreement" be- 
tween Mr. Lansing and Viscount Ishii, their official notes 
were to be given publicity on November 7. This would give 
time for both governments to communicate the text of the 
notes to their representatives at Peking and other capitals and 
to instruct them accordingly. An extraordinary feature of 
this event is that neither the American legation at Peking 
nor the American embassy at Tokio was apprised of what was 
happening, nor was consulted in any waj'- regarding the 
matter, but received the first information about the agree- 
ment from the Japanese legation at Peking and the Japanese 
foreign office at Tokio. Presumably the state department in- 
tended, between the day of signing the agreement £ind its 



CHINA AND THE WAR 161 

date of publication, to inform and instruct the representatives 
at Tokio and Peking, but before it did that the Japanese 
Government anticipated it. The Japanese foreign office com- 
municated the notes to the Allied diplomatic representatives 
in Tokio on November 1, the day before it was signed. The 
state department, on the other hand, kept so strictly to the 
' ' gentlemen 's agreement ' ' that it did not even inform its own 
representatives abroad. 

On November 4 the Japanese legation at Peking officially 
notified the Chinese foreign office of the agreement and pre- 
sented it with copies of the text in Chinese and Japanese. 
On the same day Baron Hayashi, the Japanese minister at 
Peking, called at the American legation and gave the Ameri- 
can minister, Dr. Eeinsch, a copy of the notes in English. 
There is no doubt that this procedure was deliberately cal- 
culated to impress the Chinese Government that the United 
States Government had to some extent conceded Japan's para- 
mountcy in China, and therefore it was Japan's prerogative 
officially to notify both the Chinese foreign office and the 
American legation of this important matter. 

A very significant point in connection with the communica- 
tion of the agreement to the Wai Chiao-Pu by the Japanese 
minister at Peking is that both the Japanese and Chinese 
texts used certain characters (li-i) to translate the "special 
interests" of Japan that are recognized by the United States 
in the instrument. In the translation submitted to the Wai 
Chiao-Pu later by the American legation as the official text 
recognized by the American Government, different characters 
(kuan-hsi) were used to describe the "special interests" that 
were recognized. The characters mean almost the same thing, 
yet with a distinction. As translated by the Japanese version, 
"special interests" indicate vested interests or proprietorship, 
something tangible. In the American version, "special in- 
terests" means merely a close or strong general interest in 
the welfare of China, not a particular or vested proprietary 
or paramount intepest. Having gotten the "jump" by pre- 



162 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

maturely giving publicity to the agreement, Japan was en- 
abled by the extensive Japanese press propaganda in China 
to give out the Japanese version for publication in the Chinese 
press, and thus created a presumption regarding the meaning 
of the agreement that accords with Japan's interpretation of 
it. After the American interpretation had been given out, 
and published in the Chinese press, the Japanese legation 
made an effort to induce the American legation to accept 
the Japanese translation and amend the American version, 
but that was declined. Nevertheless, the inspired Chinese 
newspapers under Japanese control positively refuted the 
American version, and denied its authenticity, stating that 
the Japanese version was the correct one, as only Japan had 
the right to decide upon the meaning of the agreement. 

A few hours after having been notified by Baron Hayashi 
of the agreement, the American legation received by telegraph 
from the state department the text in English, and at once 
made a correct translation into Chinese. (I say correct trans- 
lation, because after the controversy about the two transla- 
tions, many sinologues essayed their own translations, and 
without exception that I know of the American version was 
taken as more accurate.) "When he had been informed by his 
own Government, the American minister sent the following 
letter to the Wai Chiao-Pu : 

LEGATION OP THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Peking:, 
No. 667. November 8, 1917. 

Excellency : 

Referring to my Note of to-day's date, enclosing the text of an 
exchange of Notes between the Secretary of State and Yiscount 
Ishii, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I am in- 
structed bj' my Government to communicate to you the following 
message : 

"The visit of the Imperial Japanese Mission to the United States 
afforded an opportunity for free and friendly discussion of inter- 
ests of the United States and Japan in the Orient by openly pro- 
claiming that the policy of Japan as regards China is not one of 



CHINA AND THE WAR 163 

aggression and by declaring tbat there is no intention to take ad- 
vantage eommereially or indirectly of the special relations to China 
created by geographical position. The representatives of Japan 
have cleared the diplomatic atmosphere of the suspicions which 
had been so carefully spread by German propaganda. 

"The Governments of the United States and Japan again declare 
their adherence to the Open Door Policy and recommit themselves, 
as far as these two Governments are concerned, to the maintenance 
of equal opportunity for the full enjoyment by the subjects or 
citizens of any country in the commerce and industry of China. 
Japanese commercial and industrial enterprises in China manifestly 
have, on account of the geographical relation of the two countries, 
a certain advantage over similar enterprises on the part of the 
citizens or subjects of any other country. 

"The Governments of the United States and Japan have taken ad- 
vantage of a favorable opportunity to make an exchange of ex- 
pressions with respect to their relations with China. This under- 
standing is formally set forth in the Notes exchanged and now 
transmitted. The statements in the Notes require no explanation. 
They not only contain a reaffirmation of the Open Door Policy 
but introduce a principle of non-interference with the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of China which, generally applied, is 
essential to perpetual international peace, as has been so clearly 
declared by President Wilson." 

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Tour Excellency 
the assurance of my highest consideration. 

(signed) Paul S. Reinsch, 
His Excellency, American Minister. 

"Wang Ta-hsieh, 

Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

The Chinese Government was dumfounded, as well it might 
be, by the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, and especially by the 
fact that it had been concluded without previously informing 
or consulting the Chinese Government or any of its officials. 
The Chinese legation at Washington, where the negotiations 
between the American and Japanese governments were carried 
on, was easily accessible ; but Dr. Wellington Koo, the Chinese 
minister, first learned of the agreement by the despatches 
from Peking to the American newspapers. This of course 
placed him in a very embarrassing position with his own Gov- 



164 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

ernment because he had not informed it of what was con- 
templated. The Chinese Government also was humiliated that 
it should be ignored in the negotiation and in signing of an 
agreement which related exclusively to its territory and pre- 
rogatives. In a few daj's after publication of the agreement 
the Chinese Government issued the following statement con- 
cerning it: 

DECLARATION OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE NOTES 
EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND JAPAN DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1917. 

The Government of the United States and the Government of 
Japan have recently, in order to silence mischievous reports, effected 
an exchange of notes at Washington concerning their desires and 
intentions with regard to China. Copies of the said notes have 
been communicated to the Chinese Government by the Japanese 
Minister at Peking; and the Chinese Government, in order to avoid 
misunderstanding, hastens to make the following declaration so as 
to make known the views of the Government. 

The principle adopted by the Chinese Government towards the 
friendly nations has always been one of justice and equality; and 
consequently the rights enjoyed by the friendly nations derived 
from the ti'eaties have been consistently respected, and so, even with 
the special relations between countries created by the fact of terri- 
torial contiguity, it is only in so far as they have already been pro- 
vided for in her existing treaties. Hereafter the Chinese Govern- 
ment will still adhere to the principle hitherto adopted, and hereby 
it is again declared that the Chinese Government will not allow her- 
self to be bound by any agreement entered into by other nations. 

Chinese Legation, Washington. 

November 12th, 1917. 

The Chinese Government scarcely could have remained 
silent about the agreement, for silence might have been con- 
strued as tantamount to acquiescence with the Japanese in- 
terpretation. It took occasion to announce that the position 
of China as a sovereign state, and her treaty arrangements 
with other friendly nations, were not subject to revision or 
amendment by any outside nations without consulting China. 

In explaining the agreement to the public and to the world, 



CHINA AND THE WAR 165 

the Japanese propaganda in China was forehanded because 
it was advised officially and could discuss the matter with a 
purpose. The press in Japan, however, left more to their own 
devices, were a good deal puzzled by the notes. The editors 
were doubtful whether Japan had gained or had been worsted 
in the agreement. Read one way, the document was innocu- 
ous, and left the issues just where they had been before. 
Read another way, Japan had gained what she wanted. Read 
still another way, the United States had scored a point. Many 
Japanese editors argued that the reaffirmation of the open 
door and integrity of China should have been omitted. Some 
Japanese newspapers attacked the American minister at 
Peking because he issued an explanation. Publication of the 
notes in the United States was accompanied by an utterance 
of the state department, and also by private admonitions, 
plainly intimating to the press that criticism of the agreement 
would better be repressed, and to any writers who might dis- 
regard this injunction was conveyed the imputation of aiding 
German propaganda. Foreign diplomats at Peking were 
deeply interested, and accepted the incident as an obscure 
diplomatic finesse. As for myself, the comment in this book 
is the first that I have published on the Lansing-Ishii Agree- 
ment, although, as inclusions in this book show, I discussed it 
extensively in private memoranda and correspondence. As 
indicating how the agreement was regarded by Americans in 
China, I will give extracts from reports of an official who 
was in China then : 

Dated Nov. 19, 1917. 

Under date of Nov. 8 I cabled to the effect that the Lansing-Ishii 
agreement would without question result in immediate and marked 
increase of Japanese aggression against China, and such has been 
borne out most plainly as indicated by the events of the last few 
days. 

Unless cheeked, Japan's aggressive policy in the far East will 
bring war either with us or the British (or perhaps both) sooner 
or later, and it is with the object of doing all in our power to pre- 



166 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

vent this deplorable event that I suggest our using every effort to 
obtain publication of the truth. 

I am unaware what the situation was that necessitated or made 
desirable the signing of such an agreement, but if its purpose was 
to assist in bringing about harmonious relations between the gov- 
ernments of the United States and Japan, I can assuredly state 
that the ambiguous wording has had just the opposite effect, and 
the situation is intensified as far as ill feeling is concerned. 

A News Agency conducted by Japanese in Peking, presumed to be 
inspired by the Japanese Legation, issued a general notice to the 
Peking press on November 18 to the effect that the American in- 
terpretation of the Note was not correct, and that the meaning of 
the agreement was the recognition of "political superiority" of 
Japan in China — in other words, "suzerainty." 

I wish to emphasize most emphatically the point that the Lansing- 
Ishii agreement has but resulted in the pouring of oil on the fire 
and we should be prepared for the worst. Japan and the govern- 
ment and people of that country' have lost their heads completely 
over the China situation, and their desire to consolidate their po- 
sition here while the powers are occupied elsewhere is leading them 
along a dangerous path. 

Don't misunderstand me — I am not so lacking in common sense 
as not to realize that the signing of the agreement probably was 
forced upon the United States, but I feel it my duty to let you 
know what its effect here is now and what it probably will be. 

Japan now has thrown all restraint to the winds and is bent on 
a course of seeing just how far she can go, and where it is to end 
except in trouble I fail to see. 

The suggestion that Germany has been back of the ill feeling 
between Japan and the United States is about as weak and puerile 
an argument as has been put out in a long time, and although there 
may have been detached instances of such action, yet the backbone 
of ill-feeling has been due to Japan's lack of straightforwardness 
and nothing else. Japan has a bad ease of guilty conscience . . . 

Notwithstanding: the explanations of the American Gov- 
ernment and the disposition of Chinese to credit it with only 
honest intentions in signing the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, 



CHINA AND THE WAR 167 

that event continued to cause serious misgivings in China. I 
quote from a letter that I received from a foreign resident in 
China, dated November 24, 1917 : 

We are exceedingly anxious to get something more definite re- 
garding the Lansing-Ishii agreement, for everybody out here seems 
to be entirely at sea about it. Instead of "clearing up misunder- 
standings," I am of the opinion that it muddles the question still 
more. Chinese feel that America has thrown them over. Dr. 

, editor of one of the leading missionary organs in China, 

and who is one of the closest foreign students of political move- 
ments in China, told me the other day that the Japanese propaganda 
press [Chinese papers controlled by Japan] circulated a report 
throughout China three weeks before the agreement became public 
at Peking, that Viscount Ishii had shaken his fist in the faces of 
Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lansing and had forced them to recognize 
Japan's paramountcy in China. 

It need not be presumed because the report mentioned in 
that letter as being circulated in the Chinese language press 
is ridiculous to Americans that it is equally preposterous to 
the Chinese masses. Those people, like the masses in Russia 
and other countries, believe what they see, and information 
that jibes with what they know. The phrase "shook his fist" 
used in this connection probably was taken metaphorically in 
the sense of political intimidation. There is no doubt what- 
ever that Chinese readily will believe that the United States 
was under intimidation from Japan in that matter, for this 
view coincides with much that is common knowledge in China 
and with a logical interpretation of the situation as it is com- 
prehended there. Therefore the explanations of the American 
Government of its purpose in making the agreement, while it 
did lessen the resentment of Chinese and partly relieve their 
suspicions as to the motive of the United States, hy no means 
allayed their fears. The view of the Russian ambassador at 
Tokio, as quoted previously, that Japan will interpret the 
agreement in one sense, and the American Government will 
interpret it in another sense, but that Japan, while realizing 
this diversity of interpretation, still expects to put her inter- 



168 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

pretation into practice and to make it prevail eventually as 
the accepted interpretation, coincided with the opinions of 
Chinese. The more intelligent Chinese were the most mysti- 
fied by the agreement. 1 quote from a letter I received from 
a prominent Chinese who was educated in America, dated 
December 1, 1917: 

I cannot understand why, if the American and Japanese govern- 
ments had only the common purpose of joining together to protect 
China's political autonomy and territorial integrity, based on their 
territorial propinquity to China, reference was not made to the 
Philippines, an American possession or dependency. As the agree- 
ment reads, it is only the special interests of Japan exclusively 
which are mentioned as being based on the principle of territorial 
propinquity, while the special interests of the United States on the 
same basis are not mentioned. This omission logically can be con- 
strued as intentional, and as indicating that the American Govern- 
ment meant to grant to Japan special interests in China that are 
paramount to American interests here and also are superior to the 
interests of other foreign nations. 

China theoretically is an independent and sovereign State. In 
such an agreement there would have been an equal diplomatic pro- 
priety if Japan also had recognized the special interests of the 
United States in Canada, although Canada is a part of the British 
Empire. Chinese feel that the signing of this agreement relating 
especially and solely to China, made by two other governments, and 
without previously informing or consulting the Chinese Government, 
constitutes the same kind of a diplomatic impropriety as if Japan 
and America would make an agreement about Canada and Aus- 
tralia without consulting or previously informing the British Gov- 
ernment. 

As the parts of this agreement containing mutual guarantees of 
the integrity of China and of the commercial open door in China 
are also contained in several other agreements which were in exist- 
ence, it therefore must be presumed that the real gist of this new 
agreement is the recognition of Japan's special interests in China. 
Thus thrown into relief, the words "special interests" become the 
only original departure of the agreement, and logically must be 
taken to indicate a meaning to concede to Japan some form of spe- 
cial position or relation to China politically which differs from and 
is in excess of the relations of China with nations under the existing 
treaties. As China denies that Japan has any especial position or 



CHINA AND THE WAR 169 

relation to her politically or commercially, any reasonable deduc- 
tion from the use of this phrase in the agreement is offensive and 
alarming to China. 

The state of the world at this time causes wonder at the American 
Government's action in thus reviving the doctrine of territorial pro- 
pinquity now. This doctrine, in the sense of pohtical influence, 
logically was in process of being relegated as opposed to the newer 
and broader and more liberal principle of the right of nations to 
decide and determine without outside interference or coercion their 
own affairs. It moreover is apparent that the acceptance in this 
manner by the United States of this doctrine may become em- 
barrassing before the issues of the great war are adjusted. Its 
cogent application to the situation of Germany and Austria in 
respect to Russia, Poland and the Balkan nations, is obvious. Its 
application to various other international juxtapositions that are 
affected by the war and which must be adjusted by the peace terms 
is equally apparent : viz., Japan's propinquity to Russia's far East- 
em territory. This doctrine seems to make international rights 
and responsibilities, and proportions of international influence, de- 
pendent on relative propinquity. It is clear that this doctrine of 
territorial propinquity is susceptible of being made to support the 
most iniquitous ambitions and designs of nations. 

I replied to that letter, in part, as follows : 

These considerations lead to an analysis of the elements which will 
determine which of these diverse interpretations will prevail. In 
the last analysis, if there is a divergence of views between Japan 
and American about the meaning of this agreement, the view that 
will prevail will be the one which can array to support it the pre- 
ponderance of power. There can be little doubt, taking probabili- 
ties into account, that the preponderance of power will rest with 
the United States, or will be susceptible to its influence rather than 
to the influence of Japan. However, in this connection it must be 
remembered that power, as applied in such a case, does not depend 
solely on a control over material elements, but also depends on the 
will and resolution to use those elements so as to affect international 
affairs. At this time I know that many Chinese incline to believe 
that America is fundamentally more powerful than Japan ; but oven 
Chinese who hold that opinion are very doubtful that the American 
Government will exert its power upon tlie situation of China as 
opposed to Japan. I-realize that China is confronted with a condi- 
tion, not a theory. 



170 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

A scrutiny of the Lansing-Ishii agreement indicates that the 
American Government has laid in the phraseology of the notes a 
better case for supporting what is now presumed to be the American 
interpretation of the notes. If one presumes that after the war 
an International Court is established, and that questions like this 
will be submitted to that court for adjudication, and that by a 
League of Nations the decisions of such a court can be enforced, it 
is an interesting speculation to consider the legal aspects of this 
agreement. 

A principle of contract applicable to this Agreement is the rule 
that parts and articles of a contract are to be construed to har- 
monize with the whole intent and object of the instrument. Any 
other method of construing a contract disrupts the contract by in- 
jecting an element of dissent in motive and purpose, while the 
legal presumption is that the purposes and motives of the contract- 
ing parties were to agree in all the matters dealt with m the con- 
tract. To put one clause in a contract which negatives another 
clause of it of course is destructive of the very essence of a eon- 
tract, and consequently clauses and articles of a contract which may 
seem, when afterward applied, to diverge in some ways from other 
equally important clauses or articles, usually will be construed by 
courts with a view to making their meanings harmonize, instead of 
construing them as dissonant. 

By applying this principle of contract to those clauses of the 
Lansing-Ishii agreement which, first, recognize the "special inter- 
ests" of Japan in China based on territorial propinquity, and, sec- 
ond, which positively and affirmatively commit both nations to a full 
recognition and support of China's territorial integrity and of the 
commercial open door in China, then the "special interests" clause 
would logically be construed to harmonize with the subsequent arti- 
cles. A different construction would invalidate the whole contract, 
for then the articles assuring and guaranteeing the integrity of 
China and the open door would be antagonistic to the "special in- 
terests" clause. On the other hand, by construing the "special in- 
terests" clause as not giving Japan any political or economic pri- 
ority in China, the "special interests" clause harmonizes with all 
the succeeding articles. 

Courts often take into consideration, when construing contracts, 
moral aspects of the matters which are in dispute. A construction 
of a contract which in practice works out into an offense to morals 
frequently is enough to invalidate that construction. There hardly 
can be any doubt that a construction of the Lansing-Ishii agreement 
which allows Japan, under the "special interests" clause, to negative 



CHINA AND THE WAE 171 

the clauses which guarantee the integrity of China and the open 
door, would be a violation of international morals. Such a con- 
struction reduces the agreement to the status of a piece of diplo- 
matic trickery, which intended to do exactly what it professed not 
to do, or which professed objects which the contracting parties did 
not wish nor intend to carry out ; in short, such a contract connives 
at fraud, and has no standing in a court of justice. 

The only decent construction that can be placed on the American 
Government's interpretation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement is that 
it regards the "special interests" clause as being in harmony with 
the subsequent articles. Therefore it can be presumed that the 
American Government has in view a policy and means that will 
make it feasible to sustain that theory of the agreement. 

It is a fair presumption that the Japanese Government, at the 
time this agreement was made, understood the probable legal con- 
struction that a court will give the instrument, favoring the Amer- 
ican interpretation. Since it is probable that Japan will try to give 
a practical, and later a theoretical construction to the agreement 
that is contrary to the American theorj% it follows that Japan ex- 
pects that practical considerations will supersede and overrule the 
American interpretation, which will lapse into the position of an 
academic contention without material substance, which time will 
obliterate. This perhaps is what the high Japanese official at Tokio 
meant by stating (as alleged) to the Russian ambassador that Japan 
has better means of insisting on her interpretation of the agree- 
ment. Or it may be that Japanese statesmen believe that, after the 
war, the American Government will lack the will and the resolution 
to take a firm stand on this question, which would leave the way 
open for Japan by a process of steady pressure to make her inter- 
pretation practically in effect. 

It of course is true that this agreement has not the binding effect 
of a Treaty, for on the part of the American Government it has 
not been ratified by the Senate. It is of the nature of a "gentle- 
man's agreement," which can be changed or discarded on due notice. 
It is apparent that both the contracting Governments regard it as 
of the character of a diplomatic expedient. 

Reason rejects a theorv^ that the American Government would 
enter into such an agreement as this, which undoubtedly will for 
some time embarrass and hinder American business interests in 
China, and American popularity and prestige there, merely for some 
temporarj- expediency of Japanese- American relations, or (as some 
have it) of sustaining^ the present Japanese Government in power. 



172 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

To attempt to solve the question of Japanese in America by trading 
off American interests in China (and at the same time trading off 
China's interests too) is as immoral as it is futile; for the question 
of Asiatic immigration to the United States and the fate of China 
vis-a-vis Japan are entirely different propositions. One therefore 
is driven to search for another theory for the motive of the Amer- 
ican Government. (Japan's motive is perfectly obvious.) Such a 
motive might be found in a device to apply to Japan a pressure 
of world psychology upon her poUcy in China. The American 
Government may calculate that, after thus getting Japan's positive 
reaffirmation of the integrity of China and the commercial open door 
and giving public attention a focus on far Eastern events in rela- 
tion to the war, if Japan hereafter takes a course which in practice 
negatives the principles of these commitments as Americans and 
other western peoples will understand them, then Japan without 
doubt will acquire the distrust of western civilization. This will be 
a gradual process induced by Japan's own acts — just as Japan's 
course during the war, and its complete selfishness, has in time begun 
to sink into popular consciousness in Europe and America. By 
this device, therefore, it is ''put up" to Japan, by her own acts, 
to restore herself in western good opinion, or to make herself wholly 
distrusted. 

If by the time the peace conference is assembled, Japan has by 
her acts made herself even more offensive to China and to other 
nations than she is now (a probable contingency), then it wiU be 
easier for the American Government and other powers that wish to 
preserve the rights and the integrity of China to put a pressure on 
Japan that will be backed by an accumulative world psychologrj'^ op- 
posed to Japan's adaptation of Prussianism. On the other hand, 
if Japan really "plays the game" in China, and also gives help in 
the war that requires some sacrifices and that is not patently ani- 
mated by self-interest, a genuine betterment of the Eastern situa- 
tion, and of China, will be worked out. 

It is apparent that, by a combination of Great Britain and the 
United States (and the moral assent of other nations in the Allies' 
group), an economic pressure can at any time now be applied to 
Japan that will put great compulsion on her. Japan's modem 
industrialism and even her naval and military power depend on 
three major elements — iron, steel and cotton. Japan depends on 
China for iron principally, and also for a little raw cotton. America 
is the only place in the world now where steel can be obtained in 
quantity. Great Britain (India and Egypt) and the United States 
practically control the world's production of raw cotton. Further- 



CHINA AND THE WAE 173 

more, America is the principal market for many of Japan's prod- 
ucts. The next best market is Chma. Thus it is possible to draw 
an economic ring about Japan, during the war, and after the war in 
case she offends the moral and political ideals of the leading west- 
ern powers. As off -setting that thesis (which is understood by 
Japanese statesmen, no doubt), Japan may expect by her propa- 
ganda in Asia to establish herself m a firm leadership of a Pan- 
Asian doctrine; and to be able to hold her own, or preserve a bal- 
ance with the West, by trading with Germany after the war in both 
the political and economic meanings. 

More than one year has passed since I wrote that brief 
analysis of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement as it probably was 
conceived by the American Government, and I have almost 
nothing to change in it or add to it now. The American 
Government, acting under what pressure from its co-belliger- 
ents I do not know, was willing to go that far to placate Japan 
temporarily, even at the cost of a temporary loss of prestige 
and confidence in China. The immediate practical effect of 
the agreement was that it gave Japan comparatively a free 
hand in China for the remainder of the war or until its crisis 
had passed. What did Japan do with her opportunity? 



CHAPTER YIII 

THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 

Increase of Japan's influence in China — The revised Japanese policy — 
Its motives and methods — China's wish to participate in the war — How 
it was defeated — American loan refused — Efl'ects of this refusal — Cor- 
ruption of Chinese officials — Getting control of the Government — The 
War Participation Board—The military agreement — Advent of Nishi- 
hara — The orgy of loans — Japan's two-faced policy — Attitude of other 
powers — The rake's progress — Sowing seeds of internal dissension — 
Japan in Shantung — Establishment of ci\il administration there — Pro- 
tests of the Chinese inhabitants — The question analysed — Japans objects 
revealed — Forced sale of Chinese lands — Fraudulent seizure of mines — 
Survey of Japanese "penetration" of Tsinan-fu — Brothels and drug-shops 
— Where the money came from — Refastening the opium trade on China — 
Japan's illicit trade in morphia — How the trade is conducted — Explana- 
tions of the Japanese Government — Exploiting the Chinese bandits. 

AN immediate effect of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement 
in China, where its beneficial purposes were pre- 
sumed to apply solely, was to raise Japanese influ- 
ence at Peldng to an unprecedented degree. The strongest 
man in the existing Government, Tuan Chi-jui, premier and 
leader of the military party, already was obligated financially 
to Japanese banks for help in regaining his position. There 
had for some time been a pro-Japan group in Chinese politics 
composed partly of men who honestly believed that China's 
best policy was to follow Japan, and partly of men who had 
taken that side for financial inducements. When the Lansing- 
Ishii notes were published, the pro-Japan element in Chinese 
official circles went about saying: ''I told you. so. We al- 
ways said that no dependence could be placed in America." 
After China had planned active participation in the war on 
the expectation of a loan from the American Government, 

m 



THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 175 

and that loan was refused, the pro-Japan group again scored 
heavily. 

The Government's position was, precarious, and it needed 
money constantly to pay its troops and to hold the Tuchuns, 
or military governors of the provinces, in line. There are 
reasons to believe that up to that time Tuan Chi-jui had been 
loyal to China, and had hoped to work out a solution without 
having to accept important assistance from Japan. But after 
the publication of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement his attitude 
changed, and he became completely entangled in the Japanese 
mesh. Among Tuan's close supporters and followers were a 
number of Chinese of exceeding cleverness in politics, but, as 
events proved, of no moral stamina, and they became ready 
instruments and accessories of Japan's corruption policy. 

Japan's revised China policy (1917-18) can be summarized 
as follows: 

(a) To prevent China from taking any creditable part in 
the war. 

(b) To get control of China's military organisation. 

(c) To control China's representation at the peace confer- 
ence. 

(d) To get control of China's natural resources, which are 
essential to modem economic and military strength. 

(e) To control all future development of China's transpor- 
tation systems. 

(f) To take advantage of the preoccupation of Western 
nations in the war further to undermine their economic status 
in China. 

It may be remarked that only in the first three articles of 
this summary does Japan's policy show any change, for the 
objects designated (d), (e), and (f) had animated it for 
years pre%aously. But China's entrance into the war had 
created new conditions which might qualify or undo much that 
Japan had accomplished toward attaining her major objec- 
tives. The revision of Japanese policy was therefore not a 
revision as to objectives and purposes, but only a revision 



176 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

of methods to meet the new conditions. The motives and 
reasons of the Japanese Government in this period can be 
explained briefly. 

Although nominally an Allied belligerent since early in the 
war, Japan's course had been so purely selfish that the other 
Allied powers were feeling disgruntled at and distrustful 
of her, a sentiment that might seriously compromise Japan's 
position at the peace conference if the Allies won the war. 
If China would now give substantial help to the Allies (even 
when a neutral China had helped by sending laborers to 
Europe), Japan's attitude would be thrown into strong and 
unfavorable contrast. A military participation by China in 
Europe would have important internal and external effects 
upon China's situation. It would place nations in Europe 
under a sympathetic obligation to China, and it would extend 
the horizon of the Chinese people and widen their friendly 
contacts. At home it would tend to lessen internal friction 
by arousing a spirit of national unity and purpose. United 
and orderly at home, and having made a respectable contri- 
bution toward winning the war, China's favorable position 
at the peace conference would be assured. 

On the other hand, if China failed to give any assistance 
in the war, if she fell into serious internal disorder, if she 
failed to suppress German propaganda and economic activi- 
ties in her territories, if she continued academically pro- 
German in sentiment, if she continued to demonstrate her 
inability to conduct her own affairs or to meet her foreign 
obligations, then her position at the peace conference would 
be precarious, and the nation would have qualified for a 
place among those that require a strong neighbor to oversee 
and manage them. 

From China's declaration of war to the present, Japan's 
policy has been to keep China alienated from and suspicious 
of the western powers in the Allied consortium, so as to 
drive a wedge between China and the important western 
nations and isolate China. Then, with a group of private 



THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 177 

agreements made with the leading powers, giving to Japan 
a special position in respect to China, Japanese diplomats 
could argue to the Chinese Government that China's only 
hope at the peace conference was to entrust her interests to 
Japan, and to delegate to Japan the right to represent China 
there. 

The Japanese method was comparatively simple. For years 
China has been thoroughly studied by hundreds of special 
agents of the Japanese Government who have gathered and 
classified complete data showing the personnel and charac- 
teristics of all Chinese officials, military men, and political 
possibilities; the resources of the country, both natural and 
improved; the private and public debts of every official, mili- 
tary commandant, province, city, and industrial enterprise; 
the revenues of all officials, generals, provinces, cities, and 
industrial enterprises. The plan would be to select an offi- 
cial or general who needed or wanted money — and nearly all 
of them did — then propose to make a loan to him or his 
province or city, with some local industrial plant or revenues 
or undeveloped resources as security, or for a concession or 
monopoly of possible future value. Sometimes a so-called 
Sino-Japanese corporation would be formed to construct and 
operate an enterprise or utility, and positions and shares 
would be judiciously distributed among Chinese officials and 
their friends. The conditions of most of these loans were .such 
that Chinese officials could deflect all or a large part of the 
residue of the funds to their private uses and to pay their 
satellites. Of Japanese loans in China during this period 
there were few instances when the money was applied to the 
purposes for which it nominally was borrowed. Usually only 
a part of the loan would be advanced, and the advance rarely 
would be used for the purpose designated. Whatever Japan 
wanted in China or that was worth tying up, the Japanese 
set out to get by this indirect process of bribery. When, as 
frequently happened, a Chinese official could not be handled 
by this method, then- Japan's agents were put to work to stir 



178 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

up trouble for him, and lie soon felt the pressure from all 
sides of Japan's organized influence; while Chinese who were 
amenable to Japan's projects and suggestions were supported 
by that influence, and also given opportunities to make money 
easily. There are people in every country who can be cor- 
rupted into downright treason, even men in high official posi- 
tions, and the percentage of Chinese who are thus susceptible 
is no greater than elsewhere. In most of these instances 
there was nothing in the proposals on their face to stamp 
them as invidious to China; indeed, for some time after the 
Lansing-Ishii notes were published a great many intelligent 
Chinese believed that the western Allied powers had thrown 
China over, that her only hope was to make the best possible 
terms with Japan, and that further to resist Japan's penetra- 
tion of their country was futile. Also, as time passed it 
became increasingly evident that Japan's opposition consti- 
tuted a powerful bar to political advancement for any 
Chinese. 

"With this outline of Japan's motives and methods, I will 
narrate some outstanding events and conditions that demon- 
strate the practical working of the policy. While in every 
province and district of China, Japan, through her consuls, 
agents, propaganda press, commercial and financial organiza- 
tions, played a distinct and often a separate game as dictated 
by expediency, her principal effort was directed to gain con- 
trol of the Peking Government. Control of the purse and 
the army of any nation means control of all its functions 
ultimately, and Japan first set to work to make her influence 
decisive in the ministries of war, finance, and communications. 
Tuan Chi-jui, the premier, also was minister of war. The 
character of the ministry of finance is clearly indicated by 
its name. In China the ministry of communications directs 
the railways and other public utilities, giving it control of 
transportation and also of considerable revenues. Virtually 
all of the revenues of the central Government pass through 
the ministries of finance and communications. 



THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 179 

Had the American Government given financial support to 
the plan for Chinese military participation in Europe, which 
was carefully worked out by a French military expert who 
went to Peking for the purpose, the course of events in China 
during this period could have been changed. But when the 
American Government did not support the plan, it fell flat. 
A suggestion that Japan might finance China for that pur- 
pose was advanced, but of course it had not the slightest 
chance of success. Japan had no difiiculty in finding millions 
to play her own game in the far East, but had no money for 
genuine war activities. 

I will not trace here the machinations of Chinese politics 
whereby men under Japan's influence gained control of the 
ministries of finance and communications in the Peking Gov- 
ernment. Suffice that Chinese who became tools of Japan did 
get those positions, or the men who held them gradually were 
swung to fall in with Japan's plans. The first flower of 
this combination was the War Participation Board, This 
board was ostensibly organized to manage China's partici- 
pation in the war; in fact, it was organized to prevent any 
effective participation of China in the war. and did prevent 
it. Tuan Chi-jui was head of the board, and it was com- 
posed of his henchmen. This board became notorious because 
of its acts in trying to commit China's military organization 
and policy into Japan's hands. General Chin Ting-Pang 
and General Hsu Cheng, both lieutenants of the premier, were 
co-directors of the board. From its inception the board was 
completely under Japanese control. General Saito of the 
Japanese Army, a military attache of the Japanese legation 
at Peking, had an office in the War Participation Board and 
advised it on all questions. 

The principal act of the War Participation Board was to 
negotiate and sign the so-called ''military agreement" be- 
tween Japan and China in the spring of 1918. During the 
time when this agreement was being negotiated, and even 
after it had been signed, the Japanese Government and the 



180 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

War Participation Board denied that it was contemplated. 
Opposition in China, based on rumors, became so strong that 
the negotiations were transferred to Tokio. General Chin 
went to Tokio and signed the agreement there, and was 
decorated by the Japanese Government. 

The circumstances of signing this agreement are most ex- 
traordinary. At first it was kept a close secret, and the 
Japanese legation at Peking denied officially that it had 
any knowledge of the matter. When the rumors persisted, 
and a few facts about the proposal leaked out, the Chinese 
foreign office demanded that it be informed of what was 
going on. The War Participation Board then consented to 
admit a representative of the Foreign Office to the discus- 
sions, and when opposition developed from that quarter, the 
negotiations were secretly and suddenly transferred to Tokio. 
After the agreement was signed, both the Japanese and 
Chinese governments for some time denied its existence; and 
to this day, unless it was privately revealed at Paris, no au- 
thentic copy of the treaty has been communicated to the other 
Allied governments. Here were two nations in the Allied 
group, while the war was at a critical stage, making a secret 
military agreement relating to the conduct of the war. When 
officially questioned, the Japanese Government finally admitted 
that such an agreement had been signed, and stated that it 
was for the purpose of mutual cooperation of China and 
Japan in the East solely. The Chinese Government, through 
the Foreign Office, could only state to inquiries of other na- 
tions that it believed that some kind of agreement was signed, 
but that it was without complete knowledge of its scope and 
meaning. The military agreement never was ratified by the 
Chinese cabinet, nor the Council; and it was protested and 
repudiated by the southern parliament. The real purpose of 
this agreement, as was demonstrated subsequently in Siberia 
and Manchuria, was to tie China to Japan, and make it impos- 
sible for her to act in the war without first consulting Japan, 



THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 181 

and under Japan 's dictation. The quid pro quo to the Chinese 
ofSeials who signed the agreement was, of course, money : loans 
supposed to be used to equip for participation in the war, but 
which really were used to finance Premier Tuan 's fight to keep 
the Chinese military party in power. 

One act of the War Participation Board that very well 
illustrates its character was with reference to the German 
and Austrian ships that had been interned in Chinese waters 
since the beginning of the war. When China declared war, 
the Allied governments wanted to obtain these ships for 
transport work, for ships were badly needed. It was pro- 
posed to charter them from China after China had taken 
possession. In due course the Chinese navy department took 
the ships over. A Sino-Japanese company was formed, com- 
posed of Japanese and certain Chinese officials in the War 
Participation Board and the ministry of communications, to 
purchase these ships and then charter them. A Japanese 
bank was to finance this deal, and the necessary repairs were 
to be done in Japan. The plan was to sell the ships to this 
company at a very low price, and a large profit would be 
made in repairing and chartering or reselling them. This 
plan was blocked by a vigorous protest of the British Gov- 
ernment, which represented that war needs of the Allies 
should be first considered; but by a trick in which the char- 
ters were based on dead weight instead of registered tonnage, 
a bit of sharp practice was made to yield an illegitimate profit 
to schemers in the War Participation Board, 

When the way had been paved by firmly planting Japanese 
influence in the Peking Government, Japan's plan developed 
another phase. In the spring of 1918 Nishihara Kamezo, a 
Japanese financial and diplomatic agent, came to Peking. 
Mr. Nishihara is a director of the Bank of Chosen (Korea), 
one of the group of banks closely connected with the Japanese 
Government. He had not previously been prominent in Japa- 
nese finance, but it soon developed that he had powerful 



182 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

financial and official backing. The activities of Nishihara in 
China soon created a scandal of such proportions that it 
created uneasiness even in Japan. How it was viewed in 
China is indicated by some editorial comment of "Millard's 
Review" (written by Prof. J. B. Powell) in the issue of July 
20, 1918: 

Baron Hayashi is Japan's official representative in Peking whilst 
Mr. Nishihara, the secret agent of the Japanese Prime Minister, is 
her unofficial representative. Recent events indicate that the latter 
has done more for his own country and people and is commanding 
greater influence. Much of his work in China, which has neces- 
sarily to be sub rosa, is said to be unknown to Baron Hayashi, the 
Japanese Minister to Peking, and many a Chinese journalist is bet- 
ter informed of it than the Baron. It has happened a number of 
times that Baron Hayashi would issue an official denial of certain 
Chinese-Japanese negotiations which later turned out to be true. 
It seems Nishihara had undertaken them without Baron Hayashi's 
knowledge. It is bruited about Peking that the Japanese Minister 
has repeatedly protested to Tokio against this unprecedented prac- 
tice — all in vain. This is quite within expectations. Nishihara is 
the confidential secret agent of the present Japanese Prime Minister, 
who is greatly interested in the Chosen Bank and the Taiwan Bank. 
He was purposely sent to China to secure concessions and make 
loans in opposition to the Yokohama Specie Bank, which is under- 
stood to have been receiving the support of Baron Hayashi and 
other Japanese officials, except Count Terauchi. This situation 
results in the adoption of conflicting financial policies by Japan in 
China. Count Terauchi and Mr. Nishihara, representing the Chosen 
Bank and the Taiwan Bank, are deabng with the Chinese Govern- 
ment in all money matters through Mr. Tsao Ju-lin, Minister of 
Finance, and Mr. Lu Chung-yu, Director of the Chinese-Japanese 
Exchange Bank, whilst other high Japanese officials advocate that 
all the Japanese financiers should transact business with men like 
Mr. Liang Sliih-yi, who is more substantial and who they believe 
can command greater influence in official circles, and that the Yoko- 
hama Specie Bank should represent the Japanese in such transac- 
tions. In consequence, the Chosen Bank and the Taiwan Bank are 
obtaining all the business they desire from China, with the Yoko- 
hama Specie Bank being left out in the cold. The explanation for 
this state of affairs is simple enough. Messrs. Tsao and Lu are in 



THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 183 

a position to conclude loans as they are closely connected with the 
Government, and in the meantime Mr. Liang is not. 

And on July 27, 1918, Prof. Powell wrote further in "Mil- 
lard's Review": 

Between January 1, 1909, and June 30, 1918, Japanese bankers 
have advanced to China Yen 178,770,000 and, in addition, three 
other loans to the amount of Yen 106,000,000 have practically been 
agreed upon, and probably will be signed before the end of July. 
Of the Yen 178,770,000 already advanced. Yen 164,100,000 has been 
advanced since May 1, 1915, showing that Japanese activity in the 
Chinese field really did not begin until eight months after the opening 
of hostiHties in Europe. Outside of a comparatively small part of 
the Yen 164,100,000 which was used for purposes of flood relief 
and to combat the plague last winter, most of the money has been 
used in internal warfare in China, About twelve million Yen has 
been advanced to the Southern Chinese provinces, presumably for 
military use on the Southern side, and the rest has been used by the 
Northern or Peking Government for similar purposes. To pay for 
these loans China has mortgaged railway lines, gold, coal, antimony 
and iron mines. She has mortgaged the Government printing office 
at Peking, the Hankow electric light and waterworks, and native 
forests in various parts of the country. There is a clause in each 
of these loan agreements to the effect that the Chinese authorities 
shall not obtain additional funds upon these securities unless the 
consent of the Japanese bankers first has been obtained. As to the 
expenditure of this money, so far as is known the Japanese bankers 
have placed no restrictions whatever upon the uses to which the 
money was to be put. For example, the Chinese authorities make a 
loan agreement with the Japanese bankers to extend a railroad, 
develop a coal or iron mine, or to construct telegraph lines. After 
the money has been obtained and the bankers and negotiators receive 
their commissions, the rest of the loan is apportioned out among 
various military governors who use it to pay their soldiers and keep 
them loyal. 

In the past, loans to China which have been made through the 
Consortium of foreign banks have been made for administrative pur- 
poses only, on condition that the expenditure of the loans shall be 
supervised and that the security shall be under control. To use the 
words of Mr. David Fi-azer, Peking Correspondent of the "London 
Times" and "North China Daily News": "This policy has been 



184 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

adopted by the powers interested with the definite object of saving 
China from herself, in short with the object of ensuring that money 
lent shall be properly spent, and security created by means of which 
China shall have no difficulty in repaymg principal and interest." 
Since Japan is a member of the Consortium, the question naturally 
arises: How can Japan, who is committed by an agreement with 
the powers covering financial advances to China, make these present 
loans without following out the understanding regarding restrictions 
upon the expenditure of the money by China? The answer to this 
question is also given by Mr. Frazer to the effect that the new 
loans are made through another group of Japanese bankers who are 
not bound by the Consortium agreement. His statement follows* 

The mystery is partly explained by a paragraph in a recent Japa- 
nese newspaper. The Industrial Bank of Japan, a component part 
of the so-called Korean Group of which Mr. Nishihara is the impres- 
sario, is announced as placing Yen 50,000,000 of new debentures 
upon the market. The paragraph says that part of this money has 
already been advanced to China as an instalment of the Kirin- 
Hueining Railway Agreement Loan, and that the remainder of the 
loan will come out of the money to be provided by the new deben- 
tures. It is also stated that the balance of the debenture proceeds 
will be lent to China, and that the Industrial Bank eventually intends 
to finance China up to Yen 100,000,000. This is pretty bad news 
for China, if the Industrial Bank is to continue to lend to the Chi- 
nese Government upon conditions that admit of heavy advances for 
military expenditure. The most interesting feature of this deben- 
ture flotation in Japan, however, is the fact that the Japanese Gov- 
ernment is behind it and has given "a promise, made legal by legis- 
lation in the last session of the Diet, to guarantee the payment of 
principal and interest of this and later loans by the bank." At any 
rate, the "Japan Advertiser," from which I quote, is of the opinion 
that the new debentures are practically public bonds, and states that 
the Government Post Offices are being used to assist in the flotation. 
From the paragraph in question, which appeared in the "Japan 
Advertiser" of June 30, it seems plain that the Japanese Govern- 
ment is making itself responsible for the repayment of money being 
borrowed to finance specified and unspecified transactions in China. 
Mr. Nishihara, representing the Korean Group, of which the Indus- 
trial Bank of Japan is a principal, is under no restrictions, and can 
lend money to China upon any terms acceptable to the group he rep- 
resents. When the Korean Group lends money to China uncondi- 
tionally the assumption is that the Japanese Government disapproves 
of the transaction and would stop it if they could, as the British 



THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 185 

Government tried to stop the Crisp Loan. Now the Kirin-Hueining 
Railway Loan Agreement provides for Yen 10,000,000 to be paid 
over to China without any conditions, to be spent exactly as the 
Chinese like. Such a transaction is positively subversive of the 
policy of the powers behind the Consortium, of which Japan is one. 
Therefore the Kirin-Hueining Loan agreement, in so far as the 
advance of Yen 10,000,000 is concerned, is opposed to the declared 
pohcy of the Japanese Government, and presumably is disapproved 
of by that Government. 

Yet we find the Japanese Government guaranteeing the Industrial 
Bank's debenture issue, the proceeds of which are to be used, it is 
specifically stated, to make the advance of Yen 10,000,000 against 
the Kirin agreement. In other words, the Japanese Government is 
pursuing one policy with the right hand, in agreement with the asso- 
ciated powers, and with the left hand is helping the Industrial Bank 
to raise money to make loans to China on conditions subversive of 
the official policy, and in violation of Japan's own understanding 
with the powers. This is what is called in polite English, "hunting 
with the hounds and running with the hare." It is no secret that 
the Japanese Government warmly supports Mr. Nishihara in many 
transactions that would never be countenanced by any of the other 
Governments because they are incompatible with their engagement 
to pursue a particular financial policy. But Japan gaily and quite 
openly does what other powers will not do. 

Here was revealed one phase of Japan's policy quite 
clearly. Officially, the Japanese Government v^^as inhibited 
from pursuing an independent financial course in China, for 
it and its fiscal agent, the Yokohama Specie Bank, were parties 
to the international banking group which were signatories, 
with the approval of the governments, of the reorganization 
loan agreement. So that obstacle was evaded by conducting 
these negotiations through different Japanese banks, and pre- 
sumably without the official knowledge or countenance of the 
Japanese foreign office. However, few in China or Japan 
were deceived by this subterfuge. In its issue of August 3, 
1918, the "Herald of Asia" (Tokio), a Japanese-owned and 
-edited newspaper, said : 

The loan activities of Nishihara Kamezo we are informed, have 
come, or will shortly cdnae, to an end. We are not sorry to hear 



186 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

it. It is too early to venture an impartial assessment of the serv- 
ives and disservices rendered by this mysterious personage during 
his meteoric career of a year and a half. He has shown a remark- 
able resourcefulness in engineering financial deals of no inconsid- 
erable magnitude. Whatever may happen to the parties on whom 
he has heaped obligations or claims, he emerges a successful man, 
with a reputation newly made. He is reported to be a disinterested 
man in money matters, so he may not have made a fortune out of 
the large transactions he has taken part in. Fifteen months ago 
nobody knew him, except a small circle of acquaintances in Chosen. 
Now he is one of the best known Japanese in the far East. That 
is probably what he was after, and well may he rest contented "with 
his success. Whatever advantages Mr. Nishihara may have derived 
personally from his activities in Peking, it may be doubted if this 
country has been benefited more than it has been injured. His 
negotiations have made' so much noise that the outside public has 
got the impression that he has secured a large number of very 
important concessions, whereas as a matter of fact very little mate- 
rial advantages will accrue to Japan from the loans arranged 
through him. . . , Then again the spectacle of a private Japanese 
agent known to be closely connected with a section of the Tokio 
Cabinet negotiating with the Chinese Government behind the back 
of our accredited representative and against his wishes, has not 
tended to enhance either the prestige or credit of the Empire in 
the eyes of the world. If the Cabinet should happen, by some un- 
foreseen luck, to drag on its existence until the winter, it will have 
a lot to explain to the Diet on this subject. 

No complete and authentic list of Japanese loans in China 
is available for publication. Many of these transactions, 
especially during the war, have been kept as secret as could 
be, and even when disclosed inadvertently, it often happens 
that they will still be denied by those officials who made them. 
I have a list, however, which represents what the combined 
efforts of American and other foreign commercial attaches 
and agents in China have been able to compile of loans which 
Japanese banks and large commercial firms have made to 
China and which are now outstanding. The list follows: 



THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 187 

LIST OF CHINA'S LOANS MADE BY JAPANESE 

From January 1, 1909, to October 25, 1918 
No. Yen 

1. 1909; From Yokohama Specie Bank to Imperial 

Railway Administration representing part 
payment of that part of the Hsinmintun- 
Mukden Railway lying east of the Liao 
River 320,000 

For 18 years at 5%, issue price 93 ; secured by 
revenues of road. 

2. 1909; From Yokohama Specie Bank to Imperial 

Railway Administration for construction of 
Kirin-Changehun Railway 2,150,000 

For 25 years at 5*^^, issue price 93 ; secured by 
revenues of road. 

3. 1910; Yokohama Specie Bank to Imperial Railway 

Administration for redemption of Peking- 
Hankow Railway 2,200,000 
For 10 years at 7%, issue price 97.50 

4. 1911; Yokohama Specie Bank to Imperial Railway 

Administration for same as above and for 
running expenses pending redemption 10,000,000 

For 25 years at 5%, issue price 95 

5. 1912; Mitsui Bussan Kaisha to Hankow Water- 

works & Electric Light Co., for construc- 
tion purposes 1,000,000 
Repayable in ten annual instalments. Int. T^". 
Guaranteed by Ministry of Communica- 
tions. 

6. ? ; To Provincial Bank of Hunan and Hupeh, 

on security of Hsiang Pi Shan Iron Mines 
(unconfirmed, but reported by good author- 
ity) 2,000,000 



Pre-War Yen 17,670,000 

LOANS TO HANTEHPING GOAL AND IRON COMPANY 

7. 1903; Industrial Bank of Japan, 30 years at 6% 3,000,000 

8. 1906; Mitsui Mining Co. Semi-annual repayments, 

71/2% 1,000,000 

9. 1906; Okura & Company, 7 years at 71/2% 2,000,000 
10. 1908; Yokohama Specie Bank, 10 years at 71/2^" 1,500,000 



188 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

No. Yen 

11. 1908; Yokohama Specie Bank, 10 years at 71/2^" 500,000 

12. 1909; Yokohama Specie Bank, 10 years at 71/2% 6,000,000 

13. 1910 ; Mitsui Mining Company, 2 years at 7% 1,000,000 

14. 1912; Mitsui Mining Company, 2 years at 7% 2,000,000 

15. 1913; Yokohama Specie Bank, 40 years at 7% to 

7th year thereafter 6% 15,000,000 

Han Yeh Ping. . . .Yen 32,000,000 
Total.... Yen 49,670,000 

16. 1915; Yokohama Specie Bank to Ministry of Com- 

munications for construction Supinkai- 
Chengehiatun Railway 5,000,000 

17. May Okura Co. Advance, $1,000,000 1,000,000 
1915 Security Feng Huang Shan Iron Mines. 

18. May 1, Asiatic Development Co. Loan to Central 

1915 Government for general purposes 5,000,000 
For ,3 years at 6'^", issue price 94; secured by 

uncertain mining concessions in Hunan and 
Anhui and by profits of brass cash smelt- 
ing scheme. 
(This loan was advanced, but the security was 
not settled; the Japanese stood out for the 
Shui-Kou-Shan and Tai-Ping-Shan mines) 

19. Sept. To Province of Shantung, for military pur- 

1916 poses 1,500,000 

20. Dec. To Kwangtung Provincial Government; the 

1916 Provincial Government gave as security the 
monthly instalments of $50,000 paid to 
them by the Central Government through 

the Salt Commissioners 1,500,000 

21. Jan. Japanese banking group to Bank of Com- 

1917 munications, for redemption of notes of 

Bank 5,000,000 

For three years at 71/^^°, no discount, secured 
by $1,500,000 shares of bank stock and 
$4,000,000 Treasury bonds, Japan obtain- 
ing privilege of appointing adviser to Bank 
and option on future loans. 

22. Jan. 30, Bank of Chosen to Fengtien Province for 
1917 relief of Chinese banks in Mukden, half 

payable in one year, half in three 2,000,000 

Interest 6^2'^°? issue price 95. 



THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 189 

No. Yen 

23. Feb. 1, Yokohama Specie Bank, second loan to 
1917 Ministry of Communications for construc- 
tion of Supinkai-Chenchiatung Railway 2,600,000 

For 1 year at 7%, secured by revenues of road. 

24. Feb. Japanese Syndicate to Kwangtung Pro- 
1917 vincial Government, 1,300,000 for advance 

to Provincial Government and 1,700,000 for 
construction of Canton cement factory, en- 
tire loan secured on revenues and property 
of cement factory and customs lands at 
Tashatou, and guaranteed by Provincial 
Government 3,000,000 

25. Aug. Japanese Syndicate to Bank of China, for 
1917 redemption of bank notes, secured by $15,- 

000,000 Bank of China notes (repaid) 5,000,000 

For 6 months at 7%. 

26. Aug. 28, Yokohama Specie Bank, advance on Sec- 
1917 ond Reorganization Loan for reimburse- 
ment of advances made by Bank of China 

to Central Government 10,000,000 

Repayable out of Second reorganization loan 

if made, otherwise to be repaid in cash in 

one year. 
Interest 7^° discount 1^". Secured by surplus 

salt revenues. 

27. Oct. 17, Sino-Japanese Industrial Co. and 10 Jap- 

1917 anese Banks to Central Government for 

relief of Chihli flood sufferers 5,000,000 

One year at l"^", secured by revenues of three 
native customs houses, including Dolnor. 

28. Oct. Loan on Kirin-Changchun Railway by South 

1918 Manchuria Railway Company 6,500,000 
For 30 years at 5*^", issue price 91.50, secured 

by revenues and property of road. 

29. Nov. Grand Canal Loan (part of Siems-Carey 

1917 loan) of total $6,000,000 gold. Americans 
take $3,500,000 and Japanese $2,000,000 
equivalent to 5,000,000 

30. Jan. Yokohama Specie Bank's share of Group 

1918 Bank advance for Flood Relief; Security 

Salt $100,000, say 2,00,000 



190 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

No. Yen 

31. Jan. Mitsui Bussan Kaisha to Central Govem- 

1918 ment on Bureau of Engraving & Printing 2,000,000 
For three years S'^", issue price 98. Agree- 
ment provides that all material shall be 
bought from M. B. K., if prices are not 
higher than competitors'. 

32. Jan. Supplement loan for Kirin-Changchun Rail- 

1918 way 630,000 

33. Jan. Mitsui Bussan Kaisha to Tsao Kxm, Tuchun 
1918 of Chihli, for military purposes, secured by 

Chinese shares in Lanchow Coal . Company, 
which forms part of Kailan Mining Ad- 
ministration 1,000,000 

34. Jan. 6, Yokohama Specie Bank second advance on 
1918 second reorganization loan, repayable out 

of reorganization loan, if made, otherwise a 
one year Japanese loan. Int. 7'^". Secured 
by surplus salt revenues 10,000,000 

35. Jan. Japanese sjmdicate, for use of Hunan Pro- 
1918 vincial Government. Said to be secured by 

right to cooperation in working iron mines 
at Taipingshan, Anhui, and antimony mines 
at Shuikoushan, Hunan, for 5 years at T^", 
issue price 94 (see loan of May 1, 1915, 
No. 18) 2,500,000 

36. Jan. Loan to province of Fukien, for general pur- 

1918 poses 1,000,000 

Secured by sundry taxes. (Unconfirmed, but 
from good authority). 

37. Jan. Mitsui Bussan Kaisha to Chihli province for 
1918 purchase of cotton yarns for Chihli spin- 
ners, repayment guaranteed by Ministry of 

Finance 1,000,000 

38. Jan. 20, Tai-hei Kumei syndicate to Central Gov- 
1918 emment for purchase of arms — interest 7^", 

issue price 95, additional commission of 5^" 

for unspecified purpose 14,000,000 

39. Jan. 20, Second Loan to Bank of Communications 20,000,000 
1918 Three years at 71/2%, secured by $25,000,000 

in Treasury bonds, money advanced by 
Bank of Chosen, Bank of Taiwan, Indus- 
trial Bank of Japan. 



THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 191 

No. Yen 

40. 1918 Chosen Group of Banks to Telegraph Admin- 

istration, for extension of land lines, in- 
terest iy2^% discount 1^/^"^", secured by all 
telegraph property not previously pledged 20,000,000 

41. 1918 Wireless loan, amount not known but prob- 

ably Yen 3,000,000 for construction of 
wireless stations, materials to be purchased 
from Mitsui Bussan Kaisha 3,000,000 

42. June To Ministry of Communications, for continu- 
1918 ance of Kirin-Changchun line to Korean 

border 20,000,000 

For 40 years at 5%. 

43. June Bank of Chosen to Fengtien Province for 
1918 Redemption of small coin notes, one half to 

be repaid in two years, one half in three, 
Int. 6^/2^°, issue price 95, secured by stock 
in Penhsihsu collieries owned by Fengtien 
Province 3,000,000 

44. 1918 Yokohama Specie Bank to Province of Hu- 

peh, Security provincial revenues. (Un- 
confirmed, but from official sources.) 1,000,000 

45. 1918 Okura Group to Province of Shensi 1,000,000 

Secured by Provincial revenues. (Uncon- 
firmed, but from official sources.) 

46. 1918 Okura Group to Central Government for mili- 

tary advance against Canton. Security, 
mines of Canton province 2,000,000 

(Unconfirmed, but reported from well-in- 
formed source.) 

47. July 3, Industrial Bank of Japan and Chosen 

1918 Group of Banks 30,000,000 

Security, all forests of Kirin and Heilung- 
kiang; interest 7%^"; 5 years 

48. July 5, Second Reorganization Loan, Third Ad- 

1918 vance. Terms as in Nos. 26 and 34 10,000,000 

49. 1918 To Yunnan Government. Security — Govern- 

ment revenues from Ko Chiu Tin Mines 3,000,000 

50. 1918 The Industrial Bank of Japan to the Ministry 

of War. Terms not stated. Security, 

treasury notes. Interest 6% " 4,000,000 

51. 1918 Industrial Bank of Japan to the Central Gov- 



192 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

No. Yen 

emment. Terms not stated. Security, 
wine and tobacco taxes. Interest 7^° 2,000,000 

52. 1918 To Central Government, advance loan for the 

construction of four railways in Manchuria, 
total cost estimated at Yen 150,000,000. 
Terms not stated 20,000,000 

53. 1918 To the Central Government, advance loan for 

the construction of the Tsinan-fu and Ka- 
omi railways. Total cost estimated at Yen 
70,000,000. Terms not stated 20,000,000 

54. 1918 To Central Government. Loan for admin- 

istrative purposes and to reconstruct the 
iron industries of China. Security, mon- 
opoly of iron and other mines in Yangtze 
provinces. Terms not stated 100,000,000 

55. 1918 To the Ministry of War. Loan for military 

purposes. Security said to be Chinese 
Government arsenals and docks 47,000,000 



Total: Yen 441,100,000 
Pre-War, including Han Yeh Peh 49,670,000 

Since August, 1914 391,430,000 

Only a complete investigation by an international financial 
commission will establish the number and character of Japa- 
nese loans made in China during the years 1917 and 1918, and 
it may never be possible to establish positively the amount of 
payments made on the loans negotiated or how the money 
was disposed of. 

The reasons why the other powers in the Allied group stood 
aside and tolerated Japan' financial escapades in China during 
this time were twofold. One reason was because of the gen- 
eral war situation, which made it inexpedient to irritate 
Japan. That reason probably accounts for the failure of the 
western Allied powers to protest strongly and officially at 
Japan's course. But why did not those of the Allies (Amer- 
ica and Great Britain) who were financially able to advance 
funds to China take that method of preventing what was 
happening? I can give no conclusive answer to this question. 



THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 193 

It may be that Great Britain could not act because of private 
agreements with Japan. The United States had no private 
agreements, — at least, one presumes that — yet it took no 
steps to aid China financially, although repeatedly requested 
and urged to do so. Failure of America and Great Britain 
to act, perhaps, was due only to lack of a definite policy. The 
truth seems to be that America and Great Britain were try- 
ing to play the game in China legitimately. Owing to 
China's internal division, there was a probability that funds 
advanced to the Government would be used to suppress the 
southern faction by force, and be frittered away uselessly. 
(This is what was done with proceeeds from most of the 
Japanese loans. ) The powers therefore may have agreed not 
to make financial advances to China unless assured exactly 
how the money would be spent. In short, a ' ' starve-the-civil- 
war-out" policy was followed. Officially, the Japanese Gov- 
ernment agreed to act with the other powers; and this ex- 
plains why, during the period of the Nishihara operations, 
the Japanese legation at Peking always professed ignorance 
of and disassociation from his schemes. By the time the 
Japanese duplicity was fully revealed, the war had taken a 
decisive turn favorable to the Allies. The Nishihara opera- 
tions then were blamed by the Japanese press on the Terauchi 
Government, and a new ministry was formed at Tokio which 
disclaimed responsibility for what had been done. 

After the Hara ministry had taken office, the Japanese 
Government outwardly reversed its loan policy in China and 
Siberia, and through the Foreign Office it issued two state- 
ments, as follows (The "Japan Advertiser," December, 
1918) : 

"Mischievous reports of Japanese activities in China, more par- 
ticularly with regard to the granting of loans, have for some time 
past been in circulation and have imputed to the Japanese Govern- 
ment intentions which are entirely foreign to them. For obvious 
reasons, the Japanese" Government cannot undertake to discourage 



194 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

financial and economic enterprises of their nationals in Cbina, so 
long as those enterprises are the natural and legitimate outgrowth of 
special relations between the two neighbouring and friendly nations. 
Nor is the Japanese Government at all receding from its readiness to 
render needed financial assistance to China, consistently with the 
terms of all the declarations and engagements to which it is a party, 
should the general security and welfare of China call for such assist- 
ance. 

"At the same time, it fully realizes that loans supplied to China, 
under the existing conditions of domestic strife in that country, are 
liable to create misunderstandings on the part of either of the con- 
tending factions, and to interfere with the re-establishment of peace 
and unity in China, so essential to her own interests as well as to the 
interests of foreign powers. 

"Accordingly, the Japanese Government has decided to withhold 
such financial assistance to China, as is likely, in its opinion, to add 
to the complications of her internal situation, believing that this 
policy will be cordially participated in by all the powers interested in 
China." 

The second statement was issued in Japanese only, of which the 
following is a translation : 

"In view of the fact that the investment of Japanese capital in 
China and Siberia affect to a great extent the diplomatic and finan- 
cial policy of the state, the Japanese Government has determined to 
establish definite principles regarding the investment of Japanese 
capital in those regions which are to be strictly enforced here- 
after : 

"1. Whenever any Japanese capitalist opens negotiations with a 
government, central or local, in China or Siberia, regarding loans 
which are to be utilized for political purposes, he is requested to 
consult with the Foreign Office, Japanese Embassies or Legations, 
or with the Japanese Consulates. When consulted, the Foreign 
Office will at once refer the matter to the Department of Finance or 
other governmental offices concerned and will give necessary instruc- 
tions to the capitalist concerned. 

"2. If any capitalist opens negotiations without awaiting govern- 
mental instructions or acts against them, the Japanese Government 
may refrain from giving any necessary protection for the capital 
thus invested. 

"3. In accordance with the nature of the loans, the Foreign Office 
may arrange for the convenience of the capitalists to the effect that 
they will be able to consult directly with the Department of Finance 
or any other offices concerned." 



THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 195 

Foreign opinion of the Japanese loan policy in China is 
very well expressed in an editorial of the ' ' Japan Chronicle, 
on August 8, 1918 : 

The political situation in China grows more and more eomph- 
eated and the economic situation less and less secure, so that foreign 
observers who were wont to hold rather optimistic opinions as to 
the future are now inclined to abandon them and regard China — 
or rather those who have the nominal control of the country — as 
engaged in a national rake's progress, the end of which will be the 
bankruptcy and dissolution of the rake and the handing over of 
his property to others. Is this consummation to be wished? Ap- 
parently there is some difference of view on this point, for while 
there are some who desire that China should pull herself up and try 
to establish some sort of order in her economics and finances, 
there are others who seem to be doing their best to accelerate 
China's pace along the road to ruin. China may be said to be 
running a race with the war to see which can finish first. If the 
war were to end to-morrow there might be some chance of saving 
China; if the war continues for a period to be reckoned in years, 
then China seems to be doomed. At the peace conference she will 
appear with a few draggled plumes representing all that is left of 
her former fine feathers, and the victorious powers will shrug their 
shoulders and protest that if China cannot rule her own country 
and people there is nothing to be done. China may be quite certain 
that another war is not going to be fought on her behalf and that 
those who have acquired part or all of her property have only to 
sit tight and smile blandly to secure themselves in their own. The 
war may be one that is being fought in preservation of the right 
of national self-determination, but the weak nation planted by the 
side of the strong one will be in much the same position after as 
before the war. Germany's blundering policy has shown which 
is the "ftTong road to follow, but there are others less antagonistic 
and equally effectual. Before the weak nation can be at rest in 
spite of a strong neighbour a change of heart must obtain, and war 
hardly seems the best way to bring this about. A peace by exhaus- 
tion is another matter altogether. 

Japan has plunged deeply into Chinese economics since the war 
started and the pace is now growing fast and furious. Loan fol- 
lows loan with almost indecent haste and provided suflicient security 
is forthcoming almost any sort of guarantee seems to be accepted. 
Local loans, national loans, private loans — all seems fish that comes 
into the net of the Japanese capitalist. The fortunes of the mor- 



196 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

row do not trouble him. Probably he bases his optimism on the 
belief that even if all law and order were dissolved in China, if 
government were overthrown and his guarantees so much waste 
paper, still the strong arm of his country would uphold him. It 
would not be the first time that warships had been used to collect 
foreign loans, and if the hard cash and interest were not forth- 
coming, the security would always remain to fall back upon. It 
might even be better to have the security than the amount of the 
original loan itself. Japan is not altogether to be blamed if she 
regards the present opportunity to invest money in China as the 
chance of her life. After all, she did not invent this process of 
peaceful penetration. She has had many opportunities of watching 
it at work all over the world, and for years she fretted at her own 
poverty when she saw other nations placing their savings in China's 
lap. She even made endeavours to take part in the game by herself 
appearing as a borrower in order to be one of China's creditors. 
Now that the war has changed her condition, her eagerness to be- 
come a bona- fide creditor of China has been given full play — per- 
haps too much play, for it cannot be denied that her policy shows 
a certain amount of roughness about the edges, — a want of savoir 
faire which has jarred upon her friends and set their teeth on edge, 
so that they too have felt caUed upon to utter sharp remarks. After 
all, these things require to be done with a certain amount of polite- 
ness. To snatch a man's purse in the street is mere vulgar robbers^ 
The contents may be caused to change hands without a cry of 
"stop thief" being raised. 

It is on these grounds that even moderate British papers in China 
have lately seen fit to criticise Japan's policy, even in face of the 
fact that Japan is one of the Allies in the great war, the winning 
of which is of primary importance if we are not all to be plunged 
into an era of barbarism. Such criticism is really most serious, 
the more especially as no man can tell when the war will finish, — 
when Germany will undergo that disintegration which now seems 
the most probable end to the war. Such disintegration will come 
suddenly when it does come, and if it finds Japan still engaged in 
financing China by methods which the best authorities regard as not 
in the interests of that country, the criticism may be turned into 
action. A financial polity based upon the somewhat sinister per- 
sonality of Mr. Nishihara hardly seems one that the powers can 
support as in the best interests of China. 

The Japanese loan policy was not confined to the Chinese 
Government (Peking) recognized by the Allied nations, and 



THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 197 

the territories and officials under its authority. It was active 
in a minor way also in the southern provinces that were in 
revolt against the Peking Government, and loans were made 
not to the so-called Southern Government at Canton, but to 
some Tuchuns and lesser local officials in the Southern prov- 
inces. Of course this process amounted to aiding and fo- 
menting rebellion against the recognized Government of 
China, which was an ally of Japan in the war. It is expected, 
when the differences between the Northern and Southern Chi- 
nese political factions are compromised, if this happens, that 
many Japanese loans and concessions given during the civil 
disorder will be disclosed, as was the case after the revolution 
of 1911 and the rebellion of 1913. 

While the corruption policy by means of loans and bribery 
was being used to extend Japanese influence and control over 
all of China's territory that was not included in Japan's 
spheres of occupation, Japan was proceeding with a high hand 
in those spheres. Manchuria provides probably the most 
complete example of this process of administrative penetra- 
tion, but in some respects Shantung Province gives even a 
better illustration of what Japan 's peaceful penetration and 
her ''enlightened administration" of non- Japanese regions 
means. Shantung provides almost a complete exposition of 
the Japanese system as it works in Korea, Formosa, and 
China, although in Formosa and Korea there are no interna- 
tional complications to restrain the system. 

For the first three years of her occupation of Shantung 
Province Japan moved with a certain caution, but by the 
autumn of 1917 it evidently was felt at Tokio that it was 
safe to extend the measures for putting Japan in complete 
control there. 

Japanese occupation and gradual usurpation of admin- 
istrative functions had been excused on the ground of mil- 
itary necessity and that they were temporary. Now Japan 
began to substitute Japanese civil administration for military 
occupation. The process is very well described in a memorial 



198 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

of the Shantung People's Association, published November 
9,1917: 

1. After the occupation of the German leased territory of Tsing- 
tau by the Japanese in the winter of 1914, they at once established 
the so-called railway zone along the Tsinan-Kiaochou line which 
was not in existence during the last seventeen years when the 
Germans were in Shantung. On account of the establishment of 
this zone with or without the concurrence of the Peking govern- 
ment, Japanese subjects have seized all mining areas, in addition 
to those already granted to the Germans, by the so-called Sino- 
Japanese cooperation. When once any Chinese comes into an agree- 
ment with the Japanese, he cannot free himself because there is 
usually the clause that "in future loans or other requirements in 
which foreign assistance is needed, that Chinese must first approach 
the Japanese" — that is to say, the Japanese enjoy preferential 
rights anywhere and everywhere they go, either in their dealings 
with the Chinese government or people. The Hanyehping Corpora- 
tion and the Bank of Communications were lost to China on account 
of this clause. 

2. After their occupation of Tsingtau, the Japanese then seized 
the Tsinan-Kiaochou railway and then pushed their influence to 
the capital of Shantung. In the districts along the Tsinan-Kiao- 
chou line, the Japanese selected wealthy natives to act as elders 
for them in every village and these men are held responsible for 
any loss of rails or sleepers. The Japanese usually take away the 
headmen as a penalty without the knowledge of the local Chinese 
officials simply because they say that there are rails or sleepers 
missing in certain villages, and all protests or requests from the 
Chinese civil Governor at Tsinan or district magistrates are ignored 
by the arrogant and haughty Japanese. After a trial at Tsingtau 
by the Japanese Court, the headmen are usually fined many times 
the worth of the rails, etc, said to have been lost or stolen by the 
natives. 

3. Now after three years of their occupation of Tsingtau, the 
Japanese have established civil offices at Tsinan, Fangtzu and 
Changfang, along the Tsinan-Kiaochou line, under the excuse that 
they are only intended for the control of Japanese in Chinese ter- 
ritory, despite the fact that there are Japanese Consulates which 
enjoy the right of extraterritoriality. If the Chinese Government 
will allow this to pass unnoticed without protest, the crafty Japanese 
will surely extend this system finally to all parts of China. The so- 
called Lansing-Ishii agreement will not bind the Japanese and will 



THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 199 

merely encourage them to utilize the words "special interests" to 
encroach upon Chinese sovereign rights, as it is exceedingly hard 
to give a proper explanation to the words "special interests." 

4. In reply to the petition of the Shantung People's Association 
General Chang Huai-tze, Tuchun and civil governor of Shantung, 
says that Baron Hayashi, Japanese minister to China, does not re- 
gard the establishment of this sort of civil office in Chinese territory 
as necessary or lawful, while the Chinese minister at Tokio, Mr. 
Chang Chung-hsiang, has reported to the Wai Chiao-pu that he 
has been informed by a delegate from the Japanese Foreign Office 
that the matter is under the careful consideration of the Japanese 
Government and that it is not true that the Japanese Government 
has refused to withdraw same. As Japanese official statements are 
generally unreliable, it is our duty as representatives of the thirty 
millions of the Shantung people to stay in the Capital and wait for 
a definite result. 

Getting no satisfaction from the Peking Government in 
response to their memorials, the inhabitants of Shantung 
started a popular agitation against the recognition of the 
Japanese civil administrations in the province. On Novem- 
ber 22, 1917, Wang Chao-chuan, a member of the Shan- 
tung Provincial Assembly, delivered an address before the 
Shantung guild at Peking, in which he said: 

I desire to give you a short report of what I have seen and 
experienced in my native land. Since the taking over of the Tsinan- 
Kiaochou railway from the Germans by Japan, the activities of 
the Japanese have been strongly felt by us. The Japanese now 
desire to make our province their colony, and the means employed 
by them to achieve their ends are far from being honest. Besides 
taking over all mines oj^erated by the Germans, they have now 
started the operation of mines in more than ten other places where 
no sanction has been obtained from the Chinese government. They 
engage Chinese to apply for license to work on the mines, and when 
any investigation is instituted by local officials they would produce 
counterfeit deeds and contracts to prove that the property had been 
transferred to them by some Chinese whose whereabouts could not 
be found. 

Now they have gone a step further, and are usurping our civil 
rights. In the villages within the railway zone, the Japanese have 
made elders responsible for the protection of certain sections of 



200 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

the road; and sometimes the Japanese railway policemen come to 
these villages to make investigations. When they find coal or iron 
in any house, they arrest the owner and inflict large fines on the 
ground that he has offered refuge to bad characters and "tufei." 
The district magistrates are helpless in the face of such outrages. 
We cannot help shedding tears as we witness the oppression of 
poor and innocent inhabitants along the railway zone. With the 
introduction of Japanese Civil Offices into these places, the condi- 
tion of the people will become even more deplorable. 

On November 30, 1917, a people's conference v^as held at 
Tsinan-fu, the capital of Shantung Province, and delegates 
were appointed to proceed to Peking and protest to the 
Government. Wang No and Wang Chia-su accepted the office, 
and on their arrival at Peking they presented a petition, in 
part as f ollov^rs : 

Some time ago the Japanese authorities established in Tsingtau 
the Office of Civil Administration, and now they have established 
branches of this office in Fangtzu, Tsinan and other places. When 
the Provincial Assembly, Educational Association and other local 
authorities telegraphed to the central government requesting that 
protests be lodged with the Japanese Legation at Peking, we de- 
cided to await the result; but we have now reached the limit of our 
patience and endurance, and if no measures be immediately taken to 
prevent such gross violation of our sovereign rights, the final de- 
struction or dismemberment of the country will soon take place. 

In May, 1915, when a Sino-Japanese Treaty was signed in connec- 
tion with the affairs of Shantung (21 demands and supplementary), 
it was provided that China should in future acknowledge the transfer 
of privileges and concessions in Shantung which might be made by 
Germany to Japan. Thus Japan can only enjoy the concessions 
after the war when they are arranged between them (Japan and 
Germany). Besides enjoying all privileges and concessions formerly 
granted to Germany by China, Japan has now attempted to usurp 
our civil rights by establishing civil offices in our territory. 

In Article 4 of Chapter 2 of the Lease of Kiaoehou-wan, it is 
provided that German merchants are allowed to work or to co- 
operate with Chinese merchants in working coal mines which are 
situated within a distance of 30 li from the railway zone. During 
the period of German occupation, no attempt whatever was made 
to interfere with the civil administration of this country even within 
the districts marked as "railway zone." But the Japanese have 



THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 201 

now established civil administration offices in Tsinan and Fang- 
tzu, despite our protests. 

The German authorities at Tsingtau have hitherto done their best 
to respect our civil rights, and they did not interfere with our 
police administration. They recalled the troops at Kaomi and 
Kiaochou, who were sent there to protect the railway, and allowed 
us to exercise police authority in the railway zone. But the Jap- 
anese have refused to recall their gendarmes under the pretext 
that their country is still in a state of war with Germany. They 
have consuls in our country, and indeed there is not the least neces- 
sity for them to establish civil offices to interfere with our admin- 
istration. 

It is evident that by their aggressive actions the Japanese are 
only enforcing their policy as implied in the new Japanese-Amer- 
ican Alliance [Lansing-Ishii agreement]. 

Other foreign governments were not oblivious to what was 
happening in Shantung, and Japan's moves were closely ob- 
served. I quote from a report of an official of the American 
Government who investigated conditions in Shantung, dated 
November 30, 1917 : 

... I have the honor to report that this action has aroused 
great opposition on the part of the Chinese in the province of 
Shantung and elsewhere. I learn that the Chinese Government in 
October presented a formal protest against not only the Civil 
Administration itself, but also against the stationing of troops 
and the extension of Japanese administrative functions outside the 
leased territory. The Chinese plainly fear that the comparatively 
trivial military operations against the Germans are to make the 
basis of Japanese permanent domination of Shantung, and they 
are bitterly opposing every manifestation of what they feel are 
hostile and sinister usurpations of their fundamental rights. 

The Japanese, on the other hand, starting with the assumption 
that the Shantung Railway, as well as the leased territory, are 
conquered areas, assert that it is both their right and their duty 
to provide for the peace and prosperity of this region, and that 
the new Department of Civil Administration and its branches out- 
side the leased territory have been created with only that laudable 
object in view. 

The report cited in detail various matters in connection 
with the Chinese agitation against the extension of Japanese 



202 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

administration, and quoted from numerous Chinese memorials 
and protests. The report also cited the Japanese moves to 
counteract this Chinese popular indignation. One method 
was for the Japanese press in Japan, China and America to 
accuse German propaganda of having instigated the agitation 
among the Chinese. Of that the report remarks that ''there 
is no tangible evidence that German propaganda or influence 
played any serious part in the matter. On the other hand, 
the Japanese and Germans seem very friendly." Efforts 
v^ere made to placate Chinese opinion by "pretending to 
withdraw somewhat." The Japanese consul-general made a 
special trip to the tomb of Confucius and laid wreaths on it. 
The Japanese military governor of Tsingtau made a trip 
along the railway and to Tsinan-fu, accompanied by Dr. M. 
Akiyama, the Japanese civil administrator who had been ap- 
pointed. The latter was very coolly received by the Chinese. 
At an after-dinner speech, on November 15, the Japanese 
commanding general (governor) said, as quoted in the 
"Shantung Jih Pao," that the Chinese should not permit 
themselves any suspicion about the establishment of civil 
administration, as it was an established international cus- 
tom to create such forms of government in conquered and 
colonized areas. The newspaper stated that these remarks 
displeased the Chinese guests so much that they remained 
silent, and soon afterward left the dinner. 

In trying to placate the Chinese population, — foreign ag- 
gressors in China always have the weapon of commercial boy- 
cott to fear — the Japanese officials indirectly made use here 
again of the "white peril" argument. This report says: 

"In connection with this visit of General Hongo, a Japanese 
press organ (Seitou Shimpo, Tsingtau) stated that a Chinese mili- 
tary officer, in toasting the Japanese general at a dinner, remarked 
that it was necessary for Japan and China to combine to resist the 
advance of the white races in the East after the war. In replying, 
General Hongo tactfully avoided the comparison, and said that the 
establishment of civil administration was a step toward closer rela- 
tions between Japan and China," 



THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 203 

The railway and harbor administration at Tsingtau were 
placed under the Japanese civil administration, thus indicat- 
ing a purpose to make Japanese occupation permanent. The 
report makes an analysis of Chinese opposition to extension 
of Japanese administration. It gives the number of Japa- 
nese in Shantung (official census) at more than 20,000, of 
whom about 6,000 are outside the leased territory and the 
railway zone. (Chinese assert that there are more than 15,000 
Japanese in Shantung outside of Tsingtau and exclusive of 
the troops and gendarmes.) The report quotes parts of an 
article by Professor J. Shiga, a Japanese, published on March 
1, 1917, in the "Santo Koron," the principal Japanese or^an 
printed at Tsinan-f u, as follows : 

I ascribed [in a previous article] the strength of Germany to 
(1) a high degree of Imperiahsm (from which their stamina and 
momentum come), (2) scientific brains (which bring about a sys- 
tematic development of the country), (3) body to overcome the odds 
of environment (requisite to thrive in work abroad). 

For your information the following parallel facts are cited: 

Germany Japan 

Area: 87,500 square miles. Japan proper: 75,000 sq. m. 

Population: 67,000,000. Korea: 35,000 sq. m. 

Ratio of increase: 1.5. Population: 67,000,000. 

Ratio of increase: 1.5. 

Past and present : Past and present : 

German people 2000 years Japan 2600 years old, changed 

old, united 50 years ago by the herself 50 years ago by the vir- 

wise policy of the old Emperor, tue of the late Emperor. 

She fought thrice with foreign Fought with foreign countries 

countries and won thrice to the thrice and won thrice to the 

glory of the nation. glory of the nation. 

Future : Future : 

India, Australia, Canada and If one possesses even the 

South Africa all belong to crust of bread of the world, well 

Great Britain, which ^elps her- and good. Far from crust, our 



204 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

self to the main portion of the new gains in the war are a dust 

bread of the world. of dust (Marianne, Caroline and 

Germany's portion is nothing Marshall islands are what we 

but its crust or its dust. How picked up). How should Japan 

should Germany provide for her- provide for herself in the f u- 

self in the future? — (Words of ture? 
Treitschke, the cause of the 
present war.) 

Such briefly is the condition in which we are. We Japanese 
should bear in mind the fact that we must not lose an inch of what 
we have acquired on the continent. We never can tell how the polit- 
ical clouds of Europe may shift even for the next moment. Re- 
member, Tsingtau is the landing place to the continent, which we 
have newly acquired with sacrifice. All the Japanese in Shantung, 
particularly at this juncture, should rouse themselves once, nay, one 
hundred times, to brace up our authorities and watch over the 
steps they take. 

With Japanese organs and Japanese leaders publishing such 
views in the capital of a Chinese province, there is little to 
wonder at that Chinese were uneasy. The report considers 
the technical status of Japan's position in Shantung. Chi- 
nese had raised the question of the leased territory, of which 
the report says : ' ' Without going into the dispute regarding 
China's declaration and attempt at abolition of the 'War 
Zone,' the above considerations [terms of the original Kiao- 
chou convention] would seem to support the contention that 
only Kiaochou leased territory and the 50 kilos zone may 
rightfully be regarded as 'occupied territory,' Japanese con- 
tentions with regard to the railway notwithstanding." In 
regard to the establishment of Japanese civil administration 
outside the leased territory, the report says: 

The establishment of Civil Administration outside of the Leased 
Territory is therefore quite a different question. The establishment 
of such offices at Fangtze and Tsinanfu was undoubtedly the inten- 
tion of the Japanese Government. Simultaneously with the publi- 
cation of the Imperial Ordinance and the local Military Ordinance 
referred to in the first paragraph of this report, Military Notifica- 
tion No. 93, of October 1, 1917, was issued by the commanding gen- 



THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 205 

eral in Tsingtau. This notification gave the jurisdictional areas of 
the local Administrations at Tsingtau Litsum (10 miles from Tsing- 
tau, within the Leased Territory). Military Ordinance No. 21 also 
made its appearance, promulgating the scheme of organization of 
the local administration. (Copies herewith.) The location of the 
first railway local administration office at Fangtze was probably 
determined by the presence there of the new barracks already re- 
ferred to. 

During the course of the Chinese opposition to the Civil Admin- 
istration this office was informally informed by an official of the 
Administration that the necessity for the offices outside the Leased 
Territory arose from the presence along the railway of great num- 
bers of Japanese residents. The annexed census shows that almost 
6000 Japanese reside in the designated area. But even granting 
these facts, it is logical to inquire by what right they are there? 
When foreign right of residence in the interior of China is so care- 
fully circumscribed by treaty, to the Chinese it must appear that 
Japan is proceeding on the assumption that the rights of residence 
granted to Japanese subjects in South Manchuria by Article 3 of 
the treaty of May 25, 1915, have been extended to Shantung, an 
assumption that is, so far as this office is informed, contrary to 
fact. But even granting, again, that this great body of Japanese 
are residing in the interior in conformity with treaty stipulations, 
they are nevertheless amenable to their consular authorities, and the 
creation of other Japanese governmental agencies would appear to be 
clearly ultra vires. 

Before it was announced that Japan would establish civil 
administrations in Shantung outside of the former German 
leased territory, the Japanese military government at Tsing- 
tau had taken steps to establish an extensive Japanese-owned 
land area there by the forcible purchase of lands from Chinese 
owners. The area and the manner of acquiring it are de- 
scribed in an official report of the agent of a foreign govern- 
ment, dated May, 1918, as follows : 

This land includes the shore of Kiaochou Bay, extending from 
the Great Harbor northward along the railway for several miles, 
'and from the Bay right across the peninsula on which Tsingtau is 
situated. Not only will every possible land approach to Tsingtau 
in the future, therefore, be Japanese-owned property, but every 
yestige of waterfront "anywhere near the railway will be theirs £is 



206 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

well. The area affected is roughly twelve square miles in area, and 
this Consulate has no doubt but that it will ultimately be extended 
to Litsun, eight miles from Tsingtau, in order to include the source 
of the city's water supply. 



It is the opinion of this Office, respectfully offered, that the Jap- 
anese army of occupation is far over-stepping the privileges allowed 
such organizations by the rules of war, and is arrogating to itself 
the civil rights secured to the former German lessees through con- 
ventional agreement. 

Chinese owners of this land were not allowed the option of 
selling or retaining their property, but were compelled to sell 
by pressure of the Japanese military authorities acting under 
martial law. Yet Dr. M. Akiyama, the newly appointed Japa- 
nese civil administrator in Shantung, in a speech made at 
Tsingtau on October 11, 1917, said: "Twenty years ago Ger- 
many treacherously occupied Tsingtau, and not only estab- 
lished a far Eastern naval base here, but also made it a com- 
mercial center vis-a-vis China." Thus an official of the Japa- 
nese Government denounced the method by which Germany 
acquired the leasehold of Kiaochou, yet Japan rests her claim 
to a position there on the validity of Germany's status. The 
statement was made in an address explaining Japan's (official) 
position in Shantung, and was read from a manuscript. Dr. 
Akiyama is supposed to be an authority on international law. 

In a petition presented to the cabinet at Peking on January 
4, 1918, by representatives of the Shantung Provincial As- 
sembly, this paragraph occurs : 

1. Not only within the once German leased territory of Tsingtau, 
but also at Poshan and some other districts, the Japanese have seized 
all mining properties by peaceful or forceful means. Japanese 
outlaws went so far as to tie up the hands and feet of those owners 
of mining hills who refused to sell their properties and beat them 
fiercely. In one case, oil was poured on the man's clothes in order 
to frighten him to accept the demands of the Japanese, and sign a 
lease to his property. Thus after the solution of the question con- 
cerning the illegal establishment of Japanese sub-civil administra- 



THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 207 

tions in Shantung, the mining question will be the most difficult 
one for the government to settle with Japan. 

In the autumn of 1918 a survey of results of the Japanese 
activities in Tsinan-fu, the capital of Shantung, was made 
by an American educator (Upton Close), who summarized 
what he learned in an article published in "Millard's Review" 
of January 18, 1919. I will include here portions of that 
article : 

Japanese political influence in Tsinan and Shantung has its hub 
in the Provincial Waiehiaopu, and its Foreign Commissioner, Tang 
Ko-san. This man, schooled in Japan, married to a Japanese wife, 
and indebted for his entire political career to Japanese influence and 
aid, has been reduced to a condition of absolute subservience and 
helpless vassalage to his patrons. His administration is inefficient, 
pusillanimous, and accused of nepotism by his fellow officials, espe- 
cially on the score of his giving too many positions to his relatives — 
the cardinal sin of Chinese officialdom. It is evident that he could 
not retain his position a day without his powerful Japanese backing. 

With these men in their control, Japanese have a strangle hold 
on the political life of the Shantung capital. It is now publicly 
announced that Commissioner Tang is an aspirant for the governor- 
ship of the province, and Japanese interests, including their local 
daily vernacular paper, are supporting him with might and main. 
Twice Chinese merchants have endeavored to combine for a boycott 
of Japanese goods; once, upon the oecasio-a of the establishment of 
the Japanese Civil Government Department their meeting was broken 
up and the Chamber of Commerce sealed by order of General Ma; 
once, in September, 1916, their plans were brought abruptly to an 
end by the despatch of a letter by courier direct to the president 
of the Chamber of Commerce while sitting in discussion of the 
question, from the Japanese Consulate, giving that body, as I am 
informed, fifteen minutes to change the subject, under threat of 
forcible dispersion. 

Let us turn to the actual Japanese occupation of and enterprise 
in the city, which, however, as we shall see further, can hardly be 
called commercial. I was going to use the word "penetration" rather 
than "occupation," but it is too much an accomplished fact for that 
expression. The first three years of the war, the Japanese popula. 
tion segregated itself near the railway station under their administra- 



208 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

tion, and in residences and buildings taken away from the Germans. 
The past year, however, their policy has been to decentralize over 
the entire settlement, and even into the principal sections of the old 
walled city. It is evident that when they get ready to map out 
their "settlement" here, as in Tsingtao, they will rebuild the "whole 
thing." Besides the large number of Chinese firms financed by Jap- 
anese money, there are, situated on every length-wise and cross street 
of the settlement and in three principal sections of the city under the 
direct operation of Japanese, 194 enterprises classified as follows: 
(This list is not guaranteed against omissions or mistakes, but was 
compiled with great care for accuracy and thoroughness.) 

SUMMARY 

Drug Shops 63 

Houses of Prostitution 22 

Notions (Miscellaneous small goods) 38 

Hotels and Inns 13 

Banks — Actual Banking Business 3 

"Banks" 3 

Hospitals 3 

"Yang Hang," etc 3 

Railroad oflices, aside from station 2 

Barracks and Gendarme Station 3 

Schools , 3 

Residences 26 

Flour Mill 

Dessicated Egg Factory 

Cinema Theater 

Postal and Telegraph Office 

Railway Station 

Wireless Station 

Railway Coal Syndicate 

Consulate 

Total, Japanese Enterprises 194 

Without Residences 168 

Percentage of total without residences: Drug 

Shops and Houses of Prostitution 50^° 

Percentage of Small, Miscellaneous Shops and 

Enterprises 32^» 

Percentage of Military, Government and Rail- 
way I'^o 

Percentage of Actual Commercial Enterprises 8'^'" 
Remaining Percentage Z'^o 



THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 209 

It should be noticed what a small percentage of the whole can be 
classed as actual commercial enterprises of any standing. 

The overwhelming percentage of Japanese enterprises in Tsinan 
are the small drug shops, miscellaneous and notion shops, and 
"touching-up stations'' — as their Japanese designation might be 
translated — the houses of prostitution. Not discussing the latter, 
which need no explanation to those familiar with Nipponese cus- 
tom, it is evident that, with the hundreds of Chinese shops selling 
Japanese patent-medicines, notions and small goods, there is no 
market in a city the size of Tsinan to support 107 Japanese shops, 
in many cases with apparently several families dependent on them, 
also handling these lines of small goods. It is charged by Chinese 
that Japanese "business" here is not commercial. A percentage 
is engaged in morphia and other lucrative traffic, as I shall show. 
But there remains nevertheless a large percentage which it is certain 
are not dealing in these illegitimate lines, which, however, are just 
as certainly not dependent on their turn-over of merchandise for 
support. One may enter these shops and ask for a common article 
in their line, and find that the shopkeeper does not know whether 
he has it in stock or not, and does not care whether he makes a 
sale or not. He does not appear in the least offended or disheart- 
ened when the prospective customer turns away without purchasing. 
In some of the drug shops the bottles are covered with dust, and 
apparently are never disturbed. Some proprietors of these shops 
are evidently of the lower class and very poor; others appear very 
comfortably situated, and many have a decided military bearing. 
The inference is that these people are an artificial population sup- 
ported or subsidized by their government to give it prestige, hold, 
and a right to participate in affairs. Or, it may be that they are 
a small army of emergency which their government finds most 
convenient to quarter in this way. The recent purchasers of the 
large number of German residences likely come in this same class, 
as there are no commercial establishments here sufficient to support 
men of the station in society who would seek such residences. 

We have now to consider the morphia trade which, although 
not confined exclusively to Japanese, is inseparable from their pene- 
tration and occupation. It may well be questioned what reasons for 
official Japan allowing its nationals to institute this traffic are suffi- 
ciently weighty to justify their running the gauntlet of the public 
opinion of the world. The writer would suggest the following 
three reasons: ^ 

1. The profit which, in the absence of real commercial enterprise, 



210 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

finances "peaceful penetration." It is a matter of public knowledge 
in Tsingtao that the profit from the drug' traffic has supplied the 
funds for the campaign of wholesale buying of everything purchas- 
able, the immense building program, and the support of the artificial 
population. 

2. The poisoning and weakening of the Chinese nation from its 
official classes down, making it an easy prey to the aggressor. 

3. The unbreakable hold gained on the official class through the 
narcotic, who become bound by a slavery stronger than steel fetters 
to their Japanese drug-providers, and can be swayed or induced 
to give up secrets. These fetters are fastened by two locks, first, 
the habit-slavery of the narcotic itself; second, the fear of the poor 
user of scandal and loss of his position and all that he has should 
he break with those pro^dding him or displease their friends or 
officials. Many concrete examples could be given. 

The writer has reliable evidence that two of the large Japanese 
commercial firms have in the past imported through Tsingtao and 
delivered shipments of arms, consisting principally of small arms, 
to individuals connected with the Chinese military. It appears that 
small shops cannot deal in this trade, as they would be more acces- 
sible to surveillance by the Chinese authorities, and could not com- 
mand the confidence of the individual for whom they were purchasing 
to the extent of inducing him to put down the cash at time of 
order, which is always demanded. The goods are ordered from and 
paid for at these companies, and later delivered direct from Tsing- 
tao in some secret way to the purchaser. 

The Chinese Police Headquarters when referred to on this sub- 
ject stated that it finds itself unable to take a census of the Jap- 
anese population, and is forced to content itself with what statistics 
are sent to it by the Japanese Consulate here, which in November, 
1917, reported 200 males and 150 females, totalling 450, and has 
made no report since. The most conservative estimate would place 
this figure as a tithe of the present Japanese population. There 
is, in addition, a continual floating population passing in and out 
of the Republic through Tsinan and Tsingtao, which reaches at 
times at least as high as two thousand. 

The above is a brief, but comprehensive, summary of the enter- 
prises wliich the acti^^ties of the Japanese officials and nationals 
have been directed to building up during their unparalleled oppor- 
tunity of the past four years. They have had absolutely a free 
hand. What they have done must he taken to represent what they 
aimed to accomplish. 



THE COREUPTION OF A NATION 211 

China's long struggle against the opium traffic and habit 
is familiar to the world. When the Great War began the 
traffic was on its last legs apparently. The Chinese Govern- 
ment and the Chinese people were in a way to accomplish 
what had seemed to be impossible, and completely to stamp 
out the cultivation, trade in, and use of the drug in the whole 
of China. All the principal powers, including Japan, were 
nominally cooperating with China in this effort, and had 
made agreements accordingly. Then the war came, disturbed 
and unsettled the administration of China, and let down all 
bars to Japanese "penetration." How Japanese, with the 
connivance and often with the actual help of the Japanese 
Government, took advantage of these circumstances to intro- 
duce and fasten another drug habit on the Chinese, constitutes 
as black an action as has been charged to any nation in recent 
times. 

Eecently the "North-China Daily News," of Shang- 
hai, the oldest and leading British organ published in China, 
threw off the restraint upon criticism of Japan which the war 
had enforced upon British publications and gave an expose 
of the Japanese morphia traffic in China. A report and an- 
alysis of this traffic revealed that for the last two years it 
has been one of the most profitable items of Japan's foreign 
trade; the profits from it in 1913 were $8,400,000, and they 
have increased enormously during the war. Extracts from 
the report of the correspondent of the "North-China Daily 
News," published in December, 1918, follow: 

It is a larger trade now than it was in 1913. Morphia, however, 
can no longer be purchased in Europe. The seat of industry' has 
been transferred to Japan and morphia is now manufactured by 
the Japanese themselves. Although Japan is a signatory to the 
Agreement which forbids the import into China of morpliia or of 
any appliances used in its manufacture or in its use, the traffic, 
inasmuch as it has the financial support of the Bank of Japan, 
is carried on with the direct approval and encouragement of the 
Japanese government. In no other country in the world has there 
ever been known sueh'a wholesale contraband traffic. Literally tens 



212 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

of millions of yen are transfeired annually from China to Japan 
for the paj'ment of Japanese morphia. 

The chief agency in the distribution of morphia in China is the 
Japanese postofifice. Morphia is imported by parcels post. No in- 
spection of parcels in the Japanese postoflices in China is permitted 
to the China Customs Service. The Service is only allowed to know 
what are the alleged contents of the postal packages as stated in 
the Japanese invoices, and yet morphia enters China by this channel 
by the ton. A conservative estimate would place the amount of 
morphia imported by the Japanese into China in the course of this 
year as high as 18 tons and there is evidence that the amount is 
steadily increasing. Wherever Japanese are predominant there the 
trade flourishes. Through Tairen morphia circulates throughout 
Manchuria and the provinces adjoining; through Tsingtao morphia 
is showered over Shantung province, Anhui and Kiangsu; while 
from Formosa, so favored by geographical propinquity, morphia 
is carried along with opium and other contraband by motor-driven 
"fishing" boats to some point on the mainland, from which it is 
distributed throughout the province of Fukien and the north of 
Kwangtung. Everywhere it is sold by Japanese under exterritorial 
protection. How efficient is that protection may be gauged by the 
fact that no Japanese has ever yet been punished for dealing in 
contraband in China. When Chinese police raid the morphia shops 
along the Tsinanfu railway in Shantung, as they have a right to 
do, for the traffic is illegal, Japanese gendarmerie rescue the ar- 
rested and exact a fine, not from the guilty be it understood, but 
from those who attempted to uphold the law. In recorded instances 
known to American investigators the Chinese magistrate himself has 
been compelled to pay an indemnity. 

In South China morphia is sold also by Chinese peddlers, each of 
whom carries a passport certifying that he is a native of the island 
of Formosa and therefore entitled to Japanese protection. Japanese 
drug stores throughout China carry large stocks of morphia. Jap- 
anese medicine vendors look to morphia for their largest profits. 
Everywhere Japanese female prostitution, the systematic extension 
of which from Yunnan city even to Urga is such an inspiring evi- 
dence of the business activities of our Asiatic Allies, goes hand in 
hand with the sale of morphia. Morphia, no longer purchasable in 
Europe, is manufactured now in well-equipped laboratories in Japan 
and in Formosa. During recent years the bulk of the Persian 
opium coming into the market has been purchased by Japan for 
conversion into morphia, for Persian opium yields a larger per- 
centage of morphia than Indian opium. Opium grown in Korea, 



THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 213 

the cultivation of which it is interesting to note followed immedi- 
ately upon the closing of the opium shops in Shanghai, Japanese 
officials providing the seeds; and opium grown under Japanese pro- 
tection in Manchuria, is an ever expanding source of the supply 
of morphia, and, it may be added, of opium required by the ad- 
ministration of Formosa. One must emphasize that this opium is 
not imported into Japan. It is transhipped in Kobe harbor to 
Tsingtao, from which point of vantage, assisted by the Japanese- 
controlled railway to Tsinanfu, it is smuggled through Shantung 
into Shanghai and the Yangtze Valley. Opium purchased in Cal- 
cutta for Es. 3,500 per chest — about Tls. 1,000 — costs, delivered in 
Kobe harbor, all told, well under Tls. 1,200 per chest. This opium — 
Tsingtao opium — is sold in Shanghai at $500 a ball of 40 balls to the 
chest — a total of 20,000 per chest. China's failure to sell "for me- 
dicinal purposes" her opium at $27,000 per chest, the price asked 
by the opium ring, is thus explained. The price is undercut by the 
Japanese. 

The dimensions that the traffic has already assumed are note- 
worthy. There is reason to believe that between January 1 and 
September 30 of this year, 1918, not less than 2,000 chests of opium 
purchased in India were imported into Tsingtao via Kobe. Upon 
this amount the Japanese authorities levy a tax, which does not ap- 
pear in the estimates, equivalent to Tls. 4,000 per chest, a total for 
the 2,000 chests at the present rate of exchange of two million pounds 
sterling. The acquisition of this immense profit from a contraband 
traffic would explain the origin of those immense sums now being 
lavished upon the development of Tsingtao and the establishment 
there of Japanese commercial supremacy. 

It may be asked how it is possible that at Dairen, where the 
morphia traffic is greatest, and at Tsingtao, which is the chief center 
of the Japanese opium trade, the importation of this contraband 
continues without the knowledge of the Chinese Maritime Customs. 
But at both Dalny and Tsingtao, the Chinese Maritime Customs 
are wholly under the control of the Japanese and wholly manned 
by them.^ Japanese military domination would forbid in both ports 
any interference with a traffic in which the Japanese authorities 
were interested, either officially or unofficially. In Dalny the highest 
civic dignity has been conferred upon the chief dealer in morphia 
and opium. Moreover in the case of Tsingtao, by the agreement 
which relinquished to Japanese the exclusive charge of the Chinese 

1 The predominance of Japanese officials in the Chinese customs offices 
at Antung, Dairen (Dalny), and Tsingtau, was among the concessions 
forced from China by the "agreement" of 1915, and other agreements. 



214 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

Maritime Customs there, any trade in which the government is inter- 
ested, contraband or not, can be carried on without the official knowl- 
edge of the Customs. Article 3 of the Agreement of December 
2, 1905, perpetuated in the Agreement of August 6, 1915, provides 
that any goods landed in Tsingtao under "certificates of govern- 
ment" shall be free from Customs examination. The way has thus 
been opened, not only for the illegal import of opium, but of con- 
traband in arms, by which the bandits of Shantung province are 
provided with the means of harrying and looting and murdering 
the peaceful peasants of the most sacred province of China. The 
China Maritime Customs returns of 1917 show that 45 piculs of 
boiled opium were admitted into Tsingtao in 1917. The actual 
amount was probably 50 times greater. The balance enters in eases 
stamped "Chun pung p'in" (military stores), and boxes so stamped 
are to be seen commonly in the Japanese drug stores along the 
Shantung railway. In 1917 morphia to the amount of nearly two 
tons is recorded as having entered Dairen for use in the Leased 
Territory, but no morphia is recorded as having entered Manchuria 
from the leased territory during the year, nor does any entry of 
morphia appear in the Tsingtao Customs returns for 1917. Yet a 
competent witness, Dr. Wu Lien-teh, states that "Almost every Jap- 
anese drug dealer or peddler in Manchuria (and Shantung he might 
have added) sells morphia in one form or another, and does so with 
impunity, because no Japanese can be arrested without first infoim- 
ing the Consul." 

In an official report to the American Government made in 
September, 1918, on the subject of the demand by the Japa- 
nese administration at Tsingtau for the removal of American 
and other foreign mercantile property from certain areas, 
the question of the extensive improvements made by the Japa- 
nese at that place was discussed as follows : 

The secondary question as to where the Japanese military head- 
quarters obtains the money now being spent in large sums for the 
purchase of property, erection of schools, residences and public 
buildings, for the laying out of strsets, for harbor improvements, 
and other public works, is an interesting one, but difficult of exact 
answer. Known sources of revenue are: (1) 20^'' of the duty 
collected; (2) land taxes; (3) business and vehicle taxes ; (4) income 
from public utilities, i.e., railways, mines, electric light, water 
works, etc. A source of income, whose amount has been variously 



THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 215 

estimated at from $700,000 to several millions per annum, is the im- 
portation under Japanese government license of opium. 

Regarding- the Japanese morphia trade in Manchuria, where 
Japan controls the situation to an even greater degree than in 
Shantung, I will quote from an American official report on 
the subject, dated July, 1918 : 

I have the honor to report that, notwithstanding the stringent 
orders issued by the Japanese consular authorities at Mukden re- 
cently, forbidding their nationals to trade in illicit drugs, a con- 
siderable number of Japanese continue to dispense morphia and 
various other narcotics to Chinese who are disposed to buy. I may 
state that in order to obtain actual proof, I sent a Chinese member 
of the consular staff to brothels holding Japanese licenses and sit- 
uated in the Japanese railway area. The charge for 5 smokes is 
$1.00 small coin and the opium thus obtained is mostly provided 
through Japanese. The tolerance by the Japanese consular author- 
ities of this practice attracts more Japanese to Manchuria, and in- 
duces Chinese to settle in territory under Japanese jurisdiction and 
to contribute directly or indirectly to the Japanese. 

Since the Indian supply of opium has been cut off the votaries of 
this drug have been dependent upon the supply coming from the 
north, principally from the districts about Harbin. The drug is 
brought into Chinese territoiy via Changchun, and into Mukden 
through the South Manchurian Railway station, where the Chinese 
authorities have no power to search incoming passengers. The 
only way to purchase opium in Mukden is through middlemen, who 
conduct business in the district immediately surrounding the South 
Manchuria Railway station. Some of the dealers are Japanese and 
some are Chinese. The latter are principally from Chili province, 
a few coming from Shanghai. 

Opium arrives here in a semi-prepared condition and is known 
as red opium, and is quoted as $10 small coin (about $5.00 gold) 
per ounce. This price, of course, is subject to sudden fluctuations. 
Many people carrying on this illicit traffic have gained enormous 
profits at the expense of the ignorant classes. 

Regarding morphia and its by-produets, it is always possible for 
the lowest class of Chinese laborers to purchase an injection from 
any so-called Japanese drug store at a price from 3 to 5 copper 
cents, say from IV2 to 2^^ American cents. In this way the Jap- 
anese have accentuated, the scarcity of copper coins, and at the 



216 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

same time have ruined many of the lowest class mentally, morally 
and physically. 

From the stringent orders issued by the Japanese consular author- 
ities regarding the sale of illicit drugs by Japanese subjects, as 
cited above, it would seem that the authorities in question are not 
desirous of complying with the wishes of the Chinese authorities 
in eradicating the opium evil, but their desire is simply to hood- 
wink the world and to go through the motions of suppressing the 
evil. The fact that opiates are sold openly on Japanese premises 
which are not under Chinese jurisdiction proves conclusively that 
the Japanese authorities are not at all anxious to cooperate with 
China and Great Britain in eliminating the drug evil. Customs 
statistics regarding the importation of morphia into Manchuria 
cannot be relied upon, owing to the enormous quantities brought into 
the country illicitly from Japanese sources. 

In this connection it is interesting to quote an item from the 
"Japan Chronicle," printed in November, 1918: 

SMUGGLING TO CHINA 

OPIUM, FIREARMS, FORGED NOTES, AND GIRLS 

The police authorities of Kyoto are examining a number of men 
in Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe in connection with smuggling of opium 
and arms to China. It is stated that a man named Shibutani Yosh- 
isaburo, living at Yamato-oji, Shito, Kyoto, working in collusion 
with three other men, bought a large quantity of poppies and secretly 
manufactured opium. The drug was smuggled to China, the quan- 
tity shipped between January and April last amounting to 16 kwan, 
valued at Y12,000. The smugglers were making arrangements to 
make another 70 kwan, valued at Y50,000, when certain informa- 
tion came to the knowledge of the police and they were arrested. 

It is also alleged that Shibutani, with the help of certain dealers 
in Osaka and Kobe, smuggled some thousands of revolvers and 
rifles to the Chinese Revolutionists. Another charge laid against 
some of the men under examination is that of being implicated in the 
kidnapping of girls from Japan to China and in the forgery of 
Chinese bank-notes. It is stated that the men arrested have many 
accomplices in the South Sea Islands, Harbin, Shanghai, and 
Hongkong. 

After the exposures about the Japanese drug traffic in 
China, the Japanese Government issued a long explanation of 



THE CORRUPTION OF A NATION 217 

its position and connection with the matter, which is very 
well summed up editorially by the "Japan Chronicle," on 
January 30, 1919, as follows : 

The Japan Advertiser contains a long explanation from official 
sources of the position of Japan in regard to the opium and morphia 
trade in China, which is in the familiar style. The chief crime 
seems to be that committed by the foreign Press in China which 
made the disclosures. Incidentally it makes Japan's case all the 
worse, because it describes how perfectly adequate the Japanese ma- 
chinery is for preventing the trade, and with this statement it is 
content to leave the matter, not venturing on the question whether 
the machinery is properly worked. It is also content "specifically 
to deny" the use of the post office as a means of distribution, and 
attempts to put the whole blame on smugglers who run their own 
cargoes into ports where Japan has no control. Then comes this 
ingenuous confession: "It was learnt yesterday that the trade in 
drugs flourishes in Manchuria, where large profits are reaped. Op- 
ium there is under monopolistic control of the Kwantung Govern- 
ment-General, which deals out the drugs to the Japanese and the 
Chinese dealers in Manchuria under the jurisdiction of the Govern- 
ment-general. Certainly, as some of the foreign journals state, the 
enormous profits thus gained by the monopoly are paying for a 
large part of the expenses of the Government-generals {sic) in main- 
taining schools and other branches of its administration." Surely 
it must have been known before yesterday. But the only official 
criticism on this is, "However, it is an international question," which 
means, presumably, that nothing will be done until an international 
commission makes up its deliberate mind on the subject. The official 
apologist further says that all nationalities are involved and that the 
amount of such drugs handled by Japanese cannot be compared 
with the British share. It is demanding a very large credulity when 
we are asked to believe that there is a greater British trade which 
is passed over in complete silence in these exposures. Are we to 
believe that the foreign Press in China is anxious only to deprive 
Japan of the profits so that those of its own nationals may be the 
greater? 

One of the nefarious methods employed by the Japanese to 
keep China constantly in a state of internal turbulence, and 
to make it appear that the Chinese Government is unable to 
maintain order and protect foreign interests, is the use of 



218 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

the banditry who are one of China's hereditary institutions. 
Evidence is accumulating to prove that Japan's agents be- 
come members of the Chinese bandit bands, and that the bands 
are armed and otherwise supplied from Japanese sources. In 
the autumn of 1918 the bandits and lawless unpaid Chinese 
soldiery in Shantung Province began to stop and board the 
express-trains on the Tientsin-Pukou Railway, causing much 
annoyance to passengers. The relation between Japanese in 
Shantung and the Chinese bandits has been pretty well estab- 
lished, and Japan's reasons for giving out an impression that 
China cannot maintain order in that province are obvious. 
It is the same in other parts of China, especially in those 
regions where the Japanese predominate. I quote from an 
American official report about conditions in Manchuria, dated 
in September, 1918: 

On August 31 there was a raid of about 200 bandits on several 
towns and villages on the China side of the Yalu river. The vil- 
lages were looted and many of the houses were burned. Circum- 
stances indicate that many of the bandits were Japanese soldiers in 
disguise. Other similar cases have occurred and the matter is be- 
coming serious. 

As has repeatedly been pointed out in reporting such instances, 
the only possible method of preventing trouble of this kind -would 
be the effectual prevention of the import of arms, and this measure 
is rendered impractical by the facility with which lawless characters 
can at all times secure ample supplies of arms and ammunition from 
Japanese smugglers. Since this smuggling can easily be stopped 
by the Japanese authorities in Korea, their failure to take any 
effective steps indicates that they are not averse to the occurrence 
of disturbances along the border that may possibly give them ex- 
cuses for interference in Chinese jurisdiction. 

I quote another official report on the same subject, dated 
May 3, 1917 : 

Information received directly from two Americans, two English- 
men and one Dane— all having first-hand knowledge of the question 
— proves conclusively that the Japanese have been conniving with 



THE COERUPTION OF A NATION 219 

the bandits and actively supporting them (specific instances given) 
, . . "The first object of the Japanese is to foment trouble and 
create serious disturbances in Manchuria so as to demonstrate to the 
world China's inability to preserve order and to maintain peace 
within her own dominions. Japanese cooperation with the Chinese 
rebels no doubt had a similar purpose and their encouragement of 
the monarchist party at the present time is directly in line with this 
policy. Anything to create dissension and disorder and to weaken 
the Chinese Government will receive their assiduous attention. The 
motive is two-fold. An excuse is provided for active intervention 
and control and even occupation, while the Chinese are weakened 
and divided, and the cost of sustaining a large armed force and pre- 
paring for incursions and insurrections keeps the treasury not only 
empty but in debt. A state of indebtedness not only enables the 
Japanese to make loans to China upon valuable concessions, but 
prevents the liquidation of old obligations and makes it easy for the 
Japanese to foreclose. . . . 

The disorder throughout China caused by the lax adminis- 
tration and internal strife naturally increases the opportuni- 
ties for outlaws, and between the demands of political fac- 
tions, exactions of officials, and the depredations of brigands, 
the peaceable Chinese citizenry know not what way to turn to 
protect their lives and property. They see everywhere Japan- 
ese going about their business freely and enjoying complete 
immunity from all those difficulties. So a somewhat remark- 
able condition has come about, which is described in a report 
of a foreign official, dated November, 1918, as follows: 

The Japanese, always alert to take advantage of conditions due 
to the disordered state of the country, have now organized a new 
business in many of the provinces, especially in central and southern 
China. For a money consideration, Japanese residents will store 
Chinese property on their premises, under the protection of a Jap- 
anese flag raised over the houses. This has developed into a large 
business in the disturbed areas, and many Japanese are amassing 
small fortunes in this way. It is curious to note that these Jap- 
anese who are able by the protection given them by the Japanese 
consulates and government, and who outside of the treaty ports liave 
no legal right of residence, are nevertheless far more secure than the 
native citizens of the-eountry, and are able to sell "protection" to 



220 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

them merely by running up a Japanese flag over Chinese property. 
The local Chinese oflficials frequently have protested at the practice, 
but dare not interfere with the Japanese, who evidently have the 
backing of their consular officers. 

A rough and of necessity an incomplete computation of 
Japanese financial and trade activities in China during the 
Great War indicates that the profits of the illicit drug traffic 
and other contraband operations of Japanese there will 
nearly equal the total amount actually advanced to China in 
the same period. Among the Japanese schemes i-n this period, 
the so-called "gold brick" proposal (a plan for China to 
create a "credit" in Japan for Japanese currency notes, 
which would be circulated in China as legal tender), the so- 
called ' ' arms ' ' deal, the draining of China of copper cash, the 
Japanese evasions of the Salt duties, and others, might well be 
entitled to elucidation ; but the citations given should suffice. 

As a deliberate and persistent attempt to debauch and ruin a 
weak and friendly (part of the time an ally) nation, Japan's 
course in China has few parallels in history. 



CHAPTER IX 

CHINA AND ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 

Definition of economic imperialism — Its relation to international af- 
fairs — ^Its working method — War-causing elements of the system — Its 
application to China — Beginning of foreign trade with China — Develop- 
ment of strategical phases — The "sphere of influence" idea — Dangerous 
phases — Prevision of John Hay — The Hay Doctrine — Its outward ac- 
ceptance by the powers — Private agreements based on the "sphere" 
thesis — Recrudescence of the "sphere of influence" practice — Due to 
Japan's policy — War provided Japan's opportunity — Japan's fear of 
American influence — A flank movement — The Shibusawa plan — The "co- 
operation" idea — Its real purpose exposed — How it was contrary to 
traditional American policy — How it was invidious to China — China's 
situation — Dangers inherent with the cooperation plan. 

MODERN political scientists almost without exception 
evince a growing realization of how international 
trade and economic relationships are interlocked 
with the causes of international hostilities and war. A new 
terminology for certain phases of these combined economic and 
political relationships is coming into use. ''Economic Im- 
perialism" is now generally accepted as describing an inter- 
national relation which frequently is given first rank among 
war-making elements; with ''peaceful penetration," "spheres 
of influence," "special position," " paramountcy, " and other 
phrases invented by diplomacy as euphemisms for the schemes 
and methods by which economic imperialism is applied. Of 
the numerous volumes on this topic that have been published 
recently, the authors usually take Germany's pre-war trade 
policy as a text to demonstrate the iniquities and dangers of 
the system. I quote Professor Alvin Johnson ("The Passing 
of Economic Nationalism," in "Harper's Magazine"): 

221 



222 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

Because political and military concepts have assumed definite 
shape, have organized themselves in well-wrought systems in our 
minds, we find it natural to interpret in purely political and mili- 
tary terms the struggle in Europe. The democratic world is striv- 
ing to pull down the German autocracy, that political freedom may 
be saved to the earth. The struggle is one of the naturally pacific 
peoples against a system of military aggression. These are indeed 
interpretations that are essentially valid. But they do not include 
the whole truth. German autocracy and militarism have had their 
counterpart in an aggressive system of economic nationalism. It is 
a system by which the whole economic life of a people, more espe- 
cially its foreign trade, is subordinated to a national purpose of 
domination. The economic nationalism of Germany does not aim 
merely to create trading relations of mutual advantage with for- 
eign states. It seeks so to entrench itself in weaker states that 
these may be compelled to exclude relations with other states. It 
seeks to stifle development of industry in the weaker states, in order 
that their dependence may be permanent. Economic nationalism is, 
in short, the principle of monopoly to the plane of statecraft. 
The destruction of the system may not, indeed, be an avowed object 
to the allied policy, but it will be no less certainly doomed by the 
defeat of Germany than aggTessive militarism and intriguing 
autocracy. 

Economic nationalism of the German type, I hasten to qualify, 
has not been confined to Gennany. It has influenced commercial 
policy throughout the world, just as German military organization 
has been widely envied and copied, and as even German autocracy 
has excited exaggerated admiration and has wrought modifications 
for evil in political systems that would naturally have developed 
in a more liberal direction. But just as the autocratic and mili- 
taristic ideas have been seized upon by the consciousness of the 
people as the essential spiritual content of the world-scourge of 
Germanism, and hence are certain to be discredited everywhere, so 
the policy of economic nationalism, no less characteristic of Ger- 
manism, is bomid to encounter a rude shock when quiet is restored 
to earth and the shattered commercial relations of the nations come 
to be reconstructed. . . . 

The poverty of the weaker nations will survive the war, to be 
sure. And a poor nation will still be subject to the seductions of a 
trading organization that scours the country with engaging agents, 
studying the people's wants and having goods made up to suit any 
taste, to be paid for in nine months or twelve months — so far in 
the future to those who are poor! And if then the customer can't 



CHINA AND ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 223 

pay, the same trading organization lias a bank which will arrange 
extensions of credit, and which is also at hand to do other business. 
Perhaps there is a railway project in abeyance for want of funds; 
the bank will arrange for its promotion in the country to which 
the bank owes allegiance; it will also procure there rails and loco- 
motives, and engineers to construct the track. As good engineers 
might be had locally, and rails and equipment might be had cheaper 
in other countries. But then there would be difficulties about the 
promotion, and, besides, it would not be easy to arrange for the 
transportation of freight by the organization's ships, perhaps the 
only ones touching at the port. All manner of enterprises would 
have to be set up along the railway, and in these the organization 
would take stock. This is ''peaceful penetration," as it was ap- 
plied by Germany to Italy, Turkey, Brazil, Venezuela, and what- 
ever other countries were poor and ambitious for development. 
Such countries there still will be. Will not the same kind of oper- 
ations be resuscitated? Yes, if the industrial nations become 
again as blind or supine as they were. But this is hardly conceiv- 
able. It is now coming to be understood that the supplying of the 
legitimate capital requirements of a poor country is a common con- 
cern of the advanced nations. They will not so soon be ready to 
consign a backward country to the mercies of Germany, or any 
other single state, to barter its independence for petty loans. 

David Jayne Hill (''Economic Imperialism" in "The Cen- 
tury Magazine") states his opinion positively: "Beyond dis- 
pute it was economic imperialism that caused the present war, 
and plunged Europe into it." He compares the two op- 
posite theories of the state and nationalism as follows : 

To those who accept the absolutist theory of the state there is 
nothing reprehensible in the spirit of conquest by imperial domina- 
tion. Why should any nation holding this theory refrain from ex- 
tending its power as far as possible? It is, in truth, '^grtain that 
it will not do so; but it follows with logical necessity that as long 
as this theory is held the conflict of nations will continue. . . . 

The whole future of civilization turns upon the decision whether 
the state is to be henceforth a creation of force or a creation of 
law. If it is to be considered merely a creation of force, then 
preparation for war is the only wisdom; for only the strong state 
can survive, and it must be at all times ready to fight for its exist- 
ence. But if, on the.^ther hand, the state is rightly conceived as a 
creation of law, then all states accepting this theory are menaced 



224 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

by the existence of strong embodiments of power which refuse to be 
governed by the rules of law. As long as they exist, as long as 
they arm themselves for aggression, as long as they devise and en- 
tertain schemes of conquest, so long the truly constitutional states 
must be prepared to defend themselves, and even to defend one 
another. 

The application of the arguments quoted to the situation of 
China and to the trade of all nations with China is very 
pointed. In the sense apparently meant by Professor John- 
son and Dr. Hill, China is one of the most complete examples 
of the effects of economic imperialism and the pass to which 
it will bring a weak nation. China affords an equally good 
example of that other phase of economic imperialism — its 
potency for frictions among the strong nations that employ 
it. In its early beginnings and for many years thereafter, 
China's commercial intercourse with foreigners resulted al- 
most exclusively from the individual or corporate efforts of 
foreign merchants. As a nation China was indifferent to the 
expansion of this trade, from having slight comprehension of 
its benefits and possibilities, and when its contacts began to 
cause complications with foreign governments, the Chinese 
Government grew uneasy and tried to discourage it. Thus 
almost from its inception foreign trade with the Chinese de- 
veloped tendencies of economic imperialism from force of cir- 
cumstances, and with the frequent application of external 
pressure on China; but it was not until the closing years of 
the nineteenth century that dangerous and invidious phases of 
the system palpably began to appear there. This period 
marked the strategical development of economic competitions 
among the leading powers in China. It was the time when 
China's military impotency was conclusively revealed by her 
defeat by Japan, whose aspirations for a foothold on the con- 
tinent were obstructed then by a combination of European 
powers ; when Germany secured by intimidation a position at 
Kiaochou, Russia obtained one at Port Arthur and Dalny, 
Great Britain at Weihaiwei, France at Kwangchowwan. 



CHINA AND ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 225 

It was the period when the "sphere of influence" idea took 
root there, and the powers began to divide China into sec- 
tions specially reserved for their own exclusive exploitation. 
Of the so-called powers, only the United States claimed no 
"sphere." Japan, too, was not included in the tentative 
partition of China at that period, but she was planning to 
secure a place there, as the war against Russia soon was to 
reveal. 

At that juncture John Hay, then secretary of state, with 
remarkable prevision recognized the fundamental importance 
of the issue to the United States and to civilization, and de- 
vised a plan to cheek the progress of economic imperialism 
in China. In view of the fact that, subsequently, it was the 
concept of economic nationalism as practised by Germany that 
disturbed the world, it is interesting to recall that the particu- 
lar action which was the occasion of Mr. Hay 's diplomacy was 
an action of Germany in procuring a lease on Chinese terri- 
tory at Kiaochou Bay and certain railway and mining con- 
cessions in Shantung province. His efforts resulted ulti- 
mately in securing the acceptance by all the major powers of 
the principles of the commercial "open door" in China and 
preservation of the territorial integrity of China.^ These 
principles are habitually termed the Hay Doctrine, and the 
doctrine embodies now, as it did then, the true bases for any 
solution of the Eastern problem. 

The Hay Doctrine can be said to date from the time of the 
Hay-Buelow correspondence and the coincident acquiescence 
of the other powers, given through the usual diplomatic chan- 
nels, in 1899. It therefrom constituted the public policy of 
all the powers on these questions, and still does. It was re- 
affirmed in the course of the next few years by several sep- 
arate agreements between the powers: the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance, the treaty of peace between Russia and Japan, a 
further special agreement between Russia and Japan, an 
agreement between France and Japan, and the special treaty 

1 Appendix A. 



226 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

between the United States and Japan known as the Root- 
Takahira agreement. Those agreements were signed during 
the years 1889-1907. 

Yet in this same period, most of the signatories to those 
agreements reaffirming the principles of the Hay Doctrine 
also concluded other agreements separately among themselves, 
outlining and defining their particular "spheres," actions 
which were subversive of the Hay Doctrine in their prin- 
ciple, and, without doubt in the case of some powers, with 
intent to evade it. There were instances where clauses af- 
firming the Hay Doctrine and clauses based on the "sphere 
of influence" principle were incorporated in the same agree- 
ment, notwithstanding their contradictory nature. For a 
few years after the acceptance of the Hay Doctrine by the 
powers, some of them apparently tried to reshape their poli- 
cies in China to conform to it. The result of the Russo- 
Japanese War, and the manifestations of Japan's policy 
which followed it, brought an immediate recrudescence of the 
"sphere" policy, and from then the Hay Doctrine has been 
rapidly undermined. The nation primarily responsible for 
this relegation of the Hay Doctrine is Japan. 

The Great War gave Japan an unusual opportunity for 
commercial penetration of China. Her principal competitor 
there for the cheaper manufactured articles, Germany, was 
virtually out of business for the time; and war conditions 
greatly disorganized the foreign trade of all European na- 
tions. For the first three years of the war, however, the 
United States shared with Japan the advantage of being com- 
paratively free of access to China, and conditions there were 
developing in a way very favorable for the expansion of 
American interests. There was much talk of American loans, 
and a Chicago banking group did make a small loan to the 
Chinese Government with a view to further business. En- 
couraged by the American Government, a firm of American 
constructors (the Siems-Carey Company) approached the 
Chinese Government about the building of railways, and, after 



CHINA AND ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 227 

meeting the usual objections of other powers on the ground 
of alleged encroachment on rights and privileges previously 
granted to them (in this case, Russia and Great Britain were 
the objectors), signed in 1916 preliminary agreements for 
the construction of several railway lines and for the recon- 
struction of the Grand Canal, 

These projects are not in themselves of transcendent im- 
portance, but the circumstances which attended their negotia- 
tion very importantly illustrate conditions relating to Ameri- 
can commercial and financial development in the East, and 
the application of Japan's theory of economic penetration of 
China. The Chinese Government at that time was particu- 
larly anxious to induce the investment of American capital in 
China for political reasons, as an offset to the impending Jap- 
anese domination, and was willing to grant more favorable 
conditions to Americans than to any other foreigners. China 
needed money, and needed the improvements contemplated by 
these undertakings. Japan was strongly urging upon the 
Chinese Government that she should be allowed to finance 
and construct them, but so great was the Chinese fear and 
suspicion of Japan that the people, and the Chinese Govern- 
ment then, preferred that nothing should be done rather than 
extend Japan's vested interests in the country. During the 
course of these negotiations, which lasted for months, Japan's 
diplomacy at Peking was privately trying to obstruct the 
American projects, but without much success until their ef- 
forts to sow distrust of America received the tacit assistance 
of Americans. 

This came about by way of a flank movement by Japan, 
under cover of a plan for Americans to "cooperate" with 
Japanese in developing enterprises in China. A propaganda 
of unusual proportions was begun in favor of such coopera- 
tion. Baron Shibusawa, Japan's leading financier, visited 
America to promote it, and in the course of the years 1915, 
1916, and 1917 other Japanese special missions to America, 
and Japan's well organized publicity propaganda in the 



228 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

United States and in Japan, took occasion to advocate this 
idea. In ''Millard's Review" for June 23, 1917, I discussed 
the so-called Shibusawa plan under the title, "Should Amer- 
ica Cooperate with Japan in China?", as follows: 

It is almost two years since Baron Shibusawa, then on a spe- 
cially timed visit to the United States, first began to lay the foun- 
dations for the so-called "cooperation" of America with Japan in 
China. I should say, perhaps, that he put it as asking Americans 
to cooperate, rather than the American Government; for Baron 
Shibusawa then pretended to be talking to American business men 
as a representative of Japanese big business interests. But Baron 
Shibusawa really was aiming at the American Government through 
the American business world, with a view to infiueneing its policy 
toward China; he really was a spokesman of the Japanese Govern- 
ment, for Japanese big business never does, and could not if it 
wanted to, operate independently of the Japanese Government in 
matters which touch foreign affairs and international policy. With 
that beginning, Japan's publicity propaganda has sedulously pushed 
the "cooperation" idea, until it seems to have taken root in some in- 
fluential quarters in America outside the Government, with a result 
that its effects have been strongly felt upon American interests in 
China, aijd give signs of having greater effects hereafter. 

The gravity of this question hardly can be exaggerated, and the 
time has come when it seems necessary, in the fundamental interest 
of not only China and America, but also of the world, to clarify it 
by examining its bases and principles. Since China is the point 
d'appui of this "cooperation" idea, then it must or ought to turn 
on the situation of China, and an elucidation of China's present 
condition would give the idea definition. 

A calm study of the situation of China as it exists today dis- 
closes, with some qualifying influences, that her immediate (I mean 
the next decade) future narrows down to two alternatives: — 

A. A period during which she will tolerate a benevolent assist- 
ance in some of her fiscal affairs, which will necessarily carry with 
it some limitations of administrative autonomy. 

B. A period during which she will he forcibly subjected to an 
unhenevolent and much more stringent supervision of her fiscal af- 
fairs, and a much more severe and extensive limitation of her ad- 
ministrative autonomy , amoiinting to foreign suzerainty. 

The first alternative would carry with it a promising possibility 
of a complete recovei"y by China of her administrative and fiscal 
autonomy in a comparatively short time — perhaps ten years. The 



CHINA AND ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 229 

second alternative would carry with it almost the certainty of China 
being a vassal State for an indefinite period. In this connection, it 
should be understood that in case alternative B prevails, the nations 
which promote and enforce it will of course pretend that it is alter- 
native A, and in their initial stages these alternatives will present 
great similarities, making it possible to confuse them superficially. 

Unfortunately, it does not rest with China exclusively to choose 
between these two alternatives, or to reject them altogether. China 
can now influence the decision only indirectly. The real decision 
rests with foreign powers. Whether the first alternative (A) is 
possible to bring about depends on whether the international agree- 
ments known as the Hay Doctrine, or those principles in new 
agreements, can be resuscitated. The Hay Doctrine cannot, in my 
opinion, be resuscitated and mamtained hereafter except by the 
active participation of the United States of America in supporting 
it. If the United States does not take an active part in restoring 
and thereafter maintaining the doctrine, then it is practically cer- 
tain that alternative B will prevail. Therefore, the application to 
China of these alternatives depends to a great extent on the course 
and policy of the United States. 

It should be taken as axiomatic, after events of the last three 
years, that it will not be feasible for the United States to take an 
active part in sustaining the Hay Doctrine (or its equivalent) un- 
less the following things occur in conjunction and coordination : 

1. A resolution of the United States Government so to act. 

2. A world diplomacy based on that resolution. 

3. Armaments, or their equivalents, sufficient to make this diplo- 
macy effective. 

4. The cooperation of American finance and commerce. 
Whether the American Government will have the first three of 

these elements depends largely on how the American people inter- 
pret the meaning to them of the great war, and the world position 
of the nation at the end of the war. Whether American financiers 
and merchants will operate extensively in China depends on their 
Government having the first three of the elements I have enumer- 
ated. Given that resolution and diplomacy and armaments, it will 
be possible for the United States to align enough powers with it to 
sustain the Hay or a similar doctrine. With the United States 
indifferent or inactive, other powers probably will be so situated, 
and so mfluenced that they will fall in with a policy embraced in 
alternative B. The importance to China of the course of the 
United States is obvious, and this gives great interest to moves that 
are designed to influence the policy of the American Government 



230 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

at this juncture. The ''cooperation" plan is in that category, and 
therefore ought to be scrutinized closely. 

To give poiut to academic argument, practical illustrations are 
useful, even necessary; and I therefore will point my views of this 
"cooperation" idea by showing how it already has worked in some 
instances. To do this requires me to publish matters concerning 
American projects about which I would prefer to be silent at this 
time. My desire is to assist and promote in all legitimate ways 
these and similar projects; but I can see a serious danger to Amer- 
ican interests in some tendencies and developments, that ought to 
be threshed out while there is yet time to correct mistakes, or to 
prevent them from being repeated in subsequent enterprises. And 
besides, Samuel G. Blythe, who recently visited China, in a striking 
article in the "Saturday Evening Post" of May 26, already has 
given wide publicity to these same matters; in fact, I perhaps can- 
not do better than to quote something from Mr. Blythe's article. 
After he has developed a political argument along certain lines, he 
goes on to say, apropos this same cooperation idea, as follows: 

"Furthermore, the Japanese know what the investment of Amer- 
ican money in China means, and they are frantically trying to pre- 
vent that investment, and even more frantically trying to join with 
investment they cannot prevent in order that its effect may be les- 
sened to a degree. If there is any person in the United States who 
pretends to know anything of the polities and policies of the Far 
East, and especially of Japan, who thinks that Japan is making 
this present determined effort to join with American investment in 
China — cooperate — with any other idea than to nullify, so far as 
possible, the effect that investment will have in the way of lessen- 
ing Japanese influence and power in China, that person is sadly — 
altruistically, mayhap, but sadly, none the less — in error. 

"Another reason for this change of official attitude in Japan to- 
ward the United States was a rather tardy but none the less acute 
awakening by Japan to the fact that she cannot yet arbitrarily con- 
trol the financial and trade and commercial destinies of China. With- 
in the past eighteen months the eAddences in China of a determination 
by the American International Corporation, and its subsidiary, the 
Siems-Carey Company, to operate in China, and the project of a 
large loan by Chicago financiers, as well as other American demon- 
strations, caused the adaptable Japanese, who realized that they are 
not yet strong enough in China to protest or disregard their paper 
adherence to the Open-Door policy, to about-face and make clever 
and, it may be, successful efforts to assume the attitude of tradi- 



CHINA AND ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 231 

tional friendship, in order to hold and to consolidate as much as 
they may of their already won advantage. Any portion of a loaf 
is better than no bread to the Japanese mind. If they can't control 
they hope to cooperate, and thus half control at any rate. 

"I do not know the details of the American end of this cooperation 
project, for I was in China during its inception and its original 
discussion; but I do know the Chinese end of it and the Japanese 
end of it, and I shall set down those phases of the plan as a part 
of this argument, basing what I have to say on five premises : 

"First: The only reason the Japanese desire to cooperate with 
the United States in China is because the Japanese have concluded 
they are not, as yet, strong enough to combat well-supported Ameri- 
can business enterprise in China, with the idea of diminishing that 
American business enterprise so far as they may be able, in order 
that they may retain as much economic and political dominion over 
China as possible; and not for any other reason. 

"Second: Any business cooperation with the Japanese in China 
that is based upon or recognizes any special or preferential political 
rights of the position of Japan in China will be suicidal. 

"Third: It is the diplomacy of Japan to join with America as a 
protection to themselves for their Closed-Door policy; for, if Amer- 
ica goes into partnership with Japan, America must, if the partner- 
ship is to be continued, accept what Japan does. 

"Fourth: Every proposition Japan makes to the United States 
for a cooperative investment in the development of China must 
necessarily be amended by Americans to include cooperation in the 
development of Southern Manchuria, Eastern Inner Mongolia and 
Shantung. Otherwise it becomes merely an extension of Japan's 
influence elsewhere. There is plenty of opportunity for develop- 
ment in Southern IVIanchuria, for example. 

"Fifth — and most important: American capitalists must realize 
that when they form any partnership, or enter into any cooperation 
in such enterprises, they are taking part as Americans simply, as 
citizens, as a corporation or company, while the Japanese are taking 
part as a government — that is to say, the Americans are going into 
partnership, as individuals, with the Japanese Government, not- 
withstanding what the Japanese proponents, as individuals, may say. 

"It is not my intention to decry the good faith or excellent inten- 
tions of the American capitalists who are imbued with the coopera- 
tion idea ; but there are certain elements of the situation that are 
perhaps not so well known to the bulk of Americans as they might 
be, and the purpose of this article is purely informative. It would 
be vain to endeavor tdT.mpress on American capitalists the fact that 



232 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

money cannot do everything, or that the decision of money is not 
the great and wise decision. Milhons can do no wrong. That is 
their creed. So, if American capitaHsts have decided to cooperate 
with Japan in China, what they have decided upon must neces- 
sarily be the part of ultimate wisdom." 

I concur with Mr. Blythe in crediting the honorable motives and 
sincere purposes of Americans who have been misled by the super- 
ficial appeal of the Shibusawa ^'cooperation" scheme; but I do not 
agree when he says, "It would be vain to endeavor to impress on 
American capitalists the fact that money cannot do everv'thing." 
With such grave possibilities in this question, surely our men in 
the statesman-financier class will give it sound study before even 
tentatively committing our financial world to it, or permitting this 
to be done by implication. There is nothing which the National 
Foreign Trade Council can do that is of more importance to the 
development of our trade with the East than to elucidate this 
proposition in all its bearings. More than trade is involved; our 
national honor and security are closely linked with the decision of 
this issue. 

The most pertinent recent instance (which Mr. Blythe alludes to) 
exemplifying the practical working of this "cooperation" idea is 
given by some things that have happened with relation to contracts 
undertaken in China by the Siems-Carey construction company, an 
American firm operating in conjunction with the American Inter- 
national Corporation. From their inception, the Siems-Carey un- 
dertakings in China have sought and have obtained the support of 
the American Government, which seemed anxious to demonstrate 
that it wants to extend all legitimate aid to American enterprises 
in this country. About the time when Baron Shibusawa visited 
America as the protagonist of the "cooperation" plan, negotiations 
were commenced at Peking for the Siems-Carey contracts. Japan's 
attitude toward such American enterprises is substantially as fol- 
lows: First, prevent them from getting a contract if possible, by 
oblique obstruction if it is not expedient to interpose open diplo- 
matic opposal; Second, if the contracts are secured, then try to 
prevent them from being carried out; Third, if both the two first 
metliods fail, then try to become parties to the contracts. 

All these methods were, in this instance, used in turn, and the 
manner of employing them was very interesting in some of their 
phases. On returning to Japan after his visit to America, Baron 
Shibusawa ga\e interviews which made an impression, and which 
were subtly intrepreted to give the impression, that his mission had 



CHINA AND ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 233 

been successful, and that the American financial world had agreed 
to "cooperate" with Japan in China. This interpretation was at 
once disseminated throughout Chuia by Japan's press propaganda 
here, and almost succeeded in preventing the Siems-Carey contracts 
from going through. A sine qua non of this transaction, from 
China's standpoint, was a desire to avoid the use of Japanese capi- 
tal and supervision in the further extension of China's internal 
transportation system; and especially in regard to the Grand Canal 
improvement, which runs partly through Shantung province, where 
JajDan is now claiming, as an evictor of Germany, an exclusive posi- 
tion under the old "sphere" theorem. So when the news was sent 
broadcast in China that American financiers had decided to cooper- 
ate with Japanese (out here everyone knows this means the Jap- 
anese Government) in these and other schemes, it at once aroused 
such suspicion of the American proj)osals among Chinese that it 
came near to defeating them. It was thought necessary to commu- 
nicate this phase of the situation officially to Washington, and thus 
to elicit an unequivocal denial from the Americans who were to 
finance the Siems-Carey work. In that case, the deep-rooted sus- 
picion of Japan's motives which now is entertained by a great ma- 
jority of Chinese was cleverly used by Japan to sow suspicions of 
America, by ostensibly placing these American projects in Japan's 
shadow. However, that device was frustrated, and the contracts 
were signed. 

Next came the effort to prevent the contracts, and particularly 
the canal improvement (which lies partly in Japan's so-called 
"sphere") from being carried out; and in this the "cooperation" 
idea was used even more cleverly. The effort was transferred from 
Peking to New York; and the American Legation, and American 
representatives of these interests then in China, were astounded one 
day to hear, via Japanese news services, that an agreement had 
been made in NeAv York whereby Japanese were admitted to par- 
ticipation in the canal improvement. This was coupled by com- 
ments, in Japanese newspapers in China and in the press of Japan, 
plainly intimating that the Americans had been forced to admit 
Japanese because of diplomatic representations, thus demonstrating 
that America was not strong enough to do anj^thing in China with- 
out Japan's consent and help. Behind these considerations (in 
themselves sufficiently damaging to American prestige) lurked the 
further presumption, that with American concessions in China runs 
the possibility and the (to China) danger of them being obtained 
by representing them as purely American enterprises, and being 
then sold into other national control which is considered invidious 



234 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

to China. And still behind that, was the presumption that the 
American Government would lend itself to such oblique political 
machinations. 

That is how American national honor comes into such transac- 
tions. A good deal has been raid, in recent years, [I have done 
some of the saying myself] about the duty of the American Govern- 
ment strongly to support its nationals in China, and to lend official 
countenance to financial and commercial enterprises. I think this 
must be done if we ever are to make headway here, and if we are 
to be of any effective aid to China. But the assumption of such 
official action by the American Government must include the as- 
sumption that American financial and commercial enterprises so 
supported will harmonize with the broad national interest, as con- 
ceived and practiced by the national foreign policy. 

Even before the world war had given a new meaning and a new 
tendency to both national and international commerce, we who re- 
side in China had come to perceive that a very close relation exists 
between American commercial efforts in China and the foreign pol- 
icy of the American Government; and that only by the consonance 
of these two elements can a really worth-while advance be made. 
Formerly we thought of this question principally, or altogether, in 
terms of the far East; but we now see that the principle is of 
world wide application — that American trade in China, and with 
China, may hinge on events in Europe, or anywhere in the world, 
which may by indirection affect political and economic conditions 
here. By this process we reach the conclusion that American Gov- 
ernment policy in China cannot be detached from American policy 
in other parts of the world, but must be coordinated with our na- 
tion's foreign policy as a whole. The same principle, it seems to 
me, also applies to American economic policy in China. 

In formulating and practicing their foreign policies Govern- 
ments are forced, or consider it expedient, at times to take courses 
that impede and obstruct — or seem to, and at least do discourage 
some business efforts of their nationals; and which bring, or seem 
to brinjr a Government into opposition to business interests. When 
these frictions occur, some basis of compromise usually is worked 
out; but if business interests, however important and powerful, 
become definitely committed to opposition to a fundamental canon 
of national policy, then inevitably the business interests have to 
yield. This principle always has held true; and every day that 
passes witnesses some new accession of the power of States to 
dominate the activities and affairs of their citizenry. Therefore if, 
by any mischance or miscalcvilation, American financial and com- 



CHINA AND ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 235 

mercial interests in China should get at cross-purposes with a funda- 
mental issue of broad American national policy, it certainly would 
retard the development of our trade here, and might react disas- 
trously upon our nation as a whole. Also, if American business 
policy in China would permit itself, consciously or unconsciously, 
to be placed in an attitude unsympathetic or detrimental to the 
legitimate aspirations and national rights of the Chinese people, a 
sound and extensive expansion of American trade here will become 
impossible. 

If the policy of Japan toward China is predicated on a hypoth- 
esis expressed by the formula I have designated previously as Al- 
ternative B, and American policy toward China is expressed hy 
Alternative A, then if American commercial policy here would 
"cooperate" with Japan in China on Japan's own conception of a 
policy and on Japan's terms, it would be placed in distinct opposi- 
tion to the broader interest of the American nation and to the[ 
foreign policy of the American Government. Does the American 
financial and commercial world want to get into this position? And, 
if it should, wittingly or unwittingly , get into this position, how can 
it expect to be listened to if it asks the support of the American 
Government (which to be effective must carry with it the idea that 
the national power goes with it, which in turn means that the Amer- 
ican people may become involved in war by such issues) in pro- 
moting its e forts in China? 

Those are the major aspects of this question. I have studied, 
from such information that I have, to discover what motives those 
Americans who incline to the "cooperation" idea, and who seem to 
have committed themselves partly to it by giving Japanese a posi- 
tion of some kind in the canal improvement, have been governed 
by in accepting that theorem for the expansion of American eco- 
nomic interests in China. Of course, it is denied that political con- 
siderations induced the admission of Japanese; but that explana- 
tion will not bear analysis. Surely, New York financiers would 
not have us believe that they, after entering on these engagements, 
could not finance them without Japanese help, or could not carry 
out the construction without Japanese expert advice? 

What was the reason, then, if not politics? The fact seems to 
be that American financiers, up to very recently, and perhaps now, 
have not believed that the United States Government would de- 
velop the elements that I have mentioned as being essential for the 
restoration and enforcement of the Hay "open-door" doctrine. It 
looks like they got "cold feet" as to whether the United States really 
is or ever will become a Teal power in the Pacific Ocean, and thought 



236 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

it better to go on under the aegis of Japan rather than stand pat 
and run the risk of being turned back. For the moment, the na- 
tional honor and prestige do not seem to have had much place in 
their calculations j present expediency was the apparent considera- 
tion. 

There is another phase to this question that has an influence on 
the attitude of American finance and commerce. Within the last 
ten years there has been a shift of conditions which has tended to 
array a considerable fraction of American trade in the far East to 
faA'or Japan rather than China. As American trade with China 
has lost ground (a loss in which Japan's policy has played a part), 
the trade of many American firms with Japan has become more im- 
portant proportionately, until a condition exists whereby their in- 
terests connected with Japan are more extensive and important 
than similar interests in China. Therefore, while these firms would 
like to have the door kept open in China, and sympathize with 
efforts to that end, commercial expediency deters them from being 
very active in promoting such a policy to an extent that will impair 
their connections with Japan. One can plainly see this motive in 
the present psychology of American finance and commerce toward 
the "cooperation" idea. Now trade with Japan is one thing; trade 
with China is another. Both America and Japan are good cus- 
tomers of each other, and I hope they always will be; but this 
simple fact, which applies to our commercial relations with all 
countries, should not lure our business interests off on a false eco- 
nomic trail. In commerce, Japan is Japan and China is China; 
just as France is France, Russia is Russia, and so forth. Japan 
doesn't trade with us because she loves us, but because of the opera- 
tion of economic and commercial processes that are of general ap- 
plication to all international trade, and which are moreover con- 
stantly shifting, and subject to political influences. Moreover, this 
particular "cooperation" scheme carries a distinct possibility of 
setting American interests in China into political antagonism with 
British, French and other foreign interests. 

I want to quote Samuel G. Blythe again, for a moment. He 
describes, in the "Saturday Evening Post" article previously quoted, 
how, when the Japanese Government tried to impose its notion of 
a right to participation with Americans in enterprises in Shantung, 
the American Legation at Peking politely mentioned some Japanese 
projects in Manchuria, and suggested that Americans might like to 
participate there, to which Baron Hayashi, after taking some time 
to think it over, responded that such American participation in 



CHINA AND ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 237 

Manchuria did not come within the ''cooperation" idea. Mr. Blythe 
remarks : 

"Well, there it was and there it is. Japan seeks to cooperate with 
the United States only in such places in China as Japan does not 
dominate at the present time. Japan brooks no cooperation or in- 
terference in places where Japan has nailed herself down, but will 
cooperate in places picked by Japan — and not by America — where 
Japan thinks Japan can be advantaged in her plans by such co- 
operation, and American profits and influence diminished." 

That really about gets at the heart of this "cooperation" idea as 
far as it has developed in China. I do not want to be understood 
as being opposed to any and all American-Japanese cooperation, 
in China or elsewhere. What I insist on is that in China Amer- 
ican cooperation with any other nation will be on lines that con- 
form with traditional American policy, with the sound develop- 
ment of American interests, and with the national integrity of 
China, 



CHAPTER X 

CHINA AND ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM — CONCLUDED 

Blindness of Americans to certain conditions — Applying lessons of the 
Great War — Relation of militarism to economic imperialism — Some as- 
pects of American trade in China — Effects of the "hyphen" in foreign 
trade — Fallacy of the Shibusawa plan — A remarkable letter — Why Amer- 
icans in China are anti-Japan — Japan and China contrasted — First and 
later impressions — Coordination of Japanese political and commercial 
methods — A strong arraignment of Japan — Her recent course in China 
indicted — How the Chinese are impressed — Seeming inconsistency of 
Allied professions and policy — Implication of America's weakness — 
Japan's anti-Allied propaganda — The coming reaction — Japan's unpopu- 
larity with the Chinese — How it may affect post-war business — Japan's 
capital in China is force — The moral issue — Effects of the cooperation 
idea on American trade in China — Its military aspect. 

ONE of the most remarkable political phenomena of 
modern times has been the singular blindness of 
Americans regarding certain conditions in the world, 
and their no less singular disinclination to take any steps to 
protect their own national life and interests from the opera- 
tion of some forces bom of and reared by those conditions. 
For instance, the attitude of Americans toward armaments. 
Nothing but being dragged into war by the scruff could make 
the American people, and the Government, realize the neces- 
sity of increasing their armaments and military efficiency. 
They were slow to read the lesson, in an armed world be not 
unarmed. The reluctance with which Americans have ac- 
cepted and acted on this lesson can be scarcely comprehended 
by any except Americans, for few other peoples had such a 
naive frame of mind about world affairs and tendencies. 
But having at last, perforce, accepted it, and being in the 
yvay of acting on it by developing a military and naval power 

238 



CHINA AND ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 239 

commensurate with the national strength and position, Amer- 
icans will not be apt to unlearn it when peace comes. The 
lesson will be too costly to be easily forgotten. If the peace 
that Americans in their own minds fought for does not suc- 
ceed in suppressing militarism, — and militarism will not nec- 
essarily be suppressed merely by defeating Germany, as 
many loosely think, — then without doubt American military 
and naval power should be maintained at a degree that is re- 
quired by circumstances. On the other hand, if peace results 
in a genuine suppression of militarism, not just a transfer of 
military ascendency from one power or group of powers to 
another power or group, then there is the other question to 
deal with — the moderation or suppression of war-causing 
phases of economic competitions. 

Militarism and economic imperialism go hand in hand. 
They are interdependent. Each breeds the other, and each 
sustains the other. Plainly, economic imperialism is not pos- 
sible without imperial militarism to back it up with force or 
with the threat of using force. Also, without the increments 
by economic reflex resulting from this use of militarism, or 
promised by governments as a result from it, peoples almost 
surely could not be induced to bear the fiscal burden of exces- 
sive armaments. Applying, now, these principles to condi- 
tions in the far East, it is evident that, if the peace brings a 
suppression of militarism, and also a suppression of the use 
of force through militarism to promote policies of economic 
imperialism, China's foreign commerce can pursue a normal 
and unintimidated course. On the other hand, if militar- 
ism is not suppressed or if it is only slightly moderated, 
then we may look to see the idea of economic imperialism 
persist for a time in respect to the economic development 
of China. This is a possibility that American commercial and 
financial interests having thought of China must not ignore. 
The reaction on British and French economic policies of Ger- 
man military efficiency and its meanings is shown by events 
and tendencies. As^or Japan, both her military and eco- 



240 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

nomic policies were long before the war frankly modeled 
after Germany; and since the war began they have steadily 
been applied on the German system until very recently, when 
changes of conditions have begun to circumscribe this method 
in its application to China, 

In respect to American trade in China, it has followed an 
unusual course since the war began. By the gradual cutting- 
off of Great Britain and Europe as sources of supply for 
manufactured articles and also as markets for the products of 
China, there has been a tendency to obtain such commodities 
from America and also to send raw and other products of 
China to America. In many manufacturing lines the war 
made America the manufacturer for the world, for that coun- 
try was the only place where many staple commodities could 
be obtained quickly. But this trade expansion has phases 
that demand attention of the American business and manu- 
facturing world and also of the United States Government. 
A considerable volume of this new trade has passed through 
non-American hands, being handled in China by British, Ger- 
man (before America and China became belligerents), Jap- 
anese, and other foreign firms. Almost without exception 
these foreign firms are also agents of similar British, German, 
or Japanese commodities, as the case may be. Rather than 
lose business, they will sell American goods for the time, and 
probably will sell them hereafter if their customers insist on 
having the American goods and no other. But after the war, 
when similar commodities can again be obtained from Eng- 
land, Europe, or anywhere, what is likely to happen to this 
new and expanding American trade if it is left in non-Ameri- 
can hands, and subject to conditions of transport and market 
dominated by other nations? 

I do not believe in or advocate a narrow intensively national 
system of economic development. I would prefer to have 
those conditions that helped to cause the war eliminated as 
far as possible. In my opinion too strict and close applica- 
tion of nationalism in trade, as in social relations, is not con- 



CHINA AND ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 241 

ducive to amicable international sentiment. The spirit of it 
is wrong. In our small dealings it is unpleasantly restrictive 
and narrow to have to stop and think, whenever anything is to 
be bought or sold, of the nationality of those whom we may cas- 
ually like to deal with; when buying a hat or when selecting 
the materials for our shirts. Americans never have followed 
that policy. We feel inclined to resent any tendency of na- 
tionalism which invokes us to adopt it. But we also should 
resent its application by other nations to ourselves. Ameri- 
cans have felt the same way and thought much the same way 
about militarism among nations. Therefore, if other power- 
ful industrial and commercial nations that are the competitors 
of America pursue the imperialistic theory of trade expan- 
sion, or if they shape their economic policies on that line, 
then American industry and trade without doubt will have to 
meet that condition by adopting similar or contravening 
methods. If we are hereafter, or for a considerable time, to 
live in an armed world, then America must be armed as pow- 
erfully as any nation is. If after the war there is a possibility 
that the intensive nationalistic thesis is to direct international 
trade, then Americans should be forewarned, and should pre- 
pare to meet this condition by a closer economic organization 
within their own nationality. It will not suffice in such a 
world to get rid of the hyphen in respect to our political and 
military organisms if we continue to retain the hyphen in the 
ramifications of our foreign trade development. 

From the time when Japan's propaganda first advanced 
the idea of a Japanese-American financial and commercial co- 
operation in China, American business men and organizations 
in China showed a strong, even a bitter antagonism to the 
plan. They regarded it as a subtle scheme to undermine 
America's moral position in China and to hinder and limit 
the progress of American trade and enterprises. Writing in 
"Millard's Review," September 1, 1917, I commented as fol- 
lows: 



242 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

Very astute and persistent efforts are being made to taek hyhens 
of a subtle and objectionable character to the development of 
American interests and trade relations with Chiaa. Prominent 
among them was the so-called Shibusawa plan for the "coopera- 
tion" of Japanese and Americans (or Japan and the United 
States) in China. That plan is gasping for breath now, if it is 
not already dead. The only sound basis it ever had was a pre- 
sumption founded on Japan's dominating military power in this 
region, and the use of that power to push a policy of economic 
imperialism. One understands why, if Americans should see a 
good business or industrial opportunity in Japan, that it would 
perhaps be desirable and it might be necessary (as without doubt 
it is) to cooperate with Japanese. One understands also that, in 
such a case in China, it would perhaps be desirable (although, 
since China has not developed militarism nor economic imperialism, 
yet, this is not necessary) to cooperate with Chinese. But the 
Shibusawa plan insists that for Americans successfully to enter- 
prise in China, Japanese cooperation (which means the consent of 
Japanese militarism) is essential, while by that plan Chinese co- 
operation (or feeling) is regarded is negligible. If the Shibusawa 
plan, as it was originally conceived and advanced, is not dead, it 
ought to be. It is a piece of economic and diplomatic fustian 
whose roots are planted deeply in the ''militarism-economic im- 
perialism" doctrine, and whose political concepts lie in "special 
position" and "paramountcy" phrases in the mouths of diplomats 
and propagandists. 

It ought not to be needed to say (yet one feels that it has to be 
said) that in this criticism of Japan's previous policies toward 
China, with their effects and consequences to other foreign inter- 
ests here and to China, there is not meant any feeling of opposi- 
tion to whatever Japanese trade expansion in this region or in the 
world can be accomplished without exerting in its behalf a com- 
bined militarism and economic imperialism. This is an issue as 
between two absolutely hostile theses of international polity; an 
iscue which, forced on by Germany, probably was the principal 
cause of the great war. Yet it is necessary to state these matters 
clearly, and to reiterate them frequently and in various aspects 
in order to drive them in, because without doubt the American 
commercial world is not fully wakened to these conditions; and 
also because American commercial interests in China have scarcely 
yet grasped more than the outside of the meaning of events, and 
still are under the influence and the shadow of the economic im- 
perialism of Japan and other nations. This influence and this 



CHINA AND ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 243 

shadow are falling away, but they persist with astonishing 
psychological vitality with a considerable part of the American 
business world. Until they are completely thrown off, or reduced 
to just proportions, American foreign trade and financial enter- 
prise will not be standing on its own foundations; it cannot take 
its proper part in building up the national wealth, power and 
prestige. 

As giving a remarkably accurate and comprehensive epito- 
mization of the sentiment of Americans and other foreigners 
living in China toward this Japanese-American cooperation 
idea, I here include a letter which is self-explanatory. I 
omit the writer's name, not that I think he would object to 
its being used, but because it is not feasible (he having gone 
into the interior of Asia) to ask his permission. "When I left 
China late in 1918, American organizations in China were 
preparing to issue this letter for the purpose of advising 
chambers of commerce in America of certain conditions, and 
I gladly give it this additional publicity. The writer goes 
beyond the so-called cooperation plan in the scope of his 
comments, but a just analysis will reveal that the cooperation 
plan comprehends all of those matters in its true significance. 

Shanghai, July 10, 1918. 
Dear : 

You will remember that when you were in Peking in January 
of this year you attended the annual dinner of the American As- 
sociation, and that you were somewhat shocked and disconcerted 
to find the majority of us intolerantly critical of Japan and Japa- 
nese policy, and incidentally of the magazine [name omitted,] upon 
which some of the discussion turned. I remember that during the 
dinner yon urged upon the members of the association the necessity 
of seeing both sides of the Japanese question before pronouncing 
upon it dogmatically, and that you also urged us to become mem- 
bers of the Asiatic Society, the publishers of [name omitted], so 
that we could make whatever criticisms we had to make as mem- 
bers from the inside, as it were, and not as an antagonistic organ- 
ization. The members of the association had however framed its 
own conception of [n^e omitted] and of the policy of the interests 
supporting that paper, and would consider no such suggestion. 



244 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

After the meeting, in a personal conversation which you had 
with me, you again emphasized the need of putting both sides of 
any argument upon Sino-Japanese or Japanese-American relations 
before all interested parties, and you asked me to enter into cor- 
I'espondence with the secretary of the American Association of 
Yokohama as the first step in an interchange of views between 
American residents in China and Japan. As you know, I left 
Peking within a few days of your return to Japan, which caused 
my resignation from the secretaryship of the American Associa- 
tion, and I doubt very much whether my successor, who is a new- 
comer in China and not so familiar with the trend of opinion 
among Americans in this country, was in a position to take up the 
correspondence suggested. Until our recent meeting in Shanghai 
it did not again occur to me that a presentation of the ease of 
those of us in China who are credited with being unreasonably 
anti-Japanese would be of any particular value, but you have 
persuaded me this time that so little is known of political and 
economic conditions in this country, or of Japan's influence upon 
Chinese affairs, that a clear statement of the views of Americans 
in China and of the reasons for these opinions should be prepared 
for the benefit of Americans both in Japan and at home who are 
interested in doing business in the Orient or in promoting friendly 
relations between the American people and the various Oriental 
peoples. Of course there will be nothing official or final about 
my ideas, but I shall try to present the opinions which I know 
are held by the majority of Americans and Britishers here, and 
I shall finally submit this letter to several persons in whose judg- 
ment you have faith and let them delete anything with which they 
do not agree. 

The matter which we discussed during our last talk at the Carl- 
ton Restaurant was of course the question of American-Japanese 
cooperation in the development of the trade, industries, conces- 
sions, etc., in China. This cooperation scheme, which is now sup- 
ported by many big American interests and by some of the most 
reputable business men in Japan, has aroused the bitterest pos- 
sible antagonism among Americans in China, as you have probably 
discovered, apparently for the sole reason that we are prejudiced 
against Japan and that we are therefore opposed to having our 
judgment upon Japan reversed by Americans at home through a 
Japanese-American trade alliance. The average American casual 
traveler in this country comes to the conclusion that we oppose 
the cooperation scheme because it discredits what appears to be 
an unreasonable and unreasoning dislike for the Japanese, and 



CHINA AND ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 245 

that our opinions can therefore be safely ignored by the practical 
business folk who want to see American business expand in this 
part of the world. 

In the eyes of the tourist Japan is clean, comfortable, progres- 
sive, and prosperous, while China is dirty, corrupt, uncomfortable, 
backward and squalidly poor. In Japan the distinguished guest 
is motored up to modern buildings through arches bearing lauda- 
tory inscriptions, is received by intelligent officials who discuss 
everything that interests him intelligently, and who are solicitous 
for his comfort and entertainment while in the country. In China 
the same man wades ankle-deep in mud, gets pockets full of bad 
money, finds Chinese persons whom he wishes to see only after 
diligent search through gloomy and crumbling buildings, and may 
then be indifferently treated by an opium-smoking idler who owes 
his place to political corruption and who is interested in nothing 
so much as ui ending the conversation and in getting his visitor 
off the premises. Naturally the visitor cannot understand why or 
how any reasonable person could ever object to Japan, who alone 
seems to be successful in getting things done in China, taking 
China over bodily, and cleaning it up in the interests of America 
and all other nations which hope to do business in this country. 

We have all had the same experiences and have gathered the 
same impressions upon our arrival in the East. We have all 
admired Japan and have cultivated a huge contempt for China 
during the first few weeks of our sojourn in the Orient. But in- 
controvertible the fact remains that, of those who have lived three 
years or more in the country, fully ninety-five per cent have ac- 
quired not only a sentimental liking for the Chinese, but a great 
faith in the capabilities and future of the Chinese people, which 
seems blind and fatuous to the visitor, and also a cordial dislike 
for the Japanese, which the new-comer can explain only as a 
malicious prejudice. The reasons for this would fill many volumes 
if fully stated. The personality of the Japanese whom most of 
us meet here is of course objectionable, but we all realize that the 
commercial and political adventurers who come to China are not 
representative, and we are not unreasonable enough to condemn 
the whole people on these grounds. The extracts from Japanese 
papers which appear in the English press are often anti-American, 
imperialistic, extremely egotistical, and complacent, and almost in- 
variably opposed to the democratic standards which the Anglo- 
Saxon peoples support. The Japanese press naturally fans prej- 
udice and antagonism, just as the Japanese whom we meet eon- 
firm prejudice ; but thS~ essential reason for our consistent damn- 



246 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

ing of the Japanese is the unscrupulous and immoral China policy 
of the Japanese Government, and the confirmed tendency of Jap- 
anese commercial interests to occupy and hold every vantage- 
point which the Japanese Government gains in this country through 
coercion or corruption. No one ever hears a word of criticism 
in China of legitimate Japanese enterprises which are legitimately 
established and which enter into legitimate competition with the 
interests of other nations. If Japanese trade and Japanese im- 
perial policy were entering this country through separate channels 
and through independent tactics, there would not be the slightest 
opposition to Japanese commercial expansion here or to an Amer- 
ican trade alliance with Japanese commercial people on any scale. 
Unfortunately, however, nearly every Japanese commercial move 
brings in its wake a political invasion of some sort, and every 
political imposition upon China or upon the interests of others 
in China is complacently regarded by the Japanese traders as a 
legitimate opening for their expansion; 

Japan's political policy in China is now no less objectionable 
than it was in 1915. Then it was one of coercion, of frank jingo- 
ism ; nuw it is one of corruption through alliance with purchasable 
Chinese officials who are put in ofSce and kept there by Japanese 
influence. The latter is certainly a much more insidious policy 
than the former, and more dangerous because it does not attract 
the attention abroad which it deserves. You have been in Peking 
recently, so there is no need to remind you of the loans which 
Japan is negotiating with the official clique in the Capital, or to 
dwell upon the character of these loans. You know as much about 
the Sino-Japanese military alliance of recent date as we do here, 
and you know that the sole purpose of that agreement, apart from 
the incidental advantage which it gives Japan of controlling 
China's military resources, was to make China's declaration of 
war against Germany somewhat more ineffectual than it already 
was and to obviate the last possibility of China being of service 
to the Allies and of thereby gaining any prestige which would stand 
her in good stead in the course of a hypothetical post-bellum set- 
tlement of Smo-Japanese disputes. 

You know quite well from what you have seen for yourself in 
China on your various visits and from what your numerous well- 
informed friends in China have told you at various times, that 
Japan has taken every possible step during the four years of this 
war to ruin China hy creating and sustaining trouble, by financing 
the most objectionable elements in every community in which she 
has been interested, by the employment of agents provocateurs. 



CHINA AND ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 247 

by the encouragement of the use of morphine over large areas, 
by the use of Japanese immoral women in Chinese official house- 
holds, by the protection given to bandits and other outlaws, by the 
wrecking of native banks, as in the recent Mukden case, by the cor- 
ruption of officials through loans, bribes, and threats; and by the 
wholesale misrepresentation of Allied war aims and the most vigor- 
ous efforts to prevent China from coming into war and then later 
to discredit the country by preventing China from being of any 
use or service to the Allies. Tow also know that during these four 
years, which have been publicly heralded as Japan's years of op- 
portunity, it has been the distinct object of the Japanese to gain 
a monopoly upon political influence in China, and at the same 
time to make openings for Japanese trade which would give the 
Japanese commercial folk as strong a commercial monopoly as pos- 
sible. And in every instance in which the Government has created 
an opening throtigh political manceuvering, seldom creditable, the 
Japanese business man, said by his defenders to be opposed to 
the truculent and unscrupulous policy of the Japanese Govern- 
ment, has been only too ready to take advantage of the oppor- 
tunities offered to drive in the trade wedge, whether the trade was 
in legitimate imports and exports or in morphine or cocaine or 
women or Chinese cash or the rights and liabilities of the Chinese 
people. 

Not only has Japan been working against the present interests 
and future good of the Chinese people, but her policy in China 
has been deliberately shaped to undermine the trade, influence, 
and prestige of the Occidental peoples, nominally her Allies, 
throughout the East. Every ideal which we have developed and 
announced as participants in the present European War is dis- 
owned or discounted in the Japanese press and by Japanese prop- 
agandists among the Chinese; and in actual diplomatic practice 
Japanese officials in China have practised every subterfuge and 
committed every diplomatic crime with which we credit the Ger- 
mans, and have invariably been supported by the home Govern- 
ment and encouraged by their commercial representatives in China. 

It is our business in the East as Americans or Britishers to make 
the Chinese believe in our announced war aims and purposes and 
to convmce them that we are sincere and are therefore entitled 
to their loyalty and support against Prussianism. The Chinese do 
not understand what Prussianism is, but they do understand Nip- 
ponism, and it is very difficult to persuade them to give us their 
whole-hearted moral support when we give countenance by com- 
mercial and diplomatic" alliances in this hemisphere to policies 



248 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

which are identical with those which we condemn under another 
name and which we are eradicating from another hemisphere, re- 
mote from Chinese interests, by the expenditure of so much treas- 
ure and blood. The Chinese have seen the most unscrupulous 
policies succeed in their country, carried out to their shame and 
humiliation without a murmur or a whimper from the Allies. 
They see the Japanese brand of Prussianism succeed in this part 
of the world without palpable opposition, and they have nothing 
more than our word for it that it is not succeeding elsewhere. 
They have heard and have digested all the statements of our high 
ideas about the protection of weak nations from alien interfer- 
ence, and they have waited for us to prove our consistency by 
bringing our Japanese ally in line with these ideals, until they 
are convinced that we are either afraid of Japan or that we place 
no value upon consistency. In Chinese eyes and the eyes of all 
other Orientals, including the Japanese, we either are too weak 
to make our announced international policy effective, or we are 
satisfied to make it effective where it is expedient and to close our 
^yes to violations of our political ethics, perpetrated by a recognized 
ally, whenever it is inexpedient to interfere. 

Although the notorious Japanese twenty-one demands have now 
receded into history and although much of the rancor which they 
aroused has been softened by time, this conspicuous Japanese at- 
tempt to take advantage of the preoccupation of the Allies and 
of America is one which we cannot and must not forget. The 
principle of the protection of the weaker nations to which Japan 
is supposed to have subscribed was never more flagrantly violated, 
nor could the Allies who had put their faith in Japan as their 
far-Eastern agent have been more insidiously betrayed. Japan 
has pretended to regret this incident and to have had a change of 
heart but you will note that Japan has not renounced any of the 
special privileges acquired, nor has she canceled the clause in the 
treaty in which she reserves the right to revive at a future date 
the i^articularly offensive "Group V." If Japan were to renounce 
the spoils M'hile she deplores the methods of a former ministry, we 
might have some faith in the alleged change of heart. As it is 
we must continue to keep alive the memory of the twenty-one 
demands, and call Japan to account, when the opportunity arrives, 
for flagrant violation of past treaties and of present international 
ethics. Whenever we think of allying ourselves in any enterprise 
with the Japanese we must remember that they still hold, and in- 
sist upon holding, the fruits of the diplomatic move that was so 
treacherous that the highest statesmen in Japan were ashamed to 



CHINA AND ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 249 

own it, and adopted the unprecedented expedient of lying to the 
whole world. 

To come back to the question of Japanese-American cooperation, 
a commercial alliance with Japan would now emphasize our incon- 
sistencies, would prove us willing to overlook all the outrages which 
Japan has perpetrated against China and against us during these 
four years, and would be tangible evidence of an American sanction 
of Japanese political and commercial methods and of a willing- 
ness to participate in Japanese spoils. I do not believe that if the 
American people saw the cooperation proposition in this light 
which is the light in which we all see it out here, they would sanc- 
tion such cooperation ; for I believe that the American people have 
too high a standard of both commercial and of international honor 
and are too sincere in their present war aims. 

These arguments are, however, based purely on moral grounds, 
and the appeal is not strictly practical. I know that to prove to 
the business man that Japanese-American cooperation is bad busi- 
ness one has to demonstrate that it is not only immoral, but in- 
expedient and unprofitable as well. When [name omitted] first 
arrived here as a representative of [name omitted] he argued that 
while it would be no credit to us to enter into commercial relations 
with the Japanese, it was essential, because America .either would 
not or could not afford sufficient protection to business in a coun- 
try like China, where investments were precarious, to warrant 
the investor in putting up his money, while Japan always took 
care of the interest of her subjects and would protect American 
interests as well as if they came in under the Japanese standard. 

Now, such an argument as this should be sufficient to shame most 
of us into disclaiming all connection with the cooperation scheme, 
but since [name omitted] came out here with that idea, and since 
the representatives of several big American corporations in this 
country have been known to make similar statements, it must 
be assumed that there are great interests at home controlled by 
men who are either ignorant enough or shameless enough to make 
such statements and to believe them, and who are willing to do 
business under such auspices as the Japanese would provide in 
China, if there was any profit in it. 

Obviously the thing to impress upon these people, to whom one 
cannot plead justice or morality, is that Japan's power to get 
business and protect it in this country is a power which cannot 
possibly survive the war if the East is again thrown open to free 
competition, because the„methods and policies by which her in- 
fluence is acquired will not be tolerated for a day by any other 



250 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

nation when Europe is at liberty to think of something other 
than the war in France. Japan's prestige among the Chinese has 
been acquired by force and corruption, and is not founded upon 
superior knowledge of the country or of the people, as the 
Japanese are fond of telling the American business world. While 
Japan is using her purchased official puppets in Peking to ac- 
quire control over Chinese liberties and national properties, she 
is arousing among the Chinese people a bitter antagonism which 
will not be forgotten in generations. Remove the coercive power 
behind Japanese enterprises and the element of corruption from 
Sino-Japanese official relations in Peking, and Japan's good-will 
in this country will not only be worthless, but a tide of reaction 
against the Japanese will set in which would not only hamper 
Japanese trade in China, but will handicap every line of enter- 
prise allied with Japanese business men at a time when the latter 
are earning as much opprobrium as profit. America would cer- 
tainly share in the opprobrium, whether or not the Japanese see 
fit to make any division of the spoils; and when the time comes 
after the war for putting an end to the Japanese practices which 
are so inconsistent with our war policies and with our Anglo-Saxon 
conception of fair dealing that we must make war upon them in 
one way or another to prove our consistency, American commerce 
will and should be involved in the collapse of Japanese trade and 
will be equally discredited throughout the Orient. Our only asset 
in this country in the past has been Chinese good-will. We could 
always get nearly as much from the Chinese by asking for it as 
the Japanese could get by force or bribery, and if a check is put 
upon Japan's present policy in Peking, this Chmese good-will will 
still be a most valuable asset, unless at that time we have sacrificed 
it by becoming implicated with Japan. 

Nearly every military and naval authority who has been in the 
East recently has assured us that Japan is no longer a military 
menace, that her military resources in a modern war would be ex- 
hausted in six months, and that she has not the wealth or the de- 
veloped industries to maintain an army in the field for long even 
if she were given ample time for preparation. We are told that 
the European and American governments no longer entertain any 
fear of Japan's possible movements, and that any false step on 
her part could be checked with veiy little effort and expenditure 
at almost any juncture. 

This means that we have no reason to fear Japan, as both Japa- 
nese and Chinese seem to believe we have, and that when the vast 
Occidental armies now in Europe are at liberty to set elsewhere, 



CHINA AND ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 251 

there will be no difficulty in impressing upon Japan, if it is neces- 
sary, our disapproval of her policy on the continent of Asia, or 
of the advantage which she takes of our preoccupation in these 
four years. Consistency and honor demand that we must have some 
settlement, that Japan must be checked and corrected in some way. 
Those who have been storing up data in the various foreign offices, 
who have been keeping elaborate records and hies, and have also 
been storing up indignation for four years, are going to insist 
upon some sort of a settlement, and the enormous growth of the 
militaiy power of America and Great Britain insures that it will 
be possible to dictate to Japan where and how her reform shall 
begin. There is little reason to doubt that it will begin in China, 
and that the end of the war will mark the end of the present 
Japanese tactics, and at the same time the end of the peculiar trade 
advantages dependent upon them which Japan is offering to Amer- 
ica as her share of the capital in a cooperation scheme. 

The advantages which Japan's partners would enjoy for the 
period of the war would then disappear, and the disadvantage of 
having been allied with an unscrupulous bully would begin to ap- 
pear. I cannot see how any one familiar with the trend of opinion 
in the East and in the various foreign offices at home, unless he 
is either extremely short-sighted or content with a brief period 
of exploitation, can hope for any advantage or profit from an 
alliance with an unscrupulous nation whose Nemesis is fairlv upon 
it. 

The only reason that Japanese policy in China is not now as 
well advertised and as cordially denounced as German policy in 
Europe is that those who have not yet realized Japan's power- 
lessness to do us any harm consider it expedient to reserve judg- 
ment until after the war. Any one who would now propose a com- 
mercial alliance with the Germans in Belgium or Poland would 
have short shrift; but there is no reason in the minds of most of 
us out here who have a daily opportunity to read denunciations 
of German policy and to consider with what remarkable fitness 
could we substitute "Japanese" for "German" wherever the latter 
word occurs, for showing any more consideration for those who 
suggest a commercial alliance with Japan for the exploitation of 
China; and we do not believe that much more consideration will 
be shown when the war is over and the Allies are free to put into 
practice here the theories and ideals which have been evolved from 
their experience with the Germans. 

The suggestion which you made of allying ourselves with the 
Japanese in order to correct them, of taking them into partner- 



252 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

ship so as to educate them up to our standard of international 
decency and fair play, is also subject to an odious comparison with 
a similar hypothetical proposition to take the Germans into a 
close alliance in the development of much abused European states 
for the benevolent purpose of humanizing and educating the Ger- 
mans. It is not our Western practice to join bandit forces in 
order to show the bandits the errors of their ways, nor do we 
take our outlaws into our armies and make officers of them, as the 
Chinese sometimes do, in order to avoid the painful duty of set- 
tling with them. If the sins of the Japanese, political and com- 
mercial, were due entirely to folly and ignorance, and if they were 
in a sufficiently modest state of mind to accept tuition, some such 
suggestion as yours might seem a particularly charitable and kindly 
one; but, as you know, the egotism of the Japanese mihtary party, 
which now controls the nation's policy, is rivaled only by the am- 
bitious scope and brutality of that policy, and the Japanese Gov- 
ernment will never accept teaching or improve its international 
manners voluntarily until it has been demonstrated that better 
behavior can be forced from it. The Japanese are a people, or 
rather the Japanese Government is a Government, which we can- 
not take into our arms, but must take by the ear. When the time 
comes for such treatment to be administered, as it must come if 
our present war apostles are not hypocrites, we do not want to 
see our American business men taken by the ear also for being 
caught in bad company, and I do not believe that if our American 
business men fully realized what they were in for, they would want 
to be caught under any such circumstances. 

After this war is over, we are going to be in as good a position 
to command the Chinese and Japanese respect for our vested in- 
terests in the Orient as any nation on earth, and if we are then tied 
up with a chastened and disgraced Japan, we shall be carrying a 
discreditable burden instead of working with an ally. We do not 
want any monopoly or any unusual privileges in this part of the 
world. We shall be amply satisfied with equal opportunity, and 
we shall be in the best possible position to insist upon equal op- 
portunity both in our dealing with China and in our relations 
with the other powers if we do not besmirch our reputation now 
by joining Japan in her filching exploits behind the world's back. 

China as a nation is now chaotic. The people of this country, 
who have given the whole East their civilization and whose indus- 
try has been the foundation of much wealth and power through 
many ages, have just emerged from a long period of darkness and 
have not yet found themselves. They are working very slowly 



CHINA AND ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 253 

toward a realization of democracy, of which they have just sufficient 
conception to keep them groping ahead, and while they are reach- 
ing out they are being devoured by a parasitical official class, 
totally lacking in all sense of responsibility, ambitious only for the 
wealth which they can strip from the awakened slumberer before 
he rubs his eyes, and now sold, body and soul, to the Japanese 
expansionists, who are interested in keeping the befuddled giant 
tormented and distracted while they get the pickings from his 
pockets away from the official pilferers. 

Toward such a people the Americans and the British, who have 
been educated for a good many centuries in the morality of fair 
play and of giving every one a chance, should be particularly sym- 
pathetic and helpful, and should at least use what power and in- 
fluence they may have over the tormentors to restrain them. All 
that China wants is that time to come to herself and a chance to 
work and fight out her problems in her own way, the right of a 
weak nation to develop her strength and her national character 
without malicious interference. If the Japanese hand were with- 
drawn from the support of the evils which are dragging China 
into deeper and deeper humiliation every day, the Chinese people 
would be free and able to fight them and eventually to conquer 
them, and to set up a clean and substantial government under 
which all the protection that any of us need would be afforded 
without the necessity for disgraceful and compromising alliances. 

This very long letter does not exhaust any of the questions 
with which it deals, of course; and, because the subject is so big, 
it is almost impossible to cite illustrations and proofs for every 
statement; but if there is anything in it which you feel inclined to 
challenge, I suggest that you call upon [names omitted] to supply 
you with illustrative cases, citing places, dates, etc., and I am sure 
they will swamp you with evidence. I trust that you will have a 
pleasant trip in America and that you will find opportunity to 
tell a few people at home just how we look at things out here. You 
might always add with truth and accuracy that these opinions are 
not held by Americans alone, but are shared by Britishers in par- 
ticular, and by virtually all other Occidentals in general. 

Yours A^ery truly, 

As an example of how other foreign business in China felt 
regarding the Japanese-American cooperation scheme, may 
be quoted some comment of the "Peking and Tientsin Times" 
(British), in its issue of January 9, 1918: 



254 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

Now most of us in the Orient would rather not do business than 
to do it on these terms. The rest of us might be willing to shelve 
our scruples and turn our trade over to Japanese agents if we 
thought that the benefits to be gained would be permanent. None 
of us in the Orient believes now that Japanese methods or Japa- 
nese prestige are going to outhve this European war. As long as 
we believe that the Allied and American governments are sincere 
in the announced principles for which they are fighting, and as long 
as we believe in their ultimate victory, we must believe that both 
Japanese influence and Japanese methods in this country are going 
to be effectually checked after the war. While we have this faith 
we must also believe that any American interest allied with Jap- 
anese interests and established by Japanese methods will be sub- 
ject to the same check. If we had not this faith we should still 
be loth to believe that American interests entrusted to the Japanese 
would be handled to the ultimate profit of anyone but the Japanese. 
American money will be used to establish a Japanese trade mo- 
nopoly in China. If the post-bellum readjustments do not make 
an end of Japanese commercial policy in China, as we believe, 
then American money will have helped Japan to establish a system 
which will put independent American, British and French trade 
in this country at the mercy of Japan, and will leave the Japanese 
free to crowd their American partners out of the cooperative 
scheme at their earliest pleasure. It must be clearly manifest 
to every American in the East that the cooperative scheme is com- 
mercially immoral in the first place, and that apart from all moral 
issues it is fatally shortsighted, no matter how conditions are 
adjusted after the war. 

The cooperation plan has also strategical military aspects. 
I quote from a report made by a military expert in 1917 : 

The example set them by the previous attempts at business coopera- 
tion (in China) between the British and Germans, and its attendant 
dangers, seems to have had little or no effect upon American 
business men, for they are falling into the same trap set by the 
Japanese. Let alone the utter foobshness of the arrangement 
viewed from a business standpoint, considering that big business 
of all kinds in Japan is under the dictation of the Japanese Gov- 
ernment to a greater degree than it is in Prussia, there is the ad- 
ditional point of assisting financially what we may assume to be 
a potential, if not a certain enemy. From the military standpoint, 
everything possible should be dona to discourage sueh cooperation. 



CHINA AND ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM 255 

While I agree with the estimate of Japan's policy toward 
China given in the letter previously quoted, I feel that the 
writer's justifiable aspersions of corrupt Chinese officials who 
have for their own pecuniary gain been willing and conscious 
agents of Japan's schemes may create a wrong impression. 
The writer of the letter omits (he could not be ignorant of the 
facts) to mention that class of Chinese officials outnumbering 
the venal ones, who through all this period have resisted at- 
tempts to corrupt and intimidate them, and who never have 
relaxed their efforts to protect their country. 

As to the purely business aspect of the cooperation plan, 
I never have met an American business man who had five 
years' experience in the far East (I don't mean a long-range 
connection) who did not believe that cooperation with Jap- 
anese in China will be as detrimental to the balance-sheet of 
American business, as it plainly is inimical to any just inter- 
pretation of American political purposes and commitments 
there. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 

Definition of the open door — Talk with Viscount Motono — China, 
Japan, and America — Monroe Doctrine and Hay Doctrine compared — 
Their principles identical — The Japanese Monroe Doctrine for China 
— False analogies — Causes for failure of the Hay Doctrine — Nullified by 
private agreements — Japan and the open door — Manchuria a test case 
— Japan's discriminations there — Spy and police systems — Making it 
unpleasant for other foreigners — Influence over Chinese officials — Reac- 
tions from the Lansing-Ishii agreement — Japanese interpretation ac- 
cepted — Special antagonism to Americans — Incidents showing Japanese 
contempt for Europeans — Case of British woman missionary — Japan 
exercising sovereign authority — Summary of methods handicapping 
American trade in Manchuria and Shantimg — The mail and shipping 
matters — Views of American organizations. 

WHAT is the open-door in China? Broadly speak- 
ing, it is a political principle designed to apply to 
international commerce; and like a contract, it 
must be construed by the adjustment of particular instances 
to the basic principle of the agreement. I have not seen any 
really authoritative or official definition of the open door, but 
I have my own idea of what it is or should be in its applica- 
tion in China. In September, 1917, I passed through Japan 
en route to America, and I had a talk with Viscount Motono, 
then Japanese minister of foreign affairs, at Tokio. It was 
understood, at Viscount Motono 's request, that the conversa- 
tion was private and that I would not publish what he said, 
which I have not, although, as a Japanese diplomat who was 
present afterward remarked, there was nothing said that 
might not have been published without any impropriety. 
However, I did make a confidential memorandum of the con- 
versation, and it may be interesting now to quote a few para- 
graphs from it. 

256 



THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 257 

I said that, by way of opening the conversation, it would be 
well to find out where we were in agreement and where we 
disagreed, and to that end I would beg to state some of my 
own opinions. I said that in my opinion it was of little use 
to try to bring a genuine improvement of the situation em- 
braced in the triangle of Japan, China, and the United States, 
with the questions arising from that juxtaposition, until 
these nations were fully agreed on the definition of treaties; 
and definition of treaties means a definition of terms. I felt 
that there could be no real understanding until all the na- 
tions that have subscribed to the open-door and integrity of 
China principles were agreed as to what these phrases mean 
in practice. There cannot be any real sympathy between 
Japanese and American policies toward China as long as, for 
instance, Japan understands the open door to mean one thing 
and the United States understands it to mean something else, 
or while Japan places a construction on the integrity of China 
that works out diametrically opposite to the American theory. 

Viscount Motono replied that he agreed with that state- 
ment, and he asked me to give my definition of the open door 
as it should be practised. 

I then stated that I understood the open door to relate 
particularly, perhaps exclusively, to commerce in China and 
with China, commerce to include, of course, all financial and 
industrial enterprises which are directly or indirectly a part 
of general commercial operations. My idea of the open door 
in commerce would be, to give a concrete example, if British, 
German, Japanese, and American firms were competing in 
China, trying to sell railway supplies or machinery for a fac- 
tory, this competition should be confined strictly to legitimate 
business methods and should be determined on that basis. 
If, for instance, a Japanese firm found itself defeated by one 
of its competitors, it should not be able to invoke the further 
support of the diplomacy of the Japanese Government, ap- 
plied by means of pressure backed by force or by the implied 
or actual threat of force, or of any diplomatic reprisal against 



258 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

China. My idea of a real open door in China would inhibit 
the method that is coming to be called economic imperialism. 
I said that it had not been the practice of the United States 
Government, even in regions where the Monroe Doctrine is 
held to apply, to sustain the commercial efforts of its nationals 
beyond the point of legitimate and open aid of the depart- 
ments organized for this work (consular and commerce), and 
consequently such extra methods by other governments in 
China or elsewhere placed American enterprises at a disad- 
vantage which could not fail to cause irritations, and to be 
provocative of a similar diplomatic policy by the United 
States, a situation containing serious possibilities for war, 
and which had caused a good deal of irritation in the relations 
of Japan and America. 

Viscount Motono replied that he agreed with this definition 
of the open door, which has accorded with the policy of the 
Japanese Government. 

I said that I could not feel that the relations of Japan and 
America vis-a-vis China could proceed harmoniously as long 
as Japan was disposed to pursue a policy of economic impe- 
rialism in China and was disposed to assert or to claim a spe- 
cial position toward China or any kind of paramountcy in 
China in a political and economic sense. Of course it would 
follow naturally that the development of international trade 
with and in China would proceed unevenly as among com- 
peting nations ; that some nations, having special advantages 
of location or otherwise, would gain over other nations by 
legitimate process. Americans could not object if for those 
reasons they were unable to be the first in helping to develop 
China. What they do want, and should demand, is equal 
opportunity as to the conditions of international trade with 
and in China, subject to no discrimination or preference ex- 
cept such as might be voluntarily instituted by the Chinese 
Government by formal treaties and for sufiicient reasons re- 
lating to China's own just requirements. I further said that 
as a resident of and a friend of China I must regard as being 



THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 259 

invidious to China, and also injurious to the status and de- 
velopment of American interests there, any policy of "peace- 
ful penetration" there by any foreign nation which aimed at, 
and would have the effect of subordinating, the economic de- 
velopment of China to the control of foreign nations, and I 
must sympathize with the natural objections of Chinese to 
such a process and aid them in resisting it. 

Viscount Motono replied that he recognized that the com- 
mercial theory known as economic imperialism is doomed by 
the defeat of Germany, and Japan is prepared to abandon it 
if the other principal nations will. He remarked, as ex- 
plaining Japan's seeming adoption of that policy, that Japan 
had done this in self-defense, as a precautionary measure. 
He felt that such a policy would be inconsistent with the 
status of international relations that was being aimed at by 
the Allied nations opposed to Germany, and Japan was ready 
to do her part in bringing a better state of affairs. 

I said that in respect to the integrity of China I could not 
regard any assertion or claim by Japan of a special position 
or paramountey in China as compatible with a genuine in- 
tegrity of China. I asked if the Ishii mission to America had 
any purpose to urge such a claim for Japan or to induce the 
United States to acquiesce with it. 

Viscount Motono replied that the Ishii mission was not 
ended, and consequently it would not be discreet to speak of 
it too definitely before its results were known. 

Although Viscount Motono has since died, I feel that no 
confidence is violated now in making public my recollection of 
his comments about the open door made less than eighteen 
months ago ; indeed, after the interview — I sailed for America 
an hour after the talk ended — a Japanese diplomat told an- 
other man that the caution about privacy was not necessary, 
as nothing was said by Viscount Motono that could not be 
published. 

In speaking to Vissount Motono on that occasion, I men- 



260 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

tioned the Monroe Doctrine with a purpose. For several 
years past, and until very recently, Japan's propaganda has 
striven to compare Japan's attitude toward China with the 
objects, purposes, and results of the Monroe Doctrine. A 
falser comparison hardly could be imagined. In one of my 
pre\dous books, "Our Eastern Question," published in 1916, 
I discussed the so-called "Japanese Monroe Doctrine for 
China" at considerable length, and wrote: 

Thus we see that the Monroe Doctrine was intended to accom- 
plish two principal things — (a) To preserve the territorial integrity 
and political autonomy of the weak American republics; (b) To 
sec2ire and preserve in those countries the commercial principle of 
the Open-Door for all nations. And when we look back at the 
record of history, from the enunciation of the doctrine to the pres- 
ent day, we see clearly that it has worked out that way. 

Suppose that the United States had used, or would hereafter 
use, the Monroe Doctrine to apply in South America a commercial 
and financial policy like Japan has practised in Korea and Man- 
churia, and which is embodied in her demands on China in 1915. 
Suppose that the Monroe Doctrine would be construed to mean 
that no railway could be built in South America except under con- 
ditions dictated by the United States; that no mines or other natural 
resources could be exploited there without the United States being 
first consulted ; that no foreign loan could be made to any South 
American nation without the consent of the United States being 
first obtained, and except with American participation (whether 
Americans had the money to lend or not) : that the United States 
must be consulted in all important industrial enterprises requiring 
foreign capital; that Americans must be employed as political, 
financial, and military advisers to South American Governments; 
that South American Governments must consult the United States 
when they want to purchase armaments, and must purchase a ma- 
jority of such supplies from the United States; that when foreign 
capital is used to build railways in those countries, American man- 
agers must be employed, and the traffic rates be fixed so as to give 
American commodities an advantage over other foreign goods; 
that supplies used in railways and other utilities in those countries 
must be purchased in the United States, or be purchased through 
American firms; that American goods entering those countries will 
be given preferential customs rates; that Americans shall have a 
right to own lands and reside in all parts of South America, and 



THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 261 

not be subject to the laws of those countries; that Americans must 
be heads of police in important South American cities; that South 
American Governments could not lease any of their own territories 
without first consulting the United States; that no contracts to build 
naval bases or harbor works in those countries would be permitted 
without first obtaining the consent of the United States; that the 
United States would have to be consulted when South American 
countries desired to change their fiscal systems. 

Every condition I have enumerated, Japan already has put into 
effect in Manchuria, and wherever she has succeeded in establish- 
ing a sphere of influence. If the United States placed such a con- 
struction on the Monroe Doctrine, for how long would other Powers 
accept the doctrine without protest? 

Is that how a Jap-ized Monroe Doctrine for China, and the 
Orient, will work out? Is what Japan is trying to do in China 
today rightly comparable to President Monroe's purposes when 
he formulated his famous doctrine? The Monroe Doctrine was de- 
signed to protect the political autonomy of the countries it covers, 
and to preserve the "open door" there, and has done it. In short, 
the Monroe Doctrine, in its theory, and also in its practical ap- 
plication, is almost exactly what the territorial integrity and open 
door doctrines in respect to China are, as they were originally ad- 
vocated by Great Britain, and afterwards formulated by the United 
States. So there is already one Monroe Doctrine that applies to 
China — a doctrine which all the Powers interested in the fate of 
China have subscribed to, and which presumably is still binding 
upon them, since none of them has openly repudiated it. 

Japanese have a completely different idea of the Monroe 
Doctrine than Americans usually have. In a recent editorial 
(February 13, 1919) on "The Monroe Doctrine and Japan," 
the "Japan Chronicle" said: 

There are few political phrases which have been subjected to sucH 
contradictory' interpretations as the Monroe doctrine To one group 
it represents a cheek on imperialistic aggression and a protection 
of democracy, to the other the predominance of a strong and power- 
ful State over the others within its immediate influence. The Japa- 
nese invariably interpret the Monroe doctrine in the latter sense. 

Analysis of the causes for the failure of the Hay Doctrine 
to solve the question of^ international political and trade riv- 
alries in China shows that its weakness, or what made it in- 



262 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

effective, was that the powers that were parties to it, except 
America, also had other agreements with one another based 
on the sphere of influence thesis, and when a practical issue 
would arise, they invariably would give weight and authority 
to the private agreements rather than to the open interna- 
national doctrine.^ In short, a majority of the powers did 
not want the Hay Doctrine to work in practice, apparently 
believing that their own advantage lay in protecting by pri- 
vate agreements their own spheres and special concessions. 

The history of the open-door doctrine may be divided into 
three periods : first, from its acceptance in 1889 to the Russo- 
Japanese War ; second, from the conclusion of the Russo-Jap- 
anese "War in 1905 to the great World War ; third, from the 
beginning of the World War in 1914 to the present. The 
first period was marked by an apparent effort of several pow- 
ers to readjust their policies in China in accordance with a 
genuine acceptance of the principle. The second period 
marked the appearance of Japan on the continent and the re- 
vival of the sphere of influence idea by all the powers except- 
ing America. In the third period Japan played practically 
a lone hand. 

Japan's policy in its relation to the open door in the years 
following the Russo-Japanese War, which gave Japan control 
of Korea and a strong foothold in Manchuria, is extensively 
reviewed by me in previous books ("America and the Far 
Eastern Question," 1909; and "Our Eastern Question," 
1916) ; but it was not until the Great War that Japan's pol- 
icy was fully displayed. Prior to that time all the powers 
were jealous of their interests and positions in China, and 
were able to support them effectively. During the war, un- 
til near its end. Great Britain, France, and Russia were 
forced, or felt compelled, to subordinate their interests in 

1 A good example of this process is the defeat of the Knox proposal 
to neutralize railways in Manchuria, a full account of which is given, 
with the diplomatic notes, in Chapter I of "Our Eastern Question." 
Also see Appendix A. 



THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 263 

China to more pressing exigencies, and the United States was 
disinclined to strong action in the East. In these circum- 
stances Japan's policy came out in its true colors. 

In a conversation I had at Peking soon after the Russo- 
Japanese War with the late W. W. Rockwell, then American 
minister to China and later ambassador to Russia and Turkey, 
we were discussing the situation in Manchuria, where I had 
just been, and he remarked: "Manchuria will provide the 
real test of the open-door policy." I have traveled in Man- 
churia frequently in the course of the last fifteen years and 
have considerable firsthand knowledge of conditions which 
in that period have existed there, and one is tempted to re- 
view them. But perhaps the best, and also the more credible, 
picture of recent events there as they touch the open door is 
found in the numerous reports of official agents of foreign 
governments who have investigated, and who have resided in 
the country. I shall quote from some of these recent reports, 
without stating how they came into my possession, except 
that in no case did I obtain them from the men who prepared 
them. 

Dated, January 16, 1918. 

Subject, Japanese Ways of Hampering Foreign Trade in 
Manchuria 

I have the honor to state that the Japanese in Manchuria not 
only contrive special advantages for themselves in contravention of 
the open door principle — as reported from time to time — but they 
manage in various ways to hamper the commercial operations of 
Europeans and Americans through their control of public and 
quasi-public utilities, and through the questionable methods which 
they are willing to adopt in fighting foreign competitors. Their 
spy and police systems are very highly developed in this region 
and the movements of all foreigners are closely watched and re- 
ported to police headquarters. The information is given to the 
Japanese who are able to use it to the best advantage. Between 
the Japanese secret service men who pester travelers with ques- 
tions and surveillance, hotels which pry into one's private affairs 
as well as baggage, telephone operators who report conversations, 
telegraph clerks who work similarly, the post office which opens 



264 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

the eorrespondenee, and railway employes who cooperate with the 
rest, there is not much about the foreign business man which is not 
known to the Japanese authorities. 

The most recent and interesting case in point is that of Mr. W. 
F. Thomas, agent of the Geo. A. Watson Tobacco Company of 
Danville, Virginia. He came to Manchuria last year to sell to- 
bacco. Upon his arrival he remarked to an American that he 
had been followed by Japanese who were evidently bent on know- 
ing all about his business and he expressed the hope that they 
would not pry hito his trunks containing samples. The American 
replied that Mr. Thomas could consider himself fortunate if the 
Japanese did nothing more than examine his trunks ; that they 
would not hesitate to steal them if they thought that this would 
hamper his business. Two days later Mr. Thomas reported that 
the trunk with all of his samples had been stolen while it was 
in charge of the South Manehurian Railway. In a letter of Octo- 
ber 18, 1917, the Geo. A. Watson Tobacco Company described the 
incident as follows: "In August we sent our representative, Mr. 
W^ F. Thomas, to the East to solicit business. In passing through 
Japan his sample trunk was robbed and every sample taken, the 
trunk being afterward returned to him empty. This happened 
between Mukden and Antung on or about August 21 on the South 
Manehurian Railway. Mr. Thomas seems to think that the rob- 
bery was committed by the people in authority for the purpose 
of discouraging American business houses seeking to develop to- 
bacco business in Manchuria and China." This is by no means 
the first time that trunks or their contents have disappeared in 
this way, but the circumstances of this ease are striking and sug- 
gestive. 

Japanese hotels in Manchuria because of the large subsidies 
which they receive and tlieir special railway privileges have driven 
most other hotels out of business. The foreign commercial traveler 
therefore is in some Japanese hotel during most of his stay in 
Manchuria and is obliged to depend on them almost entirely. 
Some of these Japanese hotels have lately shown an open and 
decided hostility to Americans. An agent of the Standard Oil 
Company of New York went to Supingkai recently — since the Ishii 
mission was accomplished, in fact — and was met at the train by 
a runner from the Japanese hotel who asked him to stop there. 
He went along with the runner and when he arrived at the hotel 
there was some inquiry as to his nationality. He told the hotel 
people that he was an American. The hotel people replied: "Oh, 
we thought that you were English; we are very sorry, but we have 



THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 265 

no room for you." He told them that any kind of a room would 
do, but they refused absolutely to give him any accommodation 
and turned him away. He related this incident to an American 
traveler for the British-American Tobacco Company who moves 
about a gTeat deal in this region. The latter stated that he has 
been treated with so much contempt and discourtesy and rudeness 
as an American at the Japanese hotels in Manchuria that he had 
got the habit of registering as an Englishman, and was thus able 
to obtain accommodations and good service. 

The attitude of the Japanese telephone company here is in keep- 
ing with the policy above described. The manager of the Stand- 
ard Oil Company has been trying for more than six months to 
have a telephone installed. Two months ago the workmen went 
to the company's native agency, where oil is also stored, and an- 
nounced their intention of putting in the telephone. They began 
the work shortly before lunch time and said that they wanted to 
cook their food on the premises. The Chinese agent refused to 
let them cook it where they wanted to because he was afraid that 
the oil might become ignited. The Japanese thereupon became 
highly indignant and went away, and refuse now to put the tele- 
phone in at all. This is not the only Japanese difficulty which the 
agent has had however. At another place he called for the long 
distance service in order to talk with the Tiehling agent, etc. 

In a report from Antung some years ago, entitled : "Japanese 
Fraud, as it affects the open door," I mentioned the case of a 
British sawmill which was placed at a disadvantage in competition 
with the Japanese mills on account of certain Japanese fraudulent 
practices. Not long afterward the British sawmill was destroyed 
by fire under very mysterious circumstances. While nothing posi- 
tive could be proven against the Japanese^ there was excellent rea- 
son to believe that they were instrumental in causing the destruc- 
tion. The same may be said of the fire here which destroyed the 
factory of the British-American Tobacco Company. Like the fires 
which are occurring now along the waterfronts of America, the 
fires above mentioned are difficult to trace, but the peculiar com- 
bination of circumstances just at the time of the conflagration are 
very suggestive to say the least, and the occurrence of these fires 
in Manchuria do not encourage the investment of foreign capital 
in enterprises here. [Other instances given] 

While the blandishments of Viscount Ishii were calculated to 
show how carefully the Japanese keep the "open door" ajar, there 
is much evidence tending to prove that the fraudulent and cunning 
practices of the Japanese in this region destroy the "equality of 



266 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

commercial opportunity" which is supposed to exist, and make 
the "open door" more fictitious than real. Several reports in this 
regard have already been submitted and more are now in the 
course of preparation. Material m this connection is being con- 
stantly gathered and will be submitted from time to time in re- 
ports of this nature so that some adequate opinion may be formed 
as to just what extent the "open door" is really open under the 
auspices of the Japanese in a region where their ''special interests" 
have now been formally recognized by the American Government. 

Extracts from Report dated June 27, 1918 

Referring to my despatches to the Department Nos. 113, 125 
and 127, all sent through the Legation, I have the honor to further 
state that the Japanese enjoy special financial and commercial ad- 
vantages (in Manchuria) not only according to the local Chinese 
practice, but according to theory as well. In a recent conversa- 
tion with the (Chinese) Governor General concerning the failure 
of (Chinese) officials in this province to give Americans and 
Europeans the rights which are enjoyed by the Japanese, he prac- 
tically said that Americans should be the last to complain, as we 
formally and officially recognized Japan's special interests in this 
region and that we cannot be surprised when they take advantage 
of such a declaration and demand special treatment and get it. 
I tried, of course, to give the Governor General the view of our 
recognition of special interests which our Government tried to offer, 
but he, like most Chinese, did not take the explanation as any- 
thing which really explained, and said that such a recognition of 
special interests must have meant something special and it implied 
that the Japanese had something which others could not expect 
to have, and therefore, why do we now expect it? I feel certain 
now, as I wrote officially long before we recognized Japanese 
"special interests," that such a formal recognition will prove to 
be extremely embarrassing when we come to demand equal treat- 
ment with the Japanese, and the conversation above mentioned 
indicates the effect upon the Chinese official mind which the recogni- 
tion has had and which it is likely to have after the Japanese care- 
fully foster such a belief on the part of the Chinese. While the 
American government carefully sought to safeguard our interests 
by emphasizing the equal rights which are enjoyed according to 
the "open door" theory, the reiteration of this oft-repeated state- 
ment did not impress the Chinese 1/100 as much as the startling 
recognition of Japanese special interests which they take to mean 
something very special that somehow places the Japanese on a 



THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 267 

higher political and commercial plane in the region to which this 
theory applies. 

Enclosed is a copy of a letter about the special treatment of 
the Japanese as regards the financial situation here and a copy 
of the reply received from the Special Delegate for Foreign Af- 
fairs (Chinese). It will be seen from the latter that the Special 
Delegate shares the view of the Governor General that the Jap- 
anese are entitled to special treatment — probably because of their 
"special interests," although he does not expressly say so. He 
does say, however: 

"The general conditions relating to the merchants and citizens 
of your nation (America) are not the same as those affecting the 
Japanese; therefore, they can be treated only in accordance with 
arrangements made for the Chinese. The method adopted is dif- 
ferent, hilt there is nothing in contravention of the existing 
treaties." 

That the Delegate for Foreign Affairs here should have the 
effrontery probably with the concurrence of the Governor General 
(for he seldom acts in such matters alone) to maintain in writing 
that American citizens are not entitled to the same treatment as 
the Japanese, is a matter of the gravest importance and calls for 
the most drastic diplomatic action, it seems to me. And this 
statement by him has been made in spite of the repeated and em- 
phatic declaration on the part of this office that we demand and 
will insist upon equal rights. 

The correspondence enclosed will also show that the Chinese 
authorities here, prior to June 8th, warned the Japanese Consul 
General about the danger of accepting notes issued by the Bank 
of Territorial Development, requesting him to notify the Japanese 
merchants accordingly. On June 13th he (the Delegate for Foreign 
Affairs) said that he was just about to write to this office in this 
regard. It is probable that he had no such intention, and if he 
did have any such intention the question arises as to why the 
Japanese Consul General should have the information so far in 
advance of all others. His letter to me was dated June 13th and 
received on the evening of that day, yet he says that all holdings 
of Americans (of the bank notes) should be reported to him be- 
fore the 14th, an absolute impossibility. 

"When the Bank of Territorial Development was closed, its notes 
immediately dropped in value and many refused to accept them 
at any price. The Japanese, knowing that they were safe on 
account of their preferential treatment in such matters — as has 
been frequently reported by this office — bought the depreciated, 



268 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

notes at a heavy discount, and foreign firms sold at a loss in order 
to avoid being loaded down with paper worthless to them. This 
office assured all Americans concerned that every effort would be 
made to have all notes redeemed for them on the same terms as 
for the Japanese, but they felt that the Japanese have such a 
hold throughout China as well as in Manchuria that there is no 
real assurance of equal treatment. When the Japanese flout the 
British and American governments, and British and Americans 
in China lose confidence in their governments' willingness or ability 
to protect them, it is, I believe, high time that some decisive and 
definite steps be taken to dispel such impressions and to maintain 
the dignity and prestige of these two gTeat occidental nations. 
The Japanese also should be made to see that they cannot steal 
a march on their Allies in any such manner and obtain special 
advantages from the Chinese government and use them in driving 
out their western competitors. The enclosed correspondence and 
the letters in this connection received and sent by my British 
colleague are absolutely identical. We decided to take similar 
action in order to bring the greater pressure to bear upon the local 
Chinese authorities, and we now both agreed that all local resources 
are exhausted and have decided to present the whole matter to 
our respective Legations for settlement. The question has reached 
a very critical stage and requires the strongest kind of diplomatic 
pressure, as predicted in my previous despatches. 

That the situation described in reports on this subject is incom- 
patible with the "open door" theory is very evident. The "open 
door" in China is a trap-door for us to fall through when the 
Japanese are ready to release the spring. They are perfecting 
the apparatus from day to day and unless adequate steps are 
taken we shall assuredly be the victims. 

As the Governor General and the Delegate for Foreign Affairs 
are thoroughly acquainted with the views of my colleague and 
myself, and as we have repeatedly expressed ourselves concerning 
the equal rights which we demand for British and Americans 
and, as both the Chinese officials not only disregard but seora 
the representations which we have made, it is time for pressure 
to be exerted from above, if such a thing is possible. . . . 

As the Japanese have secured a deposit of three millions gold 
yen to cover any loss which they may incur by accepting the de- 
preciated paper cmreney here — a fact not denied by the Delegate 
for Foreign Affaris in his letter, a copy of which is enclosed — it 
may be that the Americans and British can secure a similar dejjosit, 
or that the suggestion of one might bring the Chinese to terms. 



THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 269 

Some of the Salt Gabelle money, in fact, might be retained for 
this purpose in foreign banks. A proposition like this might 
readily solve the problem. Some solution must be found if Euro- 
pean and American firms are to enjoy that ''equality of com- 
mercial opportunity" which is supposed to exist. 

It is most significant that, after the publication in China of 
the Lansing-Ishii Agreement and the interpretations given to 
that instrument by the Japanese officials and propaganda 
there, Chinese officials in regions with spheres claimed by 
Japan began to act in accordance with the Japanese con- 
ception of the agreement. Incidents of discriminations 
against other foreigners in Manchuria, and especially against 
Americans, were more numerous and provocative than for- 
merly. These incidents became so frequent and pointed that 
the American consul-general at Mukden, on April 9, 1918, 
asked instruction as follows : 

As several Americans in this district have asked what attitude 
they should take toward the impudent and aggressive Japanese 
officials and spies in this region [Manchuria], I should appreciate 
some expression from the Department on this subject, which is 
likely to become very important. I see no reason why the Japa- 
nese Government should not be asked to instruct their detectives 
and other officials in such a way that their objectionable and in- 
sulting activities may at least be mitigated. 

Another incident showing Japanese particular contempt 
for Americans in Manchuria occurred at Mukden in April, 
1915, at the time the twenty-one demands were being pressed 
on China by the Japanese Government, and when the Jap- 
anese press was representing America as being opposed to 
the demands. This was a demonstration conducted by Jap- 
anese troops before the American consulate at Mukden, and 
was officially reported as follows : 

. . . the other party [of Japanese troops], two score or so, 
turned off the main street and proceeded to the American Con- 
sulate General. This is a gToup of old temple buildings with a 
raised gateway facing a- rather wide street. This body of soldiers 
halted directly in front of the Consulate, and the commanding 



270 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

officer stood in the raised gateway directing them while they 
maneuvered for some fifteen minutes. The American flag was fly- 
ing overhead. After a time the soldiers were marched away. 

It is to be emphasized that this demonstration took place near 
the climax of the negotiations over the Twenty-One Demands, 
just before Japan delivered her ultimatum to China and began 
to move troops into Manchuria. Further ... it was the climax 
of a series of outrages [against Americans] by Japanese subjects, 
which had occurred during recent years in Manchuria, and for 
which I believe no real satisfaction had been obtained. These in- 
eluded an assault upon the American Consul at Dalny, an assault 
upon the American Consul at Newchwang, an attack upon the wife 
of the American Consul-General at Mukden. Of course these in- 
cidents all served the purpose of helping to convince the Chinese, 
who are so impressionable in matters of this kind, that America 
had given up interest in Manchuria, and even that America is 
willing to submit to what would appear to Chinese, at least, a 
deliberate and official affront. 

The trueulence of Japanese in China, and especially in 
Manchuria and Shantung has been growing ever since the 
Russo-Japanese "War, but it attained a climax in 1918. The 
conduct of Japanese officials and troops in Manchuria led to 
many unpleasant incidents. I overheard a colloquy between 
British and American officials there. 

''The Japanese act now as if they own this country," re- 
marked one. 

''Yes, only they would not dare act in Japan as they do 
here," was the reply, "for in that ease the foreign govern- 
ments would make a fuss." 

One of the most striking demonstrations of this attitude of 
Japanese, or one that caused more than usual indignation 
among other foreigners, was the expprience of a young woman 
attached to the Irish mission at Changchun. Her story, as 
reported in writing to the nearest British consul, follows : 

Irish Mission, Changchun, 
October 3rd, 1918. 
Sir, 

Yesterday afternoon I went for a walk. After a mile or two 
I struck the South Manchuria Railway line at a point I should 



THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 271 

judge to be two or three miles west of Changcliun station. There 
was a good path along by the side of the railway and I decided 
to return home that way as I had done before on several occasions 
without let or hindrance. I had gone about a mile and was just 
about to leave the railway line by a road running south towards 
the Mission House, when I met three Japanese soldiers coming 
from the direction of Changchun station. I was about to pass 
quietly on when one of them blocked my way and pushed me back 
with his hand, shouting something unintelligible. I thought that 
they were merely taldng advantage of my being alone and un- 
protected to indulge in some horse play, so stood my ground. 
They could speak no English and only a word or two of Chinese. 
After a rather fruitless argument in which they were rude and 
impleasant, I decided discretion was the better part of valour, and 
tuned to go back the way I had come only to find that way also 
barred by one of the other soldiers, who threatened to strike me 
if I attempted to pass. There was an embankment on either side. 
I protested that I must be allowed either to go back or go for- 
ward and was thereupon struck forcibly by the soldier in front. 
I regret I lost my temper and struck the man across the face with 
my walking stick. With that the three of them fell upon me. 
They broke my stick in two and beat me with it. They buffeted 
me about the face and head, threw me down and dragged me by 
the hair of the head. They pulled out quantities of my hair and 
broke my combs with the force of their blows. They then sub- 
jected me to a humiliating search, ostensibly for bombs, the de- 
tails of which I do not care to enter into, and fhially bound me 
with a rope and marched me to barracks. While standing in the 
barracks, bound in such a way that I was almost choking, await- 
ing the arrival of the superior officer, two soldiers from, among 
the crowd which had gathered around me struck me across the 
face with great force, I have the marks of their blows still upon 
me. 

When the officer arrived on the scene he ordered me to be un- 
bound and brought into his office, and I must admit that from 
that time on, although I was detained for over three hours and in- 
terviewed by three or four officials, including the Vice Consul, I 
suffered no further ill treatment. 

I should like to emphasize the following facts: That the part 
of the line where I was walking was nowhere near any bridges, 
munition dumps or war materials of any kind; that I was struck 
first by the soldier and that apart from the one blow in self defense 
I offered no resistance to arrest; that after I was bound and help- 



272 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

less I was stuck repeatedly on the head and face and was assaulted 
gratuitously in the barracks by soldiers who had not seen the 
circumstances of my arrest, 

I can see now that to walk along the railway line under pres- 
ent conditions was a mistake as there may be regulations forbid- 
ding it of which I was unaware, but I had walked that way several 
times before without being molested. Granting even that my arrest 
was justifiable, the brutality with which it was effected and the un- 
speakable conduct of the soldiers subsequent to it were utterly 
indefensible and inexcusable. 

Much as I resent the intolerable indignity to which I have been 
subjected I would be glad to avoid the publicity involved in bring- 
ing the matter before you. Sir, but I feel that it is my duty as a 
British subject to bring the facts to your notice. I have also sought 
the advice of the only Anglo-Saxon diplomatic agent at present 
in Changchun, W. M. Palmer, Esq., Commercial Attache to the 
American Legation, who strongly recommends your being informed 
of the occurrence. I have therefore written you full details in 
the hope that you may be able to take the steps necessary to secure 
satisfaction for this and to avoid similar outrages against others 
of my countrjTnen resident in Manchuria. 

I am. Sir, 

Yours faithfully, 

On receipt of this report, a British consular officer went to 
Changchun to make an investigation. He was treated rudely 
by the Japanese consul there, but he obtained most of the 
facts, which he reported to the British legation at Peking. 
As usual in such instances, the Japanese press tried to ob- 
scure and misrepresent the incident. The "Manchurian 
Daily News," organ of the South Manchurian Railway, pub- 
lished in its issue of October 22, 1918 : 

Another Unpleasant Affair Near Changchun 

We are sorry to have to report another unpleasant affair, this 
time involving a British lady missionary at Changchun. The in- 
cident would have been passed over by us if the matter had not 
been carried to the British Legation at Peking. 

On the 2nd inst., about 6 p. m., after the shadows of dusk 
sufficiently deepened as to make it difficult to tell the people's 
faces, the figure of some one taking a walk up and down the rail- 
way track at Shihipu, about three miles south of Changchun, could 



THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 273 

be made out. Lately the fish plates and rivets of the railway 
tracks had often been found removed to the menace of the railway 
traffic. The stranger was found to be a British lady missionary 
residing at Changchun, who, when challenged by one of the Japa- 
nese patrolling soldiers made as if to deal a blow on the soldier 
with a cane carried in hand. This only strengthened the suspicion 
of the Japanese soldier, and the lady was taken to the Railway 
Guard Office, then to the Gendarmery, and lastly to the Consular 
Police. The lady was found in a temper, but, it is said, finally 
owned her own indiscretion in strolling along the railway track 
after dark. She was allowed to go home without further ado. 

It transpired later on that a complaint about an alleged insult 
to a British lady was lodged with the British Consul General, 
Mukden, who hastened in person to Changchun and saw Japanese 
Consul Yamanouehi, demanding an apology from the offending 
Japanese soldier. Mr. Yamanouehi expressed his wonder how it 
was that the lady who had owned her own indiscretion and gone 
home should lay a complaint, but promised to look into the truth 
of the ease for himself. Mr. O'Brien Butler, the British Consul 
General, then returned to Mukden. Before hearing from the Japa- 
nese Consul at Changchun, a version of the incident, as rendered 
by the lady missionary, was transmitted to the British Legation, 
Peking, and the case was duly referi'ed to the Japanese Legation 
people. Thereupon the Legation authorities asked the Consular 
people at Changchim for particulars, and the matter was very 
carefully gone into. 



We should like to hear the story of the other side or at least 
some official account of the regrettable incident before committing 
ourselves to any remarks. However, we are nevertheless sorry 
that another unpleasantry should have thus been added. 

It may be well for us to publish that a Japanese soldier on 
duty is onl}' alive to duty and respects no person. This trait is 
one of the points that make the Japanese soldiers formidable. 
For instance, inside a war zone or even a closely guarded zone, 
any one who fails to respond to a challenge, especially after night- 
fall, made by a Japanese sentry or patrol will be courting the 
danger of being fired at. — Ed. M. D. N. 

Of the scores of specific occurrences that I have informa- 
tion of from official sources, I mention one that illustrates 
one phase of the constant efforts of Japan to establish actual 



274 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

sovereignty in China and to force the nationals of other na- 
tions to recognize it. I quote from an official report, dated 
June, 1918: 

Recently . . . , a British subject who represents one of the 
largest of British firms in the East in this territory (Manchuria) 
and who is well known personally to the inhabitants of this region, 
was traveling on a train of the South Mauchurian Railway. One 
of the Japanese train officials, after having been very impudent 
in making inquiries regarding the passenger's personal affairs and 
business, demanded to see his passport. The passenger was not 
accustomed to carry his passport, as it is not required by the 
Chinese authorities and he is well known. He even was known 
to the train emploj^es from having- traveled so frequently on the 
line. When he could not produce a passport he was treated with 
indignity and violence by the train employes. When the train 
reached Changchun, he was taken to a police station (Japanese) 
and detained there for several hours and subjected to various ex- 
aminations. He was refused an interpreter. He was finally taken 
before the Japanese Consul, who, so the British subject reports, 
said: "In the view and contention of the Japanese Government 
you are in Japanese territory (the railway zone) and must sub- 
mit to the Japanese, who are the ruling authority in the East and 
must be obeyed." The Japanese Vice Consul said that he had in- 
structions that no foi'eigner was to be allowed to travel on the 
South Manchurian Eailway without having a passport visaed by a 
Japanese Consul. He also told the Britisher that he could not re- 
main in Changchun without having his passport visaed by the Jap- 
anese consulate there. It may be interesting to state that the firm 
for which his Britisher traveled is a strong competitor in the Orient 
of the big Japanese sugar factors. 

Recently a special agent of the United States Department of 
Commerce made a summary of the disabilities under which 
American merchants now operate in Manchuria and Shan- 
tung, as follows : 

1. Delays at the Japanese banks. Shroffs of American 
and other foreign firms are made to wait while Japanese are 
given prompt attention. 

2. Holding of goods at the ports of entry and railway sta- 
tions on various pretexts, while goods shipped by or con- 



THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 275 

signed to Japanese merchants are moved and handled 
promptly. 

3. Similar delays at Kobe, Japan, and at other points of 
transhipment, where cargo shipped by or consigned to Ameri- 
can firms is held up, while cargo shipped by or consigned to 
Japanese firms is moved promptly. 

4. Special favors accorded by the railways in China under 
Japanese control to Japanese shippers, including an obscure 
system of rebates. 

5. Subjection of Chinese to a "graft" system, except those 
who work in with the Japanese. 

6. Encroachments on Chinese business and property, except 
those who work in with the Japanese. 

7. Evasion of local Chinese taxes by Japanese traders and 
merchants, while other foreign merchants and the Chinese 
have to pay them. 

8. Manipulation of public utilities controlled by Japanese, 
like postal and telephone and telegraph communications, to 
give advantage to Japanese merchants. 

9. Taking advantage of the war censorship and the circum- 
stances which have caused mails from America destined to 
China and other places in the Orient to be turned over to the 
Japanese postal authorities in Japan to be forwarded, to 
delay the business mail of American firms trading in China 
and other Oriental countries, to learn the business secrets of 
those firms, and to use the information thus gained to obtain 
the business for Japanese firms ; and similar use of telegraph 
and other communications controlled by Japan. 

10. Refusing space in Japanese ships to American cargo in 
order to give advantage to competing Japanese firms, and 
giving lower rates or rebates to Japanese shippers than are 
given to competing American firms. 

11. Counterfeiting of the trade-marks and other distin- 
guishing features of well-known American manufactured ar- 
ticles and the extensive sale in China of inferior Japanese 
imitations of those articles. 



276 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

A large volume could be filled with specific citations of 
evidence and proofs of the allegations contained in that sum- 
mary. Many of the matters it mentions have in recent years 
become the occasion of action and recommendations by Amer- 
ican commercial organizations in China. The delay and 
wrong uses of American mails made possible by the censor- 
ship in Japan finally caused, in 1918, the American Govern- 
ment to order that American mails destined to China should 
be sent by American ships only, and that they should not be 
transhipped at Japan, thereby avoiding their being over- 
looked by Japanese. The reason for this transhipment of 
American mails was to save time. For instance, ships from 
America touch first at Yokohama, then proceed to Kobe and 
Nagasaki, with stops at each port. By taking the mails off a 
ship as soon as it reaches Yokohama, and sending them on by 
rail to Shimonoseki, thence by Japanese ship to Shanghai, or 
by rail through Korea and Manchuria to Tientsin and Peking, 
several days can be saved. Also, during the war, many Amer- 
ican and British ships, and Japanese mail ships from Amer- 
ica, proceeded from Nagasaki to Manila before going to 
Shanghai, and the China mails and passengers were trans- 
ferred. 

The manipulation of Japanese shipping in the China and 
trans-Pacific trade during the war against American and 
other foreign commerce was the cause of bitter complaints. 
I quote from a consular report on this subject : 

Subject : Shipping Activities of Japanese in the Far East. 
Aug. 31, 1917. 

Much complaint is made regarding Japan's unfair methods. The 
Japanese have their national characteristics, and they may be ex- 
pected to exploit every form of what we may consider questionable 
trade maneuvering in accomplishing their ends. This should be 
taken for granted, and sliould be met and overcome by the demon- 
strated superior abilities which Americans are capable of display- 
ing. . . . 

In the enclosed memorandum, an alert and active trader has sum- 
marized a number of startling shipping reports, all of which, I 



THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 277 

am assured and believe, may be supported, in a general sense, con- 
fidentially, by affidavits. 

I quote from the annual report of the American Association 
of China made on December 29, 1914: 

Turning now from trade in general to some particular consider- 
ations — what is the outlook? American cotton formerly held a 
premier position in Manchuria. Under Russian occupation, every 
nation stood on an equal footing in Manchuria. The same duties 
and charges were assessed against all and facilities for distributing 
goods and doing business in general were satisfactory. Now it is 
all changed. Under Japanese administration, no chance to advance 
its own trade is overlooked and to competitors the means taken 
appear to be a departure from fair trading. In fact, they con- 
stitute a most serious violation of the open door principle on which 
the diplomacy of the United States in China is based. Japanese 
competition takes the form of a system of rebates not only in 
freight and steamer rates, but in remission of duties and charges 
which are assessed against all other nations. In addition to this 
many forms of petty annoyances have been worked out for the 
non-Japanese trader, and the imitation of established trade-marks 
is common. 

Now that the Japanese are in Shantung, not the mere foothold 
that the Germans held at Tsingtau, but with an apparent deter- 
mination to dominate the Province, the same tactics may be ex- 
pected, since it would be exactly in line with the course employed 
in Korea and Manchuria. With Dalny on the northern promontory 
and Tsingiau on the southern Japan has secured a potential con- 
trol of the trade of North China from the Russian frontier to 
the Yangtze upon whose valley her traders have long east covetous 
eyes. In this connection it will become apparent that not only 
ourselves, but other nationalities face a loss of trade. 

The apprehensions expressed about results of Japan's oc- 
cupation of Shantung have been fully justified by events. 

The American Association of China is composed of repre- 
sentative American residents of all classes and occupations. 
The American Chamber of Commerce of China, as its name 
implies, is composed of business men principally. The offi- 
cers of the chamber in 1918 were : J. Harold Dollar, of the 
Robert Dollar Company, President; W. C. Sprague, manager 



278 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

of the Standard Oil Company, Vice-President; J. W. Galla- 
gher, of the United States Steel Products Company, Treas- 
urer; J. B. Powell, of "Millard's Review," Secretary. The 
chamber recently made public the following letter: 

Shanghai, December 16, 1918. 
Dr. Paul S. Reinseh, 

American Minister to China, 
Peking. 
Dear Sir: 

The American Chamber of Commerce of China, several members 
of which organization have interests in Tsingtao, have the honor 
to draw youi- urgent attention to the terms on which the Japanese 
Government has declared its readiness to restore the Leased Terri- 
tory of Kiaochow to China and to what in our opinion would be 
their inevitable consequence to American interests in North China. 

You will recall that the Note relative to the Leased Territory 
presented by the Japanese Minister to the Chinese Government 
in the autumn of 1917 stated — we quote the translation published 
by the "Japan Chronicle" on November 8th, 1917 — that : 

"When after the termination of the present war the leased terri- 
tory of Kiaochow Bay is completely left to the free disposal of 
Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said leased terri- 
tory to China under the following conditions: 

"1. The whole of Kiaochow Bay to be opened as a commercial 
port. 

"2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to 
be established at a place to be designed by the Japanese Govern- 
ment. 

"3. If the foreign powers desire it, an international concession 
may be established. 

"4. As regards the disposal to be made of the buildings and 
properties of Germany and the conditions and procedures relating 
thereto, the Japanese Government shall arrange the matter by mutual 
agreement before the restoration." 

We submit that in view of actual developments there these terms 
would amount in reality to the absolute control of Tsingtao and 
its hinterland by the Japanese and would in effect be equivalent, 
from a business point of view, to outright annexation of the Port 
and to virtual annexation of the Province by the Japanese Govern- 
ment. For the concession which the Japanese intend to demand 
is that part of Tsingtao in which the commerce of the Port is 



THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 279 

inevitably centered, namely the districts surrounding the harbor, 
the Customs House, and the proposed new railway goods station. 
The part of the town left for an international concession would be 
the present residential district and this could be rendered valueless 
from the point of view of revenue by such "disposal" as is proved 
in clause 4 of the terms quoted above, which would even include 
the Public Slaughter House and the Electricity Station. 

The evidence for this view of Japanese intention is unmistakable 
and patent. It meets the eyes in business houses, banks, schools 
and tea-houses, and private residences, all the outcome of an adroitly 
conceived and rapidly executed progxam designed entirely to oc- 
cupy and effectively to enrich the district essential to trade and 
commerce. What Japanese control of wharves, railways and Cus- 
toms Houses would mean, has, we submit, been amply illustrated 
in Dalny and Manchuria, where are practically no prospects what- 
ever of American or other "foreign" participation in business 
which should be open to all. 

Accordingly we urge that if non- Japanese subjects are to have 
equal opportunities with the Japanese for business in Tsingtao 
and the Province of Shantung as a whole, the whole port should 
be either internationalized or restored to the Chinese Government, 
and further that in either case, if the Japanese be given the choice 
of location for their concession all wharves, railways and Customs 
House should be kept from their control. 

We urge this not on behalf of American interests in Tsingtao, 
but on behalf of those of Shanghai and Tientsin, the export and 
import trade of which would be seriously handicapped were con- 
trol of this port and of the Shantung Railway and its proposed ex- 
tensions to be vested in Japanese hands, to be made the hinge of 
an Open Door for Japanese only. In view of the recent develop- 
ments in America and the probability of an almost immediate 
discussion of the Far Eastern situation as a whole we feel sure 
that you will appreciate the urgency of this memorandum. 

As to the preference of this Chamber in reference to the future 
disposition of this former German leased property, we are in favor 
of making it a real international settlement with all harbor facilities 
and water-front privileges under the absolute control of an in- 
ternational commission. As soon as our special committee can make 
further investigation of this matter of international control, we 
shall take pleasure in sending to you copies of our memorandum 
and recommendations. 

As you are doubtless aware, detailed information corroborating 



280 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

and illustrating our views is already in the possession of the Amer- 
ican Government, but should you require further or specific par- 
ticulars, we shall be ready to supply them. 
Very truly yours, 
(Signed) American Chamber of Commerce of China. 

I include an extract from a letter written by an American 
business man v^ho has resided at Tsingtau before and during 
the vi^ar, and the comment of the office of the American Com- 
mercial Attache to China on the letter. The letter v^as written 
in July, 1917 (my italics) : 

If you want to do some real good to American business men it 
would be well for you to find some means to transport merchandise 
to and from China, without compelling a shipper to have a Japanese 
connection in order to ship his goods. It is very nice for the De- 
partment of Commerce to send men abroad to gather information, 
and to maintain a foreign service, but the whole purpose is handi- 
capped because of lack of shipping facilities. If a buyer buys goods 
here in north China he is at the mercy of the foreign steamship lines 
entirely, the agents of which are likewise merchants who want to 
market their own goods. The same thing applies to imports. . . . 
The plain truth is, if you don't buy through the Japanese here, you 

can't ship your goods. Ask Mr. , who says he cannot fly the 

American flag, nor put a sign in English on his gate-post because of 
the Japanese regulations. 

Comment of Commercial Attache. 

I am in receipt of your communication of Sept. 7, enclosing a 
letter from Tsingtau, dated July 27 and addressed to the Department 
of Commerce and Labor. You ask me for my opinion as to whether 
or not the statements made in the enclosure are justified. In most 
parts I believe the statements are justified by facts. Japan appears 
to be doing everything within her power to strengthen her position 
in China, before the conclusion of the war. The Japanese Govern- 
ment evidently has instructed Japanese shipping companies to dis- 
criminate against shippers of other than Japanese nationality. I 
make this statement as a result of evidence furnished me by Ameri- 
can merchants in China. Several American firms have informed me 
that they have been refused space on Japanese steamers for cargo, 
which space was subsequently given to Japanese firms. A very com- 



THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY 281 

mon complaint on the part of American firms in China is that goods 
in transit through Kobe either to or from the United States and 
China, are often held unnecessarily at Kobe, while the transshipment 
of goods shipped by Japanese firms on the same ships and destined 
to or from the same ports, is expedited. One firm informed me that 
certain materials for a heating plant, shipped from the United States 
and destined to Peking, via Kobe, lay in Kobe for three months, 
during which time Japanese firms were bidding on the same mate- 
rials at Peking and offering immediate delivery. American -firms in 
Shanghai state that shipments of steel and iron from the TJ. S. to 
China, via Japanese ships during the past two years, have been ar- 
riving short, the Japanese shipping companies willingly paying all 
claims for such shortages. In one case a Japanese ship was beached 
in Japan, and the cargo of American iron and steel billed to Ameri- 
can firms in China, was removed and the claims of these firms was 
paid in full. These methods were used to secure all possible stocks 
of American iron and steel for the Japanese ship-building industry. 

American merchants in China also state that Japanese shipping 
companies use information secured through shipping documents of 
American firms to assist Japanese merchants. Another source of 
embarrassment to American shippers comes in practices of the 
Japanese in Tsingtau and Dairen. . . . 

On the whole, it appears that Japan is doing everything possible 
in the United States to make it appear that America will have noth- 
ing to fear from Japanese paramountey in China, or, in other 
words, that a so-called Japanese Monroe Doctrine in Asia will guar- 
antee to America equality of trade opportunity in China. Further- 
more, it appears that Japan is also trying to convince the American 
public that it will fare well with Japanese control of Pacific ship- 
ping. Unfortunately, Japan's acts in China are not, in any sense, 
in keeping with the representations made through her agencies and 
propaganda in the United States. Here in China, Japan is doing 
everything possible to block American enterprise and to force Amer- 
ican trade with China to pass through Japanese channels. ... I 
fear that protests to Japan at this time will be futile. Our most 
effective recourse lies in providing such American shipping and 
other facilities as will conserve our trade independence. 

The discrimination of Japanese shipping companies during 
the war against merchandise shipped to, from or through other 
foreign firms in China, was especially noticeable also on the 
Yangtze River. This question of ships as a means for the pro- 



282 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

motion, or the obstruction, of foreign trade is one of tre- 
mendous importance to the American nation ; for ships or the 
lack of them can be made to interpose handicaps to trade as 
effectual as discriminating tariff or taxation regulations. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE SIBERIAN QUESTION 

Siberia and the Eastern question — Their close relation — Developments 
after Russia's collapse — Japan and intervention — The attitude of Rus- 
sians — The propaganda for intervention — Japan's sounding of the Allies 
— Attitude of France — Great Britain's attitude — Japan and Germany 
— Danger of a combination — The interests of China — The menace to 
China — Japan's proposal to intervene exclusively — Motives of Great 
Britain and France — Effort to obtain America's assent — A flood of 
propaganda — America's interest analyzed — Importance of protecting 
democratic peoples — Territorial proximity — The old diplomacy at work 
— Suspicion of Japan — Rejection of the one-nation plan — Change of Ja- 
pan's attitude — Conversion from asset to liability. 

SIBERIA is bound up inextricably with the far-Eastern 
problem, and when, following the collapse of govern- 
ment in Russia in 1917, disorder extended to Russia's 
Asiatic territories, it reacted strongly on the international 
balance of power in that region, and came at once into the 
purview of the politics of the Great War. 

Japan was the more sensitive of the meaning and possibili- 
ties of these developments. There is much evidence that the 
Tokio Government hardly knew how to take them at first. 
Regarded one way, the disorganization of Russia complicated 
Japan's position in world politics seriously. From another 
point of view, the inability of the new Russian Government 
to protect the outlying territories of the old empire, and their 
weakness as separate governments, might bring a great oppor- 
tunity for Japan's expansion on the continent. This pros- 
pect was so alluring that for a time it almost diverted Jap- 
anese attention from China. Two schools of opinion quickly 
formed in Japan onlhis question, having the common object 

283 



284 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

of gaining advantage for Japan, but differing as to the meas- 
ures to be taken to accomplish that end. 

Sifted down, the course which almost unanimously would 
have been indorsed by Japanese sentiment was to send a large 
military force into Siberia, occupy that country as far to the 
east as seemed practicable and expedient, use the period of 
occupation to intrench Japanese interests there, prolong the 
period of occupation as long as possible, and then to use the 
position so gained as a trading proposition at the general 
peace settlement. But there were difficulties in the way of 
putting this policy into effect. For Japan to have acted in- 
dependently would have caused serious complications with 
strong nations in the Allied group. The situation perhaps 
can be made clear by an analysis of the overlapping national 
interests and sensibilities that were involved. 

If Japan alone had sent troops into Siberia and had occu- 
pied that territory, without doubt it would be construed by 
the greater part of the Russian people as a thinly-masked en- 
croachment. Russians would assuredly believe that Japan's 
ultimate purpose was acquisition of the territory so occupied, 
by the same process that Germany was then using in the west 
of Russia, and Japan used in Korea, Manchuria and Shantung. 
Russians profoundly distrust Japan, which nation they regard 
as absolutely autocratic and imperialistic in form of govern- 
ment and national aims. At that juncture the great masses of 
Russians, however keenly they felt that they must for the 
time accept the unsatisfactory peace with Germany, would be 
less resentful of German penetration than of a similar Japan- 
ese penetration. As between a European or an Asiatic foreign 
domination of them, Russians will prefer to be controlled by 
a white civilization. That is the fundamental psychology of 
this juxtaposition with Russians en masse. Allied ''assist- 
ance" of Russia, which took the shape of an Asiatic invasion 
of Russia's far-Eastern possessions by a nation which only a 
decade before was at war against Russia in that region, prob- 
ably would have dried up any remaining sentiments of sym- 



THE SIBERIAN QUESTION 285 

pathy for the Allied war aims among Russians and inclined 
them to accept Germany's efforts at conciliation and peace- 
ful penetration of Russia in Europe, and would provide Ger- 
man agents in Russia with a potent anti-Allies argument. 
At that time the military situation in Europe was precarious, 
and it was thought to be very inexpedient to risk turning 
Russian sentiment wholly against the Allies. Moreover, the 
question had numerous other aspects which affected the in- 
terests of other nations and world conditions after the war. 

The idea that Japan should intervene in Siberia was first 
advanced in the summer of 1917. It always is interesting to 
watch Japan's publicity propaganda in its handling of such 
matters. In this ease the device of having the suggestion ap- 
pear to come from another power was used. The first pub- 
licity that I noticed was in telegrams from London to the 
press in Japan and America, stating that the British and 
French governments were becoming uneasy at developments 
in Siberia, and they might ask Japan to intervene there. 
These despatches probably were inspired by the Japanese em- 
bassy at London, and served to start discussion of the ques- 
tion. Apparently the press propaganda, which continued in 
a desultory way during the summer and autumn of 1917, had 
no definite official foundation until Japan gave it that by ad- 
dressing a note to several of the Allied nations and to the 
United States, in December, 1917. I have seen what purports 
to be a copy, or rough draft, of that note. It pointed out 
certain alleged conditions, and suggested terms for Japan 
providing troops to "preserve order" and to protect the 
Allied interests in Siberia. Japan disclaimed any purpose of 
territorial annexations or permanent occupation, but she 
asked that her paramount position with respect to China 
would be recognized, and that she would have exclusive con- 
cessions for mining and timber exploitation and fisheries in 
eastern Siberia. In return, Japan engaged to aid in protect- 
ing the economic and political interests of the Allied nations 
in European Russia. ^ 



286 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

This action of the Japanese Government brought attention 
to the question, and compelled the Allied Powers to outline 
their positions. In this connection it should be remembered 
that the United States was not technically one of the AUied 
nations, as the American Government had reserved inde- 
pendence of action and had not entered into any agreements 
or alliances with the nations it jointly was making war with. 
It was a foregone conclusion that Italy and the lesser Euro- 
pean belligerents on the side of the Allies would agree to 
Japan's actions in the East in exchange for a promise that 
Japan would support their special desires in Europe. This 
left only Great Britain and France to be dealt with. 

The national policy of France at that juncture can be put 
in a sentence, "Get Alsace and Lorraine back!" Everything 
was subordinated to that object and to making France secure 
after the war. France had virtually no interests that are 
directly affected by the Manchurian and eastern Siberian 
questions except as the loss or alienation of Siberia would 
affect Russia's ultimate solvency. France's investments in 
Russia were a grave consideration, and the revolutionary 
Government in Russia already had given intimation of a 
thought to repudiate the empire's debts. As to French eco- 
nomic opportunities in Manchuria, they years before had 
been traded off for the recognition by other powers of 
France's special position in South China. French sentiment 
seemed vaguely to connect a Japanese intervention in Siberia 
with a restoration of former conditions and a sustaining of 
the financial obligations of the Imperial Russian Government. 
It was however by no means certain that a Japanese occupa- 
tion of eastern Siberia would accomplish that, and it might 
have an opposite effect by angering the Russians against 
their former allies. It was of course certain that the Jap- 
anese Government would not bestir itself or make any sacri- 
fices to save or protect French investments in Russia ; indeed, 
it safely can be assumed that Japan is indifferent whether 
these investments are lost or recovered. Japan was anxious 



THE SIBERIAN QUESTION 287 

to secure Russia's war indebtedness to Japanese, which would 
be assured by a Japanese occupation of Siberia. At the mo- 
ment the French view of world politics was obscured by the 
German peril, and, moreover, the Eastern question means 
comparatively little to France. In the abstract, if no other 
matters were involved, French statesmen probably would in- 
cline to restrain Japan's expansion on the continent of Asia, 
although France's economic reasons for opposition are less 
than those of Great Britain. 

Great Britain's attitude toward the Siberian question has 
been perplexing at times, and it seems to have been actuated 
solely by imperial expediency. As a separate and detached 
proposition, the British Government probably would not want 
Japan to enter Siberia, for such action will tend further to 
impair British position and prestige in China. But the col- 
lapse of Russia and the opening of a way for German political 
influence, and possibly a combined German and Turkish mili- 
tary pressure, to reach India, had at that time exposed that 
part of the British Empire dangerously. With the war situa- 
tion in Europe as it was then, Great Britain could ill spare 
troops to protect India in the event of latent nationalistic 
aspirations and German propaganda inciting a seditious up- 
rising there. In such an event, there were intimations that 
Japan might be asked to send troops to India, and the Anglo- 
Japanese alliance provided apparently for this contingency. 
But there is a sharp difference of opinion among the British 
about the use of Japanese troops in India. Many students of 
Asiatic politics firmly believe that Japan's Pan- Asian propa- 
ganda constitutes a far more potent danger to British rule in 
India than Germany's propaganda and intrigue there, or 
than Russia's propaganda and intrigue did formerly. At 
that time (1917) it seemed that the British Government might 
have to choose between two evils, a German propaganda sup- 
ported by a military approach through the Caucasus, with a 
Mohammedan coloring; or a Japanese influence brought 
within the country and extended everywhere by a Japanese 



288 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

army. Contemporary utterances in Parliament indicated 
that the British Government was inclined to regard Japanese 
military help as the lesser danger, but many Englishmen dis- 
sent. 

On the other hand, there was the possibility, which lurked 
in the background of the Allies' policy during most of the 
war, that Japan might come to an understanding with Ger- 
many. There was the possibility that German influence 
would cross the Ural Mountains, and somewhere in Siberia 
come in contact with the influence of Japan or China, as the 
case may be. This is not to say exactly that Germany or 
any nation in the East ever will succeed in annexing or in- 
corporating Russia; but whether what was Great Russia and 
its dependencies becomes united under one wide-spread gov- 
ernment, or if its former territories are divided among sev- 
eral governments, the internal situation of the country will 
be such that it will be susceptible to the process of peaceful 
economic penetration from the stronger nations that are 
contiguous to it. East and West. So Germany, having a thor- 
ough understanding of the real character of the Japanese na- 
tion and its ambitions, will at this time be indifferent to the 
extension of Japanese influence or the establishment of a 
Japanese ''sphere" in eastern Siberia. In that event, the 
German and Japanese spheres would move forward gradu- 
ally until they met somewhere in Siberia. Their limitations 
could then be adjusted by mutual agreement, just as, after 
the war betwec*! Japan and Russia in 1904—05, those nations 
by treaty agreed to divide the regions about which they had 
fought, and which had belonged to neither of them ; .and then 
in 1916 by a later secret treaty they mutually agreed to de- 
fend what they had gained against any third power. Ger- 
many probably would have welcomed an exclusive interven- 
tion by Japan in Siberia, for it would have tended to alienate 
Russian sympathy from the Allies and make a German policy 
of friendly assimilation in Russia easier, and it also would 
have caused disagreement among nations in the Allied group. 



THE SIBERIAN QUESTION 289 

The logic of independent intervention by Japan was that it 
was more likely to work out in Germany's favor than it was 
to benefit the Allies or Russia. 

China is the focus of the Eastern question, and her interest 
in all phases of it is absolute. It is not too much to say that 
China's interest in the Siberian question is as vital to her 
future security and national position as the Alsace-Lorraine 
question is vital to France, or the existence of buffer states 
like Holland and Belgium in Europe has been vital to the 
security of England. As a result of the Russo-Japanese War, 
China virtually lost control of her vast provinces of Man- 
churia and Mongolia. As a result of Russia's collapse in the 
Great War, China has a chance to regain control of northern 
Manchuria and to recover Mongolia. Now came a proposed 
Japanese occupation of eastern Siberia to menace again the 
whole of China's northern territories and to cast a longer 
shadow over the Middle Kingdom. By all the catch-phrase 
tests which diplomacy has invented in the process of mod- 
ern empire building, China's interest in the Siberian question 
is fundamental. By the test of "territorial propinquity," 
China has a major position, for China and Siberia are con- 
tiguous on a land frontier extending for several thousands of 
miles. By the test of "vested interests," China is again 
paramount by reason of her reversionary ownership of the 
Chinese Eastern Railway, which lies for about a thousand 
miles in Chinese territory. By the test of population con- 
tacts, China also is paramount, for hundreds of thousands of 
Chinese reside in Siberia and own much property there. By 
the test of the alleged menace of Bolshevism, China is more 
exposed to its penetration, for China at bottom is a great, 
loosely knit democracy and very susceptible to such penetra- 
tion; whereas, for instance, Japan is a rigid autocracy re- 
markably impervious to such penetration. In the circum- 
stances that existed, China could not feel otherwise than 
menaced if Japan was given a "free hand" in Siberia, for a 
Japanese occupatida of that country east of Lake Baikal 



290 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

would envelop China's northern provinces in an elbow, with 
a large part of southern Manchuria already under a Japanese 
quasi-sovereignty. In short, the considerations that were po- 
tent in inducing China to join the Allied group at war against 
the Central powers would vanish in good part, and a situa- 
tion would be created that probably would work out adversely 
to China in practice. At any rate, the Chinese were much 
alarmed at the prospect, and made their uneasiness known. 

Early in 1918, probably in January, an understanding on 
the Siberian intervention proposal was reached by the Japa- 
nese, French, and British governments. The details of this 
understanding as yet are confidential with those governments, 
but there scarcely is room to doubt that Japan induced the 
French and British governments to consent to her exclusive 
intervention provided the United States also would agree. 
Japan chose a time to press this proposition when the military 
situation for the Allies was in its darkest phase, just preced- 
ing the big German drive on the western front. France and 
Great Britain were not then in a position to offend Japan by 
showing distrust of her motives; and still less, since Ameri- 
can military reinforcements and supplies were imperatively 
essential to defeat Germany, could they venture to affront 
America. What Japan offered or promised in return for the 
support of her allies on the Siberian question is not known 
positively outside the inner circles of governments, but it is 
believed to include a promise to send troops to Europe in cer- 
tain contingencies, and to exert pressure on Russia jointly 
with the Allies to validate Russia's foreign debts. France 
and Great Britain were to support Japan in adjusting certain 
questions and conditions in the far East. 

Strengthened with this support, Japanese diplomacy then 
began a campaign to gain the assent of the United States to 
Japan's plan for intervention. Late in January, 1918, and 
through the month of February, Japan's publicity propa- 
ganda in America, strongly supported by both the British 
and French propagandas, made an active drive in favor of 



THE SIBERIAN QUESTION 291 

giving Japan a free hand. "Trust Japan" was the slogan, 
and an effort was made to hush arguments against the pro- 
posal by attributing them to German propaganda. The 
American press was complaisant to a remarkable degree, and 
it seemed for a while that Japan would get her way and that 
the United States would be rushed into giving its assent. 
With respect to the policy of the United States, on February 
28, 1918, I then analyzed the issue as follows, in a memoran- 
dum not published before: 

By reason of its relation to the war in Europe, the Government 
of the United States of America can, if it will, exercise a deter- 
mining influence on this and other Eastern questions. The ob- 
jects of the American Government in participating in the war have 
been announced by the President to be the establishment of the 
democratic forms of government in a secure position, the relega- 
tion of military autocracy as a ruling factor in civilization, and 
the suppression of all international policies and methods which are 
outgrowths of military autocracies and the imperialistic tendencies 
of nations. The two largest democracies in the world, in terri- 
tory and population, are Russia and China. We see how these 
two countries and peoples may be affected by this Siberian ques- 
tion. Both countries are struggling, somewhat vaguely and very 
inefficiently, to establish democratic forms of government. 

If a Japanese military occupation of eastern Siberia should 
happen to be co-existent and co-extensive with a German similar 
advance from the other side, and the two autocracies should effect 
a combination for mutual security of their gains, it is evident what 
might be the fate, at least for a long time, of the nascent democra- 
tic movements in Russia and China. Furthermore, if that would 
come about, it might occur that the forces of efficient autocracy, as 
expressed by that combination, and control over the destinies of 
more than half of humanity and nearly half of the earth's natural 
resources under those two powers and their satellites, would ulti- 
mately overcome democratic forms in government and set civiliza- 
tion backward for centuries. 

The United States also has veiy considerable material interests 
in this question — or rather, in some of its probable results. The 
future development of Russia and China offers a great opportunity 
for American finance and commerce. While America has many 
good reasons for desiring always (if that is possible) to remain on 
very friendly terms with Japan, this desire is secondary in im^ 



292 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

portance to the maintenance of the independence and integrity of 
China vis-a-vis Japan or another autocratic Government. Also, 
the commercial possibilities of Russia and China, singly or to- 
gether, are vastly more important potentially than commerce be- 
tween Japan and America will be in the future. Should Japan 
occupy eastern Siberia, and not be dislodged after the war; and 
on the other side Germany should obtain possession of or economic 
domination over Russia's western provinces; then after the war 
American trade can enter Russia only by passing through a Japa- 
nese zone on the East and a German zone on the West. Japan's 
commercial policy in the parts of China which she already has 
penetrated, and what is known of Germany's policy of commercial 
penetration of weaker nations, give sufficient intimation of what 
such zones on each border of Russia would mean to American 
and all other foreign trade. 

American statesmen no doubt are not oblivious to certain utter- 
ances of some high officials of our co-belligerent nations about the 
thesis of world governance after the war. In a recent speech in 
Parliament, Mr. Balfour plainly intimated that the British Govern- 
ment is not prepared to, or cannot yet see its way clear to abandon 
what is usually called the balance of power theory of world politics. 
This presages, after the war, a continuation of international poli- 
tics on the ehecks-and-balances principle. Under this system, it 
will not be in the ultimate interest of America, or of democracy, 
to augment the power and influence, in any balance of power, of 
powers whose governments are based on the autocratic principle. 
The application of this argument to the existing Siberian ques- 
tion, and its relation to China, are evident. 

The peace which is made at the end of this war will not settle 
the struggle tor a really democratic world; it may not even make 
much of an advance toward this object except that it will awake 
the democratic peoples to their peril, and stimulate them to con- 
tinue to work for free institutions and to equij^ themselves for this 
work. If the war results only in extending the balance of power 
system for another epoch, and creates a balance almost even as 
between the autocratic and democratic forces in civilization, it 
might be that the way the Russian and the Chinese peoples are 
propelled by events will be the deciding weight in the balance. 

This possibility, with the fundamental interest which America 
always will have in the balance of power in the Pacific Ocean, gives 
to the Siberian question great importance at a time when the other 
democratic powers are preoccupied. Notwithstanding that the 
British and French Governments appear to acquiesce with the 



THE SIBERIAN QUESTION 293 

proposed move of Japan into Siberia, it is evident that this attitude 
of those nations is inspired either by political expediency, by pre- 
vious secret agreements, or by too close concentration or proccupa- 
tion with the situation in Europe. The true interests of Great 
Britain and of France are not likely to be served by allowing Japan 
a free hand in Siberia and in China. It is very likely that the 
British and French Governments, while inhibited from openly op- 
posing an independent move by Japan in this case because of 
previous commitments or immediate interests elsewhere, will not 
be displeased if objections of America to the move should stop 
it, or give it a different character. And even if the United States 
should diverge from the views of the British and French Govern- 
ments in this instance, such a policy by America is more apt to 
serve British and French interests in the end than a free hand for 
Japan and the far East will. 

The very close proximity of extreme eastern Siberia — Kamchatka 
and beyond — to Alaska, a valuable and rapidly developing posses- 
sion of the United States, should be considered by the American 
Government in this connection. A permanent occupation by Japan 
of that region would have in the future a serious effect on the 
military security of America. While, in relation to the present 
proposal for Japan to occupy eastern Siberia, the contingency of a 
Japanese possession of the part of Asia lying directly across 
Behring Straits from Alaska (with the possibility in time of a 
railway connection between the two continents by that route) may 
seem remote, it should be remembered that Japan never has given 
up any territory which she has occupied on the excuse of military 
necessity, although she frequently has given assurances that she 
would. The great and undeveloped natural resources of eastern 
Siberia in minerals, coal and timber, offer a great temptation to 
Japan if she once gets in possession of them; and for her to give 
them up would mark a reversal of her whole history as a modem 
power. If she takes military control of this vast region for the 
period of the war, it is reasonable to assume that she will use the 
time to entrench herself there, and with Russia probably a weak 
and disintegrated nationality for many years to come, no force 
from that quarter will be able to dislodge Japan. In that situation, 
Japan can perhaps so manoeuver in the field of world politics that 
she can get the assent of a majority of the powers to her retention 
of eastern Siberia; just as, treaties and positive assurances to the 
contrary notwithstanding, Japan was able to get the assent of the 
powers to her annexation of Korea. Once Japan's occupation of 
eastern Siberia hecomesr~de facto, it gradually will be accepted as 



294 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

a fait accompli in world polities, and no power except America 
will have sufficient interest in tlie question to make it worth while 
to go to extreme in opposing Japan. 

This aspect of the Siberian Question ought not to be allowed to 
pass unnoticed now by the American Government. Later it may 
be difficult to raise the point, after perchance Japan has become 
established in military occupation of those regions closely con- 
tiguous to United States territory. In ease events subsequently 
should really disclose a genuine necessity for an Allied occupation 
of eastern Siberia, then without doubt the United States might 
itself take over the task of policing the trans-Amur region, on the 
ground that by reason of its nearer territorial propinquity to United 
States possessions, it is the right and duty of the American Govern- 
ment to undertake the preservation of order there. Geographically, 
a large part of that region is closer to America than to Japan. 

In securing the assent of France and Great Britain to lier 
independent intervention in Siberia, Japan's methods of ap- 
proach demonstrates the old oblique diplomatic method aptly. 
The ToMo Foreign Office no doubt realized all along that the 
real difficulty would be to obtain the consent of Washington, 
but Washington was not approached directly. In presenting 
the matter at London and Paris, Japan, so I am reliably in- 
formed, stated that since the American Government had by 
the Lansing-Ishii Agreement recognized Japan's special mis- 
sion in China, according to Japan's interpretation of that 
agreement, it hardly could refuse to recognize Japan's 
similar relation to eastern Siberia. It may be that the Brit- 
ish and French governments accepted the Japanese interpre- 
tation of the Lansing-Ishii notes: certainly almost any old- 
school diplomat would so interpret them. At any rate, the 
British and French foreign offices may have thought it a good 
time to "pass the buck" and put the issue up to Washington. 
But, somewhat unexpectedly, Washington was cold to the 
proposal. Several things may have influenced the State De- 
partment 's attitude. For one thing, Washington at that time 
took a more optimistic view of the war situation than Paris 
and London did, and consequently did not feel that the situa- 
tion was so desperate that important principles had to be 



THE SIBERIAN QUESTION 295 

traded off or qualified. For another thing, Washington by 
that time may have begun to feel uneasy at constructions 
Japan was giving the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, and thought 
it was time to make its position better understood. At any 
rate, Washington refused to assent to the plan for Japan to 
intervene exclusively, and that killed it. 

This outline of the broader political motives which ani- 
mated the policies of the principal powers in the Allies group 
indicates why the "give Japan a free hand" idea of inter- 
vention in Siberia was rejected. That suspicion of Japan 
was the major reason for rejecting it was so obvious that the 
inspired propaganda of all the western powers devoted col- 
umns to asserting how implicitly trusted Japan was by all of 
them, that distrust of her was not the reason for dropping 
the one-nation intervention plan, but that other important 
considerations required that the move, if made, should be of 
international character. The plain truth probably is that the 
Washington Government (that is, President Wilson) insisted 
that there should be joint action in Siberia or none at all, and 
its influence was sufficient to decide the matter. 

The decision to make action in Siberia a joint operation 
in case intervention became necessary completely changed the 
situation for Japan, and therefore changed her policy. It is 
clear that intervention in Siberia by Japan alone, with a 
secret free-hand mandate from the other powers in the Allied 
group, is a very different situation for Japan than participa- 
tion by her in a joint international intervention. Acting 
singly, Japan would have everything in her own hands and 
could fix matters to her own satisfaction without being inter- 
fered with, and probably could get whatever status quo that 
resulted confirmed in the peace terms. On those conditions 
Japan was anxious to int^vene. That situation was a dis- 
tinct imperialistic asset, or could be worked out into one. 
But joint international intervention, with the limitations it 
necessarily would place on military and civil functions in 
the occupied regiong7 and the further need of having the sit- 



296 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

nation take an international character in the peace settle- 
ment, took on to Japan the aspect of a liability. If Japan in- 
tervened alone, she could at the peace conference set her 
action out as a special contribution to the cause of the Allies 
and claim compensation, or accept a "special position" in 
eastern Siberia as compensation, to be converted after a few 
years into annexation, as in the case of Korea. But if Japan 
intervened jointly with the United States and other powers, 
then they would have an equal say in the final disposition 
of the region; and if, as was probable in the case of the 
United States, the cost of the expedition and occupation was 
charged on the general expense of the war, and not charged 
on the country occupied, then the cost to Japan of her expe- 
dition might be a total loss. So from the time the one-nation 
intervention plan was defeated, Japanese sentiment was 
against any intervention. In short, Japan would prefer to 
let disorder run its course in Siberia and take a chance on 
fishing quietly in the troubled waters there rather than have 
military forces and civil officers of other powers established in 
the country; for once there, their presence would be a check 
on Japan, and it might be years before they would be with- 
drawn. 

With this survey of the elements of the situation, we can 
turn to events in Siberia and Manchuria. 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE SIBERIAN QUESTION — CONCLUDED 

Effects of the Russian Revolution — Its extension to the East — The 
position of Siberia — How it differed from Russia in Europe — China's 
close relation to the question — The Chinese Eastern Railway — Disorders 
in Manchuria — Political elements analyzed — Different motives — Japan's 
selfish policy — The German influence — Various Russian factions — Col- 
lapse of Russian authority in Manchuria — China forced to act — Japan's 
fear of America — A secret diplomatic note — Japan, Russia, and Ger- 
many — Japan seeking for advantage — Proposals to Russian groups — 
Backing different factions — Secret anti-American propaganda — Some 
examples of this — The American intervention plan — Japan and the 
Chinese Eastern Railway — Obstruction of the Allies — Rushing Japanese 
troops into Manchuria — Usurpation of China's prerogatives — The Man- 
chuli incident — Attitude of Japanese toward other allies — Incident at 
Changchun — The armistice and after. 

BY the latter part of 1917 the Russian revolution had 
extended to the far-Eastern possessions of the empire, 
where its effects were up to a point almost identical 
with its course in European Russia. There was a time when 
society instinctively submitted to the existing administrative 
regime, which continued to function automatically after a 
fashion. Then came a period of rapid disintegration, when 
the old authority and forms crumbled and were succeeded by 
unlicensed personal liberty, when the ties holding the remote 
and sparsely populated dominions to the older seats of gov- 
ernment weakened and then parted altogether, when efforts 
were made to form new governments under various groups 
and leaders, when rivalries and dissensions sprung up among 
those groups and leaders, and when all of them were seeking 
the support of governments in the Allied combination. As 

?97 



298 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

to its internal condition, Siberia was moving under the same 
impulses and stimulus, composed of the same constituent ele- 
ments, from which the revolution had grown. 

But there were important differences in the external con- 
tacts of European and Asiatic Russia. In Europe, Russia 
was contiguous to the Central powers and cut off from the 
Allies. Siberia was contiguous to three nations in the Allied 
group, China, Japan, and America; to China by a very long 
land frontier, and to Japan and America by close oversea 
proximity. These geographical and political contacts, cou- 
pled with semi-detachment from Russia in Europe, marked 
out Siberia as a new, almost a separate problem. 

It was natural that the international reactions from Siberia 
would first be felt by China. This came about chiefly by 
reason of the location of the Chinese Eastern Railway, that 
part of the so-called Siberian trunk-line which skirts Mongo- 
lia and crosses Manchuria, and is the main-traveled route be- 
tween Chita, where the Amur line branches off' northward, 
and Vladivostok. Under the old agreement this railway in 
Manchuria, which China has a right to purchase outright at 
the expiration of a stated period, was operated and policed 
by Russia. The offices of the trans-Baikal division were at 
Harbin, in the center of Manchuria, a junction-point with 
railways connecting with Peking and Port Arthur. There 
was a large Russian garrison at Harbin and smaller garrisons 
at other points, and a considerable Russian civil population 
had settled in Manchuria, especially at Harbin. At times in 
previous years a controversy had occurred between Russia 
and China about the extent of Russia's administrative au- 
thority in the railway zone, and on several occasions the 
United States Government had taken China's side by refus- 
ing to recognize Russia's pretensions. This attitude of the 
United States had irritated the Russian Government, espe- 
cially in view of the fact that Great Britain and other powers 
acquiesced with Russia's interpretation and had submitted 
their nationals at Harbin and other places to the Russian 



THE SIBERIAN QUESTION 299 

jurisdiction, thereby qualifying, in effect, China's sov- 
ereignty.^ 

Strikes and other manifestations of insubordination among 
the workmen of the Siberian and Chinese Eastern railways, 
and among garrisons along the railways, began to develop late 
in 1917. Thousands of ex-officers and soldiers from the dis- 
banded army of Russia in Europe were drifting eastward to 
escape conditions caused by the revolution, and many of 
them found Plarbin a convenient refuge. Also drifted to 
Harbin, where, because of the dual municipalities (Russian 
and Chinese), police administration was confused and lax, 
many Bolshevik agitators, and agents of the Central powers. 
Harbin became a center of intrigue. At that time and during 
the year 1918 the distinguishable political elements operating 
in eastern Siberia and Manchuria can be differentiated as 
follows : 

Western Allies, including Great Britain, France, Italy, 
United States. 

China. 

Japan. 

Russian groups. Three pro-Ally groups roughly defined 
territorially as the Omsk, Harbin, and Vladivostok adminis- 
trations ; the Bolsheviks, who were trying to overturn the more 
orderly groups in all those administrations. 

German agents, composed partly of trained men assigned 
by the German Government and partly of released German 
and Austrian prisoners of war. 

Czecho-Slovaks. 

I have so outlined these elements because of their distinctly 
different motivations. 

Although at war against Germany, China had no deep 
hostility to that nation and no special fear of it. China 

1 This agreement between Russia and Great Britain (Appendix F) is 
a very good example of the practice of the powers to make private 
agreements among themselves, based on the rcognition of their various 
spheres in China. 



300 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

nominally was allied with Japan, and Japan was tlie nation 
she most feared. China's motive was to protect her own ter- 
ritories, to sustain her authority within those territories, to 
protect her rights and property there, and to prevent Rus- 
sian disorders from penetrating farther into China. Beyond 
that China did not want to go. Her attitude was purely 
defensive. She was distinctly averse to interfering in Rus- 
sia (that is, in Siberia) or to any action that could be con- 
strued as aggression. In that course China continued to fol- 
low the United States, as she had done on broad questions 
since entering the war. 

I shall state Japan's motives here as I believe them to have 
been, and shall present evidence later. Japan's motives were 
complex, yet perfectly definite. She hoped to take advan- 
tage of Russia's disorganization and disintegration to oust 
Russia from Manchuria and to replace her there by gaining 
control over the Chinese Eastern Railway. To do that she 
schemed to foment Russian dissensions, secretly backing dif- 
ferent factions and leaders against one another, sowing mu- 
tual suspicions among them; on the other hand, she gave 
encouragement to the Bolsheviks for the purpose of adding to 
the disorder and creating an excuse for intervention ; she pri- 
vately tried to sow distrust of America among the Russians, 
for the purpose of putting difficulties in the way of the 
American railway commission that had been sent to help put 
the Siberian line in order, and to incline the Russians to ac- 
cept assistance from Japan ; she occupied Manchuria with her 
troops, arrogantly thrusting aside the Chinese and taking 
over their functions; she manoeuvered diplomatically to pre- 
vent joint Allied action in Siberia, and when that was adopted, 
she obstructed it by surreptitious methods. This tortuous 
course required seeming inconsistencies and contradictions, 
but the ruling motive always was perceptible. 

The motives of Great Britain, France, and Italy were the 
same as those of the United States in principle, but subject 
to private understandings among them which circumscribed 



THE SIBERIAN QUESTION 301 

their acts to some extent, especially in their application to 
Japan. 

The motives of the United States were not tainted by any 
purpose to reap a national advantage in any form except 
by helping to create a situation beneficial to Russia and to the 
general Allied interests, and to respect the territories and 
rights of all nations involved. 

The Czecho-Slovaks were a part of the situation not by de- 
sign, but by circumstances, having forced their way out of 
Russia in an effort to reach the western front. They had 
no motive except to protect themselves against attacks from 
the Bolsheviks and to aid the general cause of the Allies, on 
the theory that after the war the Allies would support the 
creation of a Czecho-Slovak nation in Europe. They supplied 
a highly picturesque feature to the situation, but one de- 
void of any fundamental relation to it. 

The activities of German agents and the factor of released 
German and Austrian prisoners requires elucidation, and 
then it can be dismissed, for its influence was brief and 
transitory. It is necessary to distinguish between Germans 
and Austrians in Siberia and Manchuria who were working 
under orders from their governments, and released prisoners 
who were passive or of their own notion joined the Bol- 
sheviks to escape repatriation and further military service. 
This latter class is negligible, for it was merged into the Bol- 
shevik mob without appreciably adding to its strength, and 
it passed out of control or intelligent direction of the Cen- 
tral powers. The other and less numerous class of Germans 
and Austrians who responded to direction from their govern- 
ments pursued a definite and easily distinguishable course. 
For some time after the revolution the German agents in 
eastern Siberia followed the same policy as those in European 
Russia and for the same object — to disorganize Russia and 
make her incapable of further participation in the war, and 
to pave the way far a German commercial penetration of 
the country. In M^uchuri^ these agents did what they could. 



302 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

to sow dissensions among the Allies, and especially to play 
upon China's fear of Japan and Japan's jealousy of Amer- 
ica. But a time soon came when the German Government 
saw that it was not to its advantage to have disorder in east- 
ern Siberia, for that would bring intervention by the Allies, 
an armed intervention that might develop into a serious 
menace to Germany's eastern front by rallying the Russians 
to resume the war. The German Government realized that 
a tranquil and detached Siberia was for the time more to 
Germany's advantage, for it would serve as a buffer against 
an Allied advance from that quarter. So the German agents 
and propaganda in eastern Siberia were called off as to 
their incitements of turbulence or provocations of the Allies. 
''German propaganda" continued to serve Japan as a con- 
venient scapegoat to which exposures of her true policy can 
be attributed. 

There remained, however, enough turbulent qualities in 
Bolshevism to keep Siberia in disorder. In every prominent 
Siberian city — Tomsk, Omsk, Irkutsk, Blagovestchenk, 
Khabarosk, Vladivostok — the Bolsheviks made an effort to 
seize the reins of administration. Fighting occurred in many 
places, with attendant destruction of property. Supplies 
of a military character purchased by the old Russian Govern- 
ment from its allies and America, but not paid for, were ac- 
cumulated at Vladivostok and other points on the Siberian 
and Chinese Eastern railways as far as Irkutsk and beyond. 
These supplies had been stationary at those points for months, 
even before the military collapse of Russia and prior to the 
revolution. "When Japan began a propaganda in Europe and 
America to pave the way for her exclusive intervention in 
Siberia, the alleged need to protect these supplies was given 
prominence. In the winter of 1917-18 several of the Allied 
powers sent war-ships to Vladivostok to aid the Russian au- 
thorities there to preserve order, as it was explained. Japan 
was one of the powers to send ships, and Japanese thought 
on this question was very clearly revealed by the tone of 



THE SIBEEIAN QUESTION 303 

the Japanese press then, which voiced a distrust of the mo- 
tives of the United States in sending war-ships. By that 
time the alleged peril from an army of released German and 
Austrian war prisoners was really past, and with German 
intrigue removed as a factor, the other intriguing elements 
began to stand out more plainly. By that time, also, the 
other powers, especially the United States, were taking meas- 
ures to learn the real situation by having their officials re- 
port and by sending confidential agents to study conditions 
on the ground. 

Early in 1918 it became apparent that the Chinese East- 
ern Railway was becoming disorganized, and the local admin- 
istration of the railway zones at Harbin and other towns in 
Manchuria was so lax and inefficient that ministers of some 
of the Allied powers at Peking suggested to the Chinese 
Government the advisability of its taking over the adminis- 
tration of the railway and of the railway zone. It was 
pointed out, since the ability of Russia to preserve order and 
to operate the railway had collapsed, that this responsibility 
and right devolved on China. At that time Japan was 
pressing the Chinese Government to extend the ''military 
agreement" relating to joint operations against the enemy, 
and when the Japanese legation at Peking heard of the 
proposal that China should take over the administration of 
the Chinese Eastern Railway and the policing of the rail- 
way zone, it at once interposed private diplomatic objections 
on the ground that these matters were included in the agree- 
ment. Japan tried to prevent the Chinese Government from 
taking that step, and to arrange so that Japan would succeed 
Russia as administrator of the railway and of the zone, or 
would act jointly with China. China evaded the issue, but 
finally decided to increase her military forces in Manchuria 
and to take over the policing of Harbin and other places. 

It is interesting now to go back a little and cite steps taken 
by Japan from the time of the Russian revolution to secure 
a preferential and predominant position in eastern Siberia. 



304 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

The fall of the empire might have carried off with it the 
secret treaty made between Japan and Russia in 1916, and 
Japan was anxious to replace it by understandings with the 
new Government. It is evident that the Japanese Govern- 
ment felt that it had by private arrangements then in effect 
assured its position in that region with regard to the Euro- 
pean Allied powers. But the United States remained, and 
that nation was becoming a very important factor. From its 
entrance as a belligerent the American Government had taken 
a strong interest in the situation of Russia. Immediately 
following the revolution it had sent a special mission to 
Russia to offer counsel and aid, and as one of those measures 
there was created a railway commission (called the Stevens 
commission) to help Russia to put her railway system on 
an efficient basis. There were further proposals of economic 
help by America to Russia by way of developing her mineral 
and agricultural resources, and there was a good deal of dis- 
cussion of those plans in the press. How Japan regarded 
American assistance to Russia is revealed both hy the con- 
temporaneous comment of the Japanese press and by certain 
moves of Japanese diplomacy. Among the secret documents 
published after the revolution in Russia was a telegram to 
the Russian Foreign Office from Krupensky, Russian am- 
bassador at Tokio, dated July 7, 1917 : 

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Las asked me to verify 
a rumor that the self-styled Eussian Government has granted ex- 
elusive concessions, covering mining undertakings in the regions 
of the Pacific littoral, and the island of Saghalien. Viscount 
Motono added that if this rumor was in accordance with the truth 
it would have a very depressing effect in Japan. While fully 
recognizing that Russia was entitled to dispose of Russian terri- 
tory, Viscount Motono remarked, on the other hand, that Japanese 
capitalists had long expressed the desire to participate in the de- 
velopment of those mining resources and at the present time, as in 
the past, they wei'e ready to organize private Japanese companies 
for that purpose to co-operate with Russian capitalists to that end. 

While still acting as ambassador at Petrograd the Viscount had 
raised this question, but the reply he had received was that the 



THE SIBERIAN QUESTION 305 

Russian mining laws did not permit the participation of these 
foreigners in mining in that province. If at the present time any 
modification of that law had been decided upon, the Japanese, as 
the nearest neighbors and the oldest explorers of those regions, 
had a pre-eminent right to the concessions in question. The Min- 
ister pressed the point that if such negotiationc (? with foreign 
capitalists) had already been begun, the Japanese Government 
would much appreciate their cancellation. 

The Russian Ambassador in calling attention to the importance 
of this declaration, believes that in the event of unfavorable com- 
plications the Japanese claims might result in very dangerous con- 
sequences. In view of the Japanese attitude the Ambassador thinks 
it extremely desirable that the rumors of negotiations with Amer- 
ican capitalists should be denied. 



A Russo-Japanese alliance : Confidential report to a foreign lega- 
tion at Peking, October 27, 1917. 

On or about October 20 there arrived in Peking direct from Rus- 
sia a special representative of the Premier of Japan, General 
Terauchi. This man had an interview with the Chinese Premier 
(General Tuan) in which he stated that Russia would be forced to 
conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers, that Japan 
would then enter into an alliance or arrangement with Russia, and 
that it was extremely desirable that China should join them, which 
action would be welcomed by Japan. He ended by saying that 
this was for China's best interest, as when the European war was 
concluded there xvould he hut two great Powers left and these 
would rule the world. He named Japan and Germany as the two 
Powers. This report is absolutely authentic. 

The purpose of the United States Government at that time 
in trying to aid Russia was absolutely confined to a desire to 
enable Russia again to become useful as an ally in the war 
against Germany, and for that purpose it would have aided 
by capital and by supplying experts to put Russian agricul- 
ture, transportation, and mineral production on an efficient 
basis. But Japan saw these projects only as moves to pro- 
cure for America an economic and political predomination 
in Russia. It is perfectly logical that the Japanese Govern- 



306 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

ment would put this construction on all moves of other na- 
tions, for it never made a move anywhere during the war 
except with such objects. Thus in the early months of the 
revolution Japan was trying to establish for herself an ex- 
clusive and preferential position in eastern Siberia, and to 
prevent any other nation from getting a foothold. From 
that time every development, every move made by any nation 
in Siberia or relating to Siberia, every move made by Japan 
herself in that region or relating to conditions there, was 
calculated by Japanese statesmen with that motive. 

In this policy Japan was reckoning primarily of America, 
not that her people and statesmen have any special antipathy 
to America, but because they regard that nation as the nat- 
ural and at present the only formidable opponent of Japan's 
ambitions in Asia. "While Japan did not want any of the 
powers to interfere or to send forces into Siberia, and showed 
an irritation at all of them when they did so, she was specially 
uneasy about America. The course of her intrigue and prop- 
aganda during that period revealed this plainly. I quote 
from some reports of American and other official investigators 
and secret agents who were observing conditions in Siberia 
then: 

Dated Harbin, April 23, 1918. 

The Japanese plans, so far as tbey have been disclosed, exhibit 
little of advantage to the Allies and offer the prospect of Japan 
creating" for herself in Siberia one of those exclusive positions 
which it is one of our purposes in the war to remove from inter- 
national relations. I have talked with no element (Russian) yet 
which does not seem to me to be treating Japanese offers of assist- 
ance and actual assistance only as a last resort, reluctantly accepted, 
and which was not eager for American assistance as the only 
help that could be fully trusted to be both unselfish and sjanpathetie 
toward the legitimate aspirations of the Russian peoj^le. The 
Japanese, with their excellent knowledge of the extraordinaiy pos- 
sibilities of the region, have opportunities for acquiring jjroperties 
at a time when industrial conditions are unsettled, as they are at 
present. Their purchases at Harbin up to the present time, as 
ascertained by , are: ... 



THE SIBERIAN QUESTION 307 

Dated, April 23 (Harbin). 

I am confidentially informed by the Russian Committee that 
they are assured by the Japanese Government, through its repre- 
sentatives here, that Japan is prepared to send troops in sufficient 
numbers to control the situation and to place in power any govern- 
ment backed by Japan. The Committee has informed me that 
Japan asks, for her support, the following terms: 

1. Vladivostok to be made a free port. 

2. Japan to be granted exclusive mining rights in Siberia. 

3. Japan to have free navigation of the Amur river. 

4. Any further financial needs of the Chinese Eastern Railway 
to be first submitted to Japan. 

While the other Allied povrers were debating ways and 
means to solve the Russian question, Japan already was on 
the ground and taking an active part. I quote from a con- 
fidential report of a secret agent employed by a foreign 
government to study conditions in Siberia. This man spoke 
Russian fluently and was thoroughly familiar with that re- 
gion from long residence and experience there : 

Dated June, 1918. 

All the Russian groups and factions require money for conduct- 
ing a pi-opaganda in their favor, for expenses of their military 
forces and for other needs of their administrations. The Japanese 
understand very well these difficulties and are the first to propose 
to make them loans. The Japanese have offered loans to almost 
every faction and group of Russians in Siberia at different times 
since the revolution, and frequently have made loans to opposing 
factions at the same time. I mention especially the proposed loan 
of 100,000,000 rubles on most favorable conditions to the new Sibe- 
rian Provisional Government. According to the statement to me 
of the Minister for Interior Affairs of the Siberian Provisional 
Government (M. Novosseloff) this loan was not accepted by the 
Government, but be recognizes that the situation of the Siberian 
Government in Vladiostok was critical owing to lack of necessary 
cash in hand and to difficulties met in obtaining funds. The at- 
tempts of the Government to get money from America were un- 
successful, though the Americans did not refuse but were only 
promising to arrange the matter later, probably after the situation 
of the Government is more stable. 



308 DEMOCKACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

In any case we see that Japan is continuing the same policy 
which she practiced toward Seminoff; that means the policy of 
secret loans on unknown conditions. It is the same policy that 
was not long ago discussed hi the newspapers concerning Japanese 
loans in China, which loans attracted special attention of the 
Allied Powers. It seems that something definite must be under- 
taken by the Allies to prevent the possibility of Japan to continue 
her separate loan policy, which sooner or later will bring com- 
plications in Eussian affairs, if in fact it is not intended to create 
confusion and dissension. From another point of view something 
must be done to organize an open and legal assistance by the 
Allies to the authorities responsible for these localities which are 
in none of the Czech's influence, because measures directed to main- 
tain order require money before all. 

Here we musf point out a considerable difference in the ma- 
terial (money) security of the rival groups. The group of Horvath 
disposes considerable official and private resources, thanks to the 
exceptional situation of Horvath personally and the support of 
the Bourgeoise class; whilst the Siberian government has absolutely 
no money at its disposition in the Far East. 

Here follows a good example of the Japanese anti-American 
propaganda and intrigue in Siberia and Manchuria, extracted 
from a confidential official report to a foreign government. 
It is a letter from the Japanese consul-general at Harbin 
to the Russian newspaper there. 

Imperial Japanese Consulate General at Harbin, 

June 8, 1918, No. Ex. 6. 
To the Editor of the ''Novosti Zhizni" : 

The Japanese Consul General has the honor to forward you 
herewith a translation in Russian of a leading article from the 
Japanese newspaper "Osaka Mainichi Shimbun" of May 31, 1918, 
which is one of the most influential press organs in Japan. This 
article was translated from Japanese into Russian by an amateur 
in this Consulate General, and I request you not to refuse to pub- 
lish it in the earliest issue of your esteemed paper, giving a frank 
critique of the content of the article in question. But at the same 
time this Consulate General humbly requests that under no circum- 
stances should it be indicated by your esteemed newspaper that 
this document was received from this Consulate General. 



THE SIBERIAN QUESTION 309 

The official report transmitting this letter to a foreign gov- 
ernment commented thus: 

The article in question contained an attack on the motives of 
the Allies, and especially the United States, in their dealings with 
Russia, and as propaganda it can only do harm to the Allies, and 
tend to create mistrust of American motives. 

As examples of the method of Japan's propaganda in the 
far East and its special anti-American trend, I will give a 
few pertinent instances. When Japan was trying to obtain 
a hold on the Chinese Eastern Railway after the revolution 
in Russia, one effort was to make it security for a loan to 
be given to the political faction led by General Horvath, 
head of the Chinese Eastern Railway administration at Har- 
bin. This scheme was discovered, and was exposed by the 
press in China before it could be carried through (although 
there is still uncertainty about whether Horvath has com- 
promised the Russian title with Japan in some way), where- 
upon the ''Manchurian Daily News," the Japanese organ in 
Manchuria printed in English, published a report that an 
American loan was being negotiated on the same collateral. 
This was criticized as a characteristic American move to gain 
a position in Manchuria, and it set off the press in Japan in 
a great clamor. Of course there was no truth in the report 
of an American loan with the Chinese Eastern Railway as 
security, and it was a pure fabrication by the "Manchurian 
Daily News." Another example was the premature report 
in Japanese press organs that an American fleet had been 
sent to Vladivostok with the purpose of occupying Siberia. 
Another canard circulated by Japanese newspapers was that 
the United States had purchased and would take over the 
Siberian Railway. Another canard was that the United 
States had purchased the northern part of the island of 
Saghalin from Russia. Another canard was that the United 
States, or American capitalists, had obtained an exclusive 
concession to work all-^nines in Siberia, this being given out 



310 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

to offset the publication of tlie diplomatic correspondence 
revealing that Japan actually was trying to obtain such a 
right. The method is, when some secret Japanese scheme is 
discovered prematurely and published, for a Japanese propa- 
ganda organ to create a "smoke screen" by attributing the 
plan to America. A very pertinent example of this method 
is the following, printed in the "Japan Advertiser," an 
American-owned newspaper published at Tokio, on April 
27, 1918: 

Asahi Service 

Vladivostok, April 26. — An important diplomatic document re- 
garding a secret agreement between the Governments of Siberia 
and America has been discovered by Soviet officials at the residence 
of a man called Kolobov, one of the committee of the Siberian 
Government. The document is a sensational one, in which the 
following articles are stated as the proposals of the Siberian Gov- 
ernment to America. 

1. Eastern Siberia is to be recognized as an independent self- 
governing state. 

2. The people of Eastern Siberia are to be guaranteed as hav- 
ing the right of not being intervened with by foreign powei's. 

3. A republic form of government is to be guaranteed for East- 
em Siberia. 

4. The United States Government may assume the right of con- 
trol over the whole Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways, 
to be restored to the Siberian Government as soon as the war is 
over. 

5. In view of preventing the main points along these railways 
from possible disturbances, the American Government holds the 
right of dispatching its troops or asking the expedition of troops 
of the other Allied Powers, and occupy the territories as far as 
from Vladivostok to Irkutsk. 

6. The Siberian Government should not conclude peace with 
Germany without America's approval. 

7. All administrative and militai-y affairs are to be entrusted 
to the American Government. 

8. In case the Ameiican Government decides to give financial 
assistance to the Siberian Government, the former may hold an 
absolute controlling power over the expenditures of the Siberian 
Government. This includes affairs regarding ammunition. 

The discovery was naturally a shock to the Russian public, 



THE SIBERIAN QUESTION 311 

especially to the Soviet, who had regarded America as their best 
friend. It is anticipated that the friendly dii3lomatic inter-course 
between America and the Soviet Government will be greatly af- 
fected by this discovery. 

To this "Asahi" despatch the ''Advertiser" prefixed this 
comment : 

The "Asahi's" correspondent at Vladivostok telegraphs an extra- 
ordinary story, about an alleged agreement between Americans, 
unnamed, and a Siberian provisional government. The agreement 
is said to have been discovered by Soviet officials in a domiciliary 
search — that convenient method of discovering what one wants to 
discover. It is an obvious fabrication. America is still in diplo- 
matic relations with Petrograd, and would not be the least likely 
to enter into such extraordinary negotiations with unauthorised 
persons. 

The terms of this alleged "secret treaty" would be tanta- 
mount to the creation of an American protectorate over 
Siberia, exactly such a relation as Japan has for years been 
trying to establish for herself with respect to China, and 
which at that very time she was scheming to create for her- 
self in Siberia. 

Conditions in Russia continued to grow worse, and in 
the summer of 1918 the principal Allied powers decided upon 
action in Siberia. This time the United States took the 
initiative, and proposed a joint and proportionately equal in- 
tervention, with express limitations as to extent and objects. 
It was interesting to note how the Japanese press, which had 
been actively propagandizing for separate intervention by 
Japan, now began to doubt the need for it. The fact was 
that the Japanese Government wanted to intervene by itself, 
but it preferred no intervention to joint intervention. But 
the Allied governments were very well informed by that time, 
and Japan had the alternative of joining or of seeing the 
other powers intervene without her. In that situation she, 
of course, joined. It was agreed that the four leading Allied 
powers, Great Britain, Japan, France, and the United States, 



312 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

would supply a maximum of seven thousand troops each, 
while Italy also was to send a contingent. That force, with 
the small Czecho-Slovak army, was deemed sufficient for the 
purposes of the intervention as then conceived. 

Japan did not wait upon a decision of the other Allied 
powers to move. As early as the spring of 1918 Japan be- 
gan to send troops into Manchuria by increasing the gar- 
risons, or "railway guards," there. This was done chiefly 
to intimidate the Chinese Government, which had increased 
its forces in north Manchuria for the purpose of policing 
the Chinese Eastern Railway, which remained under the 
direction of General Horvath by virtue of an arrangement 
made at Peking in April, 1918, whereby the railway admin- 
istration was declared to be detached from the authority of 
the Petrograd Government. Japanese diplomacy had favored 
that arrangement because it was backing Horvath, and it 
prevented China from taking full control. The increase of 
Chinese forces in north Manchuria made necessary by the 
lapse of Russian authority in that region was resented by 
Japan, which claimed the right to decide such measures un- 
der the "military agreement" recently concluded between 
Japan and China. Meanwhile Great Britain had taken a 
hand and was giving some financial and military support to 
the Russian leader Seminoff, who had organized a mixed 
force of Russians, Chinese, Japanese (volunteers) and Mon- 
gols to oppose the Bolsheviks in the Baikal territory. Sem- 
inoff and Horvath did not agree very well, owing to clever 
playing upon their mutual jealousy by the elements (Japa- 
nese and German) that wanted to create dissension. Seminoff 
had made an effort to take Irkutsk, but was repulsed near 
the Manchuria frontier and retreated into Chinese territory, 
where most of his troops were interned by the Chinese Gov- 
ernment, which was trying to observe neutrality toward the 
revolution in Russia, and of course could not permit its terri- 
tory to be used as a military base of operations for armed 
excursions into Siberia. During this time it was convenient, 



THE SIBERIAN QUESTION 313 

owing to congestion at Vladivostok, to ship medical and other 
Red Cross supplies, and supplies needed for other Allied 
uses, into Manchuria and Siberia by the South Manchurian 
Railway, which connects with the Chinese Eastern Railway 
at Changchun. As illuminating a phase of the situation, I 
quote from an official report to a foreign government, dated 
in April: 

I have the honor to state that the Japanese railway authorities 
here have, during the past week, been seriously hampering Allied 
war operations. Their motives in doing so are easily imagined, 
but difficult to determine with any certainty or exactness. They 
are more or less inscrutable, as many of their recent actions are. 

The Japanese evidently do not want order restored by the Rus- 
sians themselves in Siberia, for in such a ease they would have no 
excuse to interfere. Another chance to "fish in troubled waters" 
would thereby be lost. Then, too, it seems that they are moving 
large quantities of their own arms and munitions to the north 
and they want theirs to arrive first. However, their action in 
this matter hardly accords with the statements made by Viscount 
Ishii and other Japanese diplomats about Japan ''standing shoulder 
to shoulder with the Allies" and doing their utmost, etc. When 
one considers the celerity and efficiency with which the Japanese 
move their own supplies over the railway, it cannot for a moment 
be thought by any rational person that the delays and ineptitude 
which characterize their actions where other Allied interests are 
concerned are anything but studied and deliberate. That, at least, 
is the opinion of every official here who has anything to do with 
the incidents described. The British Consul-General, who is a 
careful, cautious and conservative man, expressed his opinion on 
this subject in unmeasured terms. 

The action of the Japanese in holding up the Allied supplies 
is in keeping with their general railway policy in Manchuria, and 
affords another striking example of their abuse of railway rights, 
which abuse has been frequently reported in my despatches Nos. 
79 and 84, dated respectively February 16 and March 5, 1918. 
"When American Red Cross supplies were being sent to Russia, this 
office had the utmost difficulty in getting the Japanese to accept 
them for shipment. They deliberately placed obstacles in the 
way, and showed no disposition whatever to help. It was a sorry 
day for European and American interests when the Japanese 



314 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

gained control of the railway lines in South Manchuria, and all 
the plausible explanations about "equal rights" and the hypocritical 
vaporings by the Japanese about the impartiality of their railway 
administration carry no weight with those who have any personal 
knowledge of the subject. 

At the time when the Japanese Government was consider- 
ing the proposal of the United States Government for a joint 
and limited intervention in Siberia, and when it began to 
perceive the expediency of accepting the American view 
of the situation, a strict censorship was clapped on the press 
in Japan, which up to then had been allowed free expression 
on the topic. In July, 1918, a special order was issued, re- 
ported by the ''Japan Advertiser" as follows: 

NEWSPAPERS ABE WARNED 

REGARDING SIBERIAN VIEWS 



As is the order on the eve of important events in Japan, the Met- 
ropolitan Police last night issued to all newspapers a warning 
against the publishing of conjectures regarding particulars of 
negotiations between Japan and the Allies in regard to the Siberian 
question. 

The police also warned against the publication of anything that 
is likely to cause resentment to the Allies among the Japanese. 
This last warning is evidently issued in view of the attitude of 
some Japanese newspapers in commenting on the reported attitude 
of the United States toward intervention in Siberia. 

The joint Allied intervention in Siberia was promulgated 
in August, 1918. In that connection it is interesting to quote 
in full the official announcement of its participation by the 
Japanese Government: 

The Japanese Government, actuated by the sentiments of sincere 
friendship toward the Russian people, have always entertained 
the most sanguine hopes of the speedy reestablishment of order 
in Russia, and a healthy and untrammeled development of her na- 
tional life. Abundant proof, however, is now afforded to show 
that Ihe Central European Empires, taking advantage of the chaotic 
and defenceless condition in which Russia has momentarily been 



THE SIBERIAN QUESTION 315 

placed, are consolidating their hold on that country, and are 
steadily extending their activities to the Russian far Eastern posses- 
sions. They have persistently interfered with, the passage of the 
Czecho-Slovak troops through Siberia. In the forces now opposing 
these valiant troops German and Austrian prisoners are freely en- 
listed, and they practically assume the position of command. The 
Czecho-Slovak troops, aspiring to secure a free and independent 
existence for their races and loyally espousing the common cause of 
the Allies, justly command every sympathy and consideration from 
the cobelligerents to whom their destiny is a matter of deep and 
abiding concern. In the presence of the threatening danger to 
which the Czecho-Slovak troops are actually exposed in Siberia 
at the hands of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians, the Allies 
have naturally felt themselves unable to view with indifference the 
untoward course of events, and a certain number of their troops 
have already been ordered to proceed to Vladivostok. The Govern- 
ment of the United States, equally sensible of the gravity of the 
situation, recently approached the Japanese Government with pro- 
posals for early despatch of troops to relieve pressure now weigh- 
ing upon the Czecho-Slovak forces. The Japanese Government, 
being anxious to fall in with the desires of the American Govern- 
ment, and also to act in harmony with their Allies in this expedi- 
tion, have decided to proceed at once to disposition of suitable 
forces for the proposed mission. A certain number of these troops 
will be sent forthwith to Vladivostok. In adopting this course, the 
Japanese Government remain unshaken in their constant desire to 
promote the relations to enduring friendship with Russia and the 
Russian people, and they reaffirm their policy of respecting the 
teiTitorial integrity of Russia and of abstaining from all inter- 
ference in her internal politics. They further declare that, upon 
the realization of the objects above indicated, they will immed- 
iately withdraw all the Japanese troops from the Russian terri- 
tories, and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia 
in all its phases whether political or military. 

Once intervention was decided on, Japan easily forestalled 
her allies in celerity in moving troops, because of proximity 
and also because she had been ready for a long time. (I 
have trustworthy information that Japan mobilized three 
divisions for occupation of Siberia in August, 1917). By her 
railway communications through Korea and Manchuria, 
Japan quickly had tFoops at Harbin, and soon pushed them 



316 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

westward. At all points of contact, and particularly on the 
line of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Japanese military 
commanders at once assumed a superior authority over the 
officers of Chinese troops that had been sent to maintain or- 
der in those localities. Japan asserted this seniority under 
the terms of the so-called "military agreement" with China. 
China did not place that interpretation on the agreement, 
and the Chinese commanders in Manchuria showed firmness 
in maintaining that they controlled in Chinese territory, and 
in refusing to yield authority there to the Japanese. 

This situation led to many clashes between Chinese and 
Japanese troops in Manchuria, some of which assumed serious 
proportions. Japanese troops moved along the Chinese East- 
ern Railway, placing guards at all bridges, culverts, and 
stations. As Chinese guards in ample numbers already were 
stationed at all those points, and the line was, to quote from 
a report of an American military expert, "as safe as Broad- 
way," the Chinese resented being thrust aside, especially as 
the political motive of Japan in trying to take over the rail- 
way was fully understood. At several places Japanese 
troops actually drove the Chinese guards away by force. As 
an example of this condition, the occurrence known as the 
"Manchuli incident" will serve. 

Manchuli is a town on the line of the railway between 
Chita and Vladivostok at the point where it enters Chinese 
territory in western Manchuria, and has importance because 
it is where frontier customs examinations are made, pass- 
ports visaed, and other official functions performed. At 
that time the town was a rendezvous for Russian refugees 
drifting across the frontier, and stragglers from Seminoff's 
little army that was operating against the soviet government 
at Irkutsk. I quote from an official report of the incident 
made by a foreign military officer who obtained the facts 
on the ground: 

I have to report an unpleasant collision that occurred at Man- 
chuli between Japanese and Chinese troops and officials. This 



THE SIBERIAN QUESTION 317 

point has lately been the scene of considerable trouble owing to 
the attempt of the Seminoff forces to use it as a base and as a 
place to which they can retreat when repulsed by the enemy. It 
has been neeessaiy for the Chinese authorities here to take meas- 
ures to preserve China's neutrality in this warfare between Rus- 
sian political factions, and the Chinese troops have disarmed many 
of Seminoff's men who have been thrust back into Chinese terri- 
tory. This has led to some unpleasant incidents, but the Chinese 
officials were acting with moderation and a fair amount of dis- 
cretion. 

This was the situation when a Japanese military force com- 
manded by General Fujii arrived at Manchuli. General Fujii, I 
am informed, at first tried to take command of the Chinese troops, 
claiming to be the senior officer. The Chinese commander declined 
to yield the command, and on being pressed by General Fujii, he 
referred the question to the Peking Government. I understand 
that the Japanese Government through its legation at Peking put 
pressure on the Chinese Government to concede the authority of 
the Japanese commander here, but the Chinese Government refused. 
The relations between the Japanese and Chinese headquarters here 
therefore have been strained, and there have been brawls between 
the Japanese and Chinese troops which, according to my investiga- 
tion, are almost invariably caused by the truculence of the Japanese 
soldiers, who show their contempt of the Chinese in all ways. This 
was the general situation when the unfortunate incident occurred. 

At midnight or thereabout on last Tuesday night a detachment of 
Japanese soldiers, about fifteen men with one non-commissioned of- 
ficer, went to the headquarters of the Chinese military commandant. 
The Japanese were armed with rifles and hand gTenades. They 
found the outer gate of the compound closed, and they told the Chi- 
nese sentry that they wanted to talk with the Chinese commander 
and demanded admittance. The guard refused to let them inside and 
tried to induce them to leave. The Japanese then attempted to force 
an entrance. The Chmese sentry resisted and was killed. The Jap- 
anese then forced the gate and marched in a body to the inner en- 
trance, again demanding to talk with the Chinese commandant. By 
this time the Chinese commandant (General Pao) was awakened and 
one of his statf parleyed with the Japanese, who demanded admit- 
tance. The Chinese officer told them that General Pao could not dis- 
cuss matters with them as there was no Japanese officer present, and 
asked them to go and bring an officer. This the Japanese refused to 
do, and started to force an entrance to the building where General 
Pao and his staff wereljuartered. The Chinese guard then fired. 



318 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

Three Japanese soldiers were killed and the rest retreated. The 
bodies of three men in the uniform of the Japanese army were found 
in the compound after the affray was over. 

The next day, before the Chinese commander had time to make 
a report of the affair, the Japanese commanding general demanded 
an apology for the injury done to Japanese troops and practically 
detained the Chinese commandant under arrest. The Japanese 
Government make a diplomatic issue of the incident, backed up 
the Japanese General, and demanded an apology from China and 
that the Chinese troops be withdrawn from MJaxichuli, except 
a few. 

While a Chinese officer was parleying with the Japanese soldiers 
on the night of the incident, another Chinese officer telei^honed to 
the Japanese military headquarters asking that a Japanese officer 
be sent to discipline the Japanese soldiers who were making the 
disturbance, but no attention was paid to this request. 

I understand that the matter has now been settled by the Japa- 
nese and Chinese Governments as follows: China is to pay an in- 
demnity in money for the three Japanese who were killed, and the 
Chinese commandant is to apologize to the Japanese commander 
here; Japan is to pay an indemnity for the one Chinese who was 
killed. Thus China is put officially in the wrong and is com- 
pelled to submit to humiliation and "loss of face," as is usual in 
such cases. The facts seem to be that the incident was a case of 
wanton and insolent affront by Japanese soldiers who took this 
way of showing their contempt of the Chinese. 

Soon after tlie Manchuli incident, the Japanese Govern- 
ment suddenly and without previous intimation notified the 
Chinese Government that it intended to act under the "mili- 
tary agreement." China was not consulted as to this action 
in any way, either as to its advisability or the means to be 
used. At the time when China was so officially notified, 
Japanese troops already were moving. This notice to China 
was given on September 20. By September 28 it was esti- 
mated by a foreign military expert on the ground that there 
were 22,000 Japanese troops north of Changchun, the north- 
ern terminus of the South Manchurian Railway; 3,000 at 
Changchun, and 15,000 at Mukden. By the end of October 
there were about 60,000 Japanese troops in Manchuria out- 
side of the alleged Japanese sphere tapped by the South 



THE SIBERIAN QUESTION 319 

Manchurian Railway, and the Kirin and Mukden- Antung 
lines. By the understanding- among the powers about joint 
intervention in Siberia, each of the four principal powers 
was to send 7,000 troops. Japan did send about 10,000 to 
Siberia by way of Vladivostok, which evidently the Tokio 
Government considered its quota under the joint intervention. 
But, including those in South Manchuria, Japan had about 
75,000 troops in Manchuria, showing that the Japanese 
Government regarded Manchuria as its special field and as 
not included in the joint intervention plan. At the time 
when the United States had approached the Allied nations 
with its intervention plan, China also was invited to par- 
ticipate, and had consented; but China's quota of troops was 
not fixed, it being apparently assumed that her part would be 
to preserve order in Manchuria and on the line of the Chinese 
Eastern Railway. That is, China was to do what was neces- 
sary within her own territory contiguous to Siberia, and was 
to facilitate the Allies' operations as she could. 

It quickly developed that Japan was determined that China 
should take no part, at least no creditable part, in these op- 
erations, just as Japan had succeeded in preventing China 
from having any real participation in the war elsewhere. 
Japan took it solely to herself to decide upon when and how 
the "military agreement" would be applied, and in acting 
professedly under it Japan did not consult China or assign 
any part to China. Yet the operations alleged to be under- 
taken by agreement were confined exclusively to China's ter- 
ritory, and affected Chinese interests more importantly than 
those of any other nation. 

The period from the time joint Allied intervention in 
Siberia began (August, 1918) until November, when the 
armistice was signed, can be summarized briefly. Out of 
courtesy, a Japanese general was given command (or senior- 
ity) of the Allied expeditionary forces in theory, but in fact 
each different national force was directed according to the 
policy of its government. For instance, Japan for her own 



320 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

reasons desired to push as far into Siberia as was possible 
without having to do much actual fighting. The excuse to do 
this was to support the Czecho-Slovak forces that were com- 
bating the army of the Soviets in central and western Si- 
beria. France and Great Britain also seemed to favor a 
move deeper into Siberia, Great Britain probably on the 
theory that the general war situation for the Allies would 
be helped, and France perhaps for the same reason. The 
American Government, however, held its forces at or near 
the coast and declined to participate in a move toward the 
interior. Evidently "Washington foresaw the end of the war 
and did not want to become further involved in Russia's 
civil strife. 

This period, brief as it was, was long enough to demon- 
strate the strong antagonism felt by the Japanese toward all 
of their allies. The Japanese seemed to regard the British, 
French, and American troops as interlopers, as trespassers 
in a Japanese preserve, with the sole motive of depriving 
Japan of legitimate spoils of war. This disposition caused 
numerous very unpleasant incidents, and serious trouble be- 
tween the Japanese troops and those of the other allies was 
at times narrowly averted. I could relate dozens of incidents 
illustrative of this condition, but two will be enough. Two 
British officers, in uniform, were walking in the outskirts of 
Vladivostok on some military business, when they noticed the 
peculiar actions of a Japanese soldier who was stationed as 
a sentry near some supplies. The sentry was beckoning, and 
seemed to wish the officers to approach him. Disregarding 
his unmilitary demeanor, and thinking the man might be in 
trouble, the officers walked over to where he was and asked 
what he wanted. The sentry greeted them with an insolent 
grin and a tirade in Japanese, which the officers could not 
understand. Then the sentry seized a swagger-stick which 
one of the officers was carrying, broke it, and cast the pieces 
into a near-by puddle of water. By this time the officers 
comprehended that the soldier meant to insult them, and they 



THE SIBERIAN QUESTION 321 

took him suddenly by his arms and threw him, gun and all, 
into the puddle. They then continued their walk. The of- 
ficers did not report the incident formally, for many previ- 
ous similar incidents had shown that no satisfaction would 
be obtained from the Japanese superior command. Japa- 
nese troops in Vladivostok and Manchuria habitually failed to 
salute officers of other Allied forces, and on occasion even 
would shoulder them off sidewalks and display other studied 
rudeness toward them. By the late autumn of 1918 there 
was a feeling almost of hostility between the Japanese troops 
in that region and the troops of other Allied forces, which 
became so intense that measures had to be taken to prevent 
serious collisions. 

An example of this attitude of the Japanese military was 
given in Manchuria. Italy's part in the Siberian interven- 
tion was to send a battalion of troops from the garrison main- 
tained in North China under the protocol of 1901. The short- 
est and quickest way for these troops to reach the scene of 
events was by the Chinese Government railways to Mukden, 
then by the South Manchurian Railway to Changchun, where 
was a connection with the Chinese Eastern Railway on to 
Harbin. The practice has been, in transferring passengers 
at this point, to shunt trains from the Japanese line over to 
the Russian station, when trains could be changed by merely 
walking across a platform. The train conveying the Italian 
troops had arrived at Changchun and was shunted over to 
the Russian station. There the troops detrained for trans- 
fer. While this was taking place, an Italian sentry was 
posted to guard some supplies on the station platform. A 
number of Japanese soldiers were strolling about the plat- 
form, and one of them started to examine the supplies, where- 
upon the sentry properly warned him off. The Japanese 
went away, and soon returned with a Japanese officer, who 
reprimanded the Italian sentry. The sentry stood his 
ground, and when the Japanese officer started to handle the 
supplies, presented His bayonet. The Japanese officer then 



322 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

left, and returned soon with a file of Japanese soldiers fully 
armed, which he drew up in a line on the platform. By- 
then an Italian officer had appeared, and a sharp colloquy 
occurred. The Japanese officer demanded that the sentry 
be ordered to apologize, which the Italian officer refused to 
order him to do, and objected to the presence of the file of 
Japanese soldiers and their menacing attitude. After an 
argument, the Japanese withdrew. In the opinion of officers 
of other nationalities, the Japanese adopt these methods to 
impress the natives that the other powers are subservient to 
Japan, and that Japan is the dictator in Manchuria, 

The situation caused by the conduct of Japanese troops in 
Siberia and Manchuria became so strained that a joint pro- 
test, which, I am informed, was quite strong in its phraseol- 
ogy, was sent to the Japanese commanding general by the 
other allied commanders. 

With the signing of the armistice in Europe, the joint 
Allied intervention in Siberia took a new character. It no 
longer had the complexion of an oblique military move 
against the Central powers, which was no longer necessary. 
It now became purely an intervention in Russia's internal 
affairs, a situation that called for fresh consideration by the 
peace conference at Paris. Therefore military measures in 
Siberia were suspended pending the adoption of a new policy. 

The Japanese Government soon grasped the meaning of 
these events. In December it announced that it was with- 
drawing its troops from Siberia and Manchuria, and it is 
probable that the number was reduced. In February, 1919, 
it was reported that Japan had agreed to advance a loan to 
the Siberian Provisional Government at Omsk and to give 
military aid and support to that Government. For this aid 
Japan is, so the reports said, to receive exclusive concessions 
in central and eastern Siberia. Such a step of course would 
be a violation of the inter-allied agreement regarding inter- 
vention in Russia, by which none of them were to act except 
in consultation, and conjunction with the other allied nations. 



THE SIBERIAN QUESTION S23 

Semi-official denials of the reports were given out at Tokio. 
Observers of far-Eastern politics are apt to conclude that 
Japan makes a show of withdrawing from Siberia in 
order to get the other powers out, and at the same time 
is planning to take an active part, for a definite quid pro quo, 
in the civil war in Russia by renting Japanese troops (for 
the reported arrangement amounts to that) to one of the 
factions. In January, 1919, it was announced that an agree- 
ment had been reached among the Allied powers (which in 
effect meant between Japan and the United States) by which 
the Chinese Eastern and Siberian railways are for a while to 
be operated by the Stevens Commission under joint interna- 
tional control. 

In response to inquiries of press correspondents at "Wash- 
ington, the State Department questioned the correctness of 
the reports about Japanese loans to the Omsk government in 
return for concessions in the Pri-Amur district of Siberia, 
and pointed out that Japan, as a loyal ally, and with full 
representation at the peace conference, could not take inde- 
pendent action in Russia. A few days later, on February 12, 
the State Department announced that the United States and 
Japan had agreed in regard to plans for the restoration of 
railway traffic in Siberia. Acting Secretary of State Polk 
was quoted by the Associated Press as stating : 

The purpose of the agreement is to assist the Russians in Siberia 
in regaining their normal condition of life, and has been reached 
upon a definite understanding that the railways are to be operated 
for the interests of the people of Siberia. The United States and 
Japan have expressly voiced their disinterested purpose not to in- 
fringe on any existing right, either of Russia or, where the Chinese 
Eastern is concerned, of China. 

Under the plan adopted, which was to be put into effect 
immediately, the Siberian railway system, including the 
Chinese Eastern Railway, was to be supervised by an inter- 
Allied committee with a Russian as chairman. Russia, Great 
Britain, Japan, the United States, France, Italy and China 



324 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

are to have representation on the Committee. The technical 
and economic management of the railways will be in the hands 
of a technical board, the president of which will be John F. 
Stevens, head of the American railway commission sent to 
Russia in 1917. An inter-Allied military board will co- 
ordinate matters affecting military transportation arising 
from the presence in Russia of military forces of the United 
States and the Allies. 

It required months of negotiations to effect this simple ar- 
rangement, owing to the difficulties raised by Japan. As 
friction developed, the other Allied powers fell into the back- 
ground, and left the issue to be adjusted by Japan and 
America. The result, so far, indicates that the American 
Government is 'rzl disposed to abandon the Manchurian and 
Siberian situations to the exclusive treatment of Japan. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE SOLUTION 

Effects in China of the collapse of Germany — The internal situation^ — 
Composition of the Government — Japan forcing her schemes — The 
armistice — Weakening of Japanese influence at Peking — Some causes 
of this — Injection of American ideals — President Wilson's prin- 
ciples — Their application to China — Work of American propaganda — 
Japan's plan to represent China at the peace conference — The scheme 
blocked — Uneasiness of Chinese — The Southern point of view — Further 
effort by Japan to intimidate China — Effort to prevent the publication 
of secret treaties — Outcome of that matter — Further advice of the Al- 
lied powers to China — Trying to end the civil strife — The conference at 
Shanghai — What shall be done for China? — The case of China sum- 
marized — Responsibility of America — The problem analyzed — Question 
of extraterritoriality — A plan for its gradual abolition — This plan con- 
sidered — The railway question — The question of loans and finance — 
New declaration of the American Government — Will China take the 
cure? — China's appeal to civilization. 

THE breakdown of the German military offensive in 
France in the summer of 1918 threw a shadow over 
Japan's influence at Peking, and alarmed the group 
of corrupt Chinese officials who owed their positions and power 
to Japanese backing. For a while it was felt that the forma- 
tion of a new ' ' liberal ' ' ministry at Tokio might mean an ac- 
tual change in Japan's China policy. But events quickly 
showed the fallacy of such expectations. 

It soon developed that the Japanese Government did not in- 
tend to change its course in China except under compulsion, 
but would continue during the probably long period of peace 
negotiations to push the China game for all it would stand. 
Baron Ha.yashi, the Japanese minister at Peking, who had 
been out of sjonpathy with the reckless Japanese loan policy 
and was not a believer Tn drastic methods, was recalled, and 

325 



326 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

replaced by Mr, Obata. Obata was known in China as the 
"table-pounder," because during the pressure for the secret 
acceptance of the twenty-one demands and the negotiation of 
the ''agreement" of 1915 he, so it is said, would emphasize 
Japan's arguments during the conferences by thumping the 
council table vigorously. Obata 's return to Peking at that 
juncture was taken to mean that Japan would, if necessary, 
revert to table-pounding tactics to gain her points. 

A brief resume of the condition of China internally at that 
time is necessary to make the situation comprehensible. The 
government at Peking was composed of a president, a cabinet, 
and an assembly, or council. The president, Hsu Shih-chang, 
was amiable, and was believed to be a patriotic man, but one 
lacking a forceful personality. The strong man in the Gov- 
ernment was the premier, Tuan Chi-jui, who with his hench- 
men composed the predominant group in the cabinet, and con- 
trolled the ministries of war, finance, and communications. 
Tuan Chi-jui 's power rested on his affiliations with the north- 
ern Tuchuns, his command of such troops that were in and 
near Peking, and the financial and diplomatic support of 
Japan. The other cabinet ministries, including the ministry 
of foreign affairs, were not strongly under Japanese influence, 
and felt that China's safest course was to follow the United 
States and the western powers. The council, which had been 
set up to replace the seceding parliament, really amounted to 
nothing, and did nothing. As president of the senate, Liang 
Shao-yi, who had been powerful in the regime of Yuan Shih 
K'ai, had a foothold from which he exercised a certain influ- 
ence. Outside of the Tuan group there was a strong sentiment 
in favor of compromising the dispute with the South and 
creating a united national government. The Peking Govern- 
ment exercised nominal authority over about three fifths of 
the country. The remaining provinces, mostly lying south of 
the Yangtze River, supported the secession government estab- 
lished at Canton. 

The so-called Southern Government was composed of mem- 



THE SOLUTION 327 

bers of the old parliament, that had been dissolved in 1917 by 
President Li Yuan Hung at the dictation of the Tuchun's 
party led by Tuan Chi-jui, and a number of liberal leaders, 
prominent among whom were Wu Ting-fang and Tang Shao- 
yi. Sun Yat Sen for a while also affiliated with this faction, 
but in 1918 he severed relations with it and retired to Shang- 
hai. The Southern Government protested strongly against 
any foreign loans being made to the Peking Government after 
the schism, on the ground that the money was used only to at- 
tempt to suppress the effort to maintain democratic institu- 
tions in China. In 1918 Tang Shao-yi undertook a visit to 
Japan for the purpose of trying to persuade the Japanese Gov- 
ernment to stop the lending of money by Japanese to the 
Northern Tuchuns and Government, and to stop the supply of 
arms and ammunition from Japan ; but the visit had no prac- 
tical results. The Southern Government subsisted from per- 
sonal contributions, provincial revenues, and portions of the 
Salt Gabelle it was able to withhold. It denied ever taking 
money from Japan, but it is quite clearly established that some 
of the southern Tuchuns and local officials went into the Jap- 
anese loan game pretty deeply. 

Foreseeing an end of the war, but not its abrupt termination, 
the Japanese Government evidently decided to strike while 
the iron was hot, and to try to close up a number of matters 
which had been brought to a certain point, but not fully con- 
summated. For some time Japan had been pressing to have 
the Chinese Government ratify a number of additional or sup- 
plementary clauses to the "agreement" of 1915 and the ''mili- 
tary agreement" of 1918. These clauses related to Japan's 
position in Shantung and Manchuria, and would give Japan 
almost complete control over all future development and or- 
ganization of China 's military and naval forces, with right to 
supply arsenals, naval plants, arms, and munitions ; to provide 
Japanese officers to oversee those equipments and train China 's 
forces. Several grandiose projects also were afoot: one a 
plan for China to entrust her interests at the peace conference 



328 DEMOCKACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

to Japan; and another for Japan to acquire from Russia 
(which meant from the Horvath party in eastern Siberia, or 
another of the Russian groups in Siberia) with China's eon- 
sent the Russian interests and rights in the Chinese Eastern 
Railway; and various concessions and loans negotiated with 
provincial officials, and with men in the Tuan group, were 
being pressed for ratification by the central Government. 
These negotiations were being conducted chiefly at Tokio, in 
order to avoid the too close scrutiny to which Japan's moves 
were subjected at Peking, and because Japan seemed to have 
obtained a strong influence over the Chinese minister at Tokio. 
In October, 1918, it was announced that General Hsu Chang, 
who was considered the right hand of Premier Tuan, had ac- 
cepted an invitation to attend the autumn field military 
manoeuvers in Japan. This announcement at once aroused 
much suspicion and comment, for General Hsu was one of the 
leaders of the pro-Japan group in the Chinese Government 
and the chief lieutenant of the premier. The pro-China and 
anti-Japan Chinese press published speculations on the pur- 
pose of General Hsu's visit, and the consensus of opinion was 
that he was to sign an agreement by which Japan was to ad- 
vance Tls. 100,000,000 to the Peking Government (which 
meant to the Tuan group) ; and that China was to delegate 
Japan to represent her at the peace conference, was to ratify 
the supplementary articles of the 1915 and military agree- 
ments and other loan concessions, and was to give additional 
security and concessions. It was reported, in return for those 
concessions of China, that Japan would return to China the 
balance of the ''boxer" indemnity still due to Japan; a plan 
which, under the conditions that existed, would have been 
merely an adroit form of bribery. In the midst of these dis- 
cussions, and in the face of a bitterly hostile attitude of the 
greater part of China and open accusations that he had been 
bribed to betray his country, General Hsu departed for Japan. 
Before he had time to develop his projects there the sudden 
signing of the armistice brought another change in the situa- 



THE SOLUTION 329 

tion. The Hsu mission dropped quietly into the background, 
or the soft pedal was put on it. The peace conference, which 
had been considered as an event months and perhaps a year in 
the future, now was actually at hand. 

Partly to recall to the Chinese Government a sense of its 
true position and responsibility, and perhaps also for its 
oblique effect upon Japanese influence at Peking, the Allied 
governments took occasion in October, 1918, to address a 
friendly remonstrance and admonition to China concerning 
her part in the war. This act was called a protest in current 
press discussion, and it pointed out a number of matters 
wherein it was alleged that China had been delinquent. One 
was that the remissions of the "boxer" indemnity payments 
had been spent foolishly; another was that the "War Partici- 
pation Bureau had accomplished nothing ; another matter was 
the prevalence of banditry; and failure to intern enemy sub- 
jects, to liquidate enemy business, to prevent trading with the 
enemy, were other points made. The protest was based on just 
grounds; but the representatives of the powers who drafted 
and presented it knew that the Peking Government was only 
partly to blame for its failures in the war, and that a much 
stronger indictment would rest against Japan ; indeed, the pro- 
test probably was meant for Japan although made to China. 
Evidence that Japanese were evading the enemy trading regu- 
lations in China had been accumulating since early in the war. 
After it was plain that Germany would be defeated, and that 
Germans would be deported from China and their business 
liquidated, the Germans were very anxious to dispose of their 
property. Japanese were the principal purchasers. At 
Tsingtau, at Tsinan, Tientsin, Hankow, and many other places, 
German real and other property was purchased by Japanese. 
By the end of 1918 a large proportion of the desirable German 
property in China had passed into Japanese hands. 

The armistice weakened Japan 's influence at Peking in sev- 
eral ways. First, it-completely disproved one of the most 
potent arguments which Japanese suh rosa propaganda la 



330 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

China had been using to depress pro-Ally sentiment among 
the Chinese — the argument that Germany eventually would 
win the war or get a stalemate. With that theory also went 
down a number of arguments which depended on it, such as a 
new alliance of Japan and Germany, with Russia and China 
under their protection, a plan which had been presented to 
the Chinese Government by Japan as being a possible and a 
logical outcome of the war. 

But the principal thing which lessened Japan's influence 
at Peking was the demonstration of the power of the United 
States as shown by events of the year 1918, and the growing 
influence of the American Government, or rather of President 
Wilson, in world politics. To most Chinese the result of the 
war resolved into comparatively simple elements. As they 
saw it, for years the Allies could not defeat Germany, and 
Germany seemed to be getting the better of it. Then America 
entered the war, and changed its whole aspect, resulting in a 
victory of the Allies. Chinese also were impressed by the 
fact that Germany, when she came to sue for peace, addressed 
not France or Great Britain or the Allies in Europe, but the 
President of the United States ; and as far as they could judge, 
it was the decision of the President that led to the end of the 
war. Furthermore, the Chinese had by then begun to learn 
something about the purposes of the American Government in 
entering the war. This information had been conveyed to 
them by the United States Committee on Public Information, 
which, after repeated urging of Americans in China, Anally, 
in the summer of 1918, had created an organization for propa- 
ganda in China. This propaganda was under the direction 
of Carl Crow, formerly with ' ' The China Press, " " The Japan 
Advertiser," and "Millard's Review"; and with Dr. Paul S. 
Reinsch, the American minister to China, and John B, Powell, 
of "Millard's Review," as official advisers. A telegraph serv- 
ice of American news was instituted, and circulated among 
the Chinese vernacular and foreign press in China. But even 
more effective was the translation into Chinese and publication 



THE SOLUTION 331 

in book form of the principal war addresses of President Wil- 
son. My last information was that this edition of the Presi- 
dent's addresses in Chinese was running into the hundreds of 
thousands and was taxing the ' ^ Commercial Press ' ' of Shang- 
hai to meet the demand. Placards in Chinese and English, 
with striking phrases of President Wilson's speeches, suitable 
for hanging in windows and homes or for posting on walls, 
were printed and circulated in all parts of China. One of 
these placards quoted a paragraph of the President's Fourth 
of July address of 1918: 

Second, the settlement of every question, whether of teiritory, of 
sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or political relationship upon 
the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people 
immediately concerned and not upon the basis of the material in- 
terest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire 
a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or 
mastery. 

And almost as hopeful to Chinese was another paragraph 
of that same address of Mr. Wilson : 

First, the destruction of every arbitrary power, anywhere, that 
can separately, secretly and of its single choice disturb the peace 
of the world or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at least its 
reduction to virtual impotence. 

The utterances of leading officials of the European Allied 
governments about the war and their aims and purposes in 
waging it to a conclusion had not been lacking in eloquence 
and force, and all had been published in China by the British 
and French press there. But such utterances of European 
statesmen had come to be meaningless to Chinese, in view of 
what they knew of the actions of one of the Allies, Japan, with 
the tacit and perhaps the positive secret assent and approval 
of the other Allied powers. The Chinese also knew of some 
of the secret agreements made among the leading Allied powers 
during the war relating to annexations of territories of other 
belligerent nations and even of some neutral states. Now 



332 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

came a new voice, speaking words and principles which to the 
Chinese seemed to be written especially to apply to them and 
to their country and its situation. It was a new voice, from 
a new world leader, representing a nation that Chinese long 
had regarded as friendly to their country. They listened to 
the voice, and for the first time the war began to take a mean- 
ing to them which they could apply to themselves. Now came 
the positive proof that the nation and its leader who uttered 
those principles were a great, perhaps the greatest, power for 
the settlement of the issues of the war and the questions of 
the peace. Doubts and fears began to diminish. The Chinese 
officials who were holding out against Japan's blandishments, 
inducements, and pressure took heart again and strengthened 
their resistance. Then there was the hope held out by the 
proposed league of nations, as stated by another paragraph of 
President Wilson's Fourth of July address: 

Fourth, the establishment of an organization of peace which shall 
make it certain that the combined power of the free nations will 
check every invasion of right and sei^e to make peace and justice 
the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which 
every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed 
upon by the people directly concerned shall be sanctioned. 

Notwithstanding Japan's pressure to induce the Chinese 
Government to commit, or in some way to delegate, China's 
representation at the peace conference to her care, the Peking 
Government, supported by the advice of the American, British, 
and other Allied legations, declined so to act, and decided to 
send a separate delegation to Paris. Lu Cheng Hsiang, minis- 
ter of foreign affairs, was nominated as head of the delegation; 
with V. K. Wellington Koo, Chinese minister at Washington ; 
Alfred Tze, Chinese minister to Great Britain ; Wei Tsun-chu, 
Chinese minister to Belgium, as advisers ; and with a staff of 
counselors and secretaries. 

Failing to become China's attorney in the ease, Japan then 
instigated an intrigue through the pro-Japan group at Peking 
to have the peace delegation include a majority of Chinese 



THE SOLUTION 333 

who were under Japan 's control. To this end it was proposed 
that the premier, Tuan Chi-jui, should be a member of the 
delegation, and that Tsao Ju-lin, the minister of finance, and 
General Hsu Chang, should accompany Tuan as expert advis- 
ers. It also was suggested to the Chinese Government pri- 
vately by the Japanese legation at Peking that the relations 
of Japan and China and their mutual interests at the peace 
conference would be greatly facilitated if China would ap- 
point a Japanese adviser to her delegation at Paris. This 
offer was declined. The suggestion that Tuan Chi-jui and 
his chief lieutenants should be sent as delegates aroused so 
much opposition throughout the country, and especially among 
the Southern party, that it was quietly dropped. I was in 
Peking during this time, and a little later I met some of the 
Southern leaders at Shanghai and discussed the situation with 
them. I found them willing, even anxious, to make peace 
with the Northern party provided a suitable basis for compro- 
mise could be arrived at. They seemed to realize the danger 
to China of divided counsels and motives at such a world crisis, 
and that it would seriously impair her position at the peace 
conference. But they did not trust the Peking Government 
as long as Tuan Chi-jui and his satellites were in power. A 
principal Southern leader thus discussed the question with 
me : 

''At this time all Chinese must put aside party advantage 
and personal ambitions and concentrate on getting justice for 
our nation in the peace settlement. To this end we of the 
Southern party are willing to concur with and to take part 
in the conferences at Paris. I think the South should be repre- 
sented in the delegation at the conference. We fear that 
Japan's control of Tuan Chi-jui and his followers will some- 
how commit the Peking Government to delegate China's case 
to Japan, or to cause it to be presented inadequately. There 
are a number of men in the Tuan crowd at Peking who, for a 
money consideration, js^ill sign ' on the dotted line ' at the end 
of any kind of agreement which Japan will write. Their sig- 



334 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

natures, of course, will not make the documents valid, but it 
may be that Japan, if she can get them signed cheaply enough, 
will think that somehow she will be able to get them ratified 
later ; and at any rate she may be able to use them for trading 
purposes at Paris. I believe it is true that a large number of 
secret agreements have been signed with Japan by different 
officials of the Tuan crowd at Peking with, as you Americans 
say, the 'blue sky as the limit.' Most of these secret agree- 
ments never have been formally ratified, for that requires 
action by the parliament, and to present them to parliament, 
or even to the Peking council, would give them publicity. So 
far a few officials at Peking, whose signatures are necessary, 
have held out against all Japanese inducements and intimida- 
tion. The Southern party will raise any amount of money to 
prevent Japan from controlling the Chinese delegation at 
Paris or to prevent it from being muzzled there." 

A result of this sentiment was that C. T. Wang, who had 
gone to America as a representative of the Canton Government 
in September, 1918, was appointed by President Hsu as an 
associate of the Chinese peace delegation, and joined it in 
Paris with several other members of the Southern party. 

Although it is futile to draw conclusions about events that 
are in process of formulation, as I write this the peace confer- 
ence already has developed some very interesting matters of 
China vis-a-vis Japan. On its way from Peking to Paris the 
original Chinese delegation traveled by rail through Man- 
churia and Korea, across the straits of Shimonoseki, and on 
to Yokohama by rail, where a Japanese ship conveyed it to 
Seattle. From Mukden, in Manchuria, on to America, the 
delegation, and of course all of its numerous pieces of luggage, 
moved entirely by Japanese-owned, and, so far as the railways 
are concerned. Government-owned and managed means of 
transportation. At Yokohama, the day before the delegation 
sailed, I met one of the Chinese secretaries, and he told me 
that some pieces of the delegation 's luggage were missing, hav- 
ing been lost or delayed in transit, and that the luggage con- 



THE SOLUTION 335 

tained documentary matter for use at Paris. Later it was 
reported that this luggage, containing certified copies of cer- 
tain documents, was not recovered, and the delegation arrived 
at Paris without it. This became public when the Chinese 
delegates at Paris made known their intention to submit to 
the conference copies of all secret agreements signed and rati- 
fied or not ratified, or proposed by Japan, but not signed, 
between Japan and China during the course of the war. 

The report that the Chinese delegation would place all these 
questions confidentially before their confreres at Paris caused 
a somewhat sensational incident, which is aptly illustrative of 
Japan's methods in China. Through the Japanese legation 
at Peking it was strongly put to the Chinese Government that 
those matters were private between Japan and China, and 
should not be submitted to the Paris conference; and it was 
urged that the Chinese Government would immediately repudi- 
ate the action of its representatives at Paris. The Chinese 
Government refused to be intimidated, and informed the other 
Allied legations at Peking of what had occurred, and also 
made the matter public. 

The disclosures placed Japan in such a bad light that the 
whole of Japan 's diplomatic organization and propaganda was 
focused on an effort to deny her part in the matter and to 
obscure the facts. For instance, as a "smoke screen," the 
Japanese embassy at Washington gave out statements to the 
effect that Japan was indifferent about the publication of all 
her agreements with China, that indeed she always had in- 
tended to publish them herself, and as an evidence of that, the 
embassy gave out for publication the old "agreement" of 
1915, which of course had been published years before. Find- 
ing that China could not be bluffed by such methods, Japan 
then proposed to China that she (Japan) would withdraw 
certain of the unratified and pending agreements, and that 
the remaining ones would be jointly given out for publication. 
It appears that Chinarassented to this proposal, which had 
advantages for her in that it amounted to wiping out a number 



336 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

of embarrassing issues ; for on February 25, 1919, a statement 
was given out at Paris containing texts of the secret supple- 
mentary agreements in the form of notes exchanged at Tokio 
on September 24, 1918, between Baron Goto, Japanese minis- 
ter of foreign affairs, and the Chinese minister. The notes 
follow : 

[Note 1.^ — Tsung-hsiang Chang to Baron Goto.] 
The Chinese Government has decided to obtain loans from Japa- 
nese capitalists and proceed speedily to build railways connecting 
the points as below set forth. Having received authorization from 
my Government, I have the honor to communicate the same to your 
Government. 

First, between Kaiyuan, Hailung, and Kirin; second, between 
Chang-ghun and Taonan, and, third, from a point between Taonan 
and Jehol to some seaport. (This line to be determined subject to 
future investigation.) 

Should there be no objection to the above propositions, it is re- 
quested that your Government lose no time in taking the necessary 
steps to cause capitalists in your country to agree to enter negotia- 
tions for loans on the same. A reply to the above is awaited and 
will be appreciated. 

[Note 2. — Baron Goto to the Chinese Minister.] 
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's 
note, intimating that your Government has decided speedily to 
build with loans from Japanese capitalists railways connecting the 
points as set forth below. (The note cites items 1, 2, and 3 as 
contained in the note of the Chinese Minister.) 

The Imperial Government, while noting with much pleasure the 
communication of the Chinese Government, begs to state in reply 
that it will lose no time in taking necessary steps to cause Japanese 
capitalists to enter into negotiations for loans on the same. 

[Notes 3 and 4 missing.] 

[Note 5. — Baron Goto to the Chinese Minister.] 
I have the honor to inform you that the Imperial Government, in 
view of the feeling of good neighborhood existing between the two 
countries and in a spirit of mutual accommodation, has deemed it 
fitting, and accordingly has decided, to propose to your Government 
to settle various questions relating to the Province of Shantung in a 
manner as set forth below; 



THE SOLUTION 337 

First — To concentrate at Tsing-tao all Japanese troops stationed 
along the Tsing-tao-Tsinan Railway, excepting a contingent to be 
left at Tsinan. 

Second — The Chinese Government to provide for the guarding of 
the Tsing-tao-Tsinan Railway and to organize a police force for that 
purpose. 

Third — The Tsing-tao-Tsinan Railway to contribute an appropri- 
ate sum to defraying the expenses of such police force. 

Fourth — Japanese to be employed at the headquarters of the police 
force, the principal railway stations, and the training stations of the 
police force. 

Fifth — Chinese to be employed on the Tsing-tao-Tsinan Railway. 

Sixth — On determination of ownership, the Tsing-tao-Tsinan Rail- 
way to be run as a joint Chino-Japanese undertaking. 

Seventh — The civil administrations now in force to be withdrawn. 

In acquainting you with the above, the Japanese Government de- 
sires to be advised as to the disposition of your Government regard- 
ing the proposals. 

[Note 6. — Tsung-hsiang Chang to Baron Goto.] 
I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note with contents 
to the following effect. (Repeats almost verbatim the contents of 
Baron Goto's note.) I beg to acquaint you in reply that the Chinese 
Government gladly agrees to the proposals of the Japanese Govern- 
ment above alluded to. 

The Japanese and Chinese delegates at Paris, and the Chi- 
nese and Japanese governments at Peking and Tokio, at the 
same time stated publicly that these notes were all the agree- 
ments that had been made between those governments, and 
that there were no other secret agreements. That statement 
probably is not true literally ; but it can be taken to mean that 
any other secret agreements were abrogated by mutual con- 
sent, leaving only these in issue as to their validity. By mak- 
ing that statement to the Conference, the Japanese Govern- 
ment is estopped from presenting later as valid instruments 
any other agreements with China that it may be holding up 
its sleeve. The Japanese Government probably preferred thus 
to disclaim secret agreements that it has extorted from China 
or obtained by briberyjar attempted to obtain, rather than to 
have them exposed to the world. 



338 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

While these events connected with the peace conference 
were developing, attention was being given by the Allied 
powers to the internal situation of China. As at several times 
previously, the lead was taken by the United States, and on 
October 10, the anniversary of the Chinese Revolution, which 
is a national holiday, President Wilson sent a telegram to the 
President of China. The telegram and the reply follow: 

The President of The Republic of China, Peking. 

On this memorable anniversary when the Chinese people unite to 
commemorate the birth of the Republic of China I desire to send to 
you on behalf of the American people my sincere congratulations 
upon your accession to the Presidency of the Republic and my most 
heartfelt wishes for the future peace and prosperity of your country 
and people. I do this with the greatest earnestness not only because 
of the long and strong friendship between our countries but more 
especially because in this supreme crisis in the history of civilisation, 
China is torn by internal dissension so grave that she must compose 
these before she can fulfil her desire to cooperate with her sister 
nations in their great struggle for the future existence of their high- 
est ideals. This is an auspicious moment as you enter upon the 
duties of your high office for the leaders in China to lay aside their 
differences and guided by a spirit of patriotism and self-sacrifice to 
unite in a determination to bring about harmonious cooperation 
among all elements of your great nation so that each may contribute 
its best effort for the good of the whole and enable your Republic 
to reconstitute its national unity and assume its rightful place in the 
council of nations. 

WooDRow Wilson. 

Hsu Shih-chang's reply follows : 
The President of 

The United States of America, 
Washington. 

Please accept my very sincere thanks for your telegram of con- 
gratulations upon my assumption of the office to which I was duly 
elected by the Parliament of the Republic. It is my earnest desire 
that not only the traditional intimate friendship existing between our 
two countries will be maintained and strengthened but also all efforts 
within our power will continue to be exerted toward the furtherance 
of the common cause in wliich the splendid success of the army of 
your country has won the admiration and respect of the world. 



THE SOLUTION 339 

National unity upon which the welfare of the people entirely de- 
pends is a matter demanding my first attention, and you may be 
assured that I will put forth my best effort to bring about its con- 
summation and meet the wishes of the people of the whole country 
that in the coming councils of the family of nations our country may 
assume its rightful place and work with your country hand in hand 
toward the realisation of the highest ideals. 

Hsu Shih-chang. 

As was to have been expected, this telegram of President 
Wilson was taken amiss by the Japanese press, which made 
the usual effort to construe it as an interference in China's 
affairs contrary to the Lansing-Ishii Agreement. As typical 
of the Japanese view of this question, can be quoted a telegram 
sent from Peking by a Japanese news agency, and published 
in the ' ' Shanghai Times, ' ' a Japanese organ : -_^ 

It has been noticed that since his return from the United States, 
Dr. Eeinsch, the American minister to Peking, has been endeavoring 
to arrange a compromise between the North and the South, If this 
is true, it will be an infringement of the American-Japanese agree- 
ment. 

This in effect meant that the Japanese idea of the Lan- 
sing-Ishii Agreement is that the American Government or 
President properly cannot address a communication to the 
Chinese Government or to Chinese without first consulting 
Japan or by sending the communication through Tokio. Some 
Japanese newspapers stated that plainly. Of course Dr. 
Eeinsch, who had just returned from a short trip to Washing- 
ton to consult with his Government, was taking absolutely no 
part in China 's internal strife except as instructed by the state 
department ; but there is no doubt that all the Allied legations 
at Peking were very strongly urging upon their governments 
the need for some action by the powers to settle China 's politi- 
cal troubles and bring the North and South together. Only 
Japan did not want that done, and every move toward that 
end irritated the Japanese press exceedingly. However, after 
the armistice was signed, the Japanese Government made an- 



340 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

other change of attitude, and when it was again suggested that 
the powers advise China jointly to make internal peace, Japan 
rushed to the front and tried to carry off the matter as if it 
was her proposal and initiative. On December 2, 1918, the 
following joint note was presented to the Chinese Government 
through the legations at Peking: 

It is with grave concern that the American, British, French, Italian 
and Japanese governments have witnessed the continued civil strife 
"which for the past two years has divided this country. This un- 
happy division has proved no less harmful to foreign interests than 
disastrous to the welfare of China itself. The consequent unrest has 
been an encouragement to the enemy, and during the crisis of the 
war hampered the effective cooperation of China with the Allies and 
now that that crisis is past and the nations look forward to the hope 
of effecting some reorganization of the world for the realization of 
peace and justice among all peoples, the disunion still prevailing in 
China makes their task more difficult. The associated governments 
aforesaid have observed with hopefulness the steps already taken by 
the President of the Republic of China with a view to the settlement 
of civil strife, and have been happy to believe that the attitude of the 
Southern leaders indicated no less a desire on their part to arrive at 
a suitable adjustment of differences. These governments, therefore, 
have taken the occasion to express the sympathy and hopefulness 
with which they regard these indications of a desire on the part both 
of the Peking government and the leaders of the Southern party to 
set aside all considerations of merely personal sentiment and legal 
technicality and, while carefully refraining from taking any step 
which might be an obstacle to peace, to seek without delay, by frank 
conference, some means of attaining a reconciliation upon a basis of 
law and devotion to the interests of the Chinese nation such as is 
necessary to assure to China peace and unity within its borders. In 
taking this action to express earnest sympathy with the efforts of 
both sides to achieve a solution of the difficulties that have hitherto 
divided them, the governments aforesaid desire to make clear that in 
so doing they have contemplation of no ulterior plan of intervention 
and no desire to control or influence the particular terms of the ad- 
justment, which must remain for the Chinese themselves to arrange. 
They only desire to lend what encouragement they can to the aspira- 
tions and efforts of both parties for a reconciliation and re-union 
which will enable the Chinese nation to bear the more worthily of its 



THE SOLUTION 341 

own traditions its part in the reconstruction which the nations of 
the world are now hoping to attain. 

In Japanese newspapers and news services in the far East 
tMs note was represented, in some cases, as having been pre- 
sented by Japan exclusively, and in all other cases it was made 
to appear that the other powers had acted only on Japan's 
request that they do so. Thus the fiction of Japan's alleged 
paramountcy in China was preserved, in so far as Japanese 
propaganda could do that, among the natives of far Eastern 
countries. 

An immediate result of this note was that the Northern 
and Southern groups made arrangements for a conference at 
Shanghai for the purpose of agreeing upon a cessation of the 
civil war. These conferences are going on at this writing, but 
it already has developed that Japanese intrigue, operating 
through the Tuan Chi-jui group in the Peking G..vernment 
and through other pro-Japan Chinese officials in the provinces, 
is working to prevent agreement. This civil war in China will 
soon die of inanition if its leaders are deprived of funds to 
pay their private armies. The Japanese loan orgy of 1917- 
18 has provided most of the funds, and even after the Shang- 
hai peace conference w^as convened, Japanese financiers, with 
the knowledge and backing of their Government, were trying 
to arrange for a large loan to the Tuan Chi-jui faction. 
Without doubt such loans, and only such loans, will keep the 
civil strife alive ; for as long as the military party can obtain 
funds it can hold the reins of power in at least a part of the 
country. The pro- Japan group of Chinese officials at Peking 
seem to have decided that it is as well to be hanged for a sheep 
as for a goat and to play out their string to its last thread. 
Until China is rid of them, there can be little progress toward 
reform. 

Of the so-called weak nations whose fates may be decisively 
influenced by acts or omissions of the peace conference, China 
ranks with Russia as the more important. Her population, 



342 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

territory, and resources indisputably give her that place. 
China has been a sick nation for many years. Only yesterday 
Russia was ranked among the great powers. Her rapid de- 
cline shows how easy it may become to convert a nation from 
a power into a distracted and impotent country that is a 
menace to civilization. China is trembling on the brink of a 
similar abyss; or, conversely, she might as unexpectedly and 
almost as rapidly, by organizing her vast human and material 
resources, assume a respected place among nations. These 
alternative possibilities ought to be enough to obtain attention 
for her case. 

But with regard to China's case, Americans should realize 
that they and their nation have very definite obligations relat- 
ing thereto. Events daily remind us that we have become en- 
tangled with, and to some extent have become responsible for, 
the right settlement of European questions in which our na- 
tional interests are not very clearly involved except on broad 
humanitarian and sociological grounds. There are no pre- 
vious treaties or published agreements that commit the United 
States to any policy regarding the Balkan question or the dis- 
position of Turkey or the reconstitution of Poland or the 
security of Belgium or the reconstruction of Russia ; yet many 
Americans, on moral grounds, now feel a degree of responsi- 
bility for the solution of these issues, and the war has demon- 
strated how they can impair our peace and safety and prop- 
erty. Toward China the United States, many years ago 
and recently, assumed specific obligations and responsibilities, 
written into international treaties and agreements. Further- 
more, almost every modern authority on the Eastern question 
has reached a conclusion that of all western nations the 
United States, because of geographical juxtaposition and 
modern economic propulsions, has the greatest practical inter- 
est in the future course of China, and also that no satisfactory 
future for China can be assured without the direct and active 
participation — some say leadership — of America. 

As the protagonist of the Hay doctrine, the United States is 



THE SOLUTION 343 

obligated to observe and to maintain the territorial integrity 
and administrative autonomy of China, and the commercial 
"open door" in China's territories. The American Govern- 
ment has itself signed several international covenants asserting 
these principles, and has been instrumental in inducing five 
other powers to sign similar agreements. Moreover, I know 
that a majority of Chinese are now looking hopefully to 
America to use its friendly offices in China's behalf, and if 
our Government fails in this obligation, it will forfeit the con- 
fidence and respect of the Chinese, and diminish its influence 
in far Eastern affairs for many years to come. Since the 
American Government is thus obligated about China, and our 
nation has such an enormous stake in the future development 
and nationalistic impetus of that country, it obviously is very 
important for Americans to understand what China w^ants, 
what she purposes to ask, what justice demands should be 
given her, and in what the problem of stabilizing China during 
the reconstruction period consists. 

Probably none would be willing or able at this time to 
announce a specific list of what China wants as a result of the 
peace settlement. Chinese, that is, the politically intelligent 
class, have a tolerably clear idea of what China wants; but 
opinion among them differs about the expediency of asking 
or demanding this or that. Some Chinese and foreigners 
think that China should be modest, and should confine her 
petition to a few essential points, without referring to some 
issues that are certain to arouse controversy and incite opposi- 
tion. Others believe that the appointed hour has struck and 
that China must seize the opportunity forcibly to assert her 
full rights ; that unless she speaks now she may have forever 
after to hold her peace ; that it is better to ask and be refused 
than to allow certain issues presumably to go by default. 

There are two points of view regarding what China wants, 
Chinese and foreign. Even the most pro-Chinese foreign 
friends of China scarcely are willing to grant all that the radi- 
cal pan-China elementlaow assert. In outlining China's case 



344 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

I will try to draw the line of moderation, for I believe that 
the greater part of intelligent Chinese will approve a settle- 
ment that will also accord with the views of progressive for- 
eigners in China. 

First, I shall set out China's case in summary: 

1. Cancellation of all treaty provisions with foreign govern- 
ments that grant or recognize rights tantamount to "spheres 
of influence" within China's territories, or any monopolistic 
privileges that cannot be available to all nations under the 
most-favored nation clauses. 

2. Nationalization and international neutralization of all 
railways in China's territories, 

3. Cancellation of all monopolistic mining rights accorded 
to foreigners or foreign nations in China, and of all other 
"concessions" that tend to limit and impair China's sover- 
eignty and the commercial "open door" principle. 

4. Relinquishment of all leases of China's territories to 
foreign nations, and the temporary substitution therefor of 
international control, with a proviso that they will revert fully 
to China on the fulfilment by her of certain stipulations. 

5. Removal of all foreign troops from China's territories, 
except those pro^aded by the protocol of 1901, these to be also 
withdrawn on the fulfilment by China of certain stipulations. 

6. Removal of all foreign posts and telegraphs from China, 
and foreign supervision over the Chinese postal service to 
cease on the fulfilment by China of certain stipulations. 

7. Establishment of a uniform currency system in China, 
to be supported by an international loan under conditions 
tending to a gradual assumption of Chinese control. 

8. Granting of complete tariff autonomy to China, under 
certain specified conditions whereby China's fiscal adminis- 
tration will be gradually reformed. 

9. Abolition of extra-territoriality in China on the fulfil- 
ment by China of certain stipulations. 

10. Consolidation of the national debts of China; all out- 
standing loans, provincial and national, to be absorbed in a 



THE SOLUTION 345 

single loan or series of loans underwritten by a financial syndi- 
cate under international supervision. 

11. Eestoration of Chinese local administrative autonomy 
in all parts of Chinese territories where during recent years 
it has been insidiously subordinated to foreign authority. 

The effort to obtain justice for China in the peace settle- 
ment has two aspects : the protection of China in her age-estab- 
lished territories and national life and help for the Chinese 
in changing their country into a modern nation, and the re- 
moval in China of those frictions and causes for antagonism 
among foreign nations that in modern times are the chief 
causes of war. Both of these conditions distinctly fall within 
the main and explicit purposes of the American nation in 
making war, as repeatedly uttered by President Wilson and 
scores of our public men, and also acceded to by other major 
nations in the Allied group. They embody the principles that 
constitute the essence of the famous fourteen articles, which 
opened a way to peace. 

The eleven articles of China's petition, as I have composed 
it, will, I think, be found to comprehend all essential matters 
and questions involved in the present very complicated situa- 
tion of that country. Numbers 1, 2, 3, and 10 will cover the 
whole list of quasi-political, foreign ''concessions" that have 
been foisted on China in the last twenty-five years, including 
the Japanese loan and concession madness of the last two 
years. Although many of these loans and concessions were 
conceived and obtained by and through bribery, coercion, and 
intimidation, it is not now proposed to repudiate all of them, 
but to liquidate those which have any sound status in equity 
in a way that will remove them as a disturbing political factor 
in international affairs and as obstacles to China's internal 
progress. The means to finance this liquidation would be pro- 
vided under Number 10, which also would provide for the 
currency reform mentioned in Number 7. 

It is probable that the question included in article Number 
4 contains serious difficulties ; yet it should not if the principal 



346 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

powers are sincere and far-sighted in their recent professions. 
This article would embrace the leased territories of Kiaochou 
(Tsingtau), Weihaiwei and Kwangtung (Port Arthur and 
Dalny), and in its complete meaning also would include the 
so-called "foreign settlements" at the various principal treaty- 
ports. Attention, however, is called to the proviso that these 
leased regions and municipal settlements would remain under 
international jurisdiction until, according to stipulation, 
China should be judged capable of taking over the full ad- 
ministration. Such a system seems entirely compatible with 
any practical plan for a league of nations, which presumably 
must have a supervisory body and a method to deal with the 
affairs of the weaker and temporarily disorganized nations. 

Article Number 9 probably will arouse greater opposition 
than any of the others in my list. It is certain that a majority 
of foreigners, who live in and know China and who may be 
willing to grant all of the other ten articles, will enter strong 
objections to the abolition of extra-territoriality now. But, 
I hasten to point out, the article as I have drawn it does not 
call for the immediate or even the early abolition of extra- 
territoriality. It is true that a radical section of the Young 
China party have taken this occasion to agitate for the imme- 
diate abolition of extra-territoriality, but they are getting little 
serious approval even among the Chinese. I am sure, from 
having discussed the subject with many of the politically in- 
telligent Chinese class, that the substantial elements in Chinese 
society would not approve having the extra-territorial system 
abolished suddenly and before China has organized something 
to take its place. The present system, anomalous and galling 
to Chinese pride as it undoubtedly is, nevertheless does throw 
about even Chinese business and property safeguards that 
otherwise would be lacking. Foreigners residing in China and 
foreign business and property interests there would regard 
the early substitution of Chinese authority for the extra-terri- 
torial system as criminal recklessness. Yet in recent years I 
have become aware of a disposition among those foreign resi- 



THE SOLUTION 347 

dents who reflect seriously about conditions there and the 
future, to realize that the present system cannot be considered 
permanent, and there is a feeling that a plan should be devised 
that not only would promise to restore to the Chinese the full 
administration of law in their own country (such international 
promises already exist), but would also have a working method 
to bring such a condition about by aiding China to establish 
it. I believe such a plan to be feasible, and that an accom- 
modation of foreign powers to meet the spirit of article Num- 
ber 9 in the previous list need not alarm foreign interests or 
enterprises in China; on the contrary, I think the eventual 
result will greatly benefit and extend foreign trade and in- 
vestments in China. 

In 1918 Mr. Charles Denby visited China as a special official 
of the American Government. His work was chiefly in con- 
nection with the activities and regulations of the War Trade 
Board, but Mr. Denby took advantage of his sojourn to study 
anew the situation of China in other than commercial matters. 
He had many qualifications for such investigation. His youth, 
when his father was American minister at Peking, and much 
of his adult life were spent in China. He has been associated 
with such Chinese officials as Li Hung Chang and Yuan Shih 
K 'ai, and later was United States Consul-General at Shanghai. 
Mr. Denby evolved a plan by which the Western powers can 
aid China in preparing for the abolition of extra-territoriality 
by a gradual process, which was submitted to the state depart- 
ment in a memorandum. This plan is, having given reason- 
able notice of the change, to abolish all foreign courts in China, 
these to be replaced by Chinese courts after the order of the 
present mixed court at Shanghai. As a preliminary to this 
change, China would be required and aided to establish a de- 
partment of justice, having direction of all courts in the na- 
tion, and also over the courts with jurisdiction of foreigners 
and foreign legal causes. The leading official of the depart- 
ment of justice, next to the minister of justice, would be a 
foreigner, just as in Ihe Maritime Customs and Salt Gabelle 



348 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

administrations. Foreigners also would be a part of the 
machinerj^ of all the mixed courts, but under the department 
of justice, not under various foreign consulates, as now. In 
time, by this process, it is hoped that China would reach a 
point when she could safely be entrusted with the sole ad- 
ministration of justice. By the Denby plan, however, extra- 
territoriality is not to be fully abolished until China, in the 
opinion of the powers, has fully qualified to act by herself. 
Under a department of justice, with foreign legal advisers, 
the legal codes could be brought up to date, and the adminis- 
tration of justice completely reorganized. A government law 
college, with foreign as well as Chinese instructors, would edu- 
cate young Chinese for legal and judicial careers. That, in 
brief, is an outline of the plan proposed by Mr. Denby. He 
submitted it, I understand, to many legal authorities, includ- 
ing Judge Lobingier of the United States Court for China, to 
Dr. W. W. Willoughby, former adviser on constitutional law 
to the Chinese Government, and to W. C. Dennis, now legal 
adviser to the Chinese Government, all of whom thought favor- 
ably of it. 

I firmly believe that the time has come when it not only is 
safe, but it is necessary in the interest of foreigners as well as 
of China, to devise a way to eliminate the anomaly of extra- 
territoriality. This of course does not mean that extra-terri- 
toriality should be at once, or even quickly, abolished. As I 
understand the Denby plan, it almost surely would require 
twenty years, and might take even longer than that, before a 
sound organization for the administration of justice in China 
could be created. But that plan would provide a practical 
way to attain that goal, whereas the present system merely 
stands still, tending to extend and perhaps to perpetuate itself. 
The complete abolition of extra-territoriality of course would 
depend and be contingent upon a decision of the powers, or 
of a League of Nations, that China had fulfilled the stipulated 
requirements. 

Candid foreign students of conditions in China have felt 



THE SOLUTION 349 

for some time that a system of continuing and perpetuating 
the existing status of foreigners in China had outworn its use- 
fulness, and should be changed as much in the interest of 
foreigners and foreign trade as in justice tb the legitimate 
aspirations of Chinese. Any condition that causes resentment 
among Chinese at the presence and status of foreigners in their 
country must operate as a handicap to the development of 
good relations between them, and to the development of foreign 
trade. If the same protection can be thrown about the per- 
sons, property, and legal rights of foreigners residing in China 
by a new class of courts administered under a reorganized de- 
partment of justice, as these now have under the foreign and 
mixed courts in the foreign settlements, and Chinese sentiment 
can be appeased thereby, it is worth considering. 

The fact is that extra-territoriality as now practised, coupled 
with certain other events and tendencies, are placing Western 
interests in China somewhat at a disadvantage. For in- 
stance, by encroachments upon Chinese administrative auton- 
omy in Manchuria, Shantung, and in other parts of China, 
and by provisions enforced on China by the so-called agree- 
ment of 1915, Japan has managed to establish for her subjects 
in China a preferential position and extra-legal status. The 
Japanese are now able to travel and reside and do business 
anywhere in China, and they carry with them wherever they 
go the protection of Japanese laws. Now, the disadvantages 
that foreign residents of Japan are under because of the 
peculiar administration and interpretation of Japanese laws 
when foreigners are involved vis-a-vis Japanese are too well 
known for it to be necessary to give details here. By the 
process of their penetration of China in the last few years 
Japanese are carrying with them to the vast hinterland of 
China, outside the treaty ports, where the extra-territorial 
position of other foreigners is confined, the same advantages 
over foreigners in commercial legal status and security that 
Japanese have over foreigners in Japan, The only protec- 
tion foreigners in CEna other than Japanese have against 



850 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

this process is either in the extension of extra-territoriality 
over the whole of China, the restriction of Japanese to the 
position of other foreigners, or the creation of a system for 
all China that will make all foreigners equal under the laws 
and before the courts. In China it is notorious that the 
Japanese consular courts in the treaty ports will not properly 
punish Japanese for minor and even for serious offenses, 
and that it is virtually useless for other foreigners and Chi- 
nese to sue Japanese in the Japanese consular courts. This 
condition, coupled with the presence of Japanese gendarmes 
and police, frequently leads to serious clashes between Chinese 
and Japanese, and sometimes even between other foreigners 
and Japanese. By recent treaties wrung from China under 
menace, and by quasi-occupation of large regions in China, 
Japan now in effect has extended the jurisdiction of Japanese 
law and Japanese courts over Japanese in all parts of China, 
and with the same results that appear in the treaty ports and 
in Japan. 

An important point in laying the foundations for a modern 
legal system for China is the character of the system to be 
given to or selected by her, and handed on as the permanent 
code for future generations of Chinese and foreign residents 
to live under. In modernizing her jurisprudence, Japan 
copied the German code, with changes which did not improve 
it any from the point of view of peoples accustomed to the 
Anglo-Saxon system. If Japan obtains control or direction 
of China's legal administration, it will without doubt be 
modeled after that in Japan, which is a Nipponized version 
of the German system. "While the German code may have 
much in it that is well applicable to Oriental peoples in the 
process of shifting from old to new forms of government, 
Americans and British in China, who of western foreigners 
have the predominating population and vested and trade 
interests, probably will prefer to see China, in shaping her 
course on democratic lines, adopt or adapt Anglo-Saxon legal 
practices and principles. The more nearly the new China 



THE SOLUTION 351 

harmonizes with the administrative forms of the leading 
democratic nations of the West, the easier it should be to main- 
tain a sympathy and understanding between Chinese and 
those western peoples, and to extend their international and 
personal relations. 

For many years the American Government has desired, and 
at times has made efforts, to solve the difficulty embodied in 
article Number 2 of my list. The proposal of Mr. P. C. Knox, 
when he was secretary of state, to neutralize the railways 
in Manchuria, and its defeat by a combination of Russia, 
Japan, Great Britain, and France, will be readily recalled.^ 
But with the passing of time conditions in the world have 
changed, and, let us hope, some lessons have been learned. 
The powers that survive the Great War may now see the ad- 
visability of discontinuing the system of playing the railway 
game in China (and in other regions, too) for their own 
strategical interests, on the old theory of the balance of 
power. That will mean the complete and perhaps final aban- 
donment by some of them of long-cherished imperialist designs 
and ambitions. They already have abjured these ambitions 
in pronouncement ; will they now relinquish them in practice ? 
In discussing the railway question with informed persons I 
have found a general belief that the old system must be aban- 
doned not only in justice to China, but also in the interest of 
world peace. While different men have different thoughts 
about methods, those with whom I have talked recently are 
almost unanimous in agreeing upon principles. In the article 
as I have phrased it, it asks for the "nationalization and inter- 
national neutralization of aZZ railways in China." Used in 
this connection, nationalization and international neutraliza- 
tion amount substantially to the same thing, or would accom- 
plish the same results, working together. What I mean is, 
the railways to be nationalized under the ownership and ad- 

1 A full account of this proposal, with the official representations of 
the various governments^bout it, is given in Chapter I of the author's 
book, "Our Eastern Question." 



352 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

ministration of the Chinese Government, to focus control; 
while the foreign investments in them and the foreign super- 
vision over them necessary to protect the investments and 
assure efficient administration should be neutralized, or, in 
other words, made international in character, similar to the 
Maritime Customs and Salt administrations. In drafting 
such a plan I can think of no better model than Mr. Knox's 
proposal about railways in Manchuria, advanced in 1909, as 
to the principle it displays. 

To finance the various liquidations embraced in this case of 
China and the administrative reforms which it contemplates, 
will require some hundreds of millions of dollars. Much of 
this sum would be used to retire debts now existing, and the 
remainder would be used to promote constructive measures. 
In this connection, it is pertinent to point out that among 
large nations China is to-day, next perhaps to the United 
States, in the most solvent condition fundamentally. By this 
I mean that her debts, as compared with her realizable re- 
sources, are comparatively small. Unfortunately, however, 
it is not feasible now to entrust the Chinese Government with 
the exclusive administration of the country's fiscal affairs. 
The disturbed and divided condition of the country, the lack 
of modern administrative technie, and other causes, combine 
to detain China as yet in the class of nations not quite able 
to dispense with outside help. Almost all educated Chinese, 
except a few of the radical Young China party, now openly 
say that China is at present incapable of straightening out 
her affairs, and that she needs foreign help. They want this 
help to be temporary, and given with a view to making China 
eventually able to dispense with it altogether. They realize 
that such foreign help will of necessity carry with it a degree 
of foreign assistance and supervision in China's administra- 
tion, and they are ready to accept this. In view of the semi- 
dependent state of many nations that were recently proud 
and powerful, sensible Chinese begin to see that it would be 



THE SOLUTION 353 

a false and foolish pride that would pretend that China is 
independent of foreign influence, counsel, and aid. 

But with regard to this matter of foreign financial and ad- 
ministrative aid and supervision, there is one condition that 
is absolutely essential to make it acceptable to the Chinese. 
This condition is that the United States will be an active par- 
ticipator, if not the recognized leader, in its organization. It 
is safe to say that no international consortium that does not 
include the United States, or any plan that does not receive 
the approval and cooperation of America, with respect to 
China, will now be acceptable to Chinese. 

By its action, early in the first administration of Woodrow 
Wilson as President, in withdrawing from the six-power 
financial group that was organized to finance administrative 
reform in China, the American Government had taken a 
stand against any participation in financing in China that 
would impair, or that could be construed as impairing, China 's 
political autonomy. Certain provisions of the reorganization 
loan agreement had seemed to the American Government then 
as having that tendency and perhaps that purpose. After 
that withdrawal, various attempts were made to secure inde- 
pendent American loans by the Chinese Government, but with 
the exception of the small loan made by the Continental & 
Commercial Bank of Chicago, they resulted in failure because, 
as it seemed to American financiers, the policy of the Ameri- 
can Government did not sufficiently protect their investments. 
To remedjT- this situation, and probably also realizing that 
changes in world conditions relating to the policy of the 
United States applied also to China, the state department an- 
nounced, on July 29, 1918, its policy with regard to loans in 
China as follows: [My italics.] 

China declared war against Germany very largely because of the 
action of the United States. Therefore this Government has felt a 
special interest in the desire of China so to equip herself as to be of 
more specific assistanc^in the war against the Central Powers. 



354 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

Until the present time the engagements of the United States in 
preparing to exert effectively its strength in the European theatre of 
war has operated to prevent specific constructive steps to help China 
realize her desires. Recentlj'-, however, this Government felt that, 
because of the approach to Chinese territory of the scenes of dis- 
order, a special effort should be made to place proper means at the 
disposal of China. Consequently a number of American bankers, 
who had been interested in the past in making loans to China and 
who had had experience in the Orient, were called to Washington 
and asked to become interested in the matter. The bankers re- 
sponded very promptly and an agreement has been reached between 
them and the Department of State which has the following salient 
features : 

First — The formation of a group of American bankers to make a 
loan or loans and to consist of representatives from different parts 
of the country. 

Second — An assurance on the part of the bankers that they will co- 
operate with the Government and follow the policies outlined by the 
Department of State. 

Third — Submission of the names of the banks who will compose 
the group for approval by the Department of State. 

Fourth — Submission of the terms and conditions of any loan or 
loans for approval by the Department of State. 

Fifth — Assurances that, if the terms and conditions of the loan are 
accepted by this Government and by the Government to which the 
loan is made, in order to encourage and facilitate the free inter- 
course between American citizens and foreign States which is mu- 
tually advantageous, the Government will be willing to aid in every 
way possible and to make prompt and vigorous representations and 
to take every possible step to insure the execution of equitable con- 
tracts made in good faith by its citizens in foreign lands. 

It is hoped that the American group •will be associated with bank- 
ers of Great Britain, Japan, and France. Negotiations are now in 
progress between the Government of the United States and those 
Governments which it is hoped will result in their co-operation and 
in the participation by the bankers of those countries in equal parts 
in any loan which may be made. 

Following that announcement, a group of American bank- 
ers was formed to take up the matter of American participa- 
tion in loans in China, and it began investigations of all con- 
ditions relating to the fiscal obligations of that country. The 



THE SOLUTION 355 

news that the American Government wonld support loans to 
China was received in China with enthusiasm, and the natural 
expectation of most Chinese was that an American loan would 
be forthcoming immediately. Those expectations, of course, 
were disappointed, for owing to the world situation and the 
need to clarify the various international relationships involved 
in financing China, and to formulate a comprehensive plan ac- 
ceptable to all the powers or to a majority of them, it was 
not advisable to move prematurely. The expected American 
loan, therefore, was delayed, and is still pending, thereby pro- 
longing the lease of life of the Japanese loan orgy. An in- 
ternational plan for the financial support and relief of China 
should be — one may put it must he, if we are to secure order 
in the far East — a result of the conditions of peace and the 
machinery for its preservation. 

In connection with American participation in loans to China 
hereafter, one point needs to be made clear. The American 
financial policy in China must keep absolutely free of any 
association with Japanese business methods there, and with 
Japan's political policy as it has been expressed in recent 
years. All important American financial operations in China 
should be under the supervision and only with the approval 
of the American Government, and should conform to whatever 
plan for international cooperation that is adopted. For in- 
stance, American capital should not become associated with 
distinctly or exclusively Japanese railway or mining schemes 
in China. In the last year or two Japanese, by methods which 
are described pre\dously, have obtained many so-called ''con- 
cessions" for railways and other industrial enterprises there. 
The validity of many of these concessions is dubious ; and some 
of them are purely strategical in character. As an example 
of this, take certain projected railways in Manchuria and 
Mongolia which Japan has forced China to grant. They have 
no tangible commercial basis at this time. Their real purpose 
is to strengthen Japan 's position in those regions in a military 
sense; and they will weaken China's defensive position. 



356 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

Judge, therefore, the feelings of Chinese if hereafter Japan 
should obtain the capital in America to develop and exploit 
her strategical position in China ! Such use of American capi- 
tal not only will be invidious to China, but it also will be in- 
vidious to American commercial interests there, and to the 
thesis of the policy of the American Government. 

A careful analysis of the foregoing eleven articles and the 
methods by which they of necessity would become practicable 
at once suggests the thought that such a settlement will in 
some respects extend foreign authority in China, rather than 
diminish it. This is true. But foreign friends of China, and 
also enlightened Chinese, ought frankly to face the truth, that 
in order to deliver China from foreign quasi-domination it 
is necessary to use foreign administrative efficiency. We have 
this paradox: that to diminish foreign intervention in China's 
administrative processes it is first necessary to increase it. 
But the new conditions would be, very different from those 
that have burdened China for the last half century. They 
would differ not only in form and application, but in purpose. 
An enlightened foreign assistance, under the asgis of a league 
of nations, having the object of restoring China's complete 
administrative and fiscal autonomy by educating Chinese in 
modern methods and tranquilizing the country, would carry 
a real hope for that people and a real benefit to the world. 

Article Number 11 of my list scarcely permits of qualifica- 
tion or extenuation, as most of the other articles do. It refers 
to a condition that is an open and flagrant outrage upon 
China, the usurpation in large regions of her administration 
functions, and their restriction under the intimidation of for- 
eign military occupation. First introduced by Russia in con- 
nection with the policing of the Chinese Eastern Railway 
zone, the system was greatly extended by Japan when she by 
conquest secured the reversion of Russia's rights in southern 
Manchuria, and later was extended over nearly the whole of 
Shantung province. This system has even been implanted in 
the heart of China by Japanese police supervision of coal- and 



THE SOLUTION 357 

iron-mines and plants in the Yangtse valley, and by the in- 
stallation of a Japanese garrison in permanent barracks at 
Hankow ; and the beginnings of the system have recently ap- 
peared in Fukien province. 

Put succinctly, China's appeal to the democratic nations 
amounts to a cry to be delivered from the old system of 
predatory penetration and exploitation by imperialistic pow- 
ers, and to be allowed, and helped, to work out a peaceful 
national destiny on democratic lines. The league of nations 
is not yet perfected or adopted, but its first draft, which re- 
ceived the assent of all the nations represented at Paris, 
should be satisfactory to China with one proviso. That is 
how the matter of creating mandatary nations for the super- 
vision, under the league, of weak and backward nations, might 
be applied in practice. It is evident from the tone of the 
Japanese press that Japan may be expecting, under that pro- 
vision, to be nominated the mandatary of the league with re- 
spect to China, thereby confirming her "special position" and 
paramountcy in the far East. Chinese will bitterly resent 
that, and probably they will rebel with force against such a 
solution. First, China should not be put in the class of na- 
tions or states that require a mandatary guardian ; and, second, 
if China should against her wish be placed under a manda- 
tary, Japan probably is the last nation the Chinese would want 
to occupy that position. However, the provision that the back- 
ward states will be allowed to choose their mandatary guar- 
dians, or that they must approve them, seems to safeguard 
them from being subjected to an objectionable alien super- 
vision. 

Taking the ease of China in toto, it presents almost an ideal 
test to apply the announced principles of the major nations 
in prosecuting the war and in making the peace. It con- 
tains as yet no extraordinary difficulties, as the case of Russia 
does; no conglomeration of national and racial problems, as 
middle Europe does; no such festering caldron of jealousies 
and hatreds, as the Balkan question does. Yet in the last 



358 DEMOCRACY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION 

twenty years China has been developing into a combined 
Russia, middle Europe, and Balkans, with the antagonistic 
ambitions of several powerful nations concentrated on a strug- 
gle to control her, or to possess the lion 's share of her remains. 
What this situation leads to in international affairs has been 
sufficiently demonstrated by recent events. If China's case 
does not get sympathetic attention and just treatment by the 
world, it will not be possible for any one who knows the reali- 
ties of international politics hereafter to hear their altruistic 
professions with any confidence or respect. 



APPENDICES 



APPENDIX A 

THE HAY DOCTRINE 

NOTES AND TREATIES BETWEEN THE POWERS AFFIRM- 
ING THE COMMERCIAL PRINCIPLE OF THE "OPEN 
DOOR" AND DECLARING THEIR INTENTION TO RE- 
SPECT THE INDEPENDEI^CE AND TERRITORIAL IN- 
TEGRITY OF CHINA, AND SEPARATE AGREEMENTS 
AMONG THE POWERS CONCERNING, AND DEFINING 
THEIR RESPECTIVE "SPHERES OF INTEREST" AND 
"SPECIAL POSITIONS" IN CHINA. 



MR. HAY, AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE, TO MR. 
WHITE, AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO GERMANY 

Department of State, 
Washington, September 6, 1899. 
Sir: 

At the time when the Government of the United States was in- 
formed by that of Germany that it had leased from His Majesty the 
Emperor of China the port of Kiaoehou and the adjacent territory in 
the province of Shantung, assurances were given to the Ambassador 
of the United States at Berlin by the Imperial German Minister for 
Foreign affairs that the rights and privileges instired by treaties with 
China to citizens of the United States would not thereby suffer or be 
in anywise impaired within the area over which Germany had thus 
obtained control. 

More recently, however, the British Government reeogiiized by a 
formal agreement with Germany the exclusive right of the latter 
country to enjoy in said leased area and the contiguous "sphere of 
influence or interest" certain privileges, more especially those re- 
lating to railroads and mining enterprises; but, as the exact nature 
and extent of the rights thus recognized have not been clearly de- 
fined, it is possible that serious conflicts of interests may at any time 
arise, not only between British and German subjects within said area. 

361 



362 APPENDICES 

but that the interests of our citizens may also be jeopardized thereby. 

Earnestly desirous to remove any cause of irritation and to insure 
at the same time to the commerce of all nations in China the un- 
doubted benefits which should accrue from a formal recognition by 
the various Powers claiming ''spheres of interest" that they shall en- 
joy perfect equality of treatment for their commerce and navigation 
within such "spheres," the Government of the United States would 
be pleased to see His German Majesty's Government give formal as- 
surances, and lend its cooperation in securing like assurances from 
the other interested Powers, that each within its respective sphere 
of whatever influence — 

First. Will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any 
vested interest within any so-called "sphere of interest" or leased 
territory it may have in China. 

Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall ap- 
ply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are 
within said "sphere of interest" (unless they be "free ports"), no 
matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable 
shall be collected by the Chinese Government. 

Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of 
another nationality frequenting any port in such "sphere" than shall 
be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad 
charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its "sphere" 
on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationali- 
ties transported through such "sphere" than shall be levied on sim- 
ilar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over 
equal distances. 

The liberal policy pursued by His Imperial German Majesty in 
declaring Kiaochou a free port and in aiding the Chinese Govern- 
ment in the establishment there of a custom-house are so clearly in 
line with the proposition which this Government is anxious to see 
recognized that it entertains the strongest hope that Germany will 
give its acceptance and hearty support. 

The recent Ukase of His Majesty the Emperor of Kussia declaring 
the port of Ta-lien-wan open during the whole of the lease under 
which it is held from China to the merchant ships of all nations, 
coupled with the categorical assurances made to this Government by 
His Imperial Majesty's representative at this capital at the time, 
and since repeated to me by the present Russian Ambassador, seem 
to insure support of the Emperor to the proposed measure. Our 
Ambassador at the Court of St. Petersburg has in consequence been 
instructed to submit it to the Russian Government and to request 
their early consideration of it. A copy of my instruction on the 



APPENDICES 363 

subject to Mr. Tower is herewith enclosed for your confidential in- 
formation. 

The commercial interests of Great Britain and Japan will be so 
clearly served by the desired declaration of intentions, and the views 
of the Governments of these countries as to the desirability of the 
adoption of measures insuring the benefits of equality of treatment 
of all foreign trade throughout China are so similar to those enter- 
tained by the United States, that their acceptance of the proposition 
herein outlined and their cooperation in advocating their adoption 
by the other Powers can be confidently expected. I enclose herewith 
copy of the instruction which I have sent to Mr. Choate on the sub- 
ject. 

In view of the present favorable conditions, you are instructed to 
submit the above considerations to His Imperial German Majesty's 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to request his early consideration 
of the subject. 

Copy of this instruction is sent to our Ambassadors at London and 
at St. Petersburg for their information. 

I have, etc. 

JoHK Hat. 

COUNT VON BULOW, HIS IMPERIAL GEEMAN MAJESTY'S 
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO MR. WHITE 

(Translation.) 

Foreign Office, 
Berlin, February 19, 1900. 
Mr. Ambassador: 

Your Excellency informed me, in a memorandum presented on the 
24th of last month, that the Government of the United States of 
America had received satisfactory written replies from all the Pow- 
ers to which an inquiry had been addressed similar to that contained 
in Your Excellency's note of September 26 last, in regard to the 
policy of the open door in China. While referring to this, Your 
Excellency thereupon expressed the wish that the Imperial Govern- 
ment would now also give its answer in writing. 

Gladly complying with this wish, I have the honor to inform Your 
Excellency, repeating the statements already made verbally, as fol- 
lows: As recognized by the Government of the United States of 
America, according to Your Excellency's note referred to above, the 
Imperial Government has, from the beginning, not only asserted, 
but also practically carried out to the fullest extent in its Chinese 
possessions absolute equality of treatment of all nations with regard 



364 APPENDICES 

to trade, navigation, and eommeree. The Imperial Government en- 
tertains no thought of departing in the future from this principle, 
which at once excludes any prejudicial or disadvantageous commer- 
cial treatment of the citizens of the United States of America, so long 
as it is not forced to do so, on account of considerations of reci- 
procity, by a divergence from it by other governments. If, there- 
fore, the other Powers interested in the industrial development of the 
Chinese Empire are willmg to recognize the same principles, this can 
only be desired by the Imperial Government, which in this case upon 
being requested will gladly be ready to participate with the United 
States of America and the other Powers in an agreement made upon 
these lines, by which the same rights are reciprocally secured. 
I avail myself, etc. 

BiJLOw. 

II. 

BRITISH AND GERMAN AGREEMENT RE RAILWAY 
CONSTRUCTION IN CHINA 

Minutes of Meeting held at New Court, St. Swithen's Lane, Lon- 
don, on the 1st and 2nd September, 1898. 

Present: — Representing the German Syndicate — MA. von Hanse- 
mann. Representing the British and Chinese Corporation, Ltd. — 
MJr. W. Keswick. Representing the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank- 
ing Corporation — Mr. Ewen Cameron, Mr. Julius Brussel. 

M. VON Hansemann" proposed the following : — "It is desirable for 
the British and German Governments to agree about the sphere of 
interest of the two countries regarding the railway constructions in 
China, and to mutually support the interest of either country." 
This proposal was agreed to. 

The following proposal of M. von Hansemann regarding the 
British and German spheres of interest for applications for Railway 
concessions in China, viz. 

"1. — British sphere of interest, viz. — The Yangtze Valley, subject 
to the connection of the Shantung lines to the Yangtze at Chinkiang: 
the pro\'inces south of the Yang-tze; the province of Shansi with 
connection to the Peking- Hankow line at a point south of Chengting 
and a connecting line to the Yangtze Valley, crossmg the Hoangho 
Valley. 

"2. — German sphere of interest, viz. — The Province of Shantung 
and the Hoangho Valley with connection to Tientsin and Chengting, 
or other point of the Peking-Hankow line, in the south with connee- 



APPENDICES 365 

tion to the Yangtze at Chinkiang or Nanking. The Hoangho Valley 
is understood to be subject to the connecting lines in Shansi forming 
part of the British sphere of interest, and to the connecting line to 
the Yangtze Valley, also belonging to said sphere of interest." 

Was agreed to with the following alterations, viz. — "The line from 
Tientsin to Tsinan, or another point of the northern frontier of the 
Province of Shantung, and the line from the southern point of the 
Province of Shantung to Chinkiang to be constructed by the Anglo- 
German Syndicate (meanmg the German Syndicate on the one part, 
and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the 
British and Chinese Corporation, Limited, on the other part) in the 
following manner, viz. — 

"1 — The capital for both lines to be raised jointly. 

"2 — The line from Tientsin or Tsinan or another point on the 
northern frontier of the Province of Shantung to be built and 
equipped and worked by the German group. 

"3 — The line from the southern point of the province of Shantung 
to Chinkiang to be built and equipped and worked by the English 
Group. 

"4 — On completion the lines to be worked for joint account." So 
far the minutes of the proceedings of the meetings, and it is further 
agreed upon that neither the Gennan Group nor the English Group 
■will be bound to construct the lines assigned to their sphere unless 
the Shantung lines be constructed simultaneously. 

Signed London, September 2, 1898. 

Approved of and signed by A. von Hansemajstn, W. Keswick, 
EwEN Cameron, Julius Brussel. 



III. 

AGREEMENT BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERIMANY 
DEFINING THEIR MUTUAL POLICY IN CHINA 

Signed at London, 16th October, 1900 

Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Imperial German 
Government being desirous to maintain their interests in China and 
their rights under existing Treaties, have agreed to observe the fol- 
lowing principles in regard to their mutual policy in China : 

1. — It is a matter of joint and permanent international interest 
that the ports on the rivers and littoral of China should remain free 
and open to trade and to every legitimate form of economic activity 
for the nationals of alF countries without distinction; and the two 



366 APPENDICES 

Governments agree on their part to uphold the same for all Chinese 
territory as far as they can exercise influence. 

2. — Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Imperial German 
Government will not, on their part, make use of the present compli- 
cation to obtain for themselves any territorial advantages in Chinese 
dominions, and will direct their policy towards maintaining undimin- 
ished the territorial condition of the Chinese Empire. 

3. — In case of another Power making use of the complications in 
China in order to obtain under any form whatever such territorial ad- 
vantages, the two Contracting parties reserve to themselves to come 
to a preliminary understanding as to the eventual steps to be taken 
for the protection of their own interests in China. 

4. — The two Governments will communicate this Agreement to the 
other Powers interested, and especially to Austria-Hungary, France, 
Italy, Japan, Kussia, and the United States of America, and will 
invite them to accept the principles recorded in it. 

Salisbury. 
Hatzfeldt. 



DECLARATION BY GREAT BRITAIN RESPECTING 
WEIHAIWEI 

April 19, 1898 

England formally declares to Germany that in establishing herself 
at Weihaiwei, she has no intention of injuring or contesting the 
rights and interests of Gennany in the Province of Shantung, or of 
creating difficulties for her in that province. It is especially under- 
stood that England will not construct any railroad communication 
from Weihaiwei and the district leased therewith into the interior of 
the Province of Shantung. 

IV. 

IDENTIC NOTES EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM AND RUSSIA WITH REGARD TO THEIR 
RESPECTIVE RAILWAY INTERESTS IN CHINA 

April 28, 1899. 
Sir C. Scott to Count Mouravieff 
The undersigned, British Ambassador, duly authorized to that 
effect, has the honor to make the following declaration to His Excel- 
lency Count Mouravieff, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



APPENDICES 367 

Great Britain and Russia, animated by a sincere desire to avoid 
in China all cause of conflict on questions where their interests meet, 
and taking into consideration the economic and geographical gravi- 
tation of certain parts of that Empire, have agreed as follows : 

1. Great Britain engages not to seek for her own account, or on 
behalf of British subjects or of others, any railway concessions to 
the north of the Great Wall of China, and not to obstruct, directly 
or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region sup- 
ported by the Russian Government. 

2. Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for her own account, 
or on behalf of Russian subjects or of others, any railway conces- 
sions in the basin of the Yangtze and not to obstruct, directly or 
indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region sup- 
ported by the British Government. 

The two Contracting Parties, having nowise in view to infringe in 
any way the sovereign rights of China or existing Treaties, will not 
fail to communicate to the Chinese Government the present arrange- 
ment, which, by averting all cause of complications between them, is 
of a nature to consolidate peace in the far East, and to serve the 
primordial interests of China herself. 

Charles S. Scott. 
St. Petersburg, April 28, 1899. 

Sir C. Scott to Count Mouravieff 

In order to complete the notes exchanged this day respecting the 
partition of spheres for concessions for the construction and work- 
ing of railways in China, it has been agreed to record in the present 
additional note the agreement arrived at with regard to the line 
Shanhaikwan-Newehwang, for the construction of which a loan has 
been already contracted by the Chinese Government with the Shang- 
hai-Hongkong Bank, acting on behalf of the British and Chinese 
Corporation. 

The general arrangement established by the above-mentioned notes 
is not to infringe in any way the rights acquired under the said Loan 
Contract, and the Chinese Government may appoint both an English 
engineer and an European accountant to supervise the construction 
of the line in question, and the expenditure of the money appropri- 
ated to it. 

But it remains understood that this fact cannot be taken as con- 
stituting a right of property or foreign control, and that the line in 
question is to remain a Chinese line, under the control of the Chinese 
Government, and cannot be mortgaged or alienated to a non-Chinese 
Company. "~ 



368 APPENDICES 

As regards the branch line from Siaohieshan to Simmintin, in ad- 
dition to the aforesaid restrictions, it has been agreed that it is to 
be constructed by China herself, who may permit European — not 
necessarily British — engineers to periodically inspect it, and to verify 
and certify that the work is being properly executed. 

The present special agreement is naturally not to interfere in any 
way with the right of the Russian Government to support, if it 
thinks fit, applications of Russian subjects or establishments for con- 
cessions for railways, which, starting from the main Manchurian line 
in a southwesterly direction, would traverse the region in which the 
Chmese line terminating at Simmintin and Newchwang is to be con- 
structed. 

Charles S. Scott. 
St. Petersburg, April 28, .1899. 

The same, mutatis mutandis, was sent the same day by Count 
Mouravieff, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Charles 
Scott. 



FRANCO-JAPANESE ARRANGEMENT 

Signed at Paris, June 10, 1907. 

arrangement 

The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and the 
Government of the French Republic, animated by the desire to 
strengthen the relations of amity existing between them, and to re- 
move from those relations all cause of misunderstanding for the 
future, have decided to conclude the following Arrangement: 

"The Governments of Japan and France, being agreed to respect 
the independence and integTity of China, as well as the principle of 
equal treatment in that country for the commerce and subjects or 
citizens of all nations, and having a special interest to have the 
order and pacific state of things preserved especially in the regions 
of the Chinese Empire adjacent to the territories where they have 
the rights of sovereignty, protection or occupation, engage to sup- 
port each other for assuring the peace and security in those regions, 
with a view to maintain the respective situation and the territorial 
rights of the two High Contracting Parties in the Continent of 
Asia." 

In witness whereof, the Undersigned : His E.xeellency Monsieur 
Kurino, Ambassador Extraordinary^ and Plenipotentiary of His Maj- 



APPENDICES 369 

esty the Emperor of Japan to the President of the Fi-ench Republic, 
and His Excellency Honsier Stephen Piehon, Senator, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, authorized by their respective Governments, have 
signed this Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals. 

Done at Paris, the 10th of June, 1907. 

(L. S.j S, KuRtNO. 

(L. S.) S. PiCHON. 

DECLARATION 

The two Governments of Japan and France, while reserving the 
negotiations for the conclusion of a Convention of Commerce in re- 
gard to the relations between Japan and French ludo-China, agree 
as follows : 

The treatment of the most favored nation shall be accorded to the 
officers and subjects of Japan in French Indo-China in all that con- 
cerns their persons and the protection of their property, and the 
same treatment shall be applied to the subjects and proteges of 
French Indo-China in the Empire of Japan, until the expiration of 
the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed between Japan and 
France on the 4th of August, 1896. 

Paris, the 10th of June, 1907. 

(L. S.) S. KuRiNO. 

(L. S.) S. PiCHON. 

VI. 

CONVENTION BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA 

Signed July 30, 1907 

The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and the 
Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, desir- 
ing to consolidate the relations of peace and good neighborhood 
which have happily been reestablished between Japan and Russia, 
and wishing to remove for the future every cause of misunderstand- 
ing in the relations of the two Empires, have agreed to the following 
arrangements : — 

Article I. — Each of the High Contracting Parties engages to re- 
spect the actual territorial integrity of the other, and all the rights 
accruing to one and the other Party from treaties, conventions and 
contracts in force between them and China, copies of which have 
been exchanged between the Contracting Parties (in so far as these 
rights are not incompajtible with the principle of equal opportunity) 
of the Treaty signed at Portsmouth on the 5th day of September 



370 APPENDICES 

(23rd of August) 1905, as well as the special conventions concluded 
between Japan and Russia. 

Art. II. — The two High Contracting Parties recognize the inde- 
pendence and the territorial integrity of the Empire of China and 
the principle of equal opportunity in whatever concerns the com- 
merce and industi'y of all nations in that empire, and engage to 
sustain and defend the maintenance of the status quo and respect 
for this principle by all the pacific means within their reach. 

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their re- 
spective Governments, have signed this Convention and have affixed 
their seals. 

Done at St. Petersburg, the 30th day of the 7th month of the 40th 
year of Meiji, corresponding to the 30th (17th) of July, 1907. 

(Signed) I. Motono. 
(Signed) Iswolsky. 

VII 

NOTES EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
AND JAPAN, NOVEMBER 30, 1908, DECLARING THEIR 
POLICY IN THE FAR EAST 

Imperial Japanese Embassy, Washington, 
November 30, 1908. 
Sir: 

The exchange of views between us, which has taken place at the 
several interviews which I have recently had the honor of holding 
with you, has shown that Japan and the United States holding im- 
portant outlying insular possessions in the region of the Pacific 
Ocean, the Governments of the two countries are animated by a com- 
mon aim, policy, and intention in that region. 

Believing that a frank avowal of that aim, policy, and intention 
would not only tend to strengthen the relations of friendship and 
good neighborhood, which have immemorially existed between Japan 
and the United States, but would materially contribute to the preser- 
vation of the general peace, the Imperial Government have author- 
ized me to present to you an outline of their understanding of that 
common aim, policy, and intention : 

1. It is the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free 
and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean. 

2. The policy of both Governments, uninfluenced by any aggres- 
sive tendencies, is directed to the maintenance of the existing status 
quo in the region above mentioned and to the defense of the prin- 



APPENDICES 371 

ciple of equal opportunity for commeree and industry in China. 

3. They are accordingly iirmly resolved reciprocally to respect the 
territorial possessions belonging to each other in said region, 

4. They are also determined to preserve the common interest of 
all powers in China by supporting by all pacific means at their dis- 
posal the independence and integTity of China and the principle of 
equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that 
Empire. 

5. Should any event occur threatening the status quo as above 
described or the principle of equal opportunity as above defined, it 
remains for the two Governments to communicate with each other 
in order to arrive at an understanding as to what measures they 
may consider it useful to take. 

If the foregoing outline accords with the view of the Govern- 
ment of the United States, I shall be gratified to receive your con- 
firmation. 

I take this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assur- 
ance of my highest consideration. 

K. Takahira. 

Honorable Elihu Root, 
Secretary of State. 

Department of State, 
Washington, November 30, 1908. 
Excellency : 

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of to- 
day setting forth the result of the exchange of views between us in 
our recent interviews defining the understanding of the two Govern- 
ments in regard to their policy in the region of the Pacific Ocean. 

It is a pleasure to inform you that this expression of mutual 
understanding is welcome to the Government of the United States 
as appropriate to the happy relations of the two countries and as 
the occasion for a concise mutual affirmation of that accordant policy 
respecting the far East which the two Governments have so fre- 
quently declared in the past. 

I am happy to be able to confirm to Your Excellency, on behalf 
of the United States, the declaration of the two Governments em- 
bodied in the following words: 

1. It is the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free 
and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean. 

2. The policy of both Governments, uninfluenced by any agres- 
sive tendencies, is directed to the maintenance of the existing status 
quo in the region above mentioned, and to the defense of the prin- 
ciple of equal opportufiity for commeree and industry in China. 



372 APPENDICES 

3. They are accordingly firmly resolved reciprocally to respect the 
territorial possessions belonging to each other in said region. 

4. They are also determined to preserve the common interests 
of all powers in China by supporting by aU pacific means at their 
disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle 
of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in 
that Empire. 

5. Should any event occur threatening the status quo as above 
described or the principle of equal opportunity as above defined, 
it remains for the two Governments to communicate with each other 
in order to arrive at an understanding as to what measures they 
may consider it useful to take. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest con- 
sideration. 

Elihu Root. 
His Excellency 
Baron Kogoro Takahira. 



VIII. 

EXTRACTS FROM THE ANGLO- JAPANESE ALLIANCE 
TREATIES, RELATING TO THE HAY DOCTRINE 

(Second Alliance Treaty, Signed at London, August 12, 1905) 

(h) The preser\^ation of the common interest of all Powers in 
China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese 
Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce 
and industry of all nations in China. 

(Third Alliance Treaty, Signed July 13, 1911) 

B. — The preservation of the common interests of all the Powers 
in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese 
Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce 
and industry of all nations in China. 



APPENDIX B 

JAPAN'S DIPLOMATIC DEMANDS ON CHINA IN 1905, WITH 
THE ORIGINAL SECRET TWENTY-ONE ARTICLES, 
THE ELEVEN ARTICLES PRESENTED TO THE POW- 
ERS INCORRECTLY REPRESENTING JAPAN'S DE- 
MANDS, THE REVISED DEMANDS, THE CHINESE 
GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF THE 
NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE AGREEMENT AND NOTES 
WHICH CHINA WAS COMPELLED TO SIGN. 

THE ORIGINAL TWENTY-ONE DEI^IANDS 



The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government being de- 
sirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and fur- 
ther strengthening the friendly relations and good neighborhood 
existing between the two nations agree to the following articles: 

Article 1. The Chinese Government engages to give full assent 
to all mattei*s upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter 
agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of 
all rights, interests, and concessions, which Germany by virtue of 
treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shan- 
tung. 

Article 2. The Chinese Government engages that within the 
Province of Shantung and along its coast, no territory or island 
will be ceded or leased to a third Power under any pretext. 

Article 3. The Chinese Government consents to Japan's building 
a railway from Chefoo or Lungkou to join the Kiaoehou-Tsinanfu 
Railway. 

Article 4. Th.i Chinese Government engages, in the interest of 
trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by herself as 
soon as possible certain important cities and towns in the Province 
of Shantung as commercial ports. What places shall be opened 
are to be jointly decided upon in a separate agreement. 



373 



374 APPENDICES 

II 

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, since the 
Chinese Government has always acknowledged the special position 
enjoyed by Japan in South Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia, 
agree to the following articles : 

Article 1. The two contracting parties mutually agree that the 
term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the term of lease of 
the South Manehurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway 
shall be extended to the period of ninety-nine years. 

Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and eastern 
inner Mongolia shall have the right to lease or own land required 
either for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or 
for farming. 

Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel 
in south Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia and to engage in 
business and in manufacture of any kind whatsoever. 

Article 4. The Chinese Government agrees to grant to Japanese 
subjects the right of opening the mines in south Manchuria and 
eastern Mongolia. As regards what mines are to be opened, they 
shall be decided upon jointly. 

Article 5. The Chinese Government agrees that in respect of the 
(two) cases mentioned herein below the Japanese Government's con- 
sent shall be first obtained before action is taken : 

(a) Whenever permission is granted to the subject of a third 
Power to build a railway or to make a loan with a third Power 
for the purpose of building a railway in south Manchuria and 
eastern inner Mongolia. 

(b) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third Power pledging 
the local taxes of south Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia as 
security. 

Article 6. The Chinese Government agrees that if the Chinese 
Government employs political, financial or military advisei's or in- 
structors in south Manchuria or eastern Mongolia, the Japanese 
Government shall first be consulted. 

Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees that the control and 
management of the Kirin-Cliangehun Railway shall be handed over 
to the Japanese Government for a term of ninety-nine years dating 
from the signing of this agreement. 

Ill 

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, seeing 
that Japanese financiers and the Hanyehping Company, have close 



APPENDICES 375 

relations with each other at present and desiring that the common 
interests of the two nations shall be advanced, agree to the following 
articles : 

Article 1. The two contracting parties mutually agree that when 
the opportune moment arrives the Hanyehping Company shall be 
made a joint concern of the two nations and they further agree 
that without the previous consent of Japan, China shall not by her 
own act dispose of the rights and property of whatsoever nature 
of the said company nor cause the said company to dispose freely 
of the same. 

Article 2. The Chinese Government agrees that all mines in the 
neighborhood of those owned by the Hanyehping Company shall 
not be permitted, without the consent of the said company, to be 
worked by other persons outside of the said company ; and further 
agrees that if it is desired to carry out any undertaking which, it 
is apprehended, may directly or indirectly affect the interests of 
the said Company, the consent of the said company shall first be 
obtained. 

IV 

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government with the 
object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity cf China 
agree to the following special article: 

The Chinese Government engages not to cede or lease to a third 
Power any harbor or bay or island along the coast of China, 



Article 1. The Chinese Central Government shall employ in- 
fluential Japanese as advisers in political, financial, and military 
affairs. 

Article 2. Japanese hospitals, churches and schools in the in- 
terior of China shall be granted the right of owning land. 

Article 3. Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and the Chinese 
Government have had many cases of dispute between Japanese 
and Chinese police which caused no little misunderstanding, it is 
for this reason necessary that the police departments of important 
places (in China) shall be jointly administered by Japanese and 
Chinese or that the police departments of these places shall em- 
ploy numerous Japanese, so that they may at the same time help 
to plan for the improvement of the Chinese Police Service. 

Article 4. China shall^urchase from Japan a fixed amount of 
munitions of war (say 50 per cent, or more of what is needed by 



376 APPENDICES 

the Chinese Government) or that there shall be established in China 
a Sino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical ex- 
perts are to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased. 

Article 5. China agrees to grant to Japan the right of construct- 
ing a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang, 
another line between Nanchang and Hangchow, and another be- 
tween Nanchang and Chaochou. 

Article 6. If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build 
railways and construct harbor-works (including doqk-yards) in 
the Province of Fukien, Japan shall be first consulted. 

Article 7. China agTees that Japanese subjects shall have the 
right of missionary propaganda in China. 

THE INCORRECT VERSION OF JAPAN'S DEMANDS AS 
COMMUNICATED BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT 
TO THE OTHER POWERS IN RESPONSE TO THEIR 
INQUIRIES. 

I.-^-In relation to the Province of Shantung. 

1. — Engagement on the part of China to consent to all matters 
that may be agreed upon between Japan and Germany with re- 
gard to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions, which 
in virtue of treaties or otherwise Germany possesses in relation to 
the Province of Shantung. 

2. — Engagement not to alienate or lease upon any pretext the 
Province of Shantung or any portion thereof and any island lying 
near the coast of the said province. 

3. — Grant to Japan the right of construction of a railway con- 
necting Chifu or Lungkow and the Tsinan-Kiaochou railway. 

4. — Addition of open marts in the Province of Shantung. 

II. — In relation to south Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia. 

1. — Extension of the terms of the lease of Kwangtung, the South 
Manchuria Railway, and the Antung-Mukden Railway. 

2. — (A). Acquisition by the Japanese of the right of residence 
and ownership of land. 

(B). Grant to Japan of the mining rights of mines specified by 
Japan. 

3. — Obligation on the part of China to obtain in advance the con- 
sent of Japan if she grants railway concessions to any third Power, 
or procures the supply of capital from any Power for railway 
construction or a loan from any other Power on the security of 
any duties or taxes. 



APPENDICES 377 

4.— Obligation on the part of China to consult Japan before em- 
ploying advisers or tutors regarding political, financial or military 
matters. 

5. — Transfer of the management and control of the Kirin-Chang- 
chun Railway to Japan. 

III. — Agreement in principle that, at an opportune moment in the 
future, the Hanyehping Company should be placed under Jap- 
anese and Chinese cooperation. 

IV. — Engagement in accordance with the principle of the main- 
tenance of the territorial integrity of China, not to alienate or 
lease any ports and bays on, or any island near, the coast of 
China. 



JAPAN'S REVISED DEMANDS PRESENTED APRIL 26, 1915 

Group I 

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, being 
desirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and 
further strengthening the friendly relations and good neighborhood 
existing between the two nations, agree to the following articles: 

Article 1. The Chinese Government engages to give full assent to 
all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter 
agree with the German Government, relating to the disposition of 
all rights, interests, and concessions, which Geraaany, by virtue of 
treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Pro\ince of 
Shantung. 

Article 2. (Changed into an exchange of notes). The Chinese 
Government declares that within the Province of Shantung and 
along its coast no territory or island will be ceded or leased to any 
Power under any pretext. 

Article 3. The Chinese Government consents that as regards the 
railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow, to 
connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway, if Germany is will- 
ing to abandon the privilege of financing the Chefoo- Weihsien line, 
China will approach Japanese capitalists to negotiate for a loan. 

Article 4. The Chinese Government engages in the interest of 
trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself 
as soon as possible certain suitable places in the Province of 
Shantung as commercial_ports. 

(Supplementary exchange of notes.) 



378 APPENDICES 

The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen, and the 
regulations are to be drafted, by the Chinese Government, but the 
Japanese minister must be consulted before making a decision. 

Group II 

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, with a 
view to developing their economic relations iu south Manchuria 
and eastern inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles: 

Article 1. The two contracting Powers mutually agree that the 
term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the term of the South 
Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway, shall be 
extended to 99 years. 

(Supplementary exchange of notes.) 

The term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny shall expire in the 
86th year of the Republic or 1997. The date for restoring the 
South Manchurian Railway to China shall fall due in the 91st year 
of the Republic or 2002. Article 12 in the original South Man- 
churian Railway Agreement that it may be redeemed by China after 
36 years after the traffic is opened is hereby canceled. The term 
of the Antung-Mukden Railway shall expire in the 96th year of 
the Republic or 2007. 

Article 2. Japanese subjects in south Manchuria may lease or 
purchase the necessary land for erecting suitable buildings for 
trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural enterprises. 

Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in 
south Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture of any 
kind whatsoever. 

Article 3a. The Japanese subjects referred to in the preceding 
two articles, besides being required to register with the local au- 
thorities passports which they must procure under the existing 
regulations, shall also submit to police laws and ordinances and 
tax regulations, which are approved by the Japanese consul. Civil 
and criminal cases in which the defendants are Japanese shall be 
tried and adjudicated by the Japanese consul; those in which the 
defendants are Chinese shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese 
authorities. In either case an officer can be deputed to the court 
to attend the proceedings. But mixed civil cases between Chinese 
and Japanese relating to land shall be tried and adjudicated by 
delegates of both nations conjointly, in accordance with Chinese 
law and local usage. Wlien the judicial system in the said region 
is completely reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning Jap- 
anese subjects shall be tried entirely by Chinese law courts. 



APPENDICES 379 

Article 4. (Changed to an exchange of notes.) 

The Chinese Government agTees that Japanese subjects shall be 
permitted forthwith to investigate, select, and then prospect for and 
open mines at the following places in south Manchuria, apart from 
those mining areas in which mines are being prospected for or 
worked; until the mining ordinance is definitely settled, methods at 
present in force shall be followed : 



Province 


of Feng-tien 


LOCALITY 


DISTRICT MINERAL 


Niu Hsin T'ai 


Pen-hsi Coal 


Tien Shih Fu Kou 


Pen-hsi do. 


Sha Sung Kang 


Hai-lung do. 


T'ieh Ch'ang 


T'ung-hua do. 


Nuan Ti T'ang 


Chin do. 


An Shan Chan region 


From Liao-yang to Pen-shi Iron 



Province of Kirin (Southern Portion) 
Sha Sung Kang Ho-lung C. & I. 

Kang Yao Chi-lin 

(Kirin) Coal 

Chia Pi'i Kou Hua-tien Gold 

Article 5. (Changed to an exchange of notes.) 

The Chinese Government declares that China will hereafter pro- 
vide funds for building railways in south Manchuria; if foreign 
capital is required the Chinese Government agrees to negotiate for 
a loan with Japanese capitalists first. 

Article oa, (Changed to an exchange cf notes.) 

The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter, when a foreign 
loan is to be made on the security of the taxes of south Manchuria 
(not including customs and salt revenue on the security of which 
loans have already been made by the Central Government), it will 
negotiate for the loan with Japanese capitalists first. 

Article 6. (Changed to an exchange of notes.) 

The Chinese Government declares that hereafter if foreign ad- 
visers or instructors on political, financial, military, or police mat- 
ters are to be employed in south Manchuria, Japanese will be em- 
ployed first. 

Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees speedily to make a 
fundamental revision of the Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan Agree- 
ment, taking as a standard the provisions in railway loan agreements 
made heretofore between China and foreign financiers. If, in fu- 



380 APPENDICES 

ture, more advantageous terms than those in existing railway loan 
agreements are granted to foreign financiers, in connection with 
railway loans, the above agreement shall again be revised in ac- 
cordance with Japan's wishes. 

Chinese Counter-Proposal to Article 7 

All existing treaties between China and Japan relating to Man- 
churia shall, except where otherwise provided for by this conven- 
tion, remain in force. 

Matters Relating to Eastern Inner Mongolia 

1. The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter when a foreign 
loan is to be made on the security of the taxes of eastern inner 
Mongolia, China must negotiate with the Japanese Government 
first. 

2. The Chinese Government agrees that China will herself pro- 
vide funds for building the railways in eastern inner Mongolia; if 
foreign capital is required, she must negotiate with the Japanese 
Government first. 

3. The Chinese Government agrees, in the interest of trade and 
for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself, as soon 
as possible, certain places suitable in eastern inner Mongolia as 
commercial ports. The places which ought to be opened are to be 
chosen, and the regulations are to be drafted, by the Chinese Gov- 
ernment, but the Japanese minister must be consulted before making 
a decision. 

4. In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring jointly to un- 
dertake agricultural enterprises and industries incidental thereto, 
the Chinese Government shall give its permission. 

Group III 

The relations between Japan and the Hanyehping Company being 
very intimate, if the interested party of the said company comes to 
an agreement with the Japanese capitalists for cooperation, the 
Chinese Government shall forthwith give its consent thereto. The 
Chinese Government further agrees that, without the consent of the 
Japanese capitalists, China will not convert the company into a 
state enterprise, nor confiscate it, nor cause it to borrow and use 
foreign capital other than Japanese. 



APPENDICES 381 

Article IV 

China to give a pronouncement by herself in accordance with 
the following principle: 

No bay, harbor, or island along the coast of China may be ceded 
or leased to any Power. 

Notes to Be Exchanged 



As regards the right of financing a railway from Wuchang to 
connect with the Kiukiang-Nanchang line, the Nanchang-Hangehow 
Railway, and the Nanehang-Chaoehow Railway, if it is clearly as- 
certained that other Powers have no objection, China shall grant 
the said right to Japan. 



As regards the right of financing a railway from Wuchang to con- 
nect with the Kiukiang-Nanchang Railway, a railway from Nan- 
chang to Hangchow and another from Nanehang to Chaoehow, the 
Chinese Government shall not grant the said right to any foreign 
Power before Japan comes to an understanding with the other 
Power which is heretofore interested therein. 

Notes to Be Exchanged 

The Chinese Government agrees that no nation whatever is to be 
permitted to construct, on the coast of Fukien Province, a dock- 
yard, a coaling station for military use, or a naval base; nor to 
be authorized to set up any other military establishment. The 
Chinese Government further agrees not to use foreign capital for 
setting up the above-mentioned construction or establishment. 

Mr. Lu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated as follows: 

1. The Chinese Government shall, whenever, in future, it con- 
siders this step necessary, engage numerous Japanese advisers. 

2. Whenever, in future, Japanese subjects desire to lease or pur- 
chase land in the interior of China fOr establishing schools or hos- 
pitals, the Chinese Government shall forthwith give its consent 
thereto. 

3. When a suitable opportunity arises in future, the Chinese 
Government will send military officers to Japan to negotiate with 
Japanese military authorities the matter of purchasing arms or that 
of establishing a joint arsenal. 



382 APPENDICES 

Mr. Hioki, the Japanese minister, stated as follows: 
As relates to the question of the right of missionary propaganda, 
the same shall be taken up again for negotiation in future. 

OFFICIAL STATEMENT BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT 
RESPECTING THE SINO-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS 
NOW BROUGHT TO A CONCLUSION BY CHINA'S COM- 
PLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF JAPAN'S ULTIMATUM 
DELIVERED ON MAY 7, 1915. 

At three o'clock on the afternoon of May 7, 1915, His Excellency, 
the Japanese Minister in Peking delivered to the Chinese Govern- 
ment, in person an Ultimatum from the Imperial Japanese Govern- 
ment, with an accompanying Note of seven articles. The conclud- 
ing sentences of the Ultimatum read thus : 

"The Imperial Government hereby again offer their advice and 
hope that the Chinese Government, upon this advice, will give a sat- 
isfactory reply by six o'clock p. m. on the ninth day of May. It is 
hereby declared that if no satisfactory reply is received before or at 
the specified time the Imperial Government will take such steps as 
they may deem necessaiy." 

The Chinese Government, having received and accepted the Ulti- 
matum, feel constrained to make a frank and plain statement of 
the facts connected with the negotiations which were abruptly ter- 
minated by this drastic action on the part of Japan. 

The Chinese Government have constantly aimed, as they still aim, 
at consolidating the friendship existing between China and Japan, 
and, in this period of travail in other parts of the world, have been 
particularly solicitous of preserving peace in the far East. Un- 
expectedly on January 18, 1915, His Excellency the Japanese Min- 
ister in Peking, in pursuance of instructions from his Government, 
adopted the unusual procedure of presenting to his Excellency the 
President of the Republic of China a list (hereto appended) of 
twenty-one momentous demands, arranged in five Groups. The first 
four Groups were each introduced by a preamble, but there was no 
preamble or explanation to the fifth Group. In respect of the char- 
acter of the demands in this Group, however, no difference was in- 
dicated in the document between them and those embodied in the 
prceding Groups. 

Although there was no cause for such a demarche, the Chinese 
Government, in deference to the wishes of the Imj^erial Japanese 
Government, at once agreed to open negotiations on those articles 
which it was possible for China to consider, notwithstanding that 



APPENDICES 383 

it was palpable that the -whole of the demands were intended to 
extend the rights and interests of Japan without securing a quid 
pro quo of any kind for China. 

China approached the pending conferences in a spirit of utmost 
friendliness and with a determination to deal wath all questions 
frankly and sincerely. Before negotiations were actually com- 
menced, the Japanese Minister raised many questions with regard 
to the number of delegates proposed to represent China, the num- 
ber of conferences to be held in each week, and the method of dis- 
cussion. The Chinese Government, though their views differed from 
those of the Japanese Minister, yielded in all these respects to his 
contentions in the hope of avoiding any delay in the negotiations. 
The objections of the Japanese Minister to the customary recording 
and signing of the minutes of each conference, which the Chinese 
Government suggested as a necessary and advisable precaution, as 
well as one calculated to facilitate future reference, were also ac- 
cepted. Nor did the Chinese Government retaliate in any way when 
in the course of the negotiations the Japanese Minister twice sus- 
pended the conferences, obviously with the object of compelling 
compliance with his views on certain points at the time under dis- 
cussion. Even when delay was threatened owing to the unfortunate 
injury sustained by the Japanese Minister as a result of a fall 
from his horse, the Chinese delegates, in order to avert interruption, 
proposed that the conferences should be continued at the Japanese 
Legation, which proposal was accepted. Later, when, on March 
22, the Japanese Government despatched large bodies of troops to 
South Manchuria and Shantung for the ostensible purpose of re- 
lieving the garrison — whose term of service had not then expired — 
the Japanese Minister stated at the conference, in reply to a direct 
question as to when the retiring troops would be withdrawn, that 
this would not be done until negotiations could be brought to a 
satisfactoi-y conclusion. Although this minatory step caused much 
excitement, indignation and alarm on the part of the Chinese 
people, and made it difficult for the Chinese Government to con- 
tinue the conferences, they successfully exerted efforts to avert a 
rupture and thus enabled the negotiations smoothly to proceed. 
All this demonstrates that the Chinese Government were dominated 
by a sincere desire to expedite the progress of the conferences; 
and that the Japanese Government recognized this important fact 
was made clear on March .11 when the Japanese Minister conveyed 
to the Chinese Government an expression of his Government's ap- 
preciation of China's frankness and sincerity in the conduct of the 
negotiations. 



384 APPENDICES 

One of the supplementary proposals was in these terms : 
From February 2, when the negotiations were commenced, to 
April 17, twenty-four conferences were held in all. Throughout 
this whole period the Chinese Government steadfastly strove to ar- 
rive at an amicable settlement and made every concession possible. 
Of the twenty-one demands originally submitted by Japan, China 
agreed to fifteen, some in principle and some textually, six being 
initialled by both parties. 

I2S" THE jVIATTER OP THE DEMANDS TO WHICH CHINA AGREED 

At the first conference, held on February 2, China agreed in prin- 
ciple to the first article of the Shantung group of demands which 
provides that China should give her assent to the transfer of Ger- 
many's rights in Shantung to Japan. The Chinese Government 
maintained at first that the subject of this demand related to the 
post helium settlement, and, therefore, should be left over for dis- 
cussion by all the parties interested at the Peace Conference. Fail- 
ing to persuade the Japanese Minister to accept this view, the 
Chinese Government agreed to this demand in principle, and made 
certain supplementary proposals. 

"The Japanese Government declares that when the Chinese Gov- 
ernment give their assent to the disposition of interests above re- 
ferred to, Japan will restore the Leased Territory of Kiao-chou to 
China, and further recognizes the right of the Chinese Government 
to participate in the negotiations referred to above between Japan 
and Germany." 

The provision for a declaration to restore Kiao-chou, was clearly 
not a demand on Japan but only a reiteration of Japan's voluntary 
statement in her Ultimatum to Germany on August 15, 1914 (a 
copy of which was officially transmitted to the Chinese Government 
for perusal on August 15), and repeated in public statements by 
the Japanese Premier. Appreciating the earnest desire of Japan to 
maintain the peace of the far East and to cement her friendship 
with China, as evidenced by this friendly offer, the Chinese Govern- 
ment left the entire question of the conditions of restoration to be 
determined by Japan, and refrained from making any reference 
thereto in the supplementary proposal. The suggestion relating to 
participation in the Conference between Japan and Germany was 
made in view of the fact that Shantung, the object of futui'e nego- 
tiation between Japan and Germany, is a Chinese Province, and 
therefore China is the Power most concerned in the future of that 
territory. 

Another supplementary proposal suggesting the assumption by 



APPENDICES 385 

Japan of responsibility for indemnification of the losses arising out 
of the military operations by Japan in and about the leased terri- 
tory of Kiao-ehou was necessitated by the fact that China was 
neutral vis-d-vis the war between Japan and Germany. Had China 
not inserted such a provision, her position in relation to this con- 
flict might have been liable to misconstruction — the localities in 
which the operations took place being a portion of China's terri- 
tory — and might also have exposed herself to a claim for indemnifica- 
tion of losses for which she was in no way responsible. 

In a further supplementary proposal the Chinese Government 
suggested that, prior to the restoration of the Kiao-chou territory 
to China, the Maritime Customs, the telegraphs and post offices 
should be continued to be administered as heretofore; that the mili- 
tary railway, the telegraph lines, etc., which were installed by Japan 
to facilitate her military operations, should be removed forthwith; 
that the Japanese troops now stationed outside of the leased terri- 
tory should be first withdrawn, and those within the territory should 
be recalled at the time when Kiao-ehou is returned to China. Shan- 
tung being a Chinese Province, it was natural for China to be 
anxious concerning the restoration of the status quo ante helium. 
Although the Chinese Government were confident that the Japanese 
Government would effect such restoration in pursuance of their 
official declaration, it was necessary for China, being neutral 
throughout the war, to place these matters on record. 

At the third conference, held on February 22, China agreed to the 
second demand in the Shantung Group not to cede or lease to any 
Power any territory or island on the sea border of Shantung. 

At the fifth conference, held on February 29, China agreed to 
give Japan the preference, provided Germany abandoned the 
privilege, to supply the capital for the construction of a railway 
from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the Kiao-chou-Tsinanfu 
Kailway, in the event of China deciding to build that railway with 
foreign capital. 

At the sixth conference, held on March 3, China, in the interests 
of foreign trade, agreed to open certain important cities in Shan- 
tung as trade marts under regulations approved by the Japanese 
Government, although this was a demand on the part of Japan for 
privileges additional to any that hitherto had been enjoyed by Ger- 
many and was not an outcome of the hostilities between Japan 
and Germany, nor, in the opinion of the Chinese Government, was 
its acceptance essential to the preservation of peace in the far 
East. _ 

At the eighth conference, held on March 9, China agreed (1) to 



386 APPENDICES 

the extension of the term of the lease of Dairen and (2) Port 
Arthur, and (3) of the South Manchuria and (4) Antung-Mukden 
railways, all to 99 years. 

Owing to the bitter experiences which China sustained in the past 
in connection with the leased portions of her territory, it has become 
her settled policy not to grant further leases nor to extend the 
term of those now in existence. Therefore, it was a significant 
indication of China's desire to meet Japan's wishes when she agreed 
to this exceptional departure from her settled policy. 

At the same conference the Chinese Government also agreed to 
refrain from raising objections to the principle of cooperation in the 
Hanyehping Company, if the latter should arrive at an agreement 
in this respect with the Japanese capitalists concerned. With refer- 
ence to this question it was pointed out to the Japanese Minister 
that, in the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China, 
Chinese subjects are guaranteed the right of protection of their 
property and freedom to engage in any lawful occupation. The 
Government were precluded, therefore, from interfering with the 
private business of the people, and could not find any other solution 
than the one thus agreed to. 

As regards the single article of the Fourth Group, and the pre- 
amble thereto, the Chinese Government held that they were incon- 
sistent with Chinese sovereignty. However, China, at this confer- 
ence, expressed her readiness to meet the wishes of Japan so far as 
it was possible without infringing her sovereignty, and agreed to 
make a voluntary pronouncement that she would not alienate any 
portion of her coast line. 

In connection with the South Manchuria Railway it is worthy of 
note that the provision regarding the repurchase period in the agree- 
ment (36 years from 1902) was not mentioned in Japan's original 
proposal. Subsequently the Japanese Government, on the ground 
that the meaning of this provision was not clear, requested China 
to agree to its cancelation. To this request the Chinese Government 
acceded, though well aware that the proposed change could only 
benefit Japan. China thus relinquished the right to repurchase the 
railway at the expiration of another 23 years. 

In connection with the Antung-Mukden Railway, the nrticle, which 
was originally initialled at the conference, provided for the reversion 
of the railway to China at the end of 99 years without payment, 
but, at the subsequent meeting, the Japanese Minister requested 
that the reference to the reversion without pajTnent be deleted from 
the initialled article. In acceding to the Japanese Minister's re- 
quest, China again showed her sincere desire to expedite matters 



APPENDICES 387 

and to meet Japan's wishes even at the sacrifice of a point in her 
favor, to which Japan had already agreed. 

At the eleventh conference, held on March 16, China agreed to 
give Japan preference in regard to loans for railway construction in 
South Manchuria. 

At the thirteenth conference, held on March 23, China agreed (1) 
to the amendment of the Kirui-Changchun Railway loan agreement; 
(2) to give preference to Japan if the revenue of South Manchuria 
were offered as security for loans; (3) to give preference to Jap- 
anese in the event of the emplojTnent of advisers for South Man- 
churia; (4) to grant to Japanese the right of mining in nine speci- 
fied areas in South Manchuria. 

In its original form the demand with reference to mining in 
South Manchuria tended to creat a monopoly for Japanese subjects, 
and, therefore, was entirely inconsistent with the principle of equal 
opportunity. The Chinese Government explained that they could 
not, in view of the treaty rights of other Powers, agree to this 
monopoly, but they readily gave their acceptance when Japan con- 
sented to the modification of the demand so as to mitigate its mo- 
nopolistic character. 

In connection with the Kirin-Changehun Railway, the amendment 
agreed to involves a fundamental revision of the original agree- 
ment on the basis of the existing railway loan contracts concluded 
by China with other foreign capitalists, as well as an engagement 
on the part of the Chinese Government to extend to this railway 
any better terms which maj' be hereafter accorded to other railway 
concessionaires in China. The capital of this raihvay was originally 
fifty per cent. Chinese and fifty per cent. Japanese. The effect of 
this undertaking is to transfer the capital originally held by the 
Chinese, as well as the full control and administration of the rail- 
way, to the Japanese. 

At the twenty -first conference, held on April 10, China agreed, in 
regard to the demands concerning Fukien Province, to give Japan 
an assurance in accordance with Japan's wishes at a future time. 

As regards demands 2 and 3 in the Manchuria Group, relating 
to the ownership of land for trade, manufacture, and agricultural 
enterprises, as well as for the right of settlement in the interior of 
South Manchuria, the Chinese Government, after discussion at sev- 
eral conferences, agreed to them in principle, but desired to intro- 
duce certain amendments eonceraing the control and protection of 
the Japanese subjects who might avail themselves of these rights. 
The course of the negotiations in connection with these amendments 
will be referred to subsequently. 



388 APPENDICES 



IN" THE MATTER OF THOSE DEMANDS TO WHICH CHINA COULD 

NOT AGREE 

Of the twenty-one original demands there were six, as previously 
mentioned, to which China could not agree on the ground that they 
were not proper subjects for international negotiation, conflicting 
as they did with the sovereign rights of China, the treaty rights of 
other Powers, and the principle of equal opportunity. 

Thus, for example, the second article of the Hanyehping question 
in the original Third Group in particular seriously affected the prin- 
ciple of equal commercial opportunity. 

The proposal that there should be jouit administration by China 
and Japan of the police in China was clearly an interference with 
the Republic's domestic affairs, and consequently an infringement 
of her sovereignty. For that reason the Chinese Government could 
not take the demand into consideration. But when it was explained 
by the Japanese Minister that this referred only to South Man- 
churia, and he suggested that his Government would be satisfied 
if China agreed to engage Japanese as police advisers for that ter- 
ritory, the Chinese Government accepted the suggestion. 

The two articles relating to the acquisition of land for schools, 
hospitals, and temples, as well as to the right of missionary prop- 
aganda, would, in the opinion of the Chinese Government, have 
presented grave obstacles to the consolidation of the friendly feel- 
ing subsisting between the two people. The religions of the two 
countries are identical and, therefore, the need for a missionary 
propaganda to be carried on in China by Japanese does not exist. 
The natural rivalry between Chinese and Japanese followers of the 
same faith would tend to create incessant disputes and friction. 
Whereas Western missionaries live apart from the Chinese com- 
munities among which they labor, Japanese monks would live with 
the Chinese; and the similarity of their physical characteristics, 
their religious garb, and their habits of life would render it im- 
possible to distinguish them for purposes of affording the protection 
which the Japanese Government would require should be extended 
to them under the sj'stem of extra-territoriality now obtaining in 
China. Moreover a general apprehension exists among the Chinese 
people that these peculiar conditions favoring conspiracies for polit- 
ical purposes might be taken advantage of by some unscrupulous 
Chinese. 

The demand for railway concessions in the Yangtze Valley con- 
flicted with the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway Agreement of 
March 6, 1908^ the Nanking -Chang sha Railway Agreement of March 



APPENDICES 389 

31, 1914, and the engagement of August 24, 1914, giving preference 
to British firms for the projected line from Nanchang to Chao- 
chowfu. For this reason the Chinese Government found themselves 
unable to consider the demand, though the Japanese Minister, while 
informed of China's engagements with Great Britain, repeatedly 
pressed for its acceptance. 

In respect to the demand for the appointment of influential Jap- 
anese to be advisers and instructors in political, financial and mili- 
tary affairs, the policy of the Chinese Government in regard to the 
appointment of advisers has been similar to that which has pre- 
sumably guided the Japanese Government in like selection of the 
best qualified men irrespective of their nationality. As an indica- 
tion of their desire to avail themselves of the services of eminent 
Japanese, one of the earliest appointments made to an advisership 
was that of Dr. Ariga, while later on Dr. Hirai and Mr. Nakayami 
were appointed to the Ministry of Communications. 

It was considered that the demand that Japanese should be ap- 
pointed in the three most important administrative departments, 
as well as the demand for the joint control of China's police, and 
the demand for an engagement to purchase a fixed amount of arms 
and ammunition from Japan or to establish joint arsenals in China, 
so clearly involved the sovereignty of the Republic that the Chinese 
Government were unable even to consider them. 

For these reasons the Chinese Government, at the very outset of 
the negotiations, declared that they were unable to negotiate on 
the demands; but, in deference to the wishes of the Japanese Min- 
ister, the Chinese delegates consented to give the reasons for de- 
clining to enter into a discussion of them. 

IN THE MATTER OF THE QUESTIONS OF DISPUTE INVOLVED IN 
SOME OF THE FOREGOING DEMANDS 

The demand by Japan for the right of her subjects in South Man- 
churia to lease or own land, and to reside and travel, and to engage 
in business or manufacture of any kind whatever, was deemed by 
the Chinese Government to obtain for Japanese subjects in this 
region a privileged status beyond the terms of the treaties existing 
between the two nations, and to give them a freedom of action which 
would be a restriction of China's sovereignty and a serious in- 
fringement of her administrative rights. Should Japanese subjects 
be granted the right of owning land, it would mean that all the 
landed property in the region might fall into their hands, thereby 
endangering China's territorial integrity. Moreover, residence in 
the interior was incompatible with the existence of extra-territorial- 



390 APPENDICES 

ity, the relinquisliment of which is necessary to the actual enjoy- 
ment of the privilege of inland residence, as evidenced in the prac- 
tice of other nations. 

Japan's unconditional demand for the privilege of inland resi- 
dence accompanied with a desire to extend extra-territoriality into 
the interior of China and to enable Japanese subjects to monopolize 
all the interests in South Manchuria, was also palpably irreconcilable 
with the principle of equal opportunity. For this reason the 
Chinese Government were, in the iirst instance, unable to accept this 
demand as a basis of negotiation. Their profound regard for the 
friendly relations of the two countries, however, persuaded them 
to exert their utmost efforts, in spite of all the inherent difficulties, 
to seek a solution of a question which was practically impossible to 
solve. Knowing that the proposal made by Japan was incompatible 
with treaties, they nevertheless sought to meet her wishes within the 
limits of treaties. Accordingly they submitted a counter-proposal 
to open more places in South Manchuria to international trade and 
to establish Sino-Japanese joint reclamation companies. 

This suggestion was made in the belief that the places to which 
Japanese subjects would desire to resort for purposes of trade, 
could not be other than important localities; if all these localities 
were opened to commerce, then they could reside, trade, and lease 
land there for joint reclamation. Thus Japanese subjects might en- 
joy the essence of the privilege of inland residence and would still 
be able to reconcile their position with China's treaties and the prin- 
ciple of equal opportunity. 

After the Japanese Government declined to accept this sugges- 
tion, China withdrew it and replaced it with an amendment to the 
oii:,dnal articles. It was proposed in this amendment to grant to 
Japanese subjects the extra-treaty privilege of inland residence 
with the pro'sdsos that Japanese subjects in places outside of trade 
marts should observe Chinese police regulations and pay taxes in the 
same manner as Chinese ; and that civil and criminal cases involving 
such Japanese subjects should be adjudicated by Chinese authori- 
ties, the Japanese Consul attending merely to watch the proceed- 
ings. This suggestion was not an innovation ; it was based upon 
the modus operandi now in force as regards the Korean settlers 
in inland districts in Chientao. But the Japanese Government again 
declined to accept it. 

The Chinese Government thereupon made a third proposal along 
the line of what constitutes the present practice in Turkey, making 
a distinction, however, in favor of Japanese subjects, in the exercise 



APPENDICES 391 

of jurisdiction over civil and criminal eases. This was once more 
objected to by the Japanese Government. 

Then the Chinese Government proposed to concede still another 
step — the fourth endeavor to meet Japan's wishes. They proposed 
to agree to the full text of Articles 2 and 3 relative to the question 
of inland residence, except that "the right of owning land" was 
changed into ''the right of leasing land" and to the phrase "culti- 
vating land" was added this clause : "the regulations for which shall 
be determined separately;" and, further, to add a supplementary 
article which embodied a modus operandi which the Chinese Govern- 
ment had constrained themselves to make, out of a desire to come 
to a settlement over this question. The view advanced in this sup- 
plementary article was based upon the Japanese Minister's declar- 
ation made on March 6, 1915, that a separate article embodying 
some compromise might be added to the original articles 2 and 3 
for the purpose of avoiding any conflict with China's sovereignty 
or the system established by treaties. These suggestions made by 
the Chinese Government were not accepted by Japan. 

As regards Eastern Inner Mongolia, not only have no treaties 
been entered into with Japan concerning this region, but also the 
people are so unaccustomed to foreign trade, that the Chinese Gov- 
ernment invariably feel much anxiety about the safety of foreigners 
who elect to travel there. The Chinese Government, therefore, con- 
sidered that it would not be in the interest of foreigners to open 
the whole territory to them for residence and commerce, and on these 
grounds based their original refusal to place Eastern Inner Mon- 
golia on the same footing as South Manchuria. Still, their desire 
to meet the wishes of the Japanese Government eventually prompted 
them to offer to open a number of places in the region to foreign 
trade. 

IN THE MATTER OF JAPAN'S REVISED DEMANDS 

The foregoing is an outline of the negotiations up to April 17. 
It was hoped by the Chinese Government that the Japanese Govern- 
ment, in view of the great concessions made by China at the con- 
ferences held up to this time, would see a way of effecting an 
amicable settlement by modifying their position on certain points. 
In regard to these it had, by this time, become manifest that China 
would encounter almost insuperable difficulties in making further 
concessions. 

The Japanese Government, however, suspended the negotiations 
■until April 26 when tbey surprised the Chinese Government by 



392 APPENDICES 

presenting a new list of twenty-four demands (which is hereto ap- 
pended), and requested the Chinese Government to accord their ac- 
ceptance without delay, adding that this was their fuial proposal. 
At the same time the Japanese Minister stated that the Japanese 
Government would restore the leased territory of Kiaoehow to China 
at an opportune time in the future and under proper conditions, if 
the Chinese Government would agree to the new list of twenty-four 
demands without modification. 

In this new list, although the term "special position" in the pre- 
amble of the Manehurian Group was changed to "economic rela- 
tions," and although the character of the articles in the original 
Fifth Group was altered from Demands to a recital of alleged 
statements by the Chinese Foreign Minister, four new demands 
were introduced concerning Eastern Inner Mongolia. In deference 
to the wishes of the Japanese Governrnent, the Chinese Government 
gave the revised list the most careful consideration ; and being sin- 
cerely desirous of an early settlement offered new concessions in 
their reply presented to the Japanese Minister on May 1. (An- 
nexed.) 

In this reply the Chinese Government reinserted the proposal in 
reference to the retrocession of Kiaoehow, which they advanced at 
the first conference on February 2, and which was postponed at the 
request of the Japanese Minister. This, therefore, was in no sense 
a new proposal. 

The Chinese Government also proposed to agree to three of the 
four articles relating to Eastern Inner Mongolia. There was some 
difficulty in determining a definition of the boundaries of Eastern 
Inner Mongolia — this being a new expression in Chinese geograph- 
ical terminology — but the Chinese Government, acting upon a state- 
ment made at a previous conference by the Japanese Minister that 
the Japanese Government meant the region under Chinese admin- 
istrative jurisdiction, and taking note, in the list presented by the 
Japanese Minister, of the names of places in Eastern Inner Mon- 
golia to be opened to trade, inferred that the so-called Eastern Inner 
Mongolia is that part of Inner Mongolia which is under the juris- 
diction of South Manchuria and the Jehol Intendency; and re- 
frained from placing any limitations upon the definition of this 
teiTn. 

The Cliinese Goverament also withdrew their supplementary pro- 
posal resening the right of making regulations for agricultural en- 
terprises to be undertaken by Japanese settlers in South Manchuria. 

In respect of the trial of cases involving land disputes between 
Japanese only, or between Japanese and Chinese, the Chinese Gov- 



APPENDICES 393 

ernment accorded to the Japanese Consul the right of deputing an 
oflScer to watch the proceedings. 

The Chinese Government also agreed to accept the suggestion of 
the Japanese Government to modify the term ''police law and or- 
dinances" into "police rules and regulations," thereby limiting the 
extent of control which the Chinese would have over Japanese sub- 
jects. 

As regards the Hanyehping demand, the Chinese Government 
accepted the draft made by the Japanese Government, embodying 
an engagement by the Chinese Government not to convert the Com- 
pany into a State-owned concern, nor to confiscate it, nor to force 
it to borrow foreign capital other than Japanese. 

In respect of the Fukien question the Chinese Government also 
agreed to give an assurance in the amplified form suggested by the 
Japanese Government that the Chinese Government had not given 
their consent to any foreign nations to construct a dockyard, or a 
coaling station, or a naval base, or any other military establishment 
along the coast of Fukien Province; nor did they contemplate bor- 
rowing foreign capital for the foregoing purposes. 

Having made these concessions which practically brought the views 
of China into line with those of Japan, and having explained in a 
note accompanying the reply the difficulty for China to make fur- 
ther concessions, the Chinese Government hoped that the Japanese 
Government would accept their reply of May 1, and thus bring the 
negotiations to an amicable conclusion. 

The Japanese Govenament, however, expressed themselves as 
being dissatisfied with China's reply, and withdrew the conditional 
offer to restore Kiaoehow to China made on April 26. It was fur- 
ther intimated that if the Chinese Government did not give their 
full compliance with the list of twenty-four demands, Japan would 
have recourse to drastic measures. 

Upon receiving this intimation the Chinese Government, inspired 
by the conciliatory spirit which had been predominant fi'om the 
very beginning of the negotiations and desirous of avoiding any pos- 
sible rupture in the relations of the two countries, made a supreme 
effort to meet the situation, and represented to the Japanese Gov- 
ernment that they would reconsider their position and make another 
attempt to find a solution that would be more satisfactory^ to Japan, 
in respect to those articles which China had declared could not be 
taken iip for consideration, but to which Japan attached great im- 
portance. Even in the evening of May 6, after the Japanese Min- 
ister had notified the Ciwnese Government that the Uultimatum had 
arrived in Peking, the Chinese Government in the interests of peace 



394 APPENDICES 

still exerted efforts to save the situation by offering to meet Japan's 
wishes. 

These overtures were again rejected, and thus exhausted the means 
at the disposal of the Chinese Government to prevent an impasse. 

It is plain that the Chinese Government proceeded to the fullest 
extent of possible concession in view of the strong national senti- 
ment manifested by the people throughout the whole period of 
negotiations. All that the Chinese Government strove to maintain 
was China's plenary sovereignty, the treaty rights of foreign Pow- 
ers in China and the principle of equal opportunity. 

To the profound regret of the Chinese Government, however, the 
tremendous sacrifices which they had shown themselves ready to 
make, proved unavailing, and an Ultimatum (the text of which is 
appended) was duly delivered to them by the Japanese Minister at 
three o'clock on the afternoon of May 7. 

As to the allegations made in the Ultimatum against China, the 
Chinese Government hope that the foregoing outline of the history 
of the negotiations constitutes a clear, dispassionate, and complete 
reply. 

In considering the nature of the course they should take with 
reference to the Ultimatum the Chinese Government was influenced 
by a desire to preserve the Chinese people, as well as the large num- 
ber of foreign residents in China, from unnecessary suffering, and 
also to prevent the interests of friendly Powers from being im- 
periled. For these reasons the Chinese Government were eon- 
strained to comply in full with the terms of the Ultimatum (the re- 
ply being hereto appended), but in complying the Chinese disclaim 
any desire to associate themselves with any revision, which may 
thus be effected, of the various conventions and agreements con- 
cluded between other Powers in respect of the maintenance of 
China's territorial independence and integi'ity, the preservation of 
the status quo, and the principle of equal opportunity for the com- 
merce and industry of all nations in China. 

Memorandum Bead hy the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Eioki, 

the Japanese Minister, at a Conference Held at Waichiaopil, 

May 1, 1915. 

The list of demands which the Japanese Government first pre- 
sented to the Chinese Government consists of five Groups, the first 
relating to Shantung, the second relating to South Manchuria and 
Eastern Inner Mongolia, the third relating to the Hanyehping Com- 
pany, the fourth asking for non-alienation of the coast of the 



APPENDICES 395 

country, and the fifth relating to the questions of national advisers, 
national police, national arms, missionary "propaganda, Yangtze 
Valley railways and Fukien Province. Out of profound regard for 
the intentions entertained by Japan, the Chinese Government took 
these momentous demands into grave and careful consideration and 
decided to negotiate with the Japanese Government frankly and 
sincerely what were possible to negotiate. This is a manifestation to 
Japan of the most profound regard which the Chinese Government 
entertains for the relations between the two nations. 

Ever since the opening of the negotiations China has been doing 
her best to hasten their progress, holding as many as three con- 
ferences a week. As regards the articles in the second group, the 
Chinese Government, being disposed to allow the Japanese Gov- 
ernment to develop the economic relations of the two countries in 
South Manchuria, realizing that the Japanese Government attaches 
importance to its interests in that region, and wishing to meet the 
hopes of Japan, made a painful effort, without hesitation, to agree 
to the extension of the 25-year lease of Port Arthur and Dalny, the 
36-year period of the South Manchuria railway and the 15-year 
period of the Antung-Mukden railway, all to 99 years; and to 
abandon its own cherished hopes to regain control of these places 
and properties at the expiration of their respective original terms 
of lease. It cannot but be admitted that this is a most genuine proof 
of China's friendship for Japan. As to the rights of opening mines 
in South Manchuria, the Chinese Government has already agreed to 
permit Japanese to work mines within the mining areas designated 
by Japan. China has further agreed to give Japan a right of pref- 
erence in the event of borrowing foreign capital for building rail- 
ways or of making a loan on the security of the local taxes in South 
Manchuria. The question of revising the arrangement for the Kirin- 
Changchun railway has been settled in accordance with the proposal 
made by Japan. The Chinese Government has further agreed to 
employ Japanese first in the event of employing foreign advisers on 
political, military, financial and police matters. 

Furthermore, the provision about the repurchase period in the 
South Manchurian railway was not mentioned in Japan's original 
proposal. Subsequently, the Japanese Government, alleging that its 
meaning was not clear, asked China to cancel the provision al- 
together. Again, Japan at first demanded the right of Japanese to 
carry on farming in South Manchuria, but subsequently she con- 
sidered the word "farming" was not broad enough and asked to 
replace it with the phrase "agricultural enterprises." To these re- 
quests the Chinese Government, though well aware that the proposed 



396 APPENDICES 

changes could only benefit Japan, still acceded without delay. This, 
too, is a proof of China's frankness and sincerity toward Japan. 

As regards matters relating to Shantung, the Chinese Govern- 
ment has agreed to a majority of the demands. 

The question of inland residence in South Manchuria is, in the 
opinion of the Chinese Government, incompatible with the treaties 
China has entered into with Japan and other Powers, still the Chi- 
nese Government did its best to consider how it was possible to avoid 
that incompatibility. At first, China suggested that the Chinese 
Authorities should have full rights of jurisdiction over Japanese 
settlers. Japan declined to agree to it. Thereupon China recon- 
sidered the question and revised her counter-proposal five or six 
times, each time making some definite concession, and went so far 
as to agTee that all civil and criminal cases between Chinese and 
Japanese should be arranged according to existing treaties. Only 
cases relating to land or lease contracts were reserved to be ad- 
judicated by Chinese Courts, as a mark of China's sovereignty over 
the region. This is another proof of China's readiness to concede 
as much as possible. 

Eastern Inner Mongolia is not an enlightened region as yet and 
the conditions existing there are entirely different from those pre- 
vailing in South Manchuria. The two places, therefore, cannot be 
considered in the same light. Accordingly, China agreed to open 
commercial marts first, in the interests of foreign trade. 

The Hanyehping Company mentioned in the third group is en- 
tirely a private company, and the Chinese Government is pre- 
cluded from interfering with it and negotiating with another govern- 
ment to make any disposal of the same as the Government likes, but 
having regard for the interests of the Japanese capitalists, the 
Chinese Government agreed that whenever, in future, the said com- 
pany and the Japanese capitalists should arrive at a satisfactory 
arrangement for cooperation, China will give her assent thereto. 
Thus the interests of the Japanese capitalists are amply safe- 
guarded. 

Although the demand in the fourth group asking for a declara- 
tion not to alienate China's coast is an infringement of her sov- 
ereign rights, yet the Chinese Government offered to make a vol- 
untary pronouncement so far as it comports with China's sovereign 
rights. Thus, it is seen that the Chinese Government, in deference 
to the wishes of Japan, gave a most serious consideration even to 
those demands which gravely affect the sovereignty and territorial 
rights of China as well as the principle of equal opportunity and the 



APPENDICES 397 

treaties with foreign Powers. All this was a painful effort on the 
part of the Chinese Government to meet the situation — a fact of 
which the Japanese Government must be aware. 

As regards the demands in the fifth group, they all infringe 
China's sovereignty, the treaty rights of other Powers or the prin- 
ciple of equal opportunity. Although Japan did not indicate any 
difference between this group and the preceding four in the list which 
she presented to China in respect of their character, the Chinese 
Government, in view of their palpably objectionable features, per- 
suaded itself that these could not have been intended by Japan as 
anything other than Japan's mere advice to China. Accordingly 
China has declared from the very beginning that while she en- 
tertains the most profound regard for Japan's wishes, she was un- 
able to admit that any of these matters could be made the subject 
of an understanding with Japan. Much as she desired to pay regard 
to Japan's wishes, China cannot but respect her own sovereign rights 
and the existing treaties with other Powers. In order to be rid of 
the seed for future misunderstanding and to strengthen the basis of 
friendship, China was constrained to iterate the reasons for refus- 
ing to negotiate on any of the articles in the fifth group, yet in 
\'iew of Japan's wishes China has expressed her readiness to state 
that no foreign money was borrowed to construct harbor works in 
Fukien Province. Thus it is clear that China went so far as to 
seek a solution for Japan of a question that really did not admit 
of negotiation. Was there, then, evasion on the part of China? 

Now, since the Japanese Government has presented a revised 
list of demands and declared at the same time that it will restore 
the leased territory of Kaiochow, the Chinese Government recon- 
siders the whole question and herewith submits a new reply to the 
friendly Japanese Government. 

In this reply the unsettled articles in the first group are stated 
again for discussion. As regards the second group, those articles 
which have already been initialled are omitted. In connection with 
the question of inland residence the police regulation clause has been 
revised in a more restrictive sense. As for the trial of cases re- 
lating to land and lease contracts the Chinese Government now 
permits the Japanese Consul to send an officer to attend the pro- 
ceedings. Of the four demands in connection with that part of 
Eastern Inner Mongolia which is within the jurisdiction of South 
Manchuria and the Jehol Intendency, China agrees to three. China, 
also, agrees to the article relating to the Hanyehping Company as 
revised by Japan, -%_ 



398 APPENDICES 

It is hoped that the Japanese Government will appreciate the con- 
ciliatory spirit of the Chinese Government in making this final con- 
cession and forthwith give her assent thereto. 

There is one more point. At the beginning of the present nego- 
tiations it was mutually agTeed to observe secrecy, but unfor- 
tunately' a few days after the presentation of the demands by Japan 
an Osaka newspaper published an "Extra" giving the text of the 
demands. The foreign and the Chinese press has since been paying 
considerable attention to this question and frequently publishing 
pro-Chinese or pro-Japanese comments in order to call forth the 
world's conjecture, a matter which the Chinese Government deeply 
regrets. The Chinese Government has never carried on any news- 
paper campaign and the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs has re- 
peatedly declared it to the Japanese Minister. 

In conclusion, the Chinese Government wishes to express its hope 
that the negotiations now pending between the two countries will 
soon come to an end and whatever misgivings foreign countries en- 
tertain toward the present situation may be quickly dispelled. 



CHINA'S EELY TO JAPAN'S REVISED DEMANDS 

China's Reply op Mat 1, 1915, to the Japanese Revised 
Demands of April 26, 1915. 

GROUP I 

The Chinese Government and the Japanese Government, being 
desirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and 
further strengthening the friendly relations and good neighborhood 
existing between the two nations, agree to the following articles: 

Article 1. The Chinese Government declare that they will give 
full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese and German 
Governments may hereafter mutually agree, relating to the dis- 
position of all interests which Germany, by virtue of treaties or 
recorded cases, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung. 

The Japanese Government declares that when the Chinese Gov- 
ernment give their assent to the disposition of interests above re- 
ferred to, Japan will restore the leased territory of Kiao-chou 
to China; and further recognize the right of the Chinese Govern- 
ment to participate in the negotiations referred to above between 
Japan and Gennany. 

Art. 2. The Japanese Government consent to be responsible for 
the indemnification of all losses occasioned by Japan's military op- 



APPENDICES 399 

peration around the leased territory of Kiao-ehou. The customs, 
telegraphs and post offices within the leased territory of Kiao-ehou 
shall, prior to the restoration of the said leased territory to China, 
be administered as heretofore, for the time being. The railways and 
telegraph lines erected by Japan for military purposes are to be re- 
moved forthwith. The Japanese troops now stationed outside the 
original leased territory of Kiao-ehou are now to be withdrawn 
first, those within the original leased territory are to be withdrawn 
on the restoration of the said leased teiTitory to China. 

Art. 3. (Changed into an exchange of notes.) 

The Chinese Government declare that within the Province of 
Shantung and along its coast no territory or island will be ceded 
or leased to any Power under any pretext. 

Art. 4. The Chinese Government consent that as regards the 
railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow to 
connect with the Kiao-chou-Tsinanfu Railway, if Germany is willing 
to abandon the privilege of financing the Chee-foo-Weihsien line, 
China will approach Japanese capitalists for a loan. 

Art. 5. The Chinese Government engage, in the interest of trade 
and for the residence of foreigners, to open by herself as soon 
as possible certain suitable places in the Province of Shantung as 
Commercial Ports. 

(Supplementally exchange of notes.) 

The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen, and the 
regulations are to be drafted, by the Chinese Government, but the 
Japanese Minister must be consulted before making a decision. 

Art. 6. If the Japanese and German Governments are not able 
to come to a definite agreement in future in their negotiations re- 
specting transfer, etc., this provisional agreement contained in the 
foregoing articles shall be void. 

GROUP II 

The six articles which are foimd in Japan's Eevised Demands of 
April 26, 1915, but omitted herein, are those already initialed by the 
Chinese Foreign Minister and the Japanese Minister. 

The Chinese Government and the Japanese Government, with 
a view to developing their economic relations in South Manchuria, 
agree to the following articles : 

Art. 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may, by ar- 
rangement with the owners, lease land required for erecting suit- 
able buildings for trade and manufacture or for agricultural enter- 
prises. _ 

Art. 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel 



400 APPENDICES 

in South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture 
of any kind whatsoever. 

Art. 3a. The Japanese subjects refeiTed to in the preceding two 
articles, besides being required to register with the local authorities 
passports, which they must procure under the existing regulations, 
shall also observe police rules and regulations and pay taxes in 
the same manner as Chinese. Civil and criminal cases shall be tried 
and adjudicated by the authorities of the defendant's nationality and 
an of&cer can be deputed to attend the proceedings. But all cases 
purely between Japanese subjects, and mixed eases between Japanese 
and Chinese, relating to land or disputes arising from lease contracts, 
shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese Authorities and the Japa- 
nese Consul may also depute an officer to attend the proceedings. 
When the judicial system in the said Province is completely reformed, 
all the civil and criminal eases concerning Japanese subjects shall be 
tried entirely by Chinese law courts. 

RELATING TO EASTERN INNER MONGOLIA 

(To be exchanged by notes.) 

Article 1. The Chinese Government declare that China will not 
in future pledge the taxes, other than customs and salt revenue, of 
that part of Eastern Inner Mongolia under the jurisdiction of South 
Manchuria and Jehol Intendency, as security for raising loans. 

Art. 2. The Chinese Government declare that China will herself 
provide funds for building the railways in that part of Eastern Inner 
Mongolia under the jurisdiction of South Manchuria and the Jehol 
Intendency; if foreign capital is required, China will negotiate with 
Chinese capitalists first, provided this does not conflict with agree- 
ments already concluded with other Powers. 

Art. 3. The Chinese Government agrees, in the interest of trade 
and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself certain 
suitable places in that part of Eastern Inner Mongolia under the 
jurisdiction of South Manchuria and the Jehol Intendency, as Com- 
mercial Marts. 

The regulations for the said Commercial Marts will be made in 
accordance with those of other Commercial Marts opened by China 
herself. 

GROUP III 

The relations between Japan and the Hanyehping Company being 
very intimate, if the said Company comes to an agreement with the 
Japanese capitalists for cooperation, the Chinese Government shall 
forthwith give their consent thereto. The Chinese Government 



APPENDICES 401 

further declare that China will not convert the Company into a state 
enterprise, nor confiscate it nor cause it to borrow and use foreign 
capital other than Japanese. 

■ Letter to Be Addressed by the Japanese Minister to the 
Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs 

Excellency: 

I have the honor to state that a report has reached me that the 
Chinese Government have given permission to foreign nations to 
construct on the coast of Fukien Province dock-yards, coaling sta- 
tions for military use, naval bases and other establishments for 
military purposes and further that the Chinese Government are bor- 
rowing foreign capital for putting up the above-mentioned construc- 
tion or establishments. I shall be much obliged if the Chinese Gov- 
ernment will inform me whether or not these reports are well founded 
in fact. 

Reply to Be Addressed by the Chinese Minister of Foreign 
Affairs to the Japanese Minister 

Excellency : 

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's 

Note of . In reply I beg to state that the Chinese 

Government have not given permission to foreign Powers to con- 
struct, on the coast of Fukien Province, dock-yards, coaling stations 
for military use, naval bases or other establishments for military 
purp,oses; nor do they contemplate borrowing foreign capital for 
putting up such constructions or establishments. 



JAPAN'S UTIMATUM 

Ultimatum Delivered by Japanese Minister to Minister of 
Foreign Affairs at 3 o'Clock p. m. on May 7th, 1915 

The reason why the Imperial Government opened the present nego- 
tiations with the Chinese Government is first to endeavor to dispose 
of the complications arising out of the war between Japan and Ger- 
many, and secondly to attempt to solve various questions which are 
detrimental to the intimate relations of China and Japan with a 
view to solidifying the foundation of cordial friendship subsisting 
between the two countries to the end that the peace of the far East 
may be effectively and permanently preserved. With this object in 



402 APPENDICES 

view, definite proposals were presented to the Chinese Government in 
January of this year, and up to to-day as many as twenty-five con- 
ferences were held with the Chinese Government in perfect sincerity 
and frankness. 

In the course of the negotiation the Imperial Government has con- 
sistently explained the aims and objects of the proposals in a con- 
ciliatory spirit, while on the other hand the proposals of the Chinese 
Government, whether important or unimportant, have been attended 
to without any reserve. 

It may be stated with confidence that no effort has been spared to 
arrive at a satisfactory and amicable settlement of those questions. 

The discussion of the entire corpus of the proposals was practically 
at an end at the twenty-fourth conference ; that is, on 17th of the last 
month. The Imperial Government, taking a broad view of the nego- 
tiations and in consideration of the points raised by the Chinese Gov- 
ernment, modified the original proposals with considerable conces- 
sions and presented to the Chinese Government on the 26th of the 
same month the revised proposals for agreement, and at the same 
time it was offered that, on the acceptance of the revised proposals, 
the Imperial Government would, at a suitable opportunity, restore 
with fair and proper conditions, to the Chinese Government the 
Kiao-ehou territory, in the acquisition of which the Imperial Gov- 
ernment had made a great sacrifice. 

On the 1st of May, the Chinese Government delivered the reply 
to the revised proposals of the Japanese Government, which is con- 
trary to the expectations of the Imperial Government. The Chinese 
Goveniment not only did not give a careful consideration to. the 
revised proposals, but even with regard to the offer of the Japanese 
Government, to restore Kiao-chou to the Chinese Government, the 
latter did not manifest the least appreciation of Japan's good will 
and difficulties. 

From the commercial and military points of view Kiao-chou is an 
impoi'tant place, in the acquisition of which the Japanese Empire 
sacrificed much blood and money, and, after the acquisition, the 
Empire incurs no obligation to restore it to China. But with the 
object of increasing the future friendly relations of the two coun- 
tries, she went to the extent of proposing its restoration, yet to her 
great regret, the Chinese Government did not take into consideration 
the good intention of Japan and manifest appreciation of her diffi- 
culties. Furthermore, the Chinese Government not only ignored the 
friendly feelings of the Imperial Government offering the restoration 
of Kiao-chou Bay, but also in replying to the revised proposals they 
even demanded its unconditional restoration; and again China de- 



APPENDICES 403 

manded that Japan should bear the responsibility of paying indem- 
nity for all the unavoidable losses and damages resulting from 
Japan's military operations at Kiao-chou; and still further in con- 
nection with the territory of Kiao-chou China advanced other de- 
mands and declared that she has the right of participation at the 
future peace conference to be held between Japan and Germany. 
Although China is fully aware that the unconditional restoration of 
Kiao-chou and Japan's responsibility of indemnification for the 
unavoidable losses and damages can never be tolerated by Japan, yet 
she purposely advanced these demands and declared that this reply 
was final and decisive. 

Since Japan could not tolerate such demands, the settlement of the 
other question, however compromising it may be, would not be to 
her interest. The consequence is that the present reply of the Chi- 
nese Government is, on the whole, vague and meaningless. 

Furthermore, in the reply of the Chinese Government to the other 
proposals in the revised list of the Imperial Government, such as 
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, where Japan particu- 
larly has geographical, political, commercial, industrial and strategic 
relations, as recognized by all the nations, and made more remark- 
able in consequence of the two wars in which Japan was engaged, 
the Chinese Government overlooks these facts and does not respect 
Japan's position in that place. The Chinese Government even freely 
altered those articles which the Imperial Government, in a compro- 
mising spirit, have formulated in accordance with the statement of 
the Chinese Kepresentatives thereby making the statements of the 
Eepresentatives an empty talk ; or on seeing them conceding with the 
one hand and withholding with the other, it is very difficult to at- 
tribute faithfulness and sincerity to the Chinese Authorities. 

As regards the articles relating to the employment of advisers, the 
establishment of schools and hospitals, the supply of arms and am- 
munition and the establishment of arsenals, and railway concessions 
in South China in the revised proposals, they are either proposed 
with the proviso that the consent of the Power concerned must first 
be obtained, or they are merely to be recorded in the minutes in 
accordance with the statement of the Chinese delegates, and thus they 
are not in the least in conflict either with Chinese sovereignty or her 
treaties with the Foreig-n Powers. Yet the Chinese Government in 
their reply to the proposals, alleging that these proposals are incom- 
patible with their sovereign rights and the Treaties with the Foreign 
Powers, defeat the expectations of the Imperial Government. In 
spite of such attitude oiUhe Chinese Government, the Imperial Gov- 
ernment, though regretting to see that there is no room for further 



404 APPENDICES 

negotiation, yet warmly attached to the preservation of the peace of 
the far East, is still hoping for a satisfactory settlement in order to 
avoid the disturbance of the relations. 

So in spite of the circumstances which admitted no patience, they 
have reconsidered the feelings of the Government of their neighbor- 
ing country and with the exception of the article relating to Fukien, 
which is to be the subject of an exchange of notes as has already been 
agreed upon by the Representatives of both nations, will undertake 
to detach the Group V from the present negotiations and discuss it 
separately in the future. Therefore the Chinese Government should 
appreciate the friendly feelings of the Imperial Government by im- 
mediately accepting without any alteration all the articles of Groups 
I, II, III and IV and the exchange of notes in connection with 
Fukien Province in Group V as contained in the revised proposals 
presented on the 26th of April. 

The Imperial Government hereby again offer their advice and hope 
that the Chinese Government upon this advice will give a satisfactory 
reply by 6 o'clock p. m. on the 9th day of May. It is hereby de- 
clared that if no satisfactory reply is received before or at the desig- 
nated time, the Imperial Government will take steps they may deem 
necessary. 

JAPAN'S EXPLANATORY NOTE 

Explanatory Note Accompanying Memorandum Delivered to 
THE Minister of Foreign Affairs by the Japanese Minister 
the Seventh Day op May, 1915 

1. With the exception of the question of Fukien to be arranged 
by an exchange of notes, the five articles postponed for later nego- 
tiations refer to (a) the employment of advisers, (b) the establish- 
ment of schools and hospitals, (c) the railway concessions in South 
China, (d) the supply of arms and ammunition and the establishment 
of arsenals, (e) the propagation of Buddhism. 

2. The acceptance by the Chinese Government of the article relat- 
ing to Fukien may be either in the form as proposed by the Minister 
of Japan on the 26th of April or in that contained in the Reply of 
the Chinese Government of May 1st. Although the Ultimatum calls 
for the immediate acceptance by China of the modified proposals 
presented on April 26tb, without alteration, but it should be noted 
that it merely states the principle and does not apply to this article 
and articles 4 and 5 of this note. 

3. If the Chinese Government accept all the articles as demanded 



APPENDICES 405 

in the Ultimatum the offer of the Japanese Government to restore 
Kiao-chou to China made on the 26th of April, will still hold good. 

4. Article 2 of Group II relating to the lease or purchase of land, 
the terms "lease" and "purchase" may be replaced by these terms, 
"temporary lease" and "perpetual lease" or "lease on consultations," 
which means a long-term lease with its unconditional renewal. 

Article 4 of Group II relating to the approval of laws and ordi- 
nances and local taxes by the Chinese Consul may form the subject 
of a secret agreement. 

5. The phrase "to consult with the Japanese Government" in con- 
nection with questions of pledging the local taxes for raising loans 
and the loans for construction of railways, in Eastern Inner Mon- 
golia, which is similar to the agreement in Manchuria relating to the 
matters of the same kind, may be replaced by the phrase "to consult 
with the Japanese capitalists." 

The article relating to the opening of trade marts in Eastern Inner 
Mongolia in respect to location and regulations, may, following the 
precedent set in Shantung, be the subject of an exchange of notes. 

6. From the phrase "those interested in the Company" in Group 
III of the revised list of demands, the words "those interested in" 
may be deleted. 

7. The Japanese version of the Formal Agreement and its annexes 
shall be the official text or both the Chinese and Japanese shall be 
otficial texts. 

CHINA'S RELY TO THE ULTIMATUM 

The Reply of the Chinese Government to the Ultimatum of 
THE Japanese Gov'eenment, Deli\7ered to the Japanese Min- 
ister OF Foreign Affairs on the 8th of May, 1915 

On the 7th of this month, at three o'clock p. M., the Chinese Gov- 
ernment received an Ultimatum from the Japanese Government to- 
gether with an Explanatory Note of seven articles. The Ultimatum 
concluded with the hope that the Chinese Government up to 6 o'clock 
p. M. on the 9th of May, will give a satisfactory reply, and it is 
hereby declared that if no satisfactory reply is received before or at 
the designated time, the Japanese Government will take steps she 
may deem necessary. 

The Chinese Government with a view to preserving the peace of 
the far East, hereby accepts, with the exception of those five articles 
of Group V postponed for later negotiation, all the articles of 
Groups I, II, III and 1Y-, and the exchange of Notes in connection 
with Fukien Province in Group V as contained in the revised pro- 



406 APPENDICES 

posals presented on the 26th of April and in accordance with the 
Explanatory Note of seven articles accompanying the Ultimatum of 
the Japanese Government with the hope that thereby all outstanding 
questions are settled, so that the cordial relationship between the 
two countries may be further consolidated. The Japanese Minister 
is hereby requested to appoint a day to call at the Ministry of For- 
eign Aftairs to make the literary improvement of the text and sign 
the Agreement as soon as possible. 

NEW TREATIES AND NOTES 

BETWEEN" 

CHINA AND JAPAN 
(Translated from the Chinese) 

Treaty Respecting the Province of Shantung 

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China and His 
Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, having resolved to conclude a Treaty 
with a view to the maintenance of general peace in the Extreme East 
and the further strengthening of the relations of friendship and good 
neighborhood now existing between the two nations, have for that 
purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say: 

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, Lou 
Tseng-tsiang, Chung-cliing, First Class CMa Ho Decoration, Minis- 
ter of Foreign Affairs. 

And His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Hioki Eki, Jusliii, Second 
Class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, Minister Pleni- 
potentiary, and Envoy Extraordinary': 

Who, after ha^'ing communicated to each other their full powers 
and found them to be in good and due form, have agTeed upon and 
concluded the following Articles: — 

Article 1. The Chinese Government agrees to give full assent to 
all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter 
agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all 
rights, interests and concessions with Gei'many, by virtue of treaties 
or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung. 

Art. 2. The Chinese Government agrees that as regards the rail- 
way to be built by China herself from Chef oo or Lungkow to connect 
with the Kiao-chou-Tsinanfu railway, if Germany abandons the 
privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsien line, China will approach 
Japanese capitalists to negotiate for a loan. 

Art. 3. The Chinese Government agrees in the interest of trade 
and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself as soon 



APPENDICES 407 

as possible certain suitable places in the Province of Shantung as 
Commercial Ports. 

Art. 4. The present treaty shall come into force on the day of its 
signature. 

The present treaty shall be ratified by His Excellency the President 
of the Republic of China and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, 
and the ratification thereof shall be exchanged at Tokio as soon as 
possible. 

In witness" whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries of the High 
Contracting Parties have signed and sealed the present Treaty, two 
copies in the Chinese language and two in Japanese. 

Done at Peking this twenty-fifth day of the fifth month of the 
fourth year of the Republic of China, corresponding to the same day 
of the same month of the fourth year of Taisho. 

EXCHAITGE OF NOTES RESPECTING SHANTUNG 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of the Republic of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

In the name of the Chinese Government I have the honor to make 
the following declaration to your Government: — "Within the Prov- 
ince of Shantung or along its coast no territory or island will be 
leased or ceded to any foreign Power under any pretext." 
I avail, etc., 

^^. ^ „ (Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 

His Excellency, 

Hioki Eki, 

Japanese Minister. 

Reply 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's 
note of this day's date in which you made the following declaration 
in the name of the Chinese Government: — "Within the Province of 
Shantung or along its coast no territory or island will be leased or 
ceded to any foreign Power under any pretext." 

In reply I beg to state that I have taken note of this declaration. 
I avail, etc., 

His Excellency, ^^'^'^^ ^^^^^ ^^'' 

Lou Tseng-tsiang, -- 
Minister Foreign Affairs. 



408 APPENDICES 

Exchange of ISiotes Respecting the Opening of Ports in 
Shantung 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of the Republic of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honor to state that the places which ought to be opened 
as Commercial Ports by China herself, as provided in Article 3 of 
the Treaty respecting the Province of Shantung signed this day, will 
be selected and the regulations therefor will be drawn up, by the 
Chinese Government itself, a decision concerning which will be made 
after consulting the Minister of Japan. 
I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 

Reply 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's 
note of this day's date in which you stated ''that the places which 
ought to be opened as Commercial Ports by China herself, as pro- 
vided in Article 3 of the Treaty respecting the province of Shantung 
signed this day, will be selected and the regulations therefor will be 
drawn up, by the Chinese Government itself, a decision concerning 
which will be made after consulting the Minister of Japan." 
In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of the same. 
I avail, etc., 

(Signed) HiOKi Eki. 
His Excellency, 
Lou Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Restoration of the Leased 
Territory of Kiao-chou Bay 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

In the name of my Government I have the honor to make the 
following declaration to the Chinese Government : — 

When, after the termination of the present war, the leased terri- 
tory of Kiao-chou Bay is completely left to the free disposal of 



APPENDICES 409 

Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said leased territory 
to China under the following conditions: — 

1. The whole of Kiao-ehou Bay to be opened as a Commercial 
Port. 

2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to be 
established at a place designated by the Japanese Government. 

3. If the foreign Powers desire it, an international concession may 
be established. 

4. As regards the disposal to be made of the buildings and proper- 
ties of Germany and the conditions and procedure relating thereto, 
the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government shall arrange 
the matter by mutual agreement before the restoration. 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Hioki Eki. 
His Excellency, 
Lou Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Reply 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of the Republic of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's 
note of this day's date in which you made the following declaration 
in the name of your Government : — 

"When, after the termination of the present war, the leased terri- 
tory of Kiao-chou Bay is completely left to the free disposal of 
Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said leased territory 
to China under the following conditions : — 

"1. The whole of Kiao-chou Bay to be opened as a Commercial 
Port. 

"2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to be 
established at a place .designated by the Japanese Government. 

"3. If the foreign Powers desire it, an international concession 
may be established. 

"4. As regards the disposal to be made of the buildings and prop- 
erties of Germany and the conditions and procedure relating thereto, 
the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government shall arrange 
the matter by mutual agreement before the restoration." 

In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of this declaration. 
L avail, etc., 

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 



410 APPENDICES 

Treaty Respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner 
Mongolia 

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China and His 
Majesty the Emperor of Japan, having resolved to conclude a Treaty 
with a view to developing their economic relations in South Man- 
churia and Eastern Inner Mongolia, have for that purpose named as 
their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say: 

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, Lou 
Tseng-tsiang, Chung-cliing, First Class Chia-ho Decoration, and Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs; and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, 
Hioki Eki, JusMi, Second Class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred 
Treasure, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary; 

Who, after having communicated to each other their full powers, 
and found them to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and 
concluded the following Articles : — 

Article 1. The Two High Contracting Parties ag-ree that the 
term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the terms of the South 
Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway, shall be ex- 
tended to 99 years. 

Art. 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may, by negotia- 
tion, lease land necessary for erecting suitable buildings for trade 
and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural enterprises. 

Art. 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in 
South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture of any 
kind whatsoever. 

Art. 4. In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring jointly to 
undertake agricultural enterprises and industries incidental thereto, 
the Chinese Government may give its permission. 

Art. 5. The Japanese subjects referred to in the preceding three 
articles, besides being required to register with the local Authorities 
passports which they must procure under the existing regulations, 
shall also submit to the police laws and ordinances and taxation of 
China. 

Civil and criminal cases in which the defendants are Japanese shall 
be tried and adjudicated by the Japanese Consul ; those in which the 
defendants are Chinese shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese 
Authorities. In either case an officer may be deputed to the court to 
attend the proceedings. But mixed civil eases between Chinese and 
Japanese relating to land shall be tried and adjudicated by delegates 
of both nations conjointly in accordance with Chinese law and local 
usage. 

When, in future, the judicial system in the said region is com- 



APPENDICES 411 

pletely reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning Japanese 
subjects shall be tried and adjudicated entirely by Chinese law courts. 

Art. 6. The Chinese Government agrees, in the interest of trade, 
and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself, as 
soon as possible, certain suitable places in Eastern Inner Mongolia 
as Commercial Ports. 

Art. 7. The Chinese Government agrees speedily to make a 
fundamental revision of the Kirin-Changehun Railway Loan-Agree- 
ment, taking as a standard the provisions in railway agreements 
made heretofore between China and foreign financiers. 

When in future, more advantageous terms than those in existing 
railway loan agreements are granted to foreign financiers in connec- 
tion with railway loans, the above agreement shall again be revised 
in accordance with Japan's wishes. 

Art. 8. All existing treaties between China and Japan relating to 
Manchuria shall, except where otherwise provided for by this Treaty, 
remain in force. 

Art. 9. The present Treaty shall come into force on the date of 
its signature. The present Treaty shall be ratified by His Excellency 
the President of the Republic of China and His Majesty the Em- 
peror of Japan, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at 
Tokio as soon as possible. 

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries of the two 
High Contracting Parties have signed and sealed the present Treaty, 
two copies in the Chinese language and two in Japanese. 

Done at Peking this twenty-fifth day of the fifth month of the 
fourth year of the Republic of China, coiTesponding to the same day 
of the same month of the fourth year of Taisho. 

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Terms of Lease of Port 
Arthur and Dalnt and the Terms of South Manchurian 

AND AnTUNG-MuKDEN RAILWAYS 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of the Republic of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honor to state that, respecting the provisions contained 
in Article 1 of the Treaty relating to South Manchuria and Eastern 
Inner Mongolia, signed this day, the term of lease of Port Arthur 
and Dalny shall expire in the 86th year of the Republic or 1997. 
The date for restoring the South Manchuria Railway to China shall 
fall due in the 91st yea5_of the Republic or 2002. Article 21 in the 
Original South Manchurian Railway Agreement providing that it 



412 APPENDICES 

may be redeemed by China after 36 years from the day on which the 
traffic is opened is hereby canceled. The term of the Antung-Muk- 
den Railway shall expire in the 96th year of the Republic or 2007. 
I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 
His Excellency, 
Hioki Eki, 
Japanese Minister. 

Reply 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's 
note of this day's date in which you stated that "respecting the pro- 
visions contained in Article 1 of the Treaty relating to South Man- 
churia and Eastern Inner Mongolia, signed this day, the term of lease 
of Port Arthur and Dalny shall expire in the 86th year of the Re- 
public or 1997. The date for restoring the South Manehurian Rail- 
way to China shall fall due in the 91st year of the Republic or 2002. 
Article 12 in the original South Manehurian Railway Agreement pro- 
viding that it may be redeemed by China after 36 years from the day 
on which the traffic is opened, is hereby canceled. The term of the 
Antung-Mukden Railway shall expire in the 96th year of the Re- 
pubhe or 2007." 

In reply I beg to state that I have taken note of the same. 
I avail, etc., 

(Signed) HiOKi Eki. 
His Excellency, 

Lou Tseng-tsiang, ■ 

Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Exchange op Notes Respecting the Opening of Ports in Eastern 
Inner Mongolia 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of the Republic of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honor to state that the places which ought to be opened 
as Commercial Ports by China herself, as provided in Article 6 of the 
Treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia 
signed this day, will be selected, and the reg-ulations therefor will be 



1 APPENDICES 413 

drawn up, by the Chinese Government itself, a decision concerning 
which will be made after eonsultnig the Minister of Japan. 
1 avail, etc., 

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 
His Excellency, 
Hioki Eki, 

Japanese Minister. 

Reply 

Peking, the 25th day of the oth month of the 
4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's 
note of this day's date in which you stated "that the places which 
ought to be opened as Commercial Ports by China herself, as provided 
in Article 6 of the Treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern 
Inner Mongolia signed this day, will be selected, and the reg-ulations 
therefor, will be drawn up, by the Chinese Government itself, a 
decision concerning which will be made after consulting the Minister 
of Japan." 

In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of the same. 

I avail, etc., (Signed) HiOKi Eki. 

His Excellency, Lou Tseng-tsiang, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

South Manchuria 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of the Republic of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honor to state that Japanese subjects shall, as soon as 
possible, investigate and select mines in the mining areas in South 
Manchuria specified hereinunder, except those being prospected for 
or worked, and the Chinese Government will then permit them to 
prospect or Avork the same; but before the Mining regulations are 
definitely settled, the practice at present in force shall be followed. 
Fengtien. 

MINERAL 

Coal 



LOCALITY 


DISTRICT 


Niu Hsin T'ai 


Pen-hsi 


Tien Shih Fu Kou 


« 


Sha Sung Kang 


Hai-lung 


T'ieh Ch'ang _ 


Tung-hua 


Nuan Ti T'ang 


Chin 





Coal & Iron 


Ho-lung 


Coal 


Chi-lin (Kirin) 


Gold 


Hua-tien 




avail, etc., 




, (Signed) 


Lou TSENG-TSIANG. 



414 APPENDICES 

An Shan Chan region From Ldaoyang to Pen-hsi Iron 
Kirin (Southern portion) 
Sha Sung Kang 
Kang Yao 
Chia P'i Kou 

I 
His Excellency, Hioki Eki, 
Japanese Minister. 

Reply 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Youi' Excellency's 
note of this day respecting the opening of mines in South Man- 
churia, stating: "Japanese subjects shall, as soon as possible, in- 
vestigate and select mines in the mining areas in South Manchuria 
specified hereunder except those being prospected for or worked, 
and the Chinese Government will then permit them to prospect or 
work the same; but before the Mining regulations are definitely set- 
tled, the practice at present in force shall be followed." 
Fengtien. 



LOCALITY 


DISTRICT 


MINERAL 


Niu Hsin T'ai 


Pen-hsi 


Coal 


Tien Shih Fu Kou 


11 


u 


Sha Sung Kang 


Hai-lung 


ft 


T'ieh Ch'ang 


Tunar-hua 


u 


Nuan Ti f'ang 


Chin 


u 


An Shan Chan region From 






Liaoyang to 






Pen-hsi 


Iron 


Kirin (Southern portion) 






Sha Sung Kang 


Ho-hing 


Coal & Iron 


Kang Yao 


Chi-lin ^(Kirin) " Coal 


Chia P'i Kou 


Hna-tien 
I avail, etc., 


Gold 


His Excellency, 




(Signed) Hioki Eki. 



Lou T'^eng-tsiang, 
Minister of Foreign Affars of the Republic of China. 



APPENDICES 415 

Exchange of Notes Respecting Railways and Taxes in South 
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of the Republic of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

In the name of my Government, 

I have the honor to make the following declaration to your Gov- 
ernment : — 

China will hereafter provide funds for building necessary railways 
in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; if foreign capital 
is required China may negotiate for a loan with Japanese capitalists 
first: and further, the Chinese Government, when making a loan in 
future on the security of the taxes in the above-mentioned places (ex- 
cluding the salt and customs revenue which have already been pledged 
by the Chinese Central Government) may negotiate for it with 
Japanese capitalists first. 

I avail, etc.. 
His Excellency, (Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 

Hioki Eki, 
Japanese Minister. 

Reply 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's 
note of this day's date respecting railways and taxes in South Man- 
churia and Eastern Inner Mongolia in which you stated: 

"China will hereafter provide funds for building necessary rail- 
ways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; if foreign 
capital is required China may negotiate for a loan with Japanese 
capitalists first; and further, the Chinese Government, when making 
a loan in future on the security of taxes in the above mentioned 
places (excluding the salt and customs revenue which have already 
been pledged by the Chinese Central Government) may negotiate for 
it with Japanese Capitalists first.*' 

In reply I beg to state that I have taken note of the same. 
I avail, etc., 
His Excellency, (Signed) HiOKi Eki. 

Lou Tseng-tsianj, — 

Minister of Foreign Affair*. 



iie APPENDICES 

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Employment of Advisees 
IN South Manchuria 

Peking, the 25tli day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of the Republic of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

In the name of the Chinese Government I have the honor to make 
the following declaration to your Government: — 

"Hereafter, if foreign advisers or instructors on political, finan- 
cial, military or police matters are to be employed in South Man- 
churia, Japanese may be employed first." 

I avail, etc., 
His Excellency, (Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 

Hioki Eki, 

Japanese Minister. 

Reply 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's 
note of this day's date in which you made the following declaration 
in the name of your Government : — 

"Hereafter if foreign advisers or instructors in political, military 
or police matters are to be employed in South Manchuria, Japanese 
may be employed first." 

In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of the same. 
I avail, etc., 

(Signed) HiOKi Eki. 
His Excellency, 
Lou Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Explanation of "Lease by 
Negotiation" in South Manchuria 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I have the honor to state that the term "lease by negotiation" con- 
tained in Article 2 of the Treaty respecting South Manchuria and 
Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day shall be understood to imply 



APPENDICES 417 

a long-term lease of not more than thirty years and also the possi- 
bility of its unconditional renewal. 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Hioki Eki. 
His Excellency, 
Lou Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Reply 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of the Republic of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's 
note of this day's date in which you state : 

"The term 'lease by negotiation' contained in Article 2 of the 
Treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia 
signed this day shall be understood to imply a long-term lease of not 
more than thirty years and also the possibility of its unconditional 
renewal." 

In reply I beg to state that I have taken note of the same. 

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 
I avail, etc.. 
His Excellency, 
Hioki Eki, 

Japanese Minister. 

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Arrangement for Police 
Laws and Ordinances and Taxation in South Manchuria 
AND Eastern Inner Mongolia 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of the Republic of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honor to state that the Chinese Authorities will notify 
the Japanese Consul of the police laws and ordinances and the taxa- 
tion to which Japanese subjects shall submit according to Article 5 
of the Treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mon- 
golia signed this day so as to come to an understanding with him 
before their enforcement. 

I avail, etc.. 
His Excellency, (Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 

Hioki Eki, ^ 

Japanese Minister. 



418 APPENDICBS 

Reply 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's 
note of this day's date in which you state: 

"The Chinese Authorities Avill notify the Japanese Consul of the 
police laws and ordinances and the taxation to which Japanese sub- 
jects shall submit according to Article 5 of the Treaty respecting 
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day so as 
to come to an understanding with him before their enforcement." 
In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of the same. 
I avail, etc., 
His Excellency, (Signed) HiOKi Eki. 

Lou Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

The Postponement of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Treaty Re- 
specting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of the Republic of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honor to state that, inasmuch as preparations have to be 
made regarding Articles 2, 3, 4 & 5 of the Treaty respecting South 
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day, the Chinese 
Government proposes that the operation of the said Articles be post- 
poned for a period of three months beginning from the date of the 
signing of the said Treaty. 

I hope your Government will agree to this proposal. 
I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 
His Excellency, 
Hioki Eki, 

Japanese Minister. 

Reply 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 

4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's 
note of this day's date in which you stated that, "inasmuch as prep- 
arations have to be made regarding Articles 2, 3, 4 & 5 of the Treaty 



APPENDICES 419 

respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this 
day, the Chinese Government proposes that the operation of the said 
Articles be postponed for a period of three months beginning from 
the date of the signing of the said Treaty." 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) HiOKi Eki. 
In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of the same. 
His Excellency, 
Lou Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs. 



Exchange of Notes Respecting the Matter of Hanyehping 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of the Republic of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honor to state that if in future the Hanyehping Com- 
pany and the Japanese capitalists agree upon cooperation, the Chinese 
Government, in view of the intimate relations subsisting between the 
Japanese capitalists and the said Company, will forthwith give its 
permission. The Chinese Government further agrees not to confis- 
cate the said Company, nor without the consent of the Japanese 
capitalists to convert it into a state enterprise, nor cause it to bor- 
row and use foreign capital other than Japanese. 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 
His Excellency, 
Hoki Eki, 

Japanese Minister. 

Reply 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's 
note of this day's date in which you state: 

"If in future the Hanyehping Company and the Japanese capital- 
ists agTce upon cooperation, the Chinese Government, in view of the 
intimate relations subsisting between the Japanese Capitalists and 
the said Company, will forthwith give its permission. The Chinese 
Government further agrees not to confiscate the said Company, nor, 
without the consent of the Japanese capitalists to convert it into a 



420 APPENDICES 

state enterprise, nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other 
than Japanese." I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Hioki Eki. 
In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of the same. 
His Excellency, 
Lou Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister of ForeigTi Affairs. 

Exchange of Notes Respecting the Pukien Question 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

A report has reached me to the effect that the Chinese Government 
has the intention of j')ermitting foreign nations to establish, on the 
coast of Pukien Province, dock-yards, coaling stations for military 
use, naval bases, or to set up other military' establishments ; and also 
of borrowing foreign capital for the purpose of setting up the above- 
mentioned establishments. 

I have the honor to request that your Excellency will be good 
enough to give me a reply stating whether or not the Chinese Gov- 
ernment reaUy entertains such an intention. 

I avail, etc.. 
His Excellency, (Signed) HiOKi Eki. 

Lou Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Reply 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of the 
4th year of the Republic of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's 
note of this day's date, which I have noted. 

In reply I beg to inform you that the Chinese Government hereby 
declares that it has given no permission to foreign nations to con- 
struct, on the coast of Pukien Province, dock-yards, coaling stations 
for military use, naval bases, or to set up other military' establish- 
ments ; nor does it entertain an intention of borrowing foreign capital 
for the purpose of setting up the above-mentioned establishments. 

I avail, etc., 
His Excellency, 'Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 

Hioki Eki, * 
Japanese Minister. 



APPENDIX d 

TEXT OF THE MILITARY AGREEMENT 
(Signed March 19, 1918) 

Note : — No official text of this agreement has been p-ublished. The 
text given hereunder is, as the author was informed by a Chinese 
official, correct except for the omission of a few unimportant para- 
graphs. 

1. China and Japan, realising the fact that the gradual ex- 
tension of enemy influence towards the East may jeopardise the 
peace of the two countries, consider it their mutual duty as par- 
ticipants in the war, to take concerted action against the common 
enemy. 

2. As regards military co-operation each country shall pay due 
respect to the prestige and interests of the other country, and both 
parties shall be considered to be on an equal footing. 

3. When the time comes to take action in accordance with this 
Agreement the two countries shall instruct their military and civil 
officials and people to adopt a friendly attitude towards those of the 
other country in the military areas. The Chinese officials shall do 
their best to aid the Japanese troops in the said areas so that no 
obstacles shall arise to impede their movements, and the Japanese 
troops shall respect the sovereignty of China, and shall not be al- 
lowed to act in a manner contrary to the local customs and cause 
inconvenience to the people. 

4. The Japanese troops in Chinese territory shall be withdrawn 
as soon as military operations cease. 

5. Whenever troops have to be despatched outside Chinese ter- 
ritory, the two countries shall despatch them jointly whenever 
necessary. 

6. The military areas and other matters relating to the military 
operations shall be decided by the military authorities of the two 
countries whenever necessary, in accordance with the military 
strength of each country. 

7. In order to facilitate matters, in the course of the military 

421 



422 APPENDICES 

co-operation the military authorities of two countries shall observe 
the arrangements: 

(a) In regard to the making of all arrangements for carry- 

ing on military operations, both countries shall appoint 
deputies who shall arrange all matters regarding co-op- 
eration. 

(b) In order to secure rapid transportation by land or by 

water and rapid communication, both sides shall co-oper- 
ate to this end. 

(c) When occasion arises the two Commanders-in-chief shall 

arrange all necessary military constructions such as mili- 
tary railway, telegraph and telephone lines. These shall 
all be removed at the conclusion of the military operations. 

(d) Regardmg the necessary military supplies and materials 

required for taking concerted action against the enemy 
the two countries shall supply each other to such an ex- 
tent as not to affect the supplying of ordinary demands. 

(e) The two countries shall assist each other in carrying out 

sanitary measures for the troops in the military areas. 

(f) With regard to the question of military experts for direct 

military operations, should the necessity arise for mutual 
assistance, if one country requests the assistance of such 
exi)erts the other shall supply it. 

(g) In the areas in which military operations are taking place 

intelligence agencies may be established, and the two 
countries shall exchange important military maps and 
military reports. The intelligence agencies of the two 
countries shall exchange information and render mutual 
assistance. 

(h) All secret passwords shall be agreed upon mutually. 

The questions as to which of the above arrangements shall be 
considered first, and which shall be first entered upon 
shall be mutually arranged in a separate agreement, be- 
fore the actual commencement of hostilities. 

8. When military transportation necessities the use of the Chi- 
nese Eastern Railway, the provision in the original Treaty regard- 
ing the management and protection of the said railway shall be re- 
spected. The methods of transportation shall be decided upon at 
the time. 

9. Regarding the enforcement of the details in this agreement, it 
shall be decided upon by delegates appointed by the military au- 
thorities of the two countries. 



APPENDICES 423 

10. This agreement and the supplementary articles therein shall 
not be published by the two Governments, but shall be considered 
as military secrets. 

11. This agreement shall be signed and sealed by the military 
delegates of the two countries and recognised by the two Govern- 
ments before it becomes operative. The time for commencing ac- 
tual military operations shall be decided by the highest military 
organs of the two countries. This Agreement and all the details 
arising from this agreement shall become null and void as soon 
as the military operations of China and Japan against the enemy 
countries of Germany and Austria come to an end. 

12. Two copies of this Agreement shall be written in the Chinese 
language, and two corresponding copies in the Japanese Language, 
and each party shall keep one copy of the Agreement in each 
language. 



(TEXT OF THE Iv^AVAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN CHINA 
AND JAPAN, signed 19, 1918, translated from the Chinese) 

1. (Same as Article 1 of Military Agreement.) 

2. (Same as Article 2 of Military Agreement.) 

3. When the time comes to take action in accordance with this 
Agreement the two countries shall instruct their naval officers and 
all officials and people to adopt a friendly attitude toward those of 
the other country in the military areas, and mutually assist each 
other Avith a view to overcoming the enemy. 

4. A separate agreement shall be drawn up regarding the field 
of activity and the duties of the participants when the time comes 
for taking action against the enemy. 

5. When the time comes for action the naval authorities of China 
and Japan co-operate with a view to taking efficient measures as 
follows : — 

(a) (Same as 7(a) of the Military Agreement.) 

(b) (Same as 7 (b) of the Militai-y Agreement.) 

(e) In all matters relating to ship-building and repaiis and 
naval equipment and supplies, both countries shall mu- 
tually assist each according to its power. This also ap- 
plies to necessary military articles. 

(d) (Same as Section (f) of Article 7 of Military Agreement.) 

(e) (Same as Section (g) of Article 7 of Military Agreement. 

Siibstitute "nftval" for "mihtary" whenever used.) 

(f) (Same as Section (h) of Article 7 of Military Agreement.) 



424 APPENDICES 

6. (Same as Article 9 of Military Agreement, except that "naval" 
should Be substituted for "military" whenever used.) 

7. (Same as Article 10, with ''naval" substituted for "military.") 

8. (Same as Article 11, with "naval" substituted for "military.") 

9. (Same as Article 12.) 

7th Year of the Chinese Republic, 5th Month, 19th day; 
7th Year of the Japanese Ta Cheng, 5th Month, 19th day. 
Signed by: 

Chairman of Delegates (Chung Chiang) Shen Shen-k'un; 
Delegates: (Shao Chiang) Wu Chen-nan; 
Delegates: (Shao Chiang) Ch'en-En-tae ; 

(Chung Hsiao) Wu Kung-tsung; 
Chairman of Delegates: 

(Shao Chiang) Chi T'ien Tseng Tz'u Liang; 
Delegates : 

(Tao Tso) I Chi Yuan Chun; 

(Tao Tso) Hua Shan K'o Yeh. 

EXPLANATORY NOTES REGARDING THE NAVAL 

AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL ACTION AGAINST 

THE ENEMY 



(SignedMay 19, 1918) 

The navies of the two countries of China and Japan, looking to- 
ward the accomplishment of their mutual efforts in the War, in 
order mutually to carry out their purpose as outlined in Article 1, 
are agreed to render each other mutual assistance in the hope that 
these military efforts may be fully accomplished. 

II 

Article 5 of the Agreement is explained as follows: 
The term "deputies" used in Clause (a) of Article 5 of the Naval 
Agreement is defined as naval attaches of each Legation, and naval 
officers stationed in other places, and others to be mutually ap- 
pointed in case of necessity. 

In Clause (c) of Article 5 the term "necessary supplies" shall 
be defined as "metallic articles." "Necessary military articles" 
shall be defined as "combustibles, provisions, ammunition such as 
are required in military operations." They shall be supplied by 
each country according to its power. 



APPENDICES 425 

With reference to Clause (e) of Article 5 charts are to be sup- 
plied upon the request of either country. 

In a place within which military operations are taking place, 
should it be found necessary by both sides to make surveys and 
soundings of any bays, such surveys and soundings shall be done by 
the naval authorities of the country in which the bays are situated. 

(Signatures same as on Naval Agreement.) 



APPENDIX D 

MEMORIAL OF THE "BLACK DRAGON" (JAPANESE) 
SOCIETY CONCERNING JAPAN'S POLICY IN CHINA 

The Chinese Question and the Defensive Alliance 

It is a very important matter of policy whether the Japanese 
Government, in obedience to its divine mission shall solve the Chi- 
nese question in a heroic manner hy making China voluntarily rely 
upon Japan or hy forcing her to a position where she is obliged 
to rely upon Japan. To force China to such a position there is 
nothing else for the Imperial Japanese Government to do but to 
take advantage of the present opportunity to seize the reins of 
political and financial poiver and to enter by all means into a de- 
fensive alliance with her under secret terms as enumerated below: 

The Secret Terms of the Defensive Alliance 

The Imperial Japanese Government, with due respect for the 
sovereignty and integrity of China, and with the object and hope of 
maintaining the peace of the far East, undertakes to share the re- 
sponsibility of cooperating with China to guard her against internal 
trouble and foreign invasion, and China shall accord to Japan 
special facilities in the matter of China's national defense, or the 
protection of Japan's special rights and privileges, and for these 
objects the following treaty of alliance is entered into between the 
two contracting parties : 

1. When there is internal trouble in China or when she is at war 
with another nation or nations, Japan shall send her army to render 
assistance, to assume the responsibility of guarding Chinese terri- 
tory, and to maintain peace and order in China. 

2. China agrees to recognize Japan's privileged position in South 
Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, and to cede the sovereign rights of 
these regions to Japan to enable her to carry out a scheme of local 
defense on a permanent basis. 

3. After the Japanese occupation of Kiaochou, Japan shall acquire 
all the rights and privileges hitherto enjoyed by the Germans in 
regard to railways, mines, and all other interests, and after peace 
and order is restored in Tsingtao, the place shall be handed back to 
China to be opened as an international treaty port. 

426 



APPENDICES 427 

4. For the maritime defense of China and Japan, China shall 
lease strategic harbors along the coast of the Fukien Province to 
Japan to be converted into naval bases, and grant to Japan in the 
said province all railway and mining rights. 

5. For the reorganization of the Chinese army, China shall en- 
trust the training and drilling of the army to Japan. 

6. For the unification of China's firearms and munitions of war, 
China shall adopt firearms of Japanese pattern, and at the same time 
establish arsenals (with the help of Japan) in different strategic 
points. 

7. With the object of creating and maintaining a« Chinese Navy, 
China shall entrust the training of her navy to Japan, 

8. With the object of reorganizing her finances and improving 
the methods of taxation, China shall entrust the work to Japan, and 
the latter shall elect competent financial experts who shall act as first 
class advisors to the Chinese Government. 

9. China shall engage Japanese educational experts as educational 
advisors, and extensively establish schools in different parts of the 
country to teach Japanese, so as to raise the educational standard 
of the country. 

10. China shall first consult with and obtain the consent of Japan 
before she can enter into an agreement with another power for mak- 
ing loans, the leasing of territory, or the cession of the same. 

From the date of the signing of this defensive alliance, Japan and 
China shall work together hand-in-hand. Japan will assume the 
responsibility of safeguarding Chinese territory and maintaining 
the peace and order in China. This will relieve China of all future 
anxieties and enable her to proceed energetically with her reforms, 
and, with a sense of territorial security, she may wait for her na- 
tional development and regeneration. Even after the present 
European War is over and peace is restored China will absolutely 
have nothing to fear in the future of having pressure brought 
against her by the foreign powers. It is only thus that permanent 
peace can be secured in the far East. 

But before concluding this defensive alliance, two points must first 
be ascertained and settled. (1) Its bearing on the Chinese Govern- 
ment. (2) Its bearing on those Powers having intimate relations 
with and great interests in China, 

In considering its effect on the Chinese Government, Japan must 
try to foresee whether the position of China's present ruler Yuan 
Shih K'ai, shall he permanent or not; whether the present Govern- 
ment's policy will enjjiy the confidence of a large section of the 
Chinese people; whether Yuan Shih K'ai will readily agree to the 



428 APPENDICES 

Japanese Government's proposal to enter into a treaty of alliance 
with us. These are points to which we are bound to give a thorough 
consideration. Judging by the attitude hitherto adopted by Yuan 
Shih K'ai, we know he has always resorted to the policy of ex- 
pediency in his diplomatic dealings, and although he may outwardly 
show a friendliness toward us, he will in fact rely upon the in- 
fluence of the different Powers as the easiest cheek against us, and 
refuse to accede to our demands. Take for a single instance, his 
conduct toward us since the Imperial Government declared war 
against Germany, and his action will then be clear to all. Whether 
we can rely upon the ordinary friendly methods of diplomacy to 
gain our object or not, it does not require much wisdom to decide. 
After the gigantic struggle in Europe is over, leaving aside Amer- 
ica which will not press for advantages, China will not be able to 
obtain any loans from the other Powers. With a depleted treasury, 
without means to pay the officials and the army, with local bandits 
inciting the poverty-stricken populace to trouble, with the revolu- 
tionists waiting for opportunities to rise, should an insurrection 
actually occur while no outside assistance can be rendered to quell 
it, we are certain it will be impossible for Yuan Shih K'ai, single- 
handed, to restore order and consolidate the country. The result 
will be that the nation will be cut up into many parts beyond all 
hope of remedy. That this state of affairs will come is not difficult 
to foresee. When this occurs, shall we uphold Yuan's Government 
and assist him to suppress the internal insurrection with the cer- 
tain assurance that we could influence him to agree to our demands, 
or shall we help the revolutionists to achieve a success and realize 
our object through them? This question must be definitely decided 
upon this very moment, so that we may put it into practical ex- 
ecution. If we do not look into the future fate of China, but go 
blindly to uphold Yuan's Government, to enter into a defensive al- 
liance with China, hoping thus to secure a complete realization of 
our object by assisting him to suppress the revolutionists, it is ob- 
viously a wrong policy. Why? Because the majority of the Chi- 
nese people have lost all faith in the tottering Yuan Shih K'ai, who 
is discredited and attacked by the whole nation for having sold his 
country. If Japan gives Yuan the support, his Government, 
though in a very precarious state, may possibly avoid destruction. 
Yuan Shih K'ai belongs to that school of politicians who are fond 
of employing craftiness and cunning. He may be friendly to us 
for a time, but he will certainly abandon us and again befriend the 
other Powers when the European War is at an end. Judging by 
bis past, we have no doubt as to what he will do in the future. For 



APPENDICES 429 

Japan to ignore the general sentiment of the Chinese people and 
support Yuan Shih K'ai with the hope that we can settle with him 
the Chinese question, is a blunder indeed. Therefore, in order to 
secure the permanent peace of the far East, instead of supporting 
a Chinese Government which can neither be long continued in power 
nor assist in the attainment of our object, we should rather sup- 
port the 400,000,000 Chinese people to renovate their corrupt Gov- 
ernment, to change its present form, to maintain peace and order 
in the land, and to usher into China a new era of prosperity, so that 
China and Japan may in fact as well as in name be brought into 
the most intimate and vital relations with each other. China's era 
of prosperity is based on a Chino-Japanese alliance, and this 
alliance is the fundamental power for the repelling of the foreign 
aggression that is to be directed against the far East at the con- 
clusion of the European War. This alliance is also the foundation 
stone of the peace of the world. Japan therefore should take this 
as the last warning and immediately solve this question. Since 
the Imperial Japanese Government has considered it imperative 
to support the Chinese people, we should induce the Chinese revolu- 
tionists, the Imperialists, and other Chinese malcontents to create 
trouble all over China. The whole country will be thrown into dis- 
order and Yuan's Government will consequently be overthrown. 
We shall then select a man from amongst the most influential and 
most noted of the 400,000,000 of Chinese and help him to organize 
a new form of government and to consolidate the whole country. 
In the meantime our army must assist in the restoration of peace and 
order in the country, and in the protection of the lives and proper- 
ties of the people, so that they may gladly tender their allegiance 
to the new Government which will then naturally confide in and rely 
upon Japan. It is after the accomplishment of only these things 
that we shall without difficulty gain our object by the conclusion of 
a defensive alliance with China. 

For us to incite the Chinese revolutionists and malcontents to rise 
in China, we consider the present to be the most opportune moment. 
The reason why these men cannot now carry on an active campaign 
is because they are insufficiently provided Avith funds. If the Im- 
perial Government can take advantage of this fact to make them a 
loan and instruct them to rise simultaneously, great commotion and 
disorder will surely prevail all over China. We can then intervene 
and easily adjust matters. 

The progress of the European War warns Japan with greater 
urgency of the imperative necessity of solving this most vital of 
questions. The Imperial Government cannot be considered as em- 



430 APPENDICES 

barking on a rash project. This opportunity will not repeat itself 
for our benefit. We must avail ourselves of this chance and under 
no circumstances to hesitate. Why should we wait for the span- 
taneoiis uprising of the revolutionists and malcontent sf Why 
should we not think out and lay down a plan beforehand? When 
we examine into the form of government in China, we must ask 
whether the existing Bepublic is well suited to the national tempera- 
ment and well adapted to the thoughts and aspirations of the Chinese 
people. From the time the Republic of China was established up 
to the present moment, if what it has passed through is to be com- 
pared to what it ought to be in the matter of administration and 
unification, we find disappointment everywhere. Even the revolu- 
tionists themselves, the very ones who first advocated the republican 
form of government, acknowledge that they have made a mistake. 
The retention of the republican form of government in China will 
be a great future obstacle in the way of a Chino- Japanese alliance. 
And why must it be so? Because, in a republic the fundamental 
principles of government as well as the social and moral aims of 
the people are distinctly different from that of a constitutional 
monarchy. Their laws and administration also confiiet. If Japan 
acts as a guide to China and China models herself after Japan, it 
will only then be possible for the two nations to solve by mutual 
effort the far East question without differences and disagreements. 
Therefore to start from the foundation for the purpose of recon- 
structing the Chinese Government, of establishing a Chino-Japanese 
alliance, of mamtaining the permanent peace of the far East, and 
of realizing the consummation of Japan's Imperial policy, we must 
take advantage of the present opportunity to alter China's repub- 
lican form of government into a constitutional monarchy which 
shall necessarily be identical, in all its details, to the constitutional 
monarchy of Japan, and to no other. This is really the key and 
first principle to be firmly held for the actual reconstruction of the 
form of government in China. If China changes her republican 
form of government to that of a constitutional monarchy, shall we, 
in the selection of a new ruler, restore the Emperor Hsuan T'ung 
to his throne, or choose the most capable man from the monarchists, 
or select the most worthy member from among the revolutionists? 
We think, however, that it is advisable at present to leave this 
question to the exigency of the future when the matter is brought 
up for decision. But we must not lose sight of the fact that to act- 
ually put into execution this policy of a Chino-Japanese alliance 
and the transformation of the Republic of China into a constitu-: 



APPENDICES 431 

tionol monarchy is, in reality, the fundamental principle to he 
adopted for the reconstruction of China. 

"We shall now consider the bearing of this defensive alliance on 
the other Powers. Needless to say, Japan and China will in no way 
impair the rights and interests already acquired by the Powers. 
At this moment it is of paramount importance for Japan to come 
to a special understanding with Russia to define our respective 
spheres of influence in Manchuria and Mongolia so that the two 
countries may cooperate with each other in the future. This means 
that Japan, after the acquisition of sovereign rights in South Man- 
churia and Inner Mongolia, will work together with Russia after 
her acquisition of sovereign rights in North Manchuria and Outer 
Mongolia, to maintain the status quo, and endeavor by every effort 
to protect the peace of the far East. Russia, since the outbreak of 
the European War, has not only laid aside all ill feelings against 
Japan, but has adopted the same attitude as her allies and shown 
warm friendship for us. No matter how we regard the Manehurian 
and Mongolian questions in the future, she is anxious that we find 
some way of settlement. Therefore we need not doubt but that 
Russia, in her attitude toward this Chinese question, will be able 
to come to an understanding with us for mutual cooperation. 

The British sphere of influence and interest in China is centered 
in Tibet and the Yangtze Vallej'. Therefore if Japan can come 
to some satisfactory arrangement with China in regard to Tibet 
and also give certain privileges to Great Britain in the Yangtze 
Valley, with an assurance to protect those privileges, no matter 
how powerful Great Britain might be, she will surely not oppose 
Japan's policy in regard to this Chinese question. Wliile this pres- 
ent European War is going on, Great Britain has even asked Japan 
to render her assistance. That her strength will certainly not enable 
her to oppose us in the future need not be doubted in the least. 

Since Great Britain and Russia will not oppose Japan's policy 
toward China, it can readily be seen what attitude France will adopt 
in regard to the subject. What Japan must now reckon with is 
America. But America in her attitude toward us regarding our 
policy toward China has already declared the principle of maintain- 
ing China's territorial integrity and equal opportunity, and will be 
satisfied if we do. not impair America's already acquired rights and 
privileges. We think America will also have no cause for com- 
plaint. Nevertheless, America has in the East a naval force which 
can be fairly relied upon, though not sufficiently strong to be feared. 
Therefore in Japan's attitude toward America there is nothing really 
for us to be afraid of. 



APPENDIX E 

EXTRACTS FROM "A MEMORIAL FOR THE ADVANCE- 
MENT OF GERMAN INTERESTS IN CHINA ISSUED BY 
THE GERMAN ASSOCIATION OF SHANGHAI." 

Table of Contents. 

I. The Chinese Market. 

1 — China's charge of front. 

2 — Possibilities in China's economic development. 
3 — The importance of the Chinese Market. 
4 — The fight for the Chinese Market. 

(a) Natural advantages of our opponents. 

(b) Achievements of our opponents, 
(e) Aid of the Schools. 

(d) Gradual loss of German influence. 

(e) Our mistakes. 

(f) Our prospects. 

II. Measures, to win the Chinese Market. 

1 — Diplomatic and Consular service. 

2 — Finance. 

3 — The German Language. 

4 — A German Chinese School System. 

(a) Middle schools. 

(aa) Middle schools in open ports. 

(bb) Mission middle schools. 

(cc) Point of contact with Chinese elementary schools. 

(dd) Development (of certain schools to the grade of the 
"Arbiturium" e. g. graduation from German Gym- 
nasium). 

(ee) Number of scholars. 

(ff) Classes for teachers. 

(gg) Schools for girls. 

(b) Technical schools. 

432 



APPENDICES 433 

5 — Students to Germany. 

6 — Chinese Government schools. 

(a) The German language in Chinese government schools. 

(b) German teachers in Chinese Government schools. 
7 — General remarks. 

8 — A translation Bureau. 
9 — Museums and Industrial expositions. 
10 — The Chinese Press. 

III. Organisation and Cost. 

1 — Organization. 

(a) A head office in Berlin. 

(b) A central Committee in China, 
(e) Promotes. 

(d) Private nature (of the enterprise). 

(e) Centralization in Leadership. Decentralization in the 
work. 

2— Costs. 

(a) Amount. 

(b) Method of securing. 

IV. Closing remarks. 

1 — The German Merchant in China and his trade. 
2 — The last opportunity. 

Appendix 

1 — Germany's export and import trade with China 1900-1911. 

2 — Development of German trade with China 1900-1911. 

3 — China's imports from Germany, England, America and Japan 
1905-1911 with percentage of each. 

4 — German exports to China 1908-1910 grouped by classes of 
articles. 

5 — Possibilities for developing German trade. 

6 — Export trade of Hankow. 

7 — Antecedents of the higher Chinese officials of the Central Gov- 
ernment and of the Pi'ovinces. 

8 — Cost of the technical schools. 

9 — Cost of the Museums and Industrial expositions. 
10 — Irritating article regarding Germany from the "Eastern En- 
gineering News." — 

Of special interest and importance to us as missionaries are the 



434 APPENDICES 

paragraphs dealing with education. (At times I shall translate, at 

other times summarize.) 

After speaking of the national advantages of Germany's Chief 
Competitors (England, the United States and they say that in a 
very special degree England, the United States and even Japan, 
have during the past ten years been carrying on ''School and Cul- 
ture politics." They have spent countless millions (of marks) in 
these endeavors. Bands of Missionaries and of teachers have in- 
vaded the Country. China is flooded with English and American 
school books. Educational specialists from America travel sys- 
tematically through China and acquaint the Chinese with the won- 
ders of Modern science as seen through American eyes. The Chi- 
nese Press is to a large degree under the influence of our opponents. 
The English language is to become obligatory in Chinese govern- 
ment schools above the lower elementary grade. Most striking is the 
comparison of the German with the British and American schools 
in China. The figures mentioned are: 

For Protestant Missions: 

Lower Schools Middle and High Schools. 

Schools Scholars Schools Scholars 

English 1445 32303 241 7552 

American 1992 44354 286 23040 

German 164 4862 15 523 

As if this were not enough, England, and America have gathered 
ten Million Marks more for Universities in Shantung, Hankow and 
Hongkong. 

For Catholic Missions. 

Lower Middle and High 

Schools Scholars Schools Scholars 

6877 1263-5 157 6545 

A further advantage of America is that 500 Chinese students 
must yearly be sent to American Universities on the Boxer indemn- 
ity fund. England and America can advance their political ends 
by Culture and Schools, on this liberal scale becai;se they have ap- 
parently boundless wealth to draw upon, and because the idealism 
of their Missionaries and teachers is founded not less on patriotism 
than on religion. 

The paper goes on to say that during the last ten years there 
has been a noticeable loss in German influence; that ten years ago 



APPENDICES 435 

there was still a chance to extend the German language alongside 
of English; but that Germany had done nothing to stop the 
triumphal march of the English language. There is, however, still 
a chance of stopping it. 

Under "Our prospects" it is said the English language has not 
yet spread so far that Germany cannot hope to catch up with it. 
Our diplomacy ought to be able to assure the German language of 
that place in the Chinese Government schools that is its due, and 
to increase again German influence with the Chinese Government. 
By a better quality of schools Germany can make up for the quan- 
tity of English-American schools. The thoroughness of German 
methods of work is known to the Chinese, and is witnessed to by 
the flocking of students to the college in Tsingtau and to the 
medical and technical schools in Shanghai, that are this year (1913) 
three or four times as large as last year. Moreover, China will 
learn to understand more and more, that besides the United States 
Germany is the only one of the great powers that does not follow 
a political policy that looks to the annexation of Chinese territory. 

Measures to Gain Control op the Chinese Market. 

After speaking of the need of reorganization of the diplomatic 
and consular service, and a more liberal financial policy on the part 
of Germany the paper turns to the question of the German language. 
Under this heading it is said : 

"The important matter in attaining our goal of capturing the 
Chinese Market for German Industry, lies in the question whether 
or not we are determined to take up the fight against the dominance 
of the English language. One may think what one will about the 
general truth of the saying that 'trade follows language;' but the 
truth of the statement regarding China has already been sufficiently 
proved. Germany can, therefore, not delay in spreading the Ger- 
man language and German culture in influential Chinese circles. 
Only so can the caricature of Germany, which thanks to the lack 
of scrupulousness of our competitors, has become firmly fixed in 
the minds of the Chinese, be destroyed and place be made for the 
view that Germany needs to stand behind no one in the world, but, 
is called to play a leading part in the life of the world. 

"The situation is not yet one in which our endeavors need to be 
looked on as without a prospect of success. It is true that the 
English language has a decided advantage, but the dominance of 
the English is, in comparison with the greatness of the Chinese na- 
tion only in the elementary schools, and can still be overcome by 



436 APPENDICES 

timely opposition measures. The prospects favorable to the spread 
of the German language lie chiefly that Germany is recognized by 
all as the language of science, and therefore seems to be destined 
rather than other languages to furnish China with the means for 
completing her internal organization. It is true that there is no 
immediate prospects of our securing a number of teachers and 
scholars, equal to those of England and America, for organizations 
of this kind are not procurable on demand ; but up to a certain de- 
gree we are in a position, by an education of better quality to 
equalize the advantage gained by the larger quantity of the schools 
of our opponents. The strength of English and American schools 
has thus far consisted more in the number than in the quality of 
the culture given. Moreover, these schools have wasted much val- 
uable energy by drawing without distinction from all classes of 
society. We would confine ourselves to those circles which are 
destined to play a leading part, namely to the upper strata of the 
intellectual and commercial classes, and to take into our field of 
endeavor only those provinces, on which depend the future economic 
development of the country, and which produce the strongest men 
both in intelligence and character. In this we can overcome, at 
least in part, the quantitative advantages of our opponents. From 
this point of view the following ten provinces would be those prob- 
ably to be dealt with: Chili, Shantung, Shansi, Hunan, Hupeh, 
Szechuen Kiangsu, Chekiang, Yunnan and Kwangtung. 

We should formally as far as it accords with our aim fall in line 
with the general plan, curricula, and regulations of the Chinese 
government schools, so as to smooth the way for recognition by 
the Chinese Government. 

There follows an outline of a German School System for China 
and the cost of maintaining the same. 

Expenses 
Initial Annual 

1. Nine Middle Schools in Treaty Ports. . . .$ 380,000 $ 162,000 
(Shankhai, Hankow, Tientsin, Tsinanfu, 

Canton, Nanking, Chungking, Changsha, 
Peking) 

2. Thirty-five Mission Middle Schools 1,050,000 420,000 

(in case the Missions will fall in with the 

general plan) 

3. Subsidy to ninety Elementary schools in 

cities (that would teach German) 20,250 

4. Subsidy to 350 Elementarv schools in the 

country ". 35,000 



APPENDICES 437 

Expenses 
Initial Annual 

5. Extra expenses to develop to college grade 
C'Arbiturium") three of the Middle 

schools $ 30^000 

6. Extra expenses for normal education of 

teachers (in three centers) 30,000 

7. Schools for girls 25,000 

8. Five technical school $ 900,000 270,000 

9 Maintaining 300 students in Germany and 

10 traveling to and fro each year 235,000 

10. Teachers in Chinese Schools 150,000 

11. Translation Bureau 40,000 70,000 

12. Eight Museums and Industrial exposi- 
tions 144,000 80,000 

13. Traveling Lecture Ships 40,000 

14. Press 150,000 

15. Organization, Head Office, Office in 

China, Promoters 50,000 



$2,514,000 $1,769,250 

Proposed Means for Securing the Monet 

The difficulty of raising this money is not minimized, but it is 
thought to contain no unsurmountable difficulties. 

Two plans are proposed. 

Either the formation of an "Auslands Kultur Verein" which 
should seek to secure small stibscriptions from a very large number 
of members throughout German, or failing the successful launch- 
ing of such an organization the reliance on Government action. It 
is suggested that a portion of the annual payment of ten million 
marks to Germany from the Boxer Indemnity could be devoted to 
this end. 

The reason for desiring to work through the Missions in estab- 
lishing Middle and Elementary schools is that this course is neces- 
sitated by the fact that only missionaries can reside and carry on 
work in the interior away from the treaty ports. The paper says: 
"Only in their outward form should they be really Mission Schools, 
in their inner organizations they could be something between a 
mission school and another kind of school." Professional teachers 
will be necessary and they will divide the work in a suitable way 
with the missionaries. Moreover, these schools would have to stand 



438 APPENDICES 

in a special relation to the Mission, as they would be under a spe- 
cial organization with its school inspector, and also because the re- 
ligious element would be of secondary importance to the national. 
If participation in the religious instruction is made obligatory it is 
to be feared that just those classes of society, upon which we lay 
special emphasis, will not send their children to these schools. 
From the purely religious point of view the standpoint here put 
forward may seem somewhat questionable, but from our point of 
view it does not make so much difference, to gain new adherents to 
the Christian Church, but, much more to develop strong moral per- 
sonalities. 

We recognize that in asking the missions to take this concep- 
tion of their work we are requiring them to make a sacrifice, but on 
the other hand, the American and British Missionaries go con- 
siderably farther than this in placing national before religious 
ends, going at times so far that the Commercial point of view 
stands in the foregromid; and on the other hand our German mis- 
sionaries recognize their duties to propagate German national 
ideas. Moreover, the Missionaries, without doing violence to their 
calling, could take part in the system of schools herein proposed, 
inasmuch as an objective education which emphasizes above all a 
thorough moral instruction, prepares the way for Christian teach- 
ing. 

Thus the Y. M. C. A. admit many non- Christians to their mem- 
bership. Fortunately also the Catholic Mission in Shantung and 
several of the Protestant Missions do not make the participation 
of their scholars in religious instruction a sine qua non of admis- 
sion to their schools. We should give up our existing prejudices 
against the Missions. It has been a serious mistake that we have 
thus far co-operated so little with them. On no account can we 
dispense with the Capital of idealism developed in Missionary 
circles." 

Speaking of the German language in Government schools it is 
said that one must start from the premise that foreign schools in 
China, as in Japan, are only temporary in their nature and will 
before long be forced out by the Chinese Government or be taken 
over by it. If the German Schools are developed into Model in- 
stitutions, as is planned, could count on their being taken over in 
a reasonable time by the Chinese. "But we shall be able to reap the 
fruit of our Endeavoi-s only if we take care NOW that the Ger- 
man language is accorded the same place in Government schools 
as the English language. Otherwise, as soon as our direct con- 
trol of the institutions founded by us, ceases, we shall have to see 



APPENDICES 439 

England and America reap where we have sowed. The question 
of how we can at the present time assure to the German language 
that place in Chinese government schools, which belongs to it, ap- 
pears to us to be of the utmost importance, and of at least equal 
significance with the development of our whole German Chinese 
school system. Our diplomacy should, therefore, leave no means 
untried, to put through our endeavors in this domain. It is very 
evident, what all of this means for us. With one blow would be 
secured to the German language a determining influence, if we 
could in this way gain a foothold in China's widely branching 
school system set about this is really a political question, that 
cannot be judged from here, but it can be seen with certainty, that 
we could meet the Chinese in many other fields, if we could only 
gain success here. 

In this matter too much is at stake for us to be satisfied with 
Compromises. Whoever thinks that anything of value has really 
been gained with the recently promulgated school regulations, in ac- 
cordance with which German is to be made the leading language 
in the Medical Schools and of equal importance with English in 
the technical schools and in Agriculture and Forestry, shows that 
he is not sufficiently acquainted with the situation. Such conces- 
sions are easy to make on paper, but are of no real significance 
in practice. So long as English is made the only obligatory 
language in the middle schools, the scholars will study German only 
in exceptional cases. Of what value is it then to us, that in the 
universities or technical schools German is taught in certain 
branches, when there is a lack of scholars, adequately prepared in 
this language. The heart of the question lies in the fight for the 
Middle schools. WTiat must be gained is that the German Lan- 
guage be given an equal place with English as obligatory in mid- 
dle and technical schools, in colleges and normal schools. We 
think we can ignore the Elementary schools in which the students 
remain only untU the 11th. year. 

Under the head of the Chinese Press, after speaking of the 
Anti-German tone of other papers, and commending for its good 
work the "Hsieh Ho Pao" a German paper published in Chinese, 
the pamphlet advocates that a telegraphic service be established 
to some twenty places in the interior of China and counteract 
the influence of Reuter's service. 

Under the "concluding remarks" it is said: "Once more, and 
probably for the last time is the opportunity afforded us to take 
a hand in the course of events. If advantage is not taken now, 
England, America and Japan will obtain such a lead that we may 



440 APPENDICES 

as well give up the competition. To call attention to tlie serious- 
ness of the situation, and to the heavy dangers, which the situation 
offers for Germany is the object of this pamphlet. To work with 
small and insufficient means is valueless and means only waste of 
time, strength and money. It is very plain that we have the choice 
of only two alternatives, either to look at the Chinese market as a 
lost position, where Germany, like to a state of second rank, can 
carry on a limited trade through the medium of the English lan- 
guage, or else we must put forth our strength to the utmost, main- 
tain a "School and propaganda politic" on a large scale, and so 
safeguard for ourselves a part in China's economic development in 
keeping with our importance and the demands of our own future." 

German Association: 

C. MiCHELAu Rod. Mahnfeld 

Chairman Secretary. 

Shanghia, April, 191^. 



APPENDIX F 

COLLECTION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE 

RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT PUBLISHED BY THE 

RULING SENATE 

9 January 1915 No. 10 First Part 

Index: 

69 Regarding the igreement of the treatment of the British 

Subjects dealing in the Zone of the Chinese-Eastern Rail- 
way, as per Municipal Orders and Obligations. 

His Majesty's Rescript for the Ruling Senate by the 
ministry of Justice. 

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has informed the Minister of 
Justice, that regarding His Majesty's Rescript of the 12th Nov- 
ember 1914, our minister in Peking has an exchange of Notes 20 
November/9 December with the minister of Great Britain, regard- 
ing the Agreement worked out at Harbin for the treatment of 
British Subjects dealing in the Zone of the Chinese-Eastern Rail- 
way as per Municipal Orders and Obligations. 

According to it the Minister of Justice has offered to the Ruling 
Senate for the publication of the copies of the Notes with the 
Text of the Harbin Agreement (Our Note in Russian and French 
languages and the Note of Great Britain in English and Russian). 

The Note of the minister of Great Britain at Peking to the Rus- 
sian minister in the same town, dated 20 November/9 December 
1914. 

Sir and dear Colleague, 

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the British 
Majesty's Government have had under consideration the draft 
Agreement recently negotiated and signed in English and Russian 
languages on the 17/30_ April 1914 by the British Consul at Har- 
bin and the local Russian Authorities respecting the inclusion of 
British Subjects and their property within the scheme of the 

441 



442 APPENDICES 

Municipal Administration and Taxation established in the Zone of 
the Chinese-Eastern Railway. 

I have now received instructions from Sir E. Grey stating that 
His Majesty's the Great Britain Government approved this Agree- 
ment. I therefore have the honour to inform you that as soon 
as I learn that the Imperial Russian Government on their part 
have approved this Agreement I will undertake the necessary steps 
to enforce its regulations upon the British subjects concerned in 
same, beginning from the 1st January next. 

(This Agreement was made applicable to British subjects by 
"King's Regulations" (No. 20 of 1914) published by the British 
Minister at Peking, December 5th 1914.) 

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency 
the assurance of my highest consideration. 

(signed) J. N. Jordan, 

The Note of the Russian minister at Peking to the minister of 
Great Britain in the same town, dated 20 November/9 Decem- 
ber 1914. 

Sir Ambassador and dear Colleague, 

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency of the receipt in 
due course of your Note of even date in which you have informed 
me, that the Government of Great Britain has approved the pro- 
ject of Agreement, which recently was worked out in Russian and 
English languages and signed at Harbin 17/30 April a. e. by the 
local Authorities and British Consul in said town, respecting the 
inclusion of British Subjects and their property within the scheme 
of the Municipal Administration and Taxation established in the 
Zone of the Chinese-Eastern Railway. At the same time you have 
informed me that your Government will undertake the necessary 
measures in view to facilitate the enforcement of the regulations 
of the present Agreement upon the British Subjects interested in 
same, beginning from January 1st next, as soon as you will re- 
ceive from me the information that the Imperial Russian Govern- 
ment has confirmed said Act. 

Taking into consideration this infonnation, I have the honour 
to inform you, that I am entitled by the Imperial Russian Gov- 
ernment to inform Your Excellency that the same has likewise 
confirmed the said project of Agreement. 

Please accept. Sir Ambassador and dear Colleague, my best con- 
sideration and respect. 

(signed) B. Kroupenskt. 



APPENDICES 443 



AGREEMENT 

Between the Russian and British Governments respecting the 
inclusion of British subjects within the scheme of Municipal Ad- 
ministration and Taxation established in the area of the Chinese- 
Eastern Railway. 

Article 1. 

The Imperial Russian Government having declared that all 
taxes and dues collected in the Railway Settlement at Harbin and 
in other Settlements situated in the area of the Chinese-Eastern 
Railway shall be exclusively devoted to municipal and public pur- 
poses for the common benefit of the inhabitants of these places, 
His Britannic Majesty's Government agrees to the payment by 
British Subjects residing in the Railway Settlement at Harbin 
and in other Settlements situated in the area of the Chinese East- 
ern Railway of the same dues and taxes, whether levied in money 
or in kind, which are paid by Russian Subjects. His Britannic 
Majesty's Government further agrees that the payment of the said 
dues and taxes and the observance of the local Regulations and 
Byelaws, of which a list is hereunto annexed, shall be made ob- 
ligatory upon the aforesaid British Subjects from 1 January 1915, 
and, in like manner, undertakes to make binding upon British Sub- 
jects from the day upon which they take effect for Russian Sub- 
jects anj^ additional or amended Regulations and Byelaws of a 
similar kind, provided that due notice of their intended introduc- 
tion is given and that nothing is contained therein which conflicts 
with the extra territorial rights of British Subjects. It is agreed 
that the length of such notice shall in the ease of new or amended 
Regulations be two months and in that of new or amended Bye- 
laws two weeks. 

Article 11 

In consideration of the foregoing, British Subjects residing in 
the Railway Settlement at Harbin and in other Settlements sit- 
uated in the area of the Chinese Eastern Railway shall have the 
active and passive right of election to the local Municipal Ad- 
ministrations, both those now existing and those hereafter es- 
tablished, and shall exercise this right, like Russian Subjects, in 
accordance with the 'Stipulations of the local Municipal Regula- 
tions. At Harbin, also, there shall be introduced into the Muni- 



444 APPENDICES 

cipal Council consisting, in all, of six members, the term of whose 
ofl&ce is three years, a representative of the foreign (non-Russian) 
community who shall be a foreign (non-Russian) resident of 
good standing, the manner of whose election shall be as follows: 
The resident representatives, having full Consular jurisdiction, of 
those Foreign Powers exclusive of Russia who have obliged their 
nationals to pay taxes and observe the local Regulations and Bye- 
laws in accordance with the stipulations to this Agreement shall — 
in consultation amongst themselves, the opinion of the majority 
to prevail — prepare and present in good time to the Manager of 
the Chinese Eastern Railway for transmission to the Municipal 
Council a list containing the names of not less than three and not 
more than five persons from amongst whom the Assembly of Dele- 
gates shall elect by an ordinary majority vote — lots to be cast in 
case of even ballot — the representative in the Municipal Council 
of the foreign (non-Russian) community. The election of this 
Councillor shall be simultaneous with that of other members of 
the Council and the term of his office shall be concurrent with 
theirs. Should he resign or be dismissed before the expiration of 
this period, the Assembly of Delegates shall at the ordinary meet- 
ing occurring next after the preparation by the aforesaid Consular 
representatives of a new list, elect in the manner before stated, 
another member to serve for the remainder of the current term. 
The dismissal before his period of service has expired of a mem- 
ber of the Council elected in the method above described shall not 
be effected except with the consent of a majority of the Consular 
representatives aforesaid. 

The member of the foreign community for the present triennial 
period shall be elected in the manner before stated at a supple- 
mentary election which shall be held not later than two weeks 
after the presentation to the Manager of the Chinese Eastern Rail- 
way by the Consular representatives of the prescribed list of 
names. 

Article III 

British Subjects residing in the Railway Settlement at Harbin 
and in other Settlements situated in the area of the Chinese East- 
em Raihvay shall — as regards all matters of an economic char- 
acter, more especially such as relate to trade and industry and 
leases of land lots — enjoy the same rights and jirivileges as Rus- 
sian Subjects. This equality shall also avail should, in the future, 
the present restricted rights to land be at any time enlarged or 
should lessees of land lots or owners of houses be the recipients, 



APPENDICES 445 

oil the lapse or tennination of tlie Chinese Eastern Railway Com- 
pany's holding, of compensation of whatever kind. 

Article IV 

It is agreed that, should objections be raised by British Sub- 
jects regarding the amount of the assessment tax on commercial 
and industrial enterprises exploited hy them, their affidavits made 
before the British Consular Representative as to the size and char- 
acter of the said enterprises shall be accepted in definite proof. 

It is agreed, also, that permission shall not be given to British 
Subjects to open, establish or maintain hotels, boarding or eating 
houses, houses of entertainment or shops for the sale of liquors 
except on production of a permit issued for the purpose by the 
British Consulate. 

ArticijE V 

It is agreed that the Police Authorities in Harbin and in other 
Settlements situated in the area of the Chinese Eastern Railway 
shall give prompt effect to any requests preferred by the British 
Consular Representative for the adoption of coercive measures 
against British Subjects, but Officers of the force shall not, on 
their own initiative and in the absence of such requests, take any 
coercive action against British Subjects except in eases involving 
a breach of the peace. 

Article VI 

British Subjects shall be entitled to the benefit of any more 
favoured treatment which may be accorded by the Imperial Rus- 
sian Government to the Subjects or Citizens of other Foreign 
Powers resident in the Railway Settlement at Harbin or in other 
Settlements situated in the area of the Chinese Eastern Railway. 

Article VII 

The Imperial Russian Government undertakes that the Regula- 
tions and Byelaws, of which a list is hereunto annexed, shall be 
brought into accord with the stipulations of this Agreement by the 
date mentioned in Article I. 

We, the undersigned, hereby certify that the foregoing is the 
Draft Agreement conduded between us regarding the inclusion of 
British Subjects within the Scheme of Municipal Administration 



4t6 APPENDICES 

and Taxation established in the Area of the Chinese Ea«tem Rail- 
way. 

Harbin, April 17/30 1914. 
(Signed) : 

"W. Trautschold^ Imperial Russian Consul General. 

E. Daniel, Delegate of the Chinese Eastern Railway Adminis- 
tration. 

H. E. Sly, His Britannic Majesty's Consul. 



OUR NATION 
IN THE BUILDING 

By Helen Nicolay 

Author of The Book of American Wars, " etc. 

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STAKES OF THE WAR 

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